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Cover picture: Poster, 'Women of Britain say - "Go!" ', May 1915, United Kingdom, poster No. 75 by Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, artist E J Keale, restored by Adam Cuerden. 

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EDITORIAL*

The articles and research notes in this issue reflect some of the key aims of the Journal – to draw on new military history approaches that are both innovative and interdisciplinary. However, we are concerned, as we have been previously, about the lack of women authors other than as reviewers of books. Going forward, we have implemented a more active approach to increase the number of submissions from women to ensure that the Journal reflects the diversity of those working on military history. We will be doing this in the coming months, and we hope the results will be seen in future issues.

Following the publication of an opinion piece in *Mars & Clio*, the British Commission for Military History's internal newsletter, which expressed highly questionable interpretations of history, we have been asked by members of the BCMH to clarify what the Journal's relationship is with *Mars & Clio*. Simply put, there is no relationship other than that both publications sit under the broad umbrella of the BCMH. Our roles, editors, and editorial teams are entirely separate. Crucially, the *BJMH* editors have complete editorial independence, guaranteed by the oversight of the independent Editorial Advisory Board. As regards remits, while *Mars & Clio* acts as a newsletter for Commission members, the *BJMH* publishes scholarly research from both academic and non-academic researchers on a broad definition of military history. A significant proportion of our published pieces come from people outside universities and/or without PhDs, however all display the same high standard of intellectual rigour with arguments based on evidence from archives and elsewhere. Critically, the Journal does not publish unsubstantiated opinion pieces.

As the editors of a scholarly journal, we want to make clear that views expressed in *Mars & Clio* are not in any way reviewed or endorsed by the *BJMH*, though for anyone concerned about what *Mars & Clio* contains, it is worth noting that we have been assured by the BCMH that a firmer editorial process is now in place for the newsletter.

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Napoleonic Conscription in Indre-et-Loire 1798-1814

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ABSTRACT
Scholarship around Napoleonic conscription has often focused on the contest and resistance with which the state's quest to impose compulsory service was met, and has emphasised the broad means by which conscripts sought to avoid or evade military obligations. This article will focus on outlining the experience of conscription in the Napoleonic department of Indre-et-Loire and will argue that while open evasion was a clear challenge to the authority of the state, the largest numerical challenge to filling the ranks of the army came from those who complied with conscription legislation in order to seek legal exemptions.

Systematic military conscription was introduced in France by the *Loi Jourdan-Delbrel* of 1798. Replacing the more ad hoc system of Revolutionary *levées*, it was seen as an expedient to fill the army's ranks after six years of unceasing warfare, while ensuring that every man fulfilled his patriotic duty.[1] Over the next decade-and-a-half conscription would become the cornerstone of Napoleon's militarised state, and would provide the manpower to drive his conquests from Lisbon to Moscow. In theory, all Frenchmen aged twenty to twenty-five were placed in classes to be called up either when they reached the age of twenty, or when the state had exceptional need of their particular cohort. Each department was given a quota to fulfil, initially in whatever way the local administration saw fit, and later by a centrally mandated drawing of lots. Exemptions were granted to those unfit to withstand the 'rigours of war', married men, or those perceived to be in vital state service such as certain

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[1]Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, *Rapport Fait par Jourdan (de la Haute-Vienne), au Nom de la Commission Militaire, sur le Mode de Recrutement de l'Armée*, (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1798).

students, administrators or arms manufacturers.[2] All others were expected to serve. Yet despite this egalitarian idealism of service to the state, conscription was widely and heartily resented from the beginning. Popular antipathy was open, with men balloted to serve colloquially said to have drawn a '*mauvais numéro*', and with the departure of conscripts in some areas marked by semi-funerary ceremonies.[3] By the end of the Empire, conscription is usually understood as one of the key factors to explain the people's apparent indifference to the Napoleonic regime.

The tale of resistance and refusal is now generally familiar. Refractory conscripts and deserters – those who absconded and became fugitives rather than join or continue in the army – have been shown to have caused problems for administrators in all parts of the empire, but especially in those peripheral regions either outside France proper or traditionally far removed from the central power of Paris. Equally familiar is the state's inexorable response, with increased policing, pressure on families and communities, and ultimately the use of force in trying to recapture runaways. Perhaps less studied, however, is the less spectacular but equally important (in numerical terms, at least) phenomenon of legal conscription avoidance.

This article will show that while direct evasion was the most open challenge to the authority of the state, those seeking to avoid conscription through legal exemption (whether legitimately or fraudulently) provided the bigger challenge to getting men into the army. It will address this issue by examining the experience of conscription in a department that was, ostensibly at least, amongst those that were considered generally compliant in the matter of conscription: the department of Indre-et-Loire, situated in the north-west-centre of France, in the pre-revolutionary Touraine. Although the department suffered from significant issues in the early years of conscription – notably because of the troubles in the neighbouring Vendée and the inefficiencies of local administration – it became an apparently model department by the Empire's close. However, throughout the period significant numbers of young men from the department avoided service by obtaining legal exemptions through means fair or foul. Through examining this issue, this piece will enhance our understanding of the operation of conscription in the heartland of provincial France.

The collision of state and people has formed the basis of most studies of Napoleonic conscription. In an important intervention in 1986, Isser Woloch described conscription as 'the battleground, the ultimate contest of wills between individuals and local communities…and the distant and impersonal state', and called for a new

[2]Alain Pigeard, *La Conscription au Temps de Napoléon, 1798-1814,* (Paris: Bernard Gionvanangeli, 2003), pp. 50-58.
[3]Alan Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters: the Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 77.

examination of this important aspect of the Empire's history.[4] Two years later Alan Forrest answered that call with a monograph which also highlighted the breadth of contest inspired by forcible military recruitment: 'Over conscription, as over no other single issue, the interests of the state and the local community were seen to come into open conflict'.[5] More recently a number of local, national and international studies have enriched our understanding of conscription in France, the wider Empire, and other parts of Europe.[6] Most authors acknowledge the ultimate success of conscription – it did, after all, facilitate a decade of French domination over Europe, and even allowed Napoleon to replace the manpower losses of his catastrophic folly of 1812 and calamitous failure of 1813 – but contest and social cost have justifiably remained a primary focus. The challenge of conscription was, indeed, a major headache for Napoleonic administrators. For some Napoleonic officials conscription became a bellwether of support for the state, and by the end of the Empire there were those who took it as an article of faith that a good response to conscription equated to a well-disposed population.[7]

This equation certainly holds loosely true in some areas but, as several studies of conscription have shown, the effects of habitude and the adoption of a repertoire of coercive methods by the state served to erode non-compliance throughout the Empire, without necessarily breeding affection. Moreover, full conscription quotas often hid the continuation of relatively widespread individual resistance. Forrest drew attention to the myriad underhand means of avoidance that plagued the conscription process, placing them in a wider framework of resistance to the demands of the state, while Gavin Daly provided a valuable local case study of conscription fraud in the

[4]Isser Woloch, 'Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil Society', *Past and Present*, 111 (1986), p. 101.

[5]Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, p.viii. This work also appeared as *Déserteurs et Insoumis de la Révolution et l'Empire* (Perrin : Paris, 1988).

[6]These include: Alexander Grab, 'Army, State, and Society: Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802-1814)', *The Journal of Modern History*, 67, 1 (1995), pp. 25-54; Gavin Daly, 'Conscription and Corruption in Napoleonic France: the Case of Seine-Inférieure', *European Review of History*, 6, 2 (1999), pp. 181-97; Johan Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2000), pp. 342-79; Bernard Vandeplas, 'Le Problème de la Conscription dans la Première Moitié du XIX^{e} Siècle: un Refus de l'Identité Nationale? L'Exemple Cantalien', *AHRF*, 329 (2002), pp. 17-40; Louis Bergès, *Résister à la Conscription, 1798-1814: le Cas des Départements Aquitains* (Paris: Editions du CTHS, 2002); Donald Stoker, Frederick Schneid & Harold Blanton (ed.), *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: a Revolution in Military Affairs?* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[7]Archives Nationales (AN), F/1^{E}/53, Baron d'Alphonse to Minister of Interior, 17 May 1811.

department of Seine-Inférieure, demonstrating that this, rather than draft-dodging as traditionally understood, played a key role in allowing the department's inhabitants to avoid compulsory service.[8] Such quasi-legal avoidance also had the effect of causing the quota to be filled from a diminishing pool of eligible men, leading to frequent and sometimes violent local animosities.

While conscription drove a wedge between the sympathies of Frenchmen and Napoleon's government, it also drew them physically closer together. As Woloch and others have demonstrated, across the Empire conscription was responsible for bringing the attention of central authority into each commune and was responsible for a noticeable increase in policing and state control over people's lives.[9] A whole generation was faced with the prospect of service in the army, and the army was consequently brought to every village and family in the land. Conscription also demanded a rapid expansion of administrative control. It required not only lists of names and ages of all men in each department, but accurate knowledge of domicile and occupation, marriage and medical status, family and dependents. It was a massive bureaucratic undertaking that encompassed all manner of officials at central, departmental, and local level.

The department of Indre-et-Loire tended to follow national trends in matters of conscription. Although no department can be considered 'average', the Napoleonic Indre-et-Loire perhaps comes close. It was in many ways unremarkable, of medium size and population, with Tours (21,000 inhabitants) its major urban centre, and with no strong local identity to set it at odds with the wider 'nation'. Its military traditions were modest, and its response to Revolutionary calls to arms adequate but unexceptional.[10] Geographically, there were no mountain ranges, great forests or large areas of broken country that could easily conceal men on the run, although in 1800 the department contained approximately 3,000 hectares of woodland and was crossed by several placid river valleys, including the Loire and Cher.[11] It was far from any

[8]Gavin Daly, 'Conscription and Corruption in Napoleonic France: the Case of Seine-Inférieure', *European Review of History*, 6:2 (1999), pp. 181-97.

[9]Woloch, 'Napoleonic Conscription'; Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, pp. 187-237; Annie Crépin, 'De la Nation Armée au Service Militaire Obligatoire: la conscription au XIXe siècle: perspectives et méthodologie d'un champ historiographique', *AHRF*, 316 (1999), pp. 373-81.

[10]T. Massereau, *Recueil des Cahiers de Doléances des Baillages de Tours et de Loches* (Orléans: Imprimerie Moderne, 1918), passim for opinions on *milice*; Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, p. 22; Raymond Bailleul, *Les Tourangeaux de la Bastille à Waterloo: L'Indre-et-Loire de 1789 à 1815* (Joué-Lès-Tours: La Simarre, 1989), p. 145.

[11]Woloch, 'Napoleonic Conscription', p. 119; Bailleul, *Les Tourangeaux*, p. 263; *Annuaire du Département d'Indre-et-Loire pour l'An X de la République*, pp. 89-91.

frontier that could inspire a greater sense of duty to defend the country's borders, or that could conversely offer the seductive prospect of safety from conscription in foreign lands, as the Prefects of Haute-Garonne and l'Escaut complained at opposite ends of the Empire in 1804.[12] Economically, Indre-et-Loire was primarily agrarian, with only small-scale industry that had been in mild decline before the Revolution and suffered further with the insurrection in the west and, after 1806, the Continental Blockade.[13] Despite this, grain prices varied little from the national average under the Empire, and the department did not appear to suffer from more than average deprivation.[14] There was little to distinguish the department in terms of revolutionary (or reactionary) fervour, although the 1790s saw plenty of unrest which included virtually everything from local riots to banditry to pitched battles between republicans and royalists.[15] While a general state of lawlessness prevailed for much of the 1790s, the departmental administration maintained that poverty rather than politics was its root cause.[16] By the time Napoleon ascended his throne there was enough loyalism evident that the department did not seem oppositional to the regime, and enough dissent that it could avoid accusations of excessive affection. Prefectural reports consistently indicated an excellent *esprit public*.[17] It was, in short, a department distinguished mainly by its lack of distinguishing features.

The department's averageness extended to conscription. Indre-et-Loire was part of the north-west that, in Alain Pigeard's mildly underwhelmed assessment, '*fournit assez bien*', and the raw numbers do not indicate that it was a particularly problematic department.[18] The conscription quotas imposed upon Indre-et-Loire were never excessive, but the department consistently produced more recruits than the national

[12]Ernest d'Hauterive (ed.), *La Police Secrète du Premier Empire: Bulletins Quotidiens Adressés Par Fouché à L'Empereur* (5 Vols, Paris: Perrin & Librairie Historique Chavreuil, 1908-64), Vol. 1, p. 27 & p. 194.
[13]Bailleul, *Les Tourangeaux*, p. 289; Pierre Leveel, *Histoire de Touraine et d'Indre-et-Loire* (Chambray-Lès-Tours: CLD, 1988), p. 673.
[14]Brigitte Maillard, *Les Campagnes de Touraine au XVIII*^{ème} *Siècle* (Rennes: Presse Universitaire Rennes, 1998) p. 487.
[15]J.-P. Surrault & J. Feneant, *Jadis en Touraine, La Vie des Hommes du Grand Siècle à la Belle Epoque* (Chambray-Lès-Tours: CLD, 1988), p. 87; Bailleul, *Les Tourangeaux*; H. Faye, *La Révolution au Jour le Jour en Touraine 1789-1800* (Angers: Germain & G. Grassin, 1903) pp. 176-79.
[16]Bailleul, *Les Tourangeaux*, p. 255.
[17]Archives Départementales d'Indre-et-Loire (AD-IL), 1M141, Report from mayor of Tours, 22 July 1811; Jean Tulard (ed.), *Dictionnaire Napoléon* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p.916.
[18]Pigeard, *La Conscription*, p. 109.

average, and furnished men to both army and navy.[19] In his nationwide survey of conscription in 1808, A.A. Hargenvilliers gave a total of 4,872 men conscripted from Indre-et-Loire in the period up to Year XIII of the Republic, and calculated that this represented some 23 percent of *Tourangeaux* of conscription age.[20] The general trends of compliance and resistance tended to follow wider national trends, as like many areas Indre-et-Loire saw a gradual but steady improvement in recruitment. The earlier years were most problematic. Between Years VII and XIII, that is before the state had perfected the art of coercion, an average of 77 percent of conscripted men reported to their units; a reasonable return perhaps, given the wider national picture, but still indicative of fairly widespread evasion.[21] In Brumaire Year IX, Jean-Gérard Lacuée wrote to Prefect Jean-Robert Graham to sympathise with the difficulty of his task, but pointed out that 408 conscripts were still missing from the classes up to Year VIII, and a total of 1622 men remained to be furnished by the department.[22] Recruitment improved by Year XII, with Indre-et-Loire fulfilling its entire quota for the Prairial and Messidor call-ups, but large numbers of men still continued to evade the state's demands.[23] In Year XIII, the prefect was urged to make examples that would impose themselves on '*l'esprit de résistance*' to conscription found in the department.[24]

As Consulate became Empire, and as the Empire began to hone its instruments of administration and coercion, incidents of draft-dodging diminished. Only 39 *réfractaires* were reported in 1807, down from 117 the previous year.[25] In general during the Empire Indre-et-Loire could be counted on to provide over 80 percent of its quota, with most years seeing over 90 percent compliance rates.[26] By 1813 Indre-et-Loire was almost a model department. It provided a full quota for the *Levée des 100,000*, with only one man (who was already in prison) reported as failing to make his way to the army. In December Prefect Joseph-François-René Kergariou was congratulated by the Minister of the Interior for swiftly providing 973 out of 1000 conscripts required by October's *Levée des 120,000*, an achievement rewarded by a demand for an

[19]Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, pp. 40-41; A.A. Hargenvilliers, *Compte Générale de la Conscription* (Paris: Sirey, 1937), pp. 130-31; AD-IL, 1R31, Senatus-Consulte, relative à la conscription, 1808 and 1809; Bailleul, *Les Tourangeaux*, p. 159.
[20]Hargenvilliers, *Compte Générale*, pp. 54-55.
[21]Ibid., p. 131.
[22]AD-IL, 1R29, Lacuée to Prefect, 5 Brumaire an IX.
[23]AD-IL, 1R30, Berthier to Prefect, 6 Nivôse an XII.
[24]AD-IL, 1M138, Conseiller d'Etat Chargé du 1er Arrondissement de la Police Générale to Prefect, 13 Nivôse an XIII.
[25]AD-IL, 2R92, Lacuée to Prefect, 2 June 1807, and reply 15 June 1807.
[26]Jean Delmas, *Histoire Militaire de la France de 1715 à 1871* (Paris: PUF, 1992), pp. 310-11.

additional 600 men.[27] In total for the classes of 1811-1813 only 22 *réfractaires* were reported. The Prefect was happy enough with his department's obedience by December 1813 to instruct that the *colonne mobile* – the mobile column of soldiers sweeping through several neighbouring departments in the hunt for draft-dodgers – was not needed in Indre-et-Loire.[28]

Problems with conscription were not uniform across the department. Differences existed between arrondissements and even between villages in the same canton. Certain problematic communes and cantons appear time and again in prefectural correspondence, and they became the focus of the state's attempts to clamp down on draft evasion. One example is the commune of Chouzé, in the wooded canton of Château-La-Vallière. After recording numerous cases of *réfractaires* and deserters, the prefect ordered the use of *garnisaires* – troops billeted in the houses and communities of *réfractaires* until they surrendered themselves – in April 1809, then again in November 1810, and the commune was finally visited by the *colonne mobile* in mid-1813.[29] This rural commune, along with others such as Tauxigny, Châteauroux and Bourgueil, proved particularly troublesome to the authorities. Urban areas also occasionally caused trouble. In Years VIII and IX Tours produced only 78 conscripts, poor even for these early years. In 1813, the cantons of Tours, Tours-nord and Tours-sud provided no fewer than 24 out of 47 *réfractaires* from the *levées des 80,000* and *des 100,000*.[30] However, these years seem to be exceptions. In Year X the Mayor of Tours, Aubry, was publicly praised for raising his full conscription quota, and this trend of urban compliance continued throughout the imperial years.[31]

These raw figures of conscripts and *réfractaires* do not, of course, tell the whole story. The fact that the department found enough men to fill its quotas does not necessarily indicate the absence of significant resistance to conscription. In 1812, for example, the city of Tours offered to fill their quota with all males over sixteen in the *Hospice Général*, in order to give the impression of being a compliant area.[32] Similarly, low

[27]AD-IL, 1R26, Prefect to Captain of Recruitment, 30 September 1813; 1R75, Minister of Interior to Prefect, 31 December 1813; 1R26 Prefect to Captain of Recruitment, 8 December 1813.
[28]AD-IL, 2R98, Prefect to Director-General of Conscription, 20 December 1813.
[29]AD-IL, 1R24, Prefect to Captain of Company of Reserve, 19 April 1809; 1R26, Prefect to Captain of Company of Reserve, 30 November 1810, and to Commander of *Colonne Mobile*, April 1813.
[30]Note: it is stated above that there were only 22 *réfractaires* for the classes 1811-13. The 47 *réfractaires* of 1813 were from earlier classes revisited by the levies of that year, and not from the class of 1813 itself.
[31]AD-IL, 1R30, letter to Aubry, 6 Frimaire an X.
[32]AD-IL, 1R25, Letter to Prefect, 6 August 1812.

compliance rates do not necessarily translate into widespread resistance to the state. The poorer figures for the early years can be partially explained by administrative confusion and incompetence, as the new conscription process threw up myriad administrative problems that took time to overcome. In Year VIII, for example, the subprefecture of Chinon failed to arrange conscription as they believed that the Vendéen troubles exempted them, and later the same year the sub-prefect of Loches had to request a list of potential conscripts for his arrondissement, as his own copy was so incomplete that he could not even organise the ballot.[33] In Year XI the departmental *Annuaire* tersely noted that the lists of all cantons in these early years contained '*conscrits morts ou absens depuis fort longtemps*'.[34] In Year XI Prefect François Pommereul had to write to sub-prefects and mayors to explain the difference between a deserter and a *réfractaire*, and later the same year he was driven to complain to the Minister of War about the inefficiency of his Captain of Recruitment, Bertrand, and succeeded in getting him replaced.[35] Although administration generally improved over the years, issues persisted throughout the period. In 1813, for example, 41 of the 51 men initially declared absent for the *levée des 100,000* were found to have valid excuses, ranging from already being in the army to living in another department, being married, being infirm and, in two cases, being dead.[36] In the same year, the mayor of Bourgueil still seemed uncertain of the basic difference between a *réfractaire* and a deserter.[37] Such administrative inefficiency is by no means the only explanation for weaker compliance figures in the early years, but it was certainly a contributory factor.

Another important factor in the department was the deliberately passive approach taken by many of the local officials whose zeal was required to enforce conscription. Village authorities were often reluctant to assist with the organisation of conscription, or with the rounding up of *réfractaires* and deserters. In 1806 the Minister of the Interior chided the Prefect that, '*Un grand nombre de ces fonctionnaires favorisent la désertion et la désobéissance aux loix en tolérant des réfractaires dans les communes et en leur donnant l'éveil lorsque la Gendarmerie se présente pour en faire la recherche*'.[38] Indeed, it could be hazardous for a mayor to side with the state against his neighbours. In 1807

[33]AD-IL, 1R29, Sub-Prefect of Loches to Prefect, 29 Messidor an VIII, and *Conseil de Chinon*, 14 Germinal an VIII.

[34]*Annuaire du Département d'Indre-et-Loire Pour l'An XI de la Républiqu*e, p.176. 'Conscripts who are dead or have been absent for a very long time.'

[35]AD-IL, 1R130, Minister of War to Prefect, 29 Fructidor an XI.

[36]AD-IL, 1R75.

[37]AD-IL, 2R96, mayor Bourgueil to Prefect, 14 April 1813.

[38]AD-IL, 1R23, Minister of Interior to Prefect, 1806. 'A large number of these functionaries encourage desertion and disobedience to laws by tolerating refractory conscripts in their communes and in giving them warning when the Gendarmerie comes looking for them.'

the mayor of Saint Aubin saw his commune turn on him after he denounced a *réfractaire* and after weeks of threats and menaces he was forced to give up his position.[39] Neighbourly relations were important in small communities, and the inaction of a *garde-champêtre* who drew the ire of the Captain of Gendarmes in 1808 for failing to arrest a neighbouring *réfractaire* is therefore eminently understandable.[40] Some officials even went to some trouble to hide conscripts, such as the mayor of Avon, who gave employment to local *réfractaires* in his vineyard while denying all knowledge of their whereabouts and even their existence when questioned.[41] Such collusion without doubt helped to encourage men to risk entering into a life on the run, but it became less prevalent as the state's coercive methods gained traction. The widespread use of *garnisaires* after 1808 helped to convince many officials of the advantages of cooperation, while the more brutal methods of the *colonne mobile* from 1811 helped to pacify the most recalcitrant communes.[42] An aversion to the presence of soldiers amongst the wider community could quickly lead to draft-dodgers becoming unwelcome guests in a village.[43] The deployment of *garnisons* to Benais and Bourgueil in April 1809, for example, led to the rapid surrender of no fewer than eighteen men from the two communes, while in 1811 a *garde-champêtre* in Ressigné was able to report the arrest of a previously elusive man within days of the arrival of a unit of *garnisaires*.[44] In the same year, a mayor threatened with a visit from the *colonne mobile* wrote to the prefect saying that he suddenly remembered the whereabouts of the wanted deserter and that a visit by *gendarmes* would suffice.[45] Such methods were hardly subtle, but they certainly bore fruit in discouraging the *Tourangeaux* from refractory behaviour.

The headline figures of conscripts and *réfractaires* in Indre-et-Loire nevertheless show a fairly familiar story of rejection of service gradually whittled down as the years went by. *Réfractaires* represented the most visible and tangible challenge to state authority and, in many instances, public order, and as elsewhere the authorities responded. The state's panoply of repressive measures was able to first eliminate bands of men on the run in the department, then to make life precarious for open deserters and *réfractaires*, and finally to put enough pressure on families and communities that evading the draft

[39]AD-IL, 1M135, Mayor of Saint Aubin to Prefect.
[40]AD-IL, 1M140, Captain of Gendarmes to Prefect, 4 July 1808.
[41]AD-IL, 1R23, Captain of Gendarmes to Prefect, 19 August 1807.
[42]AD-IL, 2R95, list of *garnisaires* used; 2R96, Ministry of War to Prefect, 4 July 1812; 1R26, Prefect to Commander Company of Reserve, 30 November 1810.
[43]AD-IL, 1R25, Mayor of Ressigné to Prefect, 24 November 1811; Sub-Prefect of Loches to Prefect concerning commune of Yzeures.
[44]AD-IL, 1R24, letters 16, 18 & 19 April 1809; 1R25, Mayor of Ressigné to Prefect, 9 December 1811.
[45]AD-IL, 1R25, Letter to Prefect concerning Martin Jean Marre, 11 June 1811.

became as unpalatable as serving. However, these figures offer little insight into the men who attempted to avoid service by other means. Indeed, only a small minority of would-be draft-dodgers took the active choice to become *réfractaire*, especially after about 1807. Most who attempted to avoid service sought legal exemptions, whether honestly or through fraud, that would allow them to remain in their homes without fear of the *gendarmes*.

The distinction between legal exemption and draft-dodging is of course not absolute. Some men tried to cover their evasion with a veneer of legality by fleeing the department on a passport issued by a friendly mayor, intending to return only when they had passed conscription age. Although these men were likely to be picked up elsewhere and counted as *réfractaires*, the problem became so widespread by 1807 that Prefect Paul Lambert was obliged to prohibit mayors from issuing passports.[46] Other conscripts were able to delay their departure through various subterfuges, from claiming illness to reporting to the mayor of their home commune having become 'lost' on the way to the depot, in the hope that they might be forgotten – a hope that was invariably disappointed.[47] Such ruses may have helped to mitigate any punishment once caught, but they did little to ensure that a young man could remain at large in peace. More certain legal means of avoiding service included buying a replacement, marriage, study or reserved occupation, and medical dispensation (*réforme*). It is these means of avoiding conscription that this article will now discuss. These exemptions allowed many unfit or eligible men to avoid service, but they also provided an avenue for thousands of others to try, with varying degrees of success, to remain out of uniform. As has been explored elsewhere, some of these avenues served primarily to allow men of wealth or connections to avoid service, leaving the greater weight of conscription to fall on the poor, but men of all ranks of society could access legal exemptions.[48] While by no means an open challenge to the state, such attempts provided a far wider numerical challenge to filling the ranks of army than simple draft-dodging. Despite the department's reputation for compliance, the routes to legal exemption were still well trodden by the men of Indre-et-Loire.

Aside from being one of the lucky men who drew a 'good number' and were able to satisfy the requirements of conscription without actually having to serve, the most direct avenue of exemption for an able-bodied man was the system of replacement or substitution. This allowed any man to avoid service provided that he paid the sum of 100 francs and found another to serve in his stead, and once the system was

[46]AD-IL, 1R23, Prefect to all mayors, 4 April 1807.
[47]AD-IL, 1R24; 1R26, *Conseil de recrutement* to mayor of Langeais, 20 April 1813; Prefect Aube to Prefect; letter to Captain of Gendarmes concerning Etienne Chatrefaux.
[48]Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, pp. 38-39.

reinstituted from Year VIII a number of *Tourangeaux* took this route.[49] Replacements generally had to be paid and could be bought in Year IX for as little as 300 francs, but as in the rest of France prices rose with demand and ran to several thousand by the end of the Empire, meaning that this avenue was effectively open only to the wealthiest.[50] However, even the liberal disbursement of funds did not guarantee exemption. Men whose replacement deserted were liable to be called upon to serve unless they found a second replacement, as conscripts Coutournier and Tonneau found to their cost in Years IX and X. In 1811 another man complained bitterly that he had paid twelve louis (240 francs) to an intermediary to find a replacement, only to be swindled out of the money and sent off the Burgos with the other conscripts.[51] These instances remained a minority, however, and replacement remained an important means of avoiding service for those with sufficient wealth.

If replacement was not a viable option, exemption could be gained by young men accepted into the colleges or academies of the Imperial University, or with positions in state service. Such an avenue would require the social and perhaps financial capital to secure a position, which somewhat limited the field of candidates, but there are examples in Indre-et-Loire's archives of exemptions granted for such reasons.[52] Exemptions were also made for men performing vital war work, such as Jacques Mégrettier of Saint Branchs, whose work in a powder mill allowed him to avoid service in 1814. However, while not as socially exclusive as educational exemptions, these skilled jobs also remained available only to very few.[53]

For the majority without wealth, connections or reserved occupations, the state allowed a limited number of loopholes, and these too proved popular with *Tourangeaux*. The state was known to look favourably on requests from sole breadwinners or brothers of serving conscripts to be granted *fin de dépôt* status, allowing them to be placed at the bottom of the list of those called to serve. This was not an exemption per se, but it did allow a number of men to avoid service on the front lines of the Empire.[54] Petitions for *fin de dépôt* in the department came from a

[49]See Woloch, 'Napoleonic Conscription', pp. 111-18 for the state's internal agonising over and various refinements to the system. *Code de la Conscription* (Paris: Rondonneau, 1805), p. 84; AD-IL, 1R29. Also 1R23 for Year VIII.
[50]AD-IL, 1R23, replacements Year IX; Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, pp. 58-59.
[51]AD-IL, 2R89 Mayor of Tours to Prefect 9 Thermidor an IX, letter to Tonneau 14 Frimaire an X; 1R25, *Affaire Gautier*.
[52]AD-IL, 1R26, Rector of Academie d'Angers to Prefect; Minister of War to Prefect, 23 October 1813.
[53]AD-IL, 1R27, manager of powder mill to Prefect, 25 January 1814; *Code de la Conscription*, p. 100.
[54]Pigeard, *La Conscription*, p.141.

wide range of men. Many claimed to be to sole support of dependents, such as François Doucet, a diamond cutter of Tours who cared for an elderly widow, Jean Martin of Bourgueil, who provided for his widowed mother and disabled younger brother, or François Garnaut from rural Candes-St-Martin, the sole support of two orphaned younger brothers.[55] Others pointed to the service already given by siblings; dozens of men appealed on the grounds that, as the only son not in uniform, they were crucial to the family's subsistence, while some families sought to protect the youngest son from the army by pointing out what they had already sacrificed.[56] The trend of applications for exemption on these grounds became more pronounced in the last years of the Empire, as Napoleon increasingly fell back on summoning men from older classes who had begun to acquire greater responsibilities. In the 1813 *levée des 100,000* of men in classes 1809-12, for example, 314 men were designated '*soutien famille*', which was more than could claim exemption on either marriage or medical grounds, and the largest single reason given in that call up for men avoiding service.[57]

The state-sanctioned systems of exemption, replacement and *fin de dépôt* all provided legal means of avoiding conscription, but were designed so as not to affect the flow of men into the army. Entries into educational institutions or state service could be controlled, as could those deemed to be in reserved occupations. The replacement system allowed some men to escape service, but only if others who were not otherwise liable to conscription joined in their place. The *fin de dépôt* regulations were perhaps uncharacteristically vague and left a surprising amount of latitude in the hands of local administrators, but they also did not provide definitive exemptions. Those granted *fin de dépôt* could still be called up to remedy a shortfall in numbers, and the status became less meaningful as the depots of the empire were emptied to meet the crisis of 1813-14. Far more difficult to control for the conscription authorities were the widespread demands for absolute exemption on grounds of marriage or ill health, or the illegal obtention of genuine discharge papers through fraudulent means.

The avenue most open to all men, although by no means the most taken, was exemption through marriage. Although the law initially exempted only men who were married, widowed, divorced, or fathers of families before 12 January 1798, in practice any married man could claim exemption.[58] While any man could legally marry, there were clear impediments to this route to exemption for the average twenty-year-old,

[55]AD-IL, 1R26, François Doucet to Prefect, May 1813; Mayor of Bourgueil to Prefect, 5 April 1813; petition from Mayor of Candes-St-Martin on behalf of François Garnaut.
[56]AD-IL, 1R25, Dame Liénard to Prefect, August 1812 (& passim).
[57]AD-IL, 1R75, 'Résultat Général des Opérations du Conseil de Recrutement…', 12 February 1813. This did not include medical dispensations granted at the initial call-ups in 1809-12, which still provided the greatest number of exemptions.
[58]Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, pp. 50-51; Pigeard, *La Conscription*, p. 140.

not least the need to find a suitable partner and the financial wherewithal to maintain an independent life. This exemption was therefore most used by men of older classes which were revisited for repeat call ups in the later years of the Empire. How many men married specifically to avoid conscription is unclear, although there are hints. Indre-et-Loire saw approximately 2,000 marriages annually 1804-12, which was slightly above the pre-Revolutionary average. In 1813, this figure more than doubled to 4,469, which was in line with a national trend that saw the marriages rise from 203,000 in 1811 to 387,000 in 1813.[59] The implication here is that while ordinarily relatively few men in Indre-et-Loire entered into marriages of convenience simply to avoid conscription, the mass call ups of 1813, which included men of earlier classes who had previously drawn a 'good number', prompted hundreds of men to seek the shelter of matrimony. As a tactic it was crude but generally effective, although Jennifer Heuer has pointed to the oft-overlooked consequences for those who found themselves trapped in such marriages for many years after the fear of conscription had faded.[60] The impact of marriage should not be overstated as even in 1813 it accounted for relatively few exemptions, with only 208 out of 1554 men brought before the Council of Recruitment for the *levée des 100,000* eligible for exemption on these grounds. However, in such an apparently compliant department as Indre-et-Loire, this still represented a greater challenge to filling conscription quotas than the lingering effects of open draft-dodging.

If marriage provided a numerically small but significant route to exemption, by far the most common way for a man to avoid service across the period was to gain a medical dispensation, known as a *réforme.* This would be granted to any man not reaching the basic height requirements (by the beginning of the Empire set at 4' 9" French, or 1.544m) or demonstrating an ailment that would render him unable to withstand the 'rigours of war'. A medical dispensation could involve some financial outlay, as all those who paid (or whose parents paid) 50 francs per year in direct tax were required to provide a replacement or to pay 300 francs for their *réforme*, although those classed as 'indigent' could be granted *réformes* without condition.[61] Temporary exemptions could also be granted to those who were deemed malnourished or physically underdeveloped for their age.[62] Across France approximate one in three men were

[59]AD-IL, 6M15-19. Archival returns of total marriages per year: An XIII- 2,349, 1806-2,135, 1807-1,966, 1808-2,217, 1809-2,083, 1810-2,296, 1811-2,239, 1812-2, 115, 1813- 4,469, 1814-2,290, 1815-1,954; Bailleul, *Les Tourangeaux*, pp.332-33.
[60]Jennifer Heuer, '«Réduit à Désirer la Mort d'une Femme qui Peut-être Lui A Sauvé la Vie»: la Conscription et les Liens du Mariage sous Napoléon', *AHRF*, 348 (April/June, 2007), pp. 25-40.
[61]*Code de la Conscription*, p. 84.
[62]AD-IL, 1R30, *Instruction de 11 Germinal an VII*, article 26.

judged to meet the criteria for medical exemption, but from the beginning far more men appealed to this route as a measure to avoid military service.

In Indre-et-Loire medical dispensation quickly became the most popular method of keeping oneself from the army. In Year VIII hundreds of men avoided service, at least temporarily, simply by applying for legal exemption, as the law stated that applicants did not have to leave for the army until their petition had been considered.[63] Across Years IX-XIII, *réformes* were granted to approximately 49 percent of conscripts in Indre-et-Loire, with Year XIII itself seeing well over half of men of conscription age exempted.[64] Not only this, but in Year XI the Ministry of War complained bitterly that almost half of the department's conscripts actually sent to the army claimed unfitness.[65]

In Year XI and again in 1807 the Director-General of Conscription wrote to the Prefect expressly to complain about the number of *réformes* being granted.[66] This is not necessarily a consequence of fraud; as Woloch pointed out, overzealous recruiting officers often applied too exacting standards to medical examinations, while Louis-René Villermé's research in the nineteenth century showed that areas such as Indre-et-Loire with lower than average height were also likely to have larger numbers of men with infirmities.[67] Yet the widespread granting of *réformes* indicates that many who appealed to this avenue of exemption might have been passed fit under other circumstances, and the facility with which *réformes* were obtained certainly seemed to encourage others to seek medical exemption. By 1808 the Minister of War complained to the Prefect that too many men with infirmities were volunteering for service in order to gain an early exemption, and in the hope that they would not have to pay the indemnity.[68] Following a crackdown in 1808-09, the number of dispensations issued in the department dipped somewhat, as did the percentage of men excused on grounds of infirmity rather than height.[69] Nevertheless, despite the increased medical scrutiny and the potential cost for those who could afford it, the option of gaining *réformé* status continued to appear attractive to unwilling conscripts until the end of the Empire.

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[63]AD-IL, 1R29 Letter from Agent de Conscription, 11 Thermidor an 8.
[64]Hargenvilliers, *Compte Générale*, pp.16-17 & pp.28-29.
[65]AD-IL, 1R30, Ministry of War to Prefect, 11 Pluviôse an XI.
[66]AD-IL, 1R30, letter to Prefect, 11 Pluviôse an XI; 1R23, Director-General of Conscription to Prefect, 1807.
[67]Woloch, 'Napoleonic Conscription', p. 105; Louis-René Villermé, 'Mémoire sur la Taille de l'Homme en France', https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k81420k. Accessed 10 February 2020, p. 377; also pp. 396-97, 'Tableau concernant les tailles des conscrits'.
[68]AD-IL 1R84, Minister of War to Prefect, 25 May 1808.
[69]AD-IL, 1R75, list of *réformés* classes 1807-1810.

So attractive was it, indeed, that it encouraged fraudulent practice from some men desperate to escape service. Echoing Daly's findings in Seine-Inférieure, it is clear that a degree of foul play was afoot in the Touraine, although its precise extent is difficult to determine.[70] Mayors or medical officers were known to offer certificates of epilepsy or attest to debilitating infirmities, and in some cases well-placed officials simply sold *réformes* to conscripts.[71] Other men forged certificates, attestations, or official signatures – in Year X, for example, Vincent Blanchard was arrested for forging his mayor's signature on a document attesting that he was above the upper age limit for conscription.[72] This frequently went undetected unless discovered by a vigilant Recruitment Council or unless the corrupt vendor was reported to the authorities, as was the case with surgeon Laurent Guerin, found guilty of defrauding a conscript in July 1811, or André Jou, a *cabaretier* from Tours who offered *réformes* for cash and then decamped with the money.[73] If falsified certificates failed to do the trick, sympathetic or corrupt medical practitioners could offer relatively painless but convincing injuries. So common was this in the early years that the Ministry of War issued new instructions on what counted as 'mutilation' for the purposes of medical exemption.[74] The Ministry also complained in Year VII of a drastic increase in the number of men performing self-mutilation to avoid military service.[75] Such action was illegal and occasional cases were prosecuted in Indre-et-Loire, including two men convicted of attempting self-mutilation to avoid service in 1812.[76] It is not known how many others may have succeeded with similar ploys. Other prosecutions focused on the facilitators, such as the 1813 case of M. Briard, a veterinary surgeon from Lerné arrested for offering his skills to young men to make them eligible for a *réforme*.[77] Although the full extent of the fraudulent practice cannot be determined, it is clear that it did exist in the department, just as it is clear that the use of medical exemptions had a major effect in shrinking the pool of eligible conscripts.

Fraud around medical *réformes* was just one of a number of ways of attempting to gain undeserved legal exemption. At the crudest level there are examples of conscripts masquerading as another who had been granted an exemption, such as 22-year-old

[70]Daly, 'Conscription and Corruption', p. 188.
[71]Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, pp. 44-48; AD-IL, 1R25, Affaire Bernadeau.
[72]AD-IL, 2R89, case of Vincent Blanchard, Year X.
[73]AD-IL, 1R25, judgement against Laurent Guerin, July 1811; 1R26, judgement against André Jou, 1 December 1812.
[74]AD-IL, 1R30, circulars from Ministry of War, 11 Germinal an VII and 27 Floréal an XI.
[75]Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, p. 137-38; Bailleul, *Les Tourangeaux*, p. 150.
[76]AD-IL, 1R25, Prefect to Captain of Recruitment, 7 March 1812.
[77]AD-IL, 1R26, Sub-Prefect of Chinon to Prefect, 4 February 1813.

Sylvan Persil from Villedour, who was arrested after presenting some inquisitive *gendarmes* with a certificate stolen from François Maudin, a 27-year-old, which stated that he was medically unfit for service.[78] More frequently, however, men would try to buy exemptions in their own name. There is plenty of evidence to suggest attempts at direct fraud, either in attempting to fix the ballot or bribing a recruiting officer, frequently through a middleman. These middlemen could be family or friends, minor local officials with access to those in more important positions, or simply men seeking to make a profit. This method was more fraught as not all recruiting officers were open to bribery, and not all those who took conscripts' money followed through on promises of exemption. It is again impossible to determine the extent of such practices, as the only real evidence for '*escroquerie*' comes from the records of prosecutions. These do, however, show a wide range of people involved in attempting to procure fraudulent exemptions for conscripts. In Year XII a man from Tours was imprisoned for selling false *congés*, and another, Charles Froissard, was prosecuted the following year for falsifying papers and signatures to exempt a man from service. In 1806 a Chinon man was prosecuted for taking 200 francs to ensure a young conscript a 'good number' at the ballot, while in 1813 a farmer from Tours-nord was imprisoned and fined for *escroquerie*.[79] The best documented case in the archives is that of a widow named Boutard, convicted in 1812 of trying to bribe the captain of recruitment to exempt her son and the sons of her friends.[80]

Public officials who were implicated in these frauds were occasionally dragged before the courts, and it is perhaps reasonable to surmise that the cases for which they were prosecuted were only the thin end of the wedge. In a case that eventually drew the attention of the Ministers of War and the Interior, conscription officer Sous-Lieutenant Joseph Gagnon and former Lieutenant Louis-François-Nicholas Laporte were convicted in 1812 of accepting money in exchange for exemptions.[81] They were caught after they took 70 louis (1400 francs) from the mother of a man who was later conscripted. The mother, Dame Robin, complained and implicated Gagnon, Laporte, and M. Gagneux, the mayor of Beaulieu, who had acted as middleman. The two officers were initially found not guilty by the Tribunal of Loches in 1811 but, after the intervention of the prefect, the Director-General of Conscription and the two ministers, a retrial was held and both men were imprisoned and fined. Nor were these the only recruiters to be prosecuted; in 1813 a recruiting sergeant was also imprisoned in the department for conscription fraud.[82] Unlike the scandal that erupted in Rouen

[78]AD-IL, 2R91, Captain of Gendarmes of Loir-et-Cher to Prefect, 14 Messidor an XII.
[79]AD-IL, 1U30, Reports from an XII and Germinal an XIII; 1U20, Report from Chinon 1806; 2R96 'contrôle des individus qui ont été condamnés pendant l'année 1813…'.
[80]AD-IL, 1R25, *Affaire Veuve Boutard.*
[81]AD-IL, 1R25, Dossier Laporte et Gagnon.
[82]AD-IL, 2R96 'contrôle des individus qui ont été condamnés pendant l'année 1813…'.

in 1812, outlined by Daly, the case of Laporte and Gagnon did not implicate either the captain of recruitment or any of the civilian administrators aside from the mayor of Beaulieu, although this is perhaps not evidence of administrative innocence.[83] While there is no proof that the prefects were anything but honest in their endeavours, other mayors were occasionally amenable to bribery. The mayors of Avon in 1807 and Saint Aubin in 1810, for example, were both jailed for accepting payments in exchange for procuring exemptions for conscripts.[84] Indeed, departmental records hint that low-level corruption was endemic in the department, albeit apparently affecting only a relatively small number of people.

The overall effect of these various methods of legal exemption was to present a significant challenge to the departmental authorities in fulfilling its conscription quota. Even while the prefects happily reported successes in their conscription efforts to Paris, the sheer number of legal exemptions heavily reduced the pool of men eligible to serve. Literally thousands of men avoided service due to ill-health, height, marriage, reserved occupations, replacement or being the main supporter of a family. Some of these exemptions were certainly fraudulent, but most were perfectly legal. Compared to the few hundreds of open draft-dodgers in the department, the legal avoidance of conscription provided a rather weightier mass of lost manpower. The state's crackdown on open draft evasion after 1806, combined with the improvements in administrative efficiency and the generally law-abiding nature of the *Tourangeaux*, meant that the departmental authorities were ultimately able to find sufficient men to pay Napoleon's blood tax, but there were few successful attempts to rein in legal exemptions. The tightening up of rules on medical dispensations and the lowering of height requirements brought the number of *réformés* down a little, while the very public prosecutions of fraud cases probably did some good. However, in general the state struggled to respond to the numbers of men applying for legal exemption, instead relying on the fact that departmental quotas were low enough to be fulfilled out of the remaining stock of manpower. As with elsewhere in France, this issue could cause significant rifts in communities where the families of serving conscripts felt that others were shirking their duty.

This article has demonstrated the extent of conscription evasion and avoidance in the Napoleonic department of Indre-et-Loire. As well as offering an insight into the operation of conscription in an individual department, the findings from the Indre-et-Loire show that the experience of conscription for most men was one of compliance rather than contest – even if they used that compliance to try legally to avoid service.

[83]Daly, *Conscription and Corruption*, pp. 191-92.
[84]AD-IL, 1R23, Captain of Gendarmes to Prefect, 19 August 1807; 1R24, Minister of Interior to Prefect.

In the headline figures of draft dodging, the department provides an almost text-book example of an area brought to heel by administrative efficiency, increasingly repressive state measures, and the effect of habitude over a decade-and-a-half of warfare. However, as has been shown, these figures disguise the continued widespread avoidance of conscription through replacement, petitioning for *fin de dépôt* status, medical exemptions, marriage, or outright fraud. Even in a supposedly model department, the authorities faced significant challenges in their attempts to fulfil Napoleon's increasingly excessive demands for manpower, and as the Empire progressed those challenges came increasingly from those claiming legal exemption. It is clear from this picture that the state's enforcement of conscription was largely effective in compelling men to take part in the process, but that the system itself left plenty of scope for individuals to escape from service. This largely supports the findings of Woloch, Forrest and those who followed in their footsteps, whose work has elaborated on the frictions between state and subjects caused by conscription. However, this article emphasises that unlike the more open route of draft-dodging or the brazen fraud that has been found elsewhere in the empire, the conscription avoidance of the men of Indre-et-Loire was not necessarily confrontational. Fraud certainly existed, and there were certainly those in the department whose interpretation of the law differed substantially from that of the officials who sought to enforce it, but for the most part the men who sought exemption did so perfectly legally. The majority of men who escaped conscription, even in the early years, were those whose medical, marital or material status allowed them to remain at home. By the end of the Empire, and especially with the call ups of earlier classes, over half of men liable for service could claim such status. Despite the attention paid to resistance and *réfractaires* across France, the prevalence of legal exemption was easily the biggest numerical challenge to filling the uniforms of Napoleon's armies.

Lord Kitchener's Appointment as Secretary of State for War in 1914

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ABSTRACT
Lord Kitchener was a popular choice as Britain's Secretary for War in 1914, but many facts about his selection are contested, including why he was recalled to London and who did most to urge the appointment. While some have argued that the decision was forced on the Liberal government by the Conservative opposition and the Press, this interpretation was dismissed as a 'silly figment' by the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith. This article provides a detailed consideration of the appointment, considers possible reasons for Asquith's action, seeks to resolve ambiguities in the evidence, but also raises doubts about widely-accepted details.

Introduction

Lord Kitchener was a popular choice when appointed Secretary of State for War by the Liberal Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, in 1914. True, the Field-Marshal had little recent knowledge of Britain, having spent several years in India before becoming Consul-General in Egypt in 1911, but he had planned successful campaigns, was physically courageous, had carried out a major reform of the Indian army and won a reputation for administrative efficiency. Yet, George Cassar, author of the fullest existing account of the appointment, admitted that the details of how it came about 'are not absolutely clear.'[1] The rapid pace of events in early August 1914 meant that many details went unrecorded, while later criticism of Kitchener's wartime role may have led some of those involved to avoid commenting on his appointment in their memoirs. Many facts are contested, from why Kitchener was recalled to London, to precisely when he was offered the War Office. It has been argued that Asquith initially intended to put his friend Lord Haldane in the post[2] and that 'Haldane was keen to

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[1]George Cassar, *Kitchener,* (London: Kimber, 1977), p. 176.

[2]Peter Simkins, *Kitchener's Army,* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 31.

keep Kitchener out of the Cabinet…'[3] One account believes Haldane was formally appointed Secretary for War, albeit for a few days.[4] Lord Beaverbrook, a Conservative M.P at the time, asserted that Kitchener's 'appointment was made in deference both to the overwhelming pressure of public opinion and of the Press, and to the views of the Opposition'[5], echoing Wickham Steed, foreign editor of *The Times*, who believed it 'was due in large measure to the public insistence of Lord Northcliffe', the newspaper's owner.[6] Yet, in stark contrast to these interpretations, Asquith later wrote, 'I had talked over the matter with… Haldane, who agreed… it was of the highest importance to persuade Kitchener to accept the seals of the War Office… The legend that his nomination was forced upon a… reluctant government by… the Press is… a silly figment.'[7] This article provides a detailed consideration of Kitchener's appointment, considers possible reasons for Asquith's choice, seeks to resolve the many ambiguities in the evidence, but also raises doubts about some widely-accepted details.

Kitchener Recalled

On 23 July 1914, the European situation become deeply worrying, when Austria-Hungary made humiliating demands on its neighbour Serbia following the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. It was soon evident Germany would back Austria, while Russia – allied to France and an entente partner of Britain – would support Serbia. In London, on 29 July, the Cabinet agreed that the so-called 'precautionary stage' for hostilities had arrived, which included orders for any officials who were on leave to return to their posts, Kitchener, at home since 23 June, among them.8 Much of the accepted story of how he was recalled to London, having already set out for Cairo, was provided by his Oriental Secretary, Ronald Storrs, whose memoirs form the basis of several accounts.9 There can be no doubt Storrs was a well-placed observer, since he continued to act as Secretary during Kitchener's visit home. Storrs' account also has local colour and drama, making it attractive to biographers. He says he was initially told that Kitchener and his party would sail on 3 August; but on 31 July,

[3]Trevor Royle, *The Kitchener Enigma,* (London: History Press, 1985), p. 230.
[4]C.E. Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Volume 1,* (London: Cassell, 1927), p. 157.
[5]Lord Beaverbrook, *Politicians and the War,* (London: Collins, 1960), p. 170.
[6]Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922, Volume II,* (London: Heinemann, 1924), p. 33.
[7]H. H. Asquith, *The Genesis of the War,* (London: Cassell, 1923), p. 219.
[8]Asquith to the King, 30 July, J.A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, *Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Volume II,* (London: Hutchinson, 1932), p. 81.
[9]George Cassar, *Kitchener's War,* (Washington: Potomac, 2004), p. 20; John Pollock, *Kitchener,* (London: Constable, 1998), pp. 372-3; Royle, *Enigma*, p 229. Brad Faught's *Kitchener: hero and anti-hero,* (London: Tauris, 2016), pp. 190-91, discusses the appointment only briefly.

Colonel Oswald Fitzgerald, Kitchener's Military Secretary, warned there might be delays. On 3 August, Storrs suddenly received a telegram saying Kitchener was, after all, departing on the 1 p.m. Channel crossing. Hastily leaving his parent's house in Rochester, Storrs reached Dover at 11.55:

> We… found the boat there and Kitchener striding alone up and down the deck. "Tell the Captain to start", he kept saying. I reminded him of the boat-train [due from London], but he fretted, dreading to be held back at the last moment in an advisory capacity... After fifteen difficult minutes the boat-train came in, bearing Fitzgerald, with a message from the Prime Minister instructing Kitchener to remain.[10]

Elements of Storrs' tale circulated before he published his memoirs. *The Standard* and *Daily Herald* were among newspapers which reported, on 4 August, that Kitchener 'motored from Broome Park [his country house near Canterbury] to Dover… and embarked on a Calais steamer…', while Lady Hamilton (wife of General Sir Ian Hamilton) wrote of him being 'dragged off his steamer on his way to Egypt.'[11] Like Storrs, the 1920 official biography said Kitchener, having travelled to Dover from Broome, urged the ferry captain to depart without awaiting the boat-train.[12] Yet, there are good reasons for judging Storrs' reminiscences to be unreliable. Even a cursory reading reveals inaccuracies in his account, including misdating the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by almost a month. Other details seem, at best, unlikely. Was Storrs really ignorant of the departure time until mere hours beforehand? Did Kitchener really expect the ferry to sail without awaiting the boat train? Storrs clearly manipulates evidence, not least to suggest Kitchener was reluctant to become Secretary for War: when explaining why the Field Marshal had to quit London early, he does not mention the 'precautionary period', but instead claims, vaguely, that Kitchener was 'anxious to avoid strange political adventures.'[13] Storrs' account also flies in the face of better, alternative evidence.

Kitchener's appointment diary is unhelpful at this point. It sketches his planned schedule following his recall to Egypt but was not updated to reflect actual events.[14] More useful is newspaper evidence that exposes the absurdity of Storrs' claim of uncertainty about the return date to Egypt. The date was public knowledge: on 2 August, for example, the *Daily Telegraph* reported the plans for Kitchener to begin his

[10]Ronald Storrs, *Orientations,* (London: Ivor Nicholson, 1937), pp. 143-46.
[11]King's College, London, 20/1/2, Lady Hamilton Diary, 5 August.
[12]George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener: Volume III,* (London: Macmillan, 1920), pp. 2-3.
[13]Storrs, *Orientations*, p. 145.
[14]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) PRO30/57/116, Kitchener's engagement diary.

journey on Monday, 3 August, travelling via Paris, Marseilles, then ship across the Mediterranean. On 4 August, the same newspaper recorded that, the previous day, Kitchener had arrived in Dover on 'the first boat-train from London… [and] embarked on the one o'clock boat for Calais when he was recalled by telegram…' This suggests that, rather than arriving from Broome and pestering the captain to depart before the boat-train arrived, Kitchener travelled from London on that very train. It also fits the evidence of newspaper editor J.A. Spender, who says his wife 'had seen Kitchener in the act of departing from Victoria Station.'[15]

The most telling evidence against Storrs comes from official records. A Foreign Office minute reveals that on 31 July it was agreed Kitchener and his party would leave for Paris on 3 August.[16] At 1.30 a.m. on 3 August, a message was sent to the British Embassy in Paris, saying a 'special train is now waiting at Calais for Lord Kitchener… He proposes to start from Victoria [station] 11 a.m Monday.' But at 11 a.m., the very time Kitchener was scheduled to leave, the Office sent another telegram to Paris stating, 'Kitchener's journey through France definitely abandoned as train is forbidden to leave.'[17] This confirms a report, in a late edition of *The Times* of 3 August, that Kitchener's departure was postponed because 'Events have moved so rapidly that his journey across France… is no longer practicable.' It added, 'A different route may be taken later in the week, unless, indeed, Lord Kitchener's services should be required in the meantime for purposes other than those originally intended.'

Rather than Kitchener reaching the ferry from Broome and bidding its captain to leave, then, the truth was more mundane: the 'precautionary period' was declared on 29 July; plans were fixed for Kitchener to leave England; his party left Victoria Station at 11, as planned, and arrived in time for the 1 p.m. crossing; but by then it was impossible to travel across France because, as one of Kitchener's friends noted, French authorities 'could not let his special train interfere with their mobilization.'[18] Biographers may have been misled into believing Storrs' account by the wording of a letter from Asquith to Kitchener later in the day, saying, 'I was very sorry to interrupt your journey to-day, and I fear caused you inconvenience. But with matters in their present critical position, I was anxious that you should not get beyond the reach of personal consultation and assistance.'[19] The apologetic wording raises the possibility, either that Asquith wished to prevent Kitchener going from Dover to Broome Park, or that Downing Street initially recalled him before being informed he would not, in

[15]J.A. Spender, *Life, Journalism and Politics, Volume II,* (London: Cassell, 1927), p. 62.
[16]TNA FO371/1968/35050, Clarke minute, draft telegram, 31 July; FO371/1968/35095, Bertie to Grey, 31 July.
[17]TNA FO371/1968/35571, undated draft telegrams 74 and 308.
[18]Leo Amery, *My Political Life, Vol. II,* (London, 1953), p. 22.
[19]TNA PRO30/57/76, Asquith to Kitchener, 3 August.

any case, be able to travel across France. So, it is important to ask why Asquith recalled him to London, including whether he was already seen as the next Secretary for War.

The Candidates

The post of Secretary for War has been described as 'practically vacant' in July 1914.[20] Asquith had himself taken it up following the resignation, on 31 March, of the incumbent, Jack Seely, during the Curragh incident, after he made promises to disaffected army officers that ought to have been referred to the Cabinet.[21] Since Asquith remained busy as Prime Minister, the arrangement caused problems at the War Office (WO). Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations, complained in April, 'Asquith sent word to say he would not be in War Office till next week, so all our superior work is at a standstill. He has done practically nothing since he has been S. of S….'[22] In June, *The Times*' military correspondent, Charles Repington visited the WO and learnt Asquith 'is rarely there, does nothing, and does it extremely well.'[23] Asquith later admitted, 'It was impossible for me, when war was once declared, any longer to combine the duties of the War Office with those of Prime Minister...'[24]

One possible solution was to recall Seely, who had a military background. In fact, he may have been offered it, though the evidence is ambiguous. 'Jack' Pease, the Education Minister, recorded a conversation on 2 August when Asquith 'told me he proposed to relieve himself of the position of War Minister (? Seely to be reinstated?)'[25] The two question marks suggest grave doubts about such a move, but Seely also later told Sir George Riddell, chair of the *News of the World*, that 'the Prime Minister had offered him one of the… seats in the Cabinet, which he had declined…'[26] One piece of evidence which speaks against Asquith having offered Seely the War Office, however, is his remark in a letter of 5 August that, in handing over the post, he wished to avoid 'a repetition of the Arch-Colonel fiasco', a reference to Seely's resignation over the Curragh incident[27] ('Arch-Colonel' being Asquith's nickname for Seely, which itself

[20]Reginald Esher, *The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener,* (London: John Murray, 1921), p.24.
[21]See Ian Beckett, *The Army and the Curragh Incident,* (London: Army Records Society, 1986).
[22]Callwell, *Wilson, Vol 1*, pp. 146-47.
[23]A.J.A. Morris, ed., *The Letters of Charles à Court Repington,* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999), 224.
[24]Asquith, *Genesis*, p. 219.
[25]K.M. Wilson, ed., 'The Cabinet Diary of J.A. Pease, 24 July-5 August 1914', *Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society*, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (1983), p. 9.
[26]*Lord Riddell's War Diary,* (London: Ivor Nicholson, 1933), pp. 9-10.
[27]Michael and Eleanor Brock, eds., *H.H. Asquith letters to Venetia Stanley,* (Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 157.

may have been a mocking reference to the fact that he insisted on being referred to as Colonel even though he only held this rank in the Yeomanry, not the regular army).

The other obvious candidate for the post was Haldane, already a highly successful Secretary for War in 1905-12 and creator of the Territorial Force of reserve troops[28], but now Lord Chancellor. Before war was declared, he was already involved in urging practical preparations on the Prime Minister. Haldane later recalled that, on 2 August, 'I said to the Prime Minister… he had better write a letter entrusting to me the business of going to the War Office and in his name mobilising my old organisation.' Asquith agreed, and Haldane arrived at the WO on 3 August, at 11 a.m. – just as Kitchener's staff left Victoria Station for Dover – to order mobilisation. Haldane adds that Asquith asked him, during the afternoon, 'to summon a War Council, and to select those who should attend.'[29] If Haldane's account is accurate, this request was only made *after* the decision to recall Kitchener to London, so he cannot have been recalled *in order* to attend the Council. But other sources suggest Asquith recalled Kitchener to London specifically so that he could be there,[30] an argument supported by the 3 August letter's emphasis on not allowing him to 'get beyond the reach of personal consultation and assistance.'

On 3 August, Asquith told his confidante Venetia Stanley, 'After tomorrow Haldane is going to help me every day at the WO and we have kept back Kitchener in case of need.'[31] The term 'help me' hardly suggests Haldane was about to be made Secretary for War on a permanent basis and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, may have misremembered when he wrote, 'Asquith's first thought was naturally to send Haldane back to the War Office.'[32] Then again, Haldane took his new duties seriously, informing his mother, on 4 August, 'I have taken over the War Office. I finish all my law cases today & from tomorrow devote myself to my old office although I remain [Lord] Chancellor.'[33] As to Kitchener, Haldane told his sister, 'There is much to be said for Asquith & myself handing over to Kitchener as War Secy. The public would be comforted, but I doubt whether the soldiers would. They know what they want and like working with me.'[34] Haldane was justified in believing he had support among the

[28]See Edward Spiers, *Haldane: an army reformer,* (Edinburgh University Press, 1984).
[29]Lord Haldane, *Autobiography,* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929), pp. 275-7.
[30]Spender and Asquith, *Asquith, II*, p. 105; Violet Bonham Carter, *Winston Churchill as I Knew Him,* (London: Collins, 1965), p. 316.
[31]Brocks, *Letters*, p. 148.
[32]Edward Grey, *Twenty-Five Years, Volume II,* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925), pp. 67-8.
[33]National Library of Scotland (hereinafter NLS) Richard Haldane papers, MS. 5992, letter to his mother, 4 August.
[34]Haldane papers, MS.6012, letter to sister, 4 August.

generals. Lord Nicholson, a former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, told him, 'I feel strongly that you ought to go back to the War Office, though you can ill be spared from your present high appointment…'[35] Douglas Haig, similarly wrote, 'I hear that you have returned to the War Office. I hope that you will stay there. There is no-one who can in this crisis do for us there what you can do.'[36] Later evidence suggests Haldane had plans to reform the WO: in 1917, he told Haig, 'If I had had my way, you would have taken the place at the head of a real great Headquarters Staff in London on the 4th August 1914. But with Kitchener, who knew nothing of these things, this was impossible.'[37]

Haldane's attitude towards Kitchener is a complicated question. His letter to his sister, mentioned above, suggests he saw himself as a better candidate than the Field Marshal. In a 31 July conversation, Haldane had already expressed doubts about any War Office role for Kitchener, although this was partly because Haldane felt the Field Marshal's services were still needed in Egypt.[38] A confused account in Lady Hamilton's diary even has Haldane saying, 'Rather than that he should be Secretary of State for War… I will take it on myself', treatment that supposedly left Kitchener 'raging and fuming.'[39] But, the official biography of Haldane – by another of his supporters among the military, Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice – reproduces a letter, evidently (from its opening remarks) written late on 3 August, telling Asquith:

> The proclamation goes out tomorrow and Wednesday is the first day of mobilisation... I am willing, if you wish it, to stay on in my old office, and some of my soldier friends have been urging this upon me. In my opinion you should make Kitchener your War Minister. He commands a degree of public confidence which no one else would bring to the post.[40]

Frustratingly, this letter is now missing from Haldane's private papers, but it is supported by another contemporary letter, which he wrote to his mother:

> I think myself that if… the Prime Minister were to resign and appoint Lord Kitchener public confidence would be increased, & I am going to recommend

[35]Haldane papers, MS.5910, Nicholson to Haldane, 3 August.
[36]Frederick Maurice, *Haldane, Vol. I,* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970), p.356.
[37]Robert Blake, ed., *The Private Letters of Douglas Haig* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), p. 188.
[38]British Library, Ashley MS. 5738, Edmund Gosse, 'What I saw and heard, July-August 1914'.
[39]Hamilton diary, 5 August.
[40]Maurice, *Haldane. Vol. I*, p.356.

> this. Whether it will be done I do not know, but I shall go on doing his work of War Minister till he comes, if he does come…[41]

This letter, however, is dated 5 August; so he may not have backed Kitchener quite as early as Maurice asserts. But in her diary, Elizabeth Haldane gave a plausible reason why her brother favoured Kitchener, saying, 'it required a soldier to override soldier's decisions & also K's appt. would carry great weight in the country.'[42]

In the days following Kitchener's appointment, Haldane continued to insist he had only intended to manage the WO for a short time: 'It was impossible to justify the Prime Minister remaining at the War Office & the Ld Chancellor doing his work in such a crisis. I saw that clearly &… pressed for Lord K. as the best change in the public interest & Asquith agreed.'[43] On 9 August, during an evening walk with Sir Almeric Fitzroy, Clerk to the Privy Council, 'Haldane said that his offers of assistance to Asquith at the War Office were limited to the outbreak of war, when he urged the appointment of Kitchener.'[44] Such evidence supports a later statement by Asquith, after newspapers accused Haldane of wanting the WO for himself in August 1914:

> There is not a word of truth in this silly story. I was myself at the time Secretary of State and Lord Haldane was good enough to assist me for a few days at the Office, to cope with the overwhelming pressure. He was from the first moment a strong advocate of Lord Kitchener's appointment.[45]

Important, previously overlooked evidence that Haldane only saw himself as a temporary stand-in at the WO, comes from an account left by the Librarian of the House of Lords, Edmund Gosse, who met him in the late afternoon of 3 August. Here Haldane told Gosse that Asquith *had* offered to make him Secretary for War; but Haldane had replied to the Prime Minister, 'No, I will go through the work… in your name, but you must continue for the present to be Minister for War. Later on you may wish to make changes, and perhaps have a soldier at the War Office…'[46] Despite indications, then, that Haldane believed himself competent to run the WO, strong evidence suggests he soon realised Kitchener was the better candidate. Also,

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[41]Haldane papers, MS.5992, letter to his mother, 5 August.
[42]NLS, Elizabeth Haldane papers, Mss.20240, diary, 8 August.
[43]Haldane papers, MS.5992, letter to his mother, 6 August.
[44]Almeric Fitzroy, *Memoirs, Vol. II,* (Hutchinson, 1925), 564; see also Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie eds., *The Diary of Beatrice Webb, Vol.3,* (London: Virago, 1984), p. 216.
[45]Asquith to Lincolnshire, 1 July 1915, in Maurice, *Haldane, Vol. II*, p. 6.
[46]Gosse, 'What I saw'.

significantly, and despite claims to the contrary in some sources, Asquith *never* promised Haldane the post on a permanent basis.

The Press

The idea of a Kitchener appointment was far from novel in 1914. The former Liberal premier, Lord Rosebery, had occasionally suggested Kitchener as Secretary for War.[47] The Field Marshal himself even mulled over the possibility. His friend Sir Henry Rawlinson relates that, around New Year 1910, Kitchener said he was doubtful about becoming Secretary of War unless he could act in a non-party capacity, with the support of the Opposition, and carry through reforms of his own choosing.[48] In the 1914 crisis, the issue was first publicly raised on 3 August, in *The Times*, where Charles Repington argued:

> the immediate nomination of a Secretary for War other than the Prime Minister, whose time is fully occupied with other important affairs, is indispensable in the interests of defence. Lord Kitchener is at home, and his selection for this onerous and important post would meet with warm public approval.

Repington, a former soldier, was a well-known and independent-minded figure. True, as the son of a Conservative MP, he had little liking for Liberal radicals, but he was no enemy of Haldane, praising the latter for supporting the Anglo-French *entente cordiale*.[49] According to Geoffrey Robinson who, as editor, approved the idea of Kitchener's appointment, it came to Repington on mere impulse.[50] Repington himself adds that, after he had recommended as the new Secretary for War, 'Lord K. sent Sir Henry Rawlinson to see me and find out what political game was behind my suggestion. I told him… I had made the suggestion in the public interest without any prompting from anybody.'[51] But this was not the first time Repington had recommended Kitchener, for whose abilities he had enormous respect. In *The Observer* in April 1910, he had said, 'Kitchener should be Secretary for War when Mr. Haldane terminates his great administration'.[52]

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[47]Lord Crewe, *Lord Rosebery, Volume II,* (London: John Murray, 1931), p.580.
[48]Frederick Maurice, *The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent,* (London: Cassell, 1928), pp. 95-96.
[49]Charles Repington, *The First World War, Volume 1,* (London: Constable, 1920), pp. 12 and 286.
[50]*The History of The Times, 1912-20,* (London: The Times, 1952), p. 217.
[51]Repington, *War, Vol.1*, p. 20.
[52]A.J.A. Morris, *Reporting the First World War,* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 42; *The Observer*, 24 April 1910.

Repington's proposal sparked a general movement around Fleet Street on 3 August. J. A. Spender, editor of the pro-government *Westminster Gazette*, later recalled a series of telephone calls from about 10 a.m.:

> One after another, different voices repeated the same tale – that Kitchener was going, that he must be stopped… the voices were those of brother editors… saying in unison that, if by evening it was found that Kitchener was gone, there would to-morrow be such an uproar against the government as had not been known in our time. I was begged to convey this to the proper quarter…

Spender wrote to his friend Reginald McKenna, the Home Secretary, who was in a Cabinet meeting, asking him to pass the word to Asquith. But Spender admits, 'what effect it had, if any, I don't know' and there is no evidence to suggest the Prime Minister acted on the message. As to events over the next few days, Spender insightfully adds, 'It was one thing to use Kitchener's services and *quite another to make him Secretary for War* [italics added], and I doubt very much whether this appointment would have been made but for the extraordinary agitation that was then rising against Haldane.'[53]

The campaign in the right-wing Press against Haldane only really became serious on 5 August, however. His official biographer felt the 'clamour' was 'led by the *Daily Express*.'[54] This newspaper's remark, 'This is no time for elderly lawyers with German sympathies to play at soldiers', was the most wounding point made against Haldane and more than one Kitchener biography quotes it.[55] *The Times* probably carried more weight than the down-market *Express*, however. Northcliffe 'ordered a sharp attack on Haldane…' and his staff carried out the instruction although, according to the newspaper's official history, 'the Editor regarded it with distaste.'[56] On the 5th, an editorial headed 'Lord Haldane or Lord Kitchener' made 'an emphatic protest' against the idea the former could be appointed, partly because Kitchener possessed 'the kind of genius which shines best in war', but also because Haldane had been 'constantly strenuous in his efforts to promote Anglo-German friendship' and his appointment 'might be seriously misconceived by France.' The *Daily Mail*, also owned by Northcliffe, was cruder, declaring 'The Nation calls for Lord Kitchener' and even asking, 'Is Lord Haldane delaying war preparations?'

Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to see a united Press campaign to this affect. Some newspapers preferred to focus positively, on support for the Field Marshal, rather than

[53]Spender, *Life*, pp. 62-63.
[54]Maurice, *Haldane, Vol. I*, p. 357.
[55]Cassar, *Kitchener*, p. 175; Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*, p. 31.
[56]*History of The Times, 1912-20*, p. 217; Reginald Pound and Geoffrey Harmsworth, *Northcliffe,* (London: Cassell, 1959), pp. 464-5.

negatively, on criticisms of Haldane. *The Globe*, for example, favoured Kitchener but felt, 'both men, in their own spheres, are extremely able. Let us make use of both.' And Haldane had his supporters among the Liberal-leaning Press. The *Manchester Guardian*, which thought Kitchener might be appointed commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to the continent, believed, 'no War Minister of modern times has more completely had the confidence of the army… than Lord Haldane', and it was 'natural' he should 'go in to assist the Prime Minister…' One leading provincial newspaper, the Liberal *Sheffield Independent*, even complained of a 'concerted effort to hustle Lord Kitchener into the office of Secretary for War', while the *Newcastle Journal* suggested a compromise might emerge, with Asquith remaining Secretary for War, Haldane in assistance and Kitchener having 'the practical direction of affairs at the War Office.' True, there was widespread satisfaction in the newspapers of 6 August, after Kitchener's appointment was announced. Even the *Manchester Guardian* said this would 'give the highest gratification to the mass of English people and to our allies on the Continent' But *The Times* felt compelled, now, to thank Haldane for 'the public service he undoubtedly rendered in organizing the Territorial Forces.'

The Opposition

Many Conservatives, too, backed Kitchener and some, at least, strongly opposed Haldane. As Beaverbrook noted, the party came to see Kitchener's appointment as 'largely forced on the Premier by the Tory agitation…'[57] A former Chief Whip, the Earl of Crawford, recorded on 4 August, that in the Carlton Club, 'Much fear is expressed lest Haldane may return to the War Office.'[58] Conservatives leaders discussed Kitchener early on 3 August, during a meeting between party leader Andrew Bonar Law, former premier Arthur Balfour, the Leader in the Lords, Lord Lansdowne, and former a Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain. Chamberlain's official biographer writes, 'Austen at this meeting… seems to have made the first suggestion that Lord Kitchener… might be appointed Secretary of State for War.' But Chamberlain himself throws this account into doubt on two key points. First, he says he got the idea from Sir Percy Girouard, a railway engineer who worked with Kitchener in the Boer War. Second, rather than specifically urging that he become Secretary for War, he only suggested the Field Marshal, 'might well be kept and used at the War Office.' Chamberlain adds that, after the meeting of Conservative leaders, 'Balfour sent an immediate note to Winston [Churchill], then at the Cabinet, asking if

[57]Beaverbrook, *Politicians*, pp. 170-71.

[58]John Vincent, ed., *The Crawford Papers: the journals of David Lindsay*, (Manchester: University Press, 1984), p. 340.

it had occurred to the Prime Minister that Kitchener might be more useful in organization at the War Office...'[59]

So, the Conservative leaders may *not* specifically have suggested Kitchener should be Secretary for War – merely that he would be 'useful' in some capacity at the War Office.[60] Furthermore, it is again unclear whether the Conservative message, sent via Churchill (acting as a conduit between government and opposition at this point), led Asquith to request Kitchener's return to London. The Conservative meeting only began at 11 and the decision to contact Churchill was evidently taken some afterwards, but Asquith was chairing a Cabinet meeting from 11 a.m. and had already, perhaps, received Spender's message about newspaper editors' views. It is also odd, given subsequent claims that they had done most to force Kitchener's appointment, that the Conservative leaders did not follow up their initial foray with any formal approach to Asquith. Balfour and Lansdowne had separate, lengthy meetings with Haldane on 4 August, but there is no indication in the very full records of these meetings that they even touched upon Kitchener's position.[61]

A group of Conservative backbenchers also supported the Field Marshal. One was Lord Lovat, a hero of the Boer War; another Leo Amery, the future Cabinet minister. Amery claims to have urged Lovat and a more prominent Conservative, Lord Milner, to see Kitchener on 4 August, where they found him in 'a thoroughly bewildered and disgruntled frame of mind', having been, 'literally hauled out of his cabin on the steamer' and given 'a note from Asquith to say that the Government would be glad of his advice, but with no other indication of any specific purpose for which he might be wanted.' Keen to force a decision, Milner and Lovat 'pushed him into a taxi… to tell Asquith that it was urgent that he should go back to Egypt at once unless the government had other work for him.'[62] Milner's diary provides a specific timeline for these events: he went to the Lords about 4.30, meeting Amery and Lovat in the lobby;

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[59]Austen Chamberlain, *Down the Years,* (London: Cassell, 1935), pp. 104-05; Birmingham University Library, Austen Chamberlain papers, AC14/2/5-6, Girouard to Chamberlain, and reply, 9-10 December 1929.

[60]But Lord Selborne, a former Cabinet minister, believed Balfour 'is trying to get Asquith to appoint K. Minister of War…'Bodleian Library, Oxford, Selborne Papers, Box 102, Lord to Lady Selborne, 4 August.

[61]Blanche Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour, Volume II, 1906-30,* (London: Hutchinson, undated) pp. 86-87; British Library, Bowood Papers, uncatalogued file, 'Various papers, 1912-19', memorandum, 4 August.

[62]Amery, *Political Life, II*, 22; and see Amery to Maxse, 14 May 1917, quoted in A.M. Gollin, *Proconsul in Politics: a study of Lord Milner,* (London: Anthony Blond, 1964), p. 241.

they then arranged to see Kitchener at 6.30, then persuaded him to see Asquith.[63] This dovetails with evidence from *The Times* of 5 August, which says Kitchener was seen visiting Downing Street between 7 and 8 p.m. the previous evening. But, as will become apparent below, Asquith may not have been surprised to see Kitchener at this point; Milner and Lovat may simply have persuaded him to attend a meeting which had already been arranged. Also, Kitchener cannot have spent long with the Prime Minister: *The Times* reports that he was only one of several important figures entering Downing Street around that time, including three Cabinet ministers – Colonial Secretary Lewis Harcourt, Grey and Churchill. The last also claims to have had an influence over Kitchener's appointment.

Churchill and Asquith

Churchill carried special weight on defence matters at this point. Not only was he First Lord of the Admiralty, but he had military experience, including fighting under Kitchener at Omdurman in 1898. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, remembered that, as the war began, with regard to 'military or naval movements… so far as there was any civilian consultation it was confined to the Prime Minister… Churchill, and occasionally Lord Haldane and Sir Edward Grey.'[64] Haldane says the First Lord 'was much with Kitchener as war approached and supported his appointment to the WO.'[65] On the morning of 3 August, Churchill, according to his official biographer (based on a contemporary note, which seems to have gone missing from the Churchill archive) saw Asquith and asked 'whether he would consider the appointment of Lord Kitchener.' Churchill added, 'I could see by Mr. Asquith's reception of my remarks that his mind was moving or had already moved along the same path.' But the comment that follows telescopes events and shows this note must have been written some time later: 'Action was taken the same day: the Field-Marshal was intercepted at Dover and invited to take office.'[66] Churchill makes no mention of pressure from the Press or the Conservatives. Yet, while he probably exaggerates his own role in events, he could well have had a strong influence on Asquith at this point, given that the latter had no military expertise of his own.

As Asquith recalled about his relationship with Kitchener:

> My… acquaintance with him before August, 1914 was very slight. His visits to England were rare... On one of my official visits to the Mediterranean [in 1912] he came over from Egypt to Malta… to confer with Mr. Churchill and myself...

[63]Bodleian Library, Ms. Milner, Dep.85, 1914 diary.
[64]David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs, Vol. I,* (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1933), p. 80.
[65]Haldane, *Autobiography*, pp. 278 and 281.
[66]Martin Gilbert, *Winston Churchill, Vol. III, 1914-16,* (London: Heinemann, 1971), p. 28.

> It was impossible not to be impressed with his striking and formidable personality…[67]

Following the Malta conference, Asquith told his wife, Margot, that Kitchener was 'the only soldier with brains since [Field Marshal Sir Garnet] Wolseley.'[68] The pair had crossed paths several times more recently. They met on 30 June and again, at lunch, on 31 July.[69] Margot Asquith knew Kitchener rather better and, according to his engagement diary, hosted him for meals on 1 and 21 July.[70] She later admitted, 'When he was appointed to the War Office in 1914, I was one of the few people who regretted it. I had known him from girlhood and, while recognising his charm, was aware of his limitations… he had neither the temperament nor the training for team work.' There are no indications, however, that she actively worked against the appointment.[71]

The Prime Minister may have delayed a decision about the future leadership of the War Office simply because he was extremely busy. Biographers of Kitchener have sometimes missed this obvious point. One writes that, for forty-eight hours after his return to London, 'a series of conferences was held as to how the country could best make use of his services', creating the impression ministers had little else to worry about.[72] But Kitchener returned from Dover on the 3.15 train, presumably reaching London in the early evening[73], where there was a maelstrom of activity. That day, Asquith had met Conservative leaders, chaired two Cabinets, dealt with four threatened ministerial resignations and attended the House of Commons to listen to Grey's lengthy speech justifying war. These commitments alone would explain why he may have left Kitchener in limbo for a time.

Then again, there are signs that Asquith did not entirely abandon Kitchener in the manner sometimes suggested. For example, there is evidence that, on 4 August, Asquith asked Haldane to sound out Kitchener on becoming Secretary for War.[74] More significantly, Margot Asquith says her husband *personally* consulted Kitchener about the War Office. Her diary was often written days after events and it is difficult to square it with other evidence about Kitchener's appointment. The relevant entry, written on 15 August, records, 'on 3rd August 1914, the day Henry stopped K. going

[67]H.H. Asquith, 'Lord Kitchener', *Saturday Evening Post*, 10 Dec. 1921.
[68]Spender and Asquith, *Asquith, II*, p.18.
[69]Brocks, *Letters*, pp. 93 and 138.
[70]TNA,PRO30/57/116.
[71]Margot Asquith, *Autobiography, Volume 2,* (London: Penguin, 1936), pp. 130-32.
[72]Hodges, *Kitchener*, p. 223.
[73]*Birmingham Mail*, 3 August.
[74]Maurice, *Haldane, Vol. I*, p. 357; Haldane, *Autobiography*, p. 281.

to Egypt, he sounded him about taking the W. Office.' When Margot remarked, 'I suppose he jumped at it?', Asquith had replied: 'Not he! He didn't want it at all…' Next day, however, Margot met the society hostess Ethel Grenfell, who had seen Kitchener and commented, 'Isn't it splendid of K. to have offered his services at once to the Government!' Margot commented in her diary that the episode was 'a side-light on K.'s methods', adding, 'I knew after that he would accept.'[75] If Margot Asquith's account is correct, Kitchener was offered the War Office but initially refused it, then gave the impression to others – like Milner and Lovat – he had not been offered it at all.

This serves as a reminder that Kitchener was no passive participant in events after his return to London and it fits in with other odd pieces of evidence. There are strong hints, for example, that on 4 August, before he met these two, a decision *had* been taken on Kitchener's future, even if he was initially reluctant to stay in London. At some point that day, Kitchener sent Asquith a message, which reads, 'I am very much obliged to you for your note. Might I ask you to let me know if there is any objection now to my making arrangements to leave for Egypt on the P & O next Friday.'[76] Philip Magnus says Kitchener was telephoned by Asquith's Private Secretary and told he must not do this.[77] Rawlinson, who became Director of Recruiting at the W.O. on the 4 August, recorded, 'on that day it seemed more than likely that Lord Kitchener would be appointed Secretary of State…'[78]; in the evening, Amery was 'cheered… by a message… that Haldane was definitely going…'[79]; while Henry Wilson's diary recorded, 'Haldane is out & K is in & takes over Thursday. Good.'[80] Most tellingly, at 4.20 p.m. the Foreign Office telegraphed Cairo, notifying them that 'Lord Kitchener's return is indefinitely postponed.'[81] It is impossible to understand why such an official message was sent, unless he was being seriously considered for some senior, long-term position at home and was believed likely to accept. Yet, it was sent about two hours before Milner and Lovat supposedly found him in 'a thoroughly bewildered and disgruntled frame of mind', complaining about being ignored.

[75]Michael and Eleanor Brock, eds., *Margot Asquith's Great War Diary,* (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. xviii and 14-15.
[76]TNA PRO30/57/76, Kitchener to Asquith, 4 August.
[77]But he cites no evidence for this: Philip Magnus, *Kitchener: portrait of an imperialist* (London: John Murray, 1958), p. 277.
[78]Maurice, *Rawlinson*, p. 98.
[79]John Barnes and David Nicholson, eds. *The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume One, 1896-1929,* (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p. 108.
[80]Imperial War Museum, London, Henry Wilson diary, 4 August.
[81]TNA FO371/1968/35571, draft telegram 64, 4 August.

Once again, Edmund Gosse may help to disentangle what may have happened, even if his retrospective account (written two months later) is weakened by some mis-dating. He not only claims Kitchener attended War Councils with ministers on 3 and 4 August, but dates *The Times*' attack on Haldane to 6 August. Every one of these dates is one day awry. Nonetheless, he gives a detailed account of events on (he says) 5 August, which would make perfect sense if they had actually occurred the previous day. He relates overhearing members of the House of Lords complaining about the 'neglect' shown to Kitchener. Lord Newton, a Conservative peer, said the Field Marshal was 'in a rage. He says that no attention is paid to what he thinks and no advice is asked for from him… There is that fellow Haldane going to be gazetted Secretary of State for War tomorrow, and no notice taken of Kitchener at all…' Gosse was so concerned that he wrote a letter to Haldane, who met him (Gosse says in the early evening) and declared 'I had not the least notion that Kitchener was in that mood', before promising to see Asquith about it.

A few days later, Haldane reported back to Gosse that he had seen the Prime Minister and told him, 'England is more important than Egypt… and the mere fact of K. of K. being at the War Office will unite all parties in the country more than anything else.' Gosse adds that Asquith agreed. Haldane then saw Kitchener, having 'no difficulty in soothing him.'[82] Whatever the problems with the timings in Gosse's account, his claim about a meeting between the Lord Chancellor and Asquith would explain why, on the evening of 4 August, Downing Street issued a formal denial to the Press that Haldane was to become Secretary for War.[83] This highly significant – and long public piece of evidence – has somehow been missed in existing accounts of Kitchener's appointment. But if Haldane was not to become Secretary for War, Kitchener was the most likely alternative.

The Appointment

It is impossible to find any evidence to support Cassar's unreferenced assertion that 'With few exceptions the members of the Asquith Government… were anxious to bar Kitchener's entry to the War Office'.[84] The most detailed sources, such as the ministerial diaries by J. A. Pease and Lewis Harcourt or the letters written by another Cabinet minister, Herbert Samuel, do not even hint at such opposition. But other considerations probably delayed Kitchener's appointment. For example, attention had to be paid to the situation in Cairo. Haldane later recalled that the FO 'was unwilling that [Kitchener] should be moved from his post as Consul-General in Egypt. In that country trouble was then apprehended'; he adds that this 'was the sole cause of the

[82]Gosse, 'What I saw.'
[83]For example, *The Scotsman* or *Birmingham Daily Post*, 5 August.
[84]Cassar, *Kitchener*, p. 175.

delay… in the appointment of Lord Kitchener...'[85] The Press reported Kitchener as visiting the Foreign Office at 10.15 on 5 August and being 'for some time busy in the department.'[86] But by lunchtime, the appointment was settled: King George V's diary shows that he was informed at 1 p.m. that Kitchener would take over the WO.[87] Haldane, in a 5 August letter to his sister, says he personally 'told K that he was about to be offered the W.O. He was hugely delighted. He seemed to have thought that I would take it against him.' [88]

Time was also taken up in negotiating the precise terms on which Kitchener would serve. Again, rather than passively accepting his future role, he seems to have worked manipulatively behind-the-scenes to secure it, but then needed some tempting to commit himself to it and membership of the Cabinet. In 1910, Repington doubted Kitchener 'can possibly serve a radical government as Secretary for War' because, even if he adopted a detached attitude, he must 'share in the collective responsibility for its acts.'[89] Storrs says that on the afternoon of 5 August, Kitchener 'was summoned to the Cabinet', but this is another error in his account (Kitchener only attended his first Cabinet on 7 August) and he presumably means that the Field Marshal met Asquith in Downing Street. Storrs adds, 'He went, determined to refuse anything less or other than the full position and powers of Secretary of State for War,' which again suggest that Kitchener created difficulties over the appointment. Storrs and others waited until, 'The telephone rang and we were put out of our suspense by the news of unconditional offer and acceptance.'[90] Features of the agreement included Kitchener being able to return to Cairo after the war and receiving an allowance additional, beyond his £5,000 salary as Secretary of State.[91] Asquith's wrote to Venetia Stanley:

> I have taken an important decision today to give up the War Office and install Kitchener there as an emergency man, until the War comes to an end. It was quite impossible for me to go on, now that war is actually in being… K was (to do him justice) not at all anxious to come in, but when it was presented to him as a duty he agreed… It is a hazardous experiment, but the best in the circumstances, I think.[92]

[85]Haldane, *Autobiography*, p. 278.
[86]For example, *Portsmouth Evening News* and *Liverpool Echo*, 5 August.
[87]The Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, King George V's diary, GV/PRIV/GVD/1914: 5 August.
[88]Haldane papers, MS.6012, letter to sister, 5 August.
[89]Morris, ed., *Repington Letters*, p. 164.
[90]Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 146-47.
[91]Cassar, *Kitchener*, p. 176.
[92]Brocks, *Letters*, p. 157.

Kitchener was formally sworn in at a Privy Council at lunchtime on 6 August[93], attending his first Cabinet the following day.[94]

Asquith probably intended that Haldane would exert some control should Kitchener's authoritarian streak create problems. The new Secretary for War certainly had an immediate impact, not least by insisting that two divisions of the British Expeditionary Force should be retained in England, some of them being deployed to meet a suspected German invasion.[95] On 12 August, the Prime Minister admitted, 'Lord K has rather demoralised the War Office with his bull in the china shop manners and methods... I set Haldane onto him yesterday… '[96] Sir John Cowans, the Quarter-Master General, told Margot Asquith that Kitchener 'caused chaos and despair at first', but 'strong hints from the PM and Haldane made him change at once.'[97] Yet, in fact, Haldane failed to prevent Kitchener making major policy changes, especially by raising his 'New Armies' through an appeal for volunteers, rather than simply expanding the Territorial Force.[98] Maurice speculates that the attacks on Haldane in the Press 'lessened in Kitchener's eyes the value of Haldane's advice and made him more disposed to go his own way'.[99] In late 1915, Haldane complained that Kitchener 'has not been a great success in administering the War Office… I wish I could go there, for I think I know what is required... but thanks to certain newspapers, that cannot be.'[100]

Conclusion

Kitchener's biographers tend to portray him as a reluctant hero, eager to return to Egypt, caught at Dover in the nick of time, ignored on his return to London, then forced on a sceptical Prime Minister and reluctant Liberal ministry by the pressure from Conservatives and the Press. But the thesis contradicts itself: why did someone who desperately wished to leave Britain on 3 August, have any right to complain about the delay of mere hours in giving him a senior appointment the following day? Some make unprovable assertions, such as Cassar's, that, on 3 August, 'More and more the man in the street… was heard to repeat the same tale – that Kitchener was going and he must be kept here.'[101] The truth is that Kitchener could not travel across France on 3 August anyway; substantial evidence is lacking that the Conservatives had much impact on Asquith's decision; and, while Repington's initial call for Kitchener to

[93]Fitzroy, *Memoirs*, p. 561.
[94]Bodleian Library, Lewis Harcourt papers, Ms.Eng.c.8269, Political Journal, 7 August.
[95]Keith Jeffery, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson,* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 133.
[96]Brocks, *Letters*, p. 168.
[97]Brocks, *War Diary*, p. 24.
[98]Haldane, *Autobiography*, pp. 278-89; and see Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*, pp. 40-46.
[99]Maurice, *Haldane,* I, pp. 359-61.
[100]Haldane to his mother, 6 November 1915, MS.5994, NLS.
[101]Cassar, *Kitchener*, p. 173.

become Secretary for War was significant, the subsequent demands for this from certain newspapers only came on 5 August, too late to make much difference. While there was broad Press approval of Kitchener's appointment, the newspaper campaign in his favour was less than universal. Many editors refused to join Northcliffe in castigating Haldane, whose selection would also have pleased leading generals, including Haig. Neither did the appointment prove an unmitigated success. Among historians, Cameron Hazlehurst felt Kitchener's appointment 'the most ominous event of the early weeks of the war'[102], while John Gooch has called it 'a grave mistake – perhaps Asquith's greatest during his wartime period of office.'[103] If anything, the Prime Minister ought to have considered it more carefully.

Cassar's questions about Asquith's behaviour – 'why did he allow [Kitchener] to start for Egypt on 3 August? When Kitchener returned… why did Asquith wait forty-eight hours before rendering a verdict? And in the interim why… select Haldane to take over… the War Office?' – can be answered, without falling back on his conclusion that 'the clamour for Kitchener took on unprecedented proportions and Asquith was forced to submit to the national will.'[104] Only on 3 August was it clear the Liberal cabinet was prepared to take the country to war, Haldane was never 'selected' to take over the WO on a permanent basis – such a course was publicly ruled out by Downing Street on 4 August – and there were several reasons why Kitchener, who arrived back in London in the early evening of 3 August, was only announced as Secretary for War two days later. In the interim, Britain went to war and there was much to do. Also, attention had to be paid to the good administration of Egypt. Other reasons for delay included his own behaviour, including an initial reluctance to become Secretary of State and desire to set his own terms for acceptance. In any case, Kitchener's appointment was far smoother than some biographers later dramatised it and there is no evidence that it was delayed by opposition from within the Liberal government. By 4.20 on 4 August, less than twenty-four hours after returning to London, it was evident he would not go back to Cairo quickly and his appointment to the WO was settled around mid-day on 5 August, barely 48 hours after his recall from Dover. Ironically, the contemporary evidence suggests the most important person who urged the appointment was the much-maligned Haldane.

[102]Cameron Hazlehurst, *Politicians at War,* (London: Cape 1971) p. 152.
[103]John Gooch, *The Plans of War,* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1974) p. 299.
[104]Cassar, *Kitchener*, p. 177.

Step Forward the Cowards! – Humiliation, Shame and Countershame in Memories of the White Feather Campaign

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ABSTRACT
One of the most enduring and dramatic tropes of the First World War is the image of a young woman giving a white feather to a man who is not in uniform to shame him into enlisting. This article examines the 'White Feather Campaign' from a history of emotions perspective, focusing on the male shame experience. It analyses this as part of a dynamic interaction of the participants: the white feather giver, the receiver, and the witness(es). The narratives of the men involved illustrate the varied ways they regained their sense of manhood in the face of humiliation: through reframing and counter-shaming.

The White Feather Movement

The image of a young woman shaming a man into enlisting by giving him a white feather is, in the public imagination, one of the most potent symbols of foolish Great War jingoism. References are to be found in contemporary fiction and popular culture ranging from Pat Barker's *Regeneration* to television's Downton Abbey. This metaphor denoting cowardice originated in cock fighting, where a white feather in a bird's tail was evidence that it was 'not of the true game breed'.[1] It took physical form through the practice of presenting or sending white feathers to men as a sign of cowardice. It was by no means the only way in which both sexes sought to embarrass 'shirkers' but it became one of the enduring memories of the home front. Nicoletta Gullace's 1997 article, 'White Feathers and Wounded Men', was the first study to explore the subject

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[1]Francis Grose, *A Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue* (London, 1785), p. 177.

in any depth.[2] Since Gullace's article, a new and vibrant field has developed, the history of emotions, with a rapidly growing historiography of emotions in the military and war.[3] Anne Marie Kilday and David Nash recently revisited the White Feather phenomenon from this perspective, using it to illustrate two of the themes they believe characterise shame in modernity.[4] First, men receiving white feathers often resisted the humiliation by fighting back in some way – a concept they term 'anti-shame'. Second, the initial support for the white feather movement soon waned and turned to a rejection of the practice: the shamers were themselves shamed, demonstrating the 'reverberatory nature of shame in the modern context'[5] The main source used by Gullace was a collection of letters in the Imperial War Museum (IWM) associated with the BBC's *The Great War* television series of 1964. Kilday and Nash, also utilised recordings of interviews in the IWM archives. The current article examines these sources in more depth from the perspective of the men who received white feathers: their varied emotions of embarrassment, shame and anger; and how they managed this experience to maintain self-respect.[6] Each white feather story is part of a dynamic interplay between the white feather giver, the receiver, and the witness(es): a humiliation triad. Exploring how the participants shifted roles in this triad furthers our

[2]Nicoletta Gullace, 'White Feathers and Wounded Men: Female Patriotism and the Memory of the Great War', *Journal of British Studies*, 36, 2, (1997), pp.178-206.

[3]For an overview of the history emotions see Jan Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). For the history of emotions in war, see Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare,* (London: Granta Books, 1999); Alexander Watson, *Enduring the Great War Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914–1918,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); William G Rosenberg, 'Reading Soldiers' Moods: Russian Military Censorship and the Configuration of Feeling in World War I', *American Historical Review*, 119, 3 (2014), 714-740; Stephanie Downes, Andrew Lynch and Katrina O'Loughlin**,** *Emotions and War: Medieval to Romantic Literature,* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).

[4]Anne-Marie Kilday and David S. Nash, *Shame and Modernity in Britain,* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 21-62.

[5]Ibid., p.47.

[6]The BBC's Great War television series letters were searched for letters related to white feathers. The IWM has a collection of recorded interviews conducted with servicemen and civilians who witnessed the First World War. There are two sets of recordings: those from interviews for the BBC series (here referenced as recordings) and those from later interviews (available online and referenced here as interviews). The search term 'white feather' was used to extract and transcribe relevant oral narratives. A search using the term 'white feather' was also carried out in British newspaper archives.

understanding of the reverberatory nature of shame. A third dimension which has received little attention so far is the context in which these IWM stories were collected many years after the events. The period during which the memories were recorded came at a particular point in the emotional memorialisation of the war, and the way in which the written and oral narratives were elicited may have contributed to the absence of the voices of key players in these dramas - the white feather women themselves and conscientious objectors.

The White Feather Movement arose in the context of concerns that insufficient numbers were answering their country's call to service. At the outbreak of war, Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, recognised that the armies of France and Germany meeting in Europe would be evenly balanced, and that a substantial British force was required to break the stalemate. The Territorial Force and reserves comprised fewer than 750,000 men. In contrast, the French and German armies were able to rapidly mobilise to over 2 million men each.[7] Conscription was politically unpalatable so a massive recruitment drive was required. A full propaganda machine eventually emerged, but in the early months of the war, publication of the report citing German atrocities, followed by Moore's *Times* newspaper dispatch describing the retreat of the British Expeditionary Force from Mons prompted a surge in enlistments. 175,000 men volunteered between 30 August and 5 September 1914.[8] This massive influx overwhelmed the recruiting structure but may also have given a false benchmark for recruitment, contributing to the persistent belief that there was a reservoir of untapped manpower.[9] The 'shirkers' were staying at home while men from occupations needed to support the war effort were going to the front. This was one factor that eventually led to the introduction of conscription in 1916.[10] It also fuelled the white feather phenomenon, which was part of a wider engagement of women in the recruitment initiative. Baroness Orczy formed the 'Women of England's

[7]Peter Hart, *The Great War,* (London: Profile Books 2014), p.33.

[8]Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular responses to the outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.61; Roy Douglas, 'Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee', *The Journal of Modern History,* 42, 4 (1970), pp. 564-585. Rethinking British Volunteerism in 1914: A Rush to the Colours? | University of Oxford Podcasts - Audio and Video Lectures. http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/rethinking-british-volunteerism-1914-rush-colours. Accessed 22 July2021.

[9]David Silbey, *The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, 1914-1916,* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p.129.

[10]Silbey, *The British Working Class*, p.129. In fact, between 1914 and 1915 Britain raised the second-largest volunteer army in history, Adrian Gregory, *The Last Great War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.73.

Active Service League'. Mrs Humphrey Ward supported similar sentiments, and Emmeline Pankhurst suspended her fight for suffrage to support recruitment.[11] The white feather campaign originated on 31 August 1914 when retired Admiral Penrose Fitzgerald gave a speech promising that 30 ladies of Folkestone would 'present a white feather to every young 'slacker' found loafing about the Leas [the promenade], deaf or indifferent to their country's need, just to remind them that British soldiers are fighting and dying across the Channel.'[12] Penrose Fitzgerald warned 'the young men of Folkestone – the idle ones – that there is a danger awaiting them far more terrible than anything they can meet in battle, and that is, if they are found idling and loafing tomorrow they will be presented with a white feather.'[13] On 1st September, the *Daily Mail* reported that 'There was hardly a slacker on the Leas yesterday, and recruiting has had a new stimulus.'[14] By then, with reinforcements from London, the campaign had moved to Deal where they 'smilingly' distributed the feathers to young men who 'regarding the affair as a joke, permitted the 'favours' to be placed in buttonholes,' but later, 'realising that they had been duped by the artless way in which they had been decorated the young men hastily removed their 'favours'.'[15]

It is not clear how much the symbolism of chivalry was the invention of Penrose-Fitzgerald or the newspapers. By awarding the 'Order of the White Feather', the rules of chivalry were turned upside down. Young ladies handed out 'favours' as they would to knights who they chose as their champions, but the men were actually being awarded an emblem of cowardice. The practice soon spread across the country, peaking in 1915, but persisting until 1918.[16] There is little evidence that this was an organised campaign.[17] Nevertheless, white feather women often worked together and

[11]Emmuska Orczy, 'To the Women of England,' *Daily Mail,* September 4, 1914, p.3.
[12]'Women's War,' *Daily Mail*, August 31, 1914, p.3.
[13]'Women's War', *Daily Mail*, August 31, 1914, p.3.
[14]'White Feather Campaign', *Daily Mail*, Sept 1, 1914, p.3.
[15]'White Feather Favours', Duped youths at the seaside', *Daily Mail*, September 2, 1914, p.3.
[16]96 of the IWM letters gave dates: 1914 – 7; 1915 – 54; 1916 – 18; 1917 – 12; 1918 – 5.
[17]Orczy distanced her organization from white feather giving; There is no support in the pages of *The Suffragette* or the *Britannia,* and no reference in Emmeline or Christabel Pankhurst's autobiographies. Mona Anne Kaiser 'Emmeline Pankhurst and the Great War: Radical Suffragist, Conservative Patriot or Political Opportunist?' (MA dissertation, Simon Fraser University, Canada, 1995), pp.57.

frequented locations such as stations and theatres.[18] At first it was seen as 'an amusing, novel, and forceful method of obtaining recruits,' but even within the first week there was concern that the wrong men would be targeted.[19] Soldiers home on leave, men rejected on medical grounds, too old to fight, those in reserved occupations, and wounded men might all be out of uniform but not 'shirking.' White feather women were now the abusers and the men receiving their 'favours' were their victims. Partly in response to the white feather problem, the Government introduced 'Derby armbands' to signify a man had registered as willing to enlist but not been called up, 'Silver War Badges' to indicate a man had been wounded, and 'On War Service' badges for those in 'reserved occupations.'[20] Ironically men needed these new symbols indicating they were *not* cowards to protect them from the feathers. In a further twist, men were often too embarrassed to openly wear these symbols and so remained targets.[21]

Shame, Humiliation, Honour and Masculinity

Sociologists have argued that shame is an essential feature of how we manage our social image.[22] At its core is a sense of the self-judged negatively by others. As Sartre observed, shame is a feeling of 'being *an* object…of *recognizing myself* in this degraded, fixed and dependent being which I am for the Other.'[23] Phenomenologists speak of how in shame 'the lived body is momentarily reduced to the corporeal body' as we become aware of how our body reacts with blushing, sweating, increased heart rate etc.[24] Behaviourally shame involves gaze avoidance, cringing, and a wish to hide or

[18]109 letters indicate where the feather was given out: 53% in the street, 19% on public transport, 11% at stations, 6% on the seafront, 5% at theatres, 3% at public meetings or pubs.

[19]'White Feathers' A Novel Method of Making Young Men Enlist,' *Chatham News*, September 5, 1914, p.8. 'The White Feather,' *Daily Mail,* September 3, 1914, p.4.

[20]Questions in Parliament demanded prosecutions (HC Deb 01 March 1915 vol 70 cc547-8); Gullace, 'White Feathers', p.199.

[21]Silbey, 'The British Working Class', p.22.

[22]Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,* (New York: Anchor Books, 1959); Thomas Scheff, 'Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory', *Sociological Theory*, 18 (2000), pp.84-99.

[23]Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology* translated by Hazel E. Barnes, revised edition, (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 312.

[24]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of perception,* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). Brent Dean Robbins and Holly Parlavecchio, 'The Unwanted Exposure of the Self: A Phenomenological Study of Embarrassment', *The Humanist Psychologist*, *34*, pp.321–345; p. 322.

escape. Contemporary social psychologists broadly agree that shame arises from negative evaluation of the whole self ('*I* am to blame, and this says something bad about who I am as a person') while guilt is focused on the transgressive act ('I am to blame for my *bad behaviour* in this particular situation'). Embarrassment is a more fleeting emotion, triggered by trivial events but paradoxically often associated with stronger physical reactions.[25] Shame and embarrassment arise in a social context, but there does not need to be another person present. We can feel ashamed of acts that no one else knows about. Equally, we can feel embarrassed or ashamed when we make a faux pas even when others behave kindly towards us. Being handed a white feather sometimes evoked feelings of embarrassment and sometimes deep shame, but primarily contained the element of humiliation which requires another to ridicule or degrade us.[26] Donald Klein suggested humiliation is not just an emotion but also a process, a dynamic interplay between a 'humiliator', a 'victim' and a 'witness': the 'humiliation triad'.[27] White feather incidents are often triadic like this with a woman attempting to humiliate a young man in the presence of others. But this dynamic can change, men can reverse the roles and humiliate their attackers, or bystanders may give up the role of witness and turn upon the white feather giver (both examples of anti-shame). The historiography of shame intersects with the study of honour and gender. Modernity, in Norbert Elias' influential view, has been seen to involve a transition from shame-based to guilt-based culture.[28] Nash and Kilday's work challenges this picture.[29] Rather than shame being marginalised their research shows that in modern societies it fulfils the same functions, albeit in different forms.[30] Men receiving white feathers often saw the implication of cowardice as an insult to their honour.

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[25]See Jessica Tracy and Richard Robins, 'Putting the Self into Self-Conscious Emotions: A Theoretical Model', *Psychological Inquiry*, 15 (2004), pp.103-125; and Michael Lewis (2008) 'Self-conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame and Guilt', in *Handbook of Emotions* (3rd edition), ed. by Michael Lewis, Jeanette Haviland-Jones and Lisa Feldman Barrett, (New York: Guilford Press, 2008), pp. 742-756; June Price Tangney, Debra Mashek, and Jeff Stuewig, 'Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment: Will the Real Emotion Please Stand Up?', *Psychological Inquiry*, 16,(2005), pp.44-48.

[26]Donald C. Klein, 'The humiliation dynamic: an overview' *The Journal of Primary Prevention*, 12 (1991), pp.93-121; p.94.

[27]Ibid., p.101.

[28]Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations.* Revised edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

[29]David Nash and Anne-Marie Kilday, *Cultures of Shame: Exploring Crime and Morality in Britain, 1600-1900,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.18.

[30]Ibid.

Prior to the 19th century, as John Tosh says, a man's honour 'was virtually coterminous with reputation', the social image inextricably linked with the personal.[31] Kitchener's exhortation of 'Your Country Needs You!' was a direct appeal to manly, patriotic honour. Aspects of this honour culture were still apparent in Britain in 1914, but an alternative masculine discourse had arisen through the 19th century. Tosh argues that the needs of a rapidly urbanising, industrial society led to the development of a model of Victorian manliness focused on work and home, which nonetheless retained the values of 'physical vigor, energy and resolution, courage, and straightforwardness'.[32] It has been argued that alongside this domesticated masculinity, an idealisation of a more militaristic virility grew from around 1870 onwards, possibly in reaction to the rising women's movement, and the needs of empire.[33] This was evidenced in the hypermasculinity of adventure stories for boys and men, the hagiography of soldiers and 'para-military' boys organisations like the scout movement.[34] Working class constructions of masculine identity have received less scrutiny but evidence suggests that respectable employment and physical labour were key components of the working class male identity.[35] The extent to which working class men shared the values of the hegemonic masculinity of other classes is not entirely clear. What is clear is that when war broke out in 1914 young men had a choice of a more complex range of masculine identities than is popularly assumed, and it is important not to forget that for many their identities were only just forming.[36]

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[31]John Tosh, 'Masculinities in an Industrializing Society: Britain, 1800–1914', *Journal of British Studies*, 44 (2005), 330-342, p. 333.

[32]Michael Roper and John Tosh, editors, *Manful assertions: masculinities in Britain since 180,0* (London, 1991); Tosh, p. 335.

[33]Martin Francis, 'The Domestication of the Male? Recent Research on Nineteenth and twentieth Century Masculinity', *The Historical Journal*, 3 (2002), pp.637-652.

[34]Francis, p. 640; Claudia Nelson, 'Sex and the Single Boy: Ideals of Manliness and Sexuality in Victorian Literature for Boys', *Victorian Studies*, 32 (1989), pp.525-550; Bradley Deane, 'Imperial Boyhood: Piracy and the Play Ethic', *Victorian Studies*, 53 (2011), pp.689-714.

[35]Joanna Bourke, *Working Class Cultures in Britain, 1890–1960, Gender, Class and Ethnicity,* (London, Routledge, 1994); Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War,* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[36]See Michael Roper's psychoanalytically informed study of men's letters home to their mothers: Michael Roper (2004), 'Maternal relations: moral manliness and emotional survival in letters home during the First World War' in *Masculinities in Politics and* War edited by Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh, (Manchester: Manchester University Press) pp. 295-315.

White Feather Stories

The humiliation of receiving a white feather is explicitly evident in the letters and in the interviews in the IWM sound archives. The letters were written in response to newspaper articles (one headed 'Step Forward the Cowards') asking for men who refused to join the forces to volunteer to be interviewed for the BBC *The Great War* series. The theme running though these letters is an attempt to make clear, 'Why I am not a coward'. AH Devlin ironically titles his account 'One Coward' and explains that when given a feather he held the Mons Star.[37] A Parker says he volunteered underage after receiving a feather and spent his eighteenth birthday in the trenches.[38] F Cole tells us he was 'one of the "cowards" who raided Zeebrugge on St George's Day 1918.'[39] The letters also contain detailed lists of the men's war service, and are often signed with the First World War rank and number. What is most striking about the letters is the absence of the men the article referred to: there was only one account from a conscientious objector and only two from men of fighting age who were not in occupations perceived to be vital to the war effort.[40] As Adrian Gregory points out, 'the vast majority of the men of military age in Britain during the First World War chose not to volunteer for the armed forces.'[41] It required an active decision to go against the prevailing social pressure to volunteer, but this was rarely because of conscientious objection. Family commitments, rural indifference, and fear of being killed or maimed may all have contributed to these decisions.[42] But no one wrote to the BBC to justify their own refusal to enlist.

The interviews recorded for the series formed the basis of the Imperial War Museum (IWM) sound archive. Further interviews were conducted with veterans over following years, some of which contain direct questions about white feathers while in others the event is referred to spontaneously. While the letters are premeditated, albeit emotionally charged, accounts where the respondents felt sufficiently strongly to write in, the sound recordings contain responses to questions about white feathers

[37]AH Devlin to BBC, May 1964, DEA-DEW, fol. 188.
[38]AH Parker to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW, PAC-PAR, fol. 197.
[39]F Cole to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW, COA-COO, fol. 112-113.
[40]EH Walker's objections to fighting came from his Christian belief, and having German and Austrian friends; he was '…. almost ostracized by everyone, bombarded with white feathers in the street and found it impossible to get work except from a Quaker firm in Clerkenwell…' Notes on telephone interview with EH Walker, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW, vol HAR-HAZ, fol. 331. Another conscientious objector wrote in to say he had never received a white feather! GS Wride to BBC, 21st May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW, WRA-WYN, fol. 41.
[41]Gregory, *Last Great War*, p.89.
[42]Ibid., pp.87-95.

which were not necessarily predicted. The recording with its pauses, hesitations, non-verbal vocalisations, prosody and dialogic exchange adds a new dimension which is of particular relevance for the study of emotions in these encounters. Making use of correspondence and oral history in this way, however, raises issues about the relationship between the emotions expressed in a letter or interview many years after the event and those experienced at the time. There is substantial evidence that far from memory being a simple retrieval of stored information about an event, it is always a reconstruction, influenced by the environmental context, emotional state, and events experienced since the index event.[43] The written and spoken narratives tell us something about how men in the late 20th century recalled humiliating experiences from half a century before. Dan Todman has documented how memories and evaluations of the Great War have evolved and how over time veterans' versions of the war were reconciled with the way the war was being talked about around them.[44]

The stories they tell reveal something about the strategies they use to resolve and avoid potential shame. The extent to which this matches what they actually did at the time can never be known, although there is a close correlation between many of the white feather narratives and contemporary accounts from diaries and letters.[45] Nevertheless, the passage of time, the ageing process, subsequent life events, and the changing public portrayal of the First World War all influence how memories are reconstructed. The telling of any personal story is a performative act, in which the storyteller constructs the story to suit their purposes for the present situation.[46] Shame, however, urges concealment and silence. How many men did *not* write in to tell their white feather story? How many declined to be interviewed because of a shame they could not reveal? For those who did tell their story, there were various options for constructing the humiliation dynamic. In narrating the relationship between the giver and receiver, the storyteller has the option of emphasizing the role of victim, re-establishing the 'victim's' agency in some way (anti-shame), or referring to the perspective of witnesses to the event. Letters invite the reader to be a witness explicitly, while in recorded interviews this invitation is more implicit. The stories of those who have received white feathers tend to maximize their own agency within the

[43]See for instance, Elizabeth Loftus, 'Our changeable memories: legal and practical implications', *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 4 (2003), pp.231-234.
[44]Dan Todman, *The Great War: Myth and Memory* (London: A&C Black, 2014), p.187.
[45]Gullace, 'White Feathers', p.182.
[46]This approach of analysing narrative as performance is described by Riessman in Catherine Kohler Riessman, 'Analysis of personal narratives', *Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method*, eds. J.F. Gubrium and J.A.Holstein, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001).

story. Stories told by those close to the recipient, emphasise the recipient's victimhood.

White Feathers for Un-enlisted Men

The letters and recordings contain stories of men who were on the edge of manhood when presented with white feathers, mature in appearance but too young to enlist. For many of these boys - at an age where self-consciousness is at its height - the shame of appearing to be adult but not in uniform was very powerful. Frederick Broome's experience is one of the most striking, because he had already been at the front and discharged, and then while on Putney Bridge was given white feathers by four girls:

> Several people had collected around the girls and was giggling and I, er, felt most uncomfortable and awfully embarrassed and said something about I had a good mind to chuck them into the Thames (…) and (I) eventually broke off the conversation, feeling very humiliated. I finished the walk across the bridge and there on the other side was the Thirty-seventh London Territorial Association of the Royal Field Artillery. I walked straight in and re-joined the army.[47]

He was still only sixteen. Seventeen-year-old Sebastian Lang was given a white feather in the street, then a sergeant came out of one of the shops, and said to me, 'Did she call you a coward?' And I said yes and I felt very indignant at the time. He says: 'Well come across the roadway to the drill hall and we'll soon prove that you are not a coward.'

In a daze he was taken to the recruiting office and sworn in.[48] In these instances the white feather seems to have achieved its purpose as a spur to recruitment. The feather is the trigger for action which resolves the liminality of adolescence. In the step towards the recruiting office the boy steps out of the humiliation triad and becomes a man. These stories of the feather prompting enlistment are reported by both middle class and working-class men. Because young men's motives for joining up were often difficult to verbalise, receiving a white feather was a significant event around which they could structure their story.[49] With years of retelling the story, the significance of the feather may have grown. It is likely that far more boys received a feather and did

[47]Interview with Frederick Broome, Imperial War Museum [sound recording] 4039 (1964).

[48]Sebastian Lang, IWM Recording 4154, (1964).

[49]Jessica Meyer, *Men at War: Masculinity and the First World War in Britain,* (London, 2009), pp. 34-36: Some expressed high minded patriotic ideals, but most spoke of specific individuals as their motivation for fighting e.g., G.R.Barlow told his aunt he volunteered 'so as to help protect you.'

not act but we do not have their accounts. We do not know if they experienced similar feelings of shame or how they managed them. An interesting way in which one or two boys reframed their gift of a feather was to see it as a recognition of manhood: 'someone obviously thought I looked old enough to be "doing my bit"… and I had a white feather to prove it! … I treasured that passport to maturity for a long time afterwards.'[50] Ironically, the humiliator was converted to an admirer in the eye of the recipient!

Men in reserved occupations reported multiple instances of humiliation. Walter Ostler was a railway clerk and exempt from service but being very tall felt conspicuous. On a crowded tramcar a woman stuck a white feather in his buttonhole, much to his 'embarrassment and discomfiture', and he 'began to think it was time to think about service.'[51] George Truphet working at Woolwich Arsenal, got so fed up with being given white feathers he joined the Navy.

> Oh, I had 'em handed to me. I had 'em handed to me in the street walking along […]. They would carry these feathers, you see, and if they saw a young fit fellow, and I was a bit of an athlete at the time, […] They would just go up and abuse you and make a scene and get everybody looking at you and this is what I couldn't take. That was a coward from that angle (laughs).[52]

Men who worked in munitions factories, shipyards, aircraft factories or coalmines, still felt the need to justify why they had not enlisted. L. Malpass, worked on the railways, only got relief from white feathers when he was given a badge with an engine on it and the inscription 'The Lines behind the Lines!'[53] The power of the white feather to induce guilt in others who knew they actually had good reason not to be in uniform was considerable. Medical students were ordered to complete their studies and knew they would be of more use qualified, but still joined the RAMC or Navy as Surgeon Probationers; Merchant Seamen also tried to enlist only to be told they were needed in their current, already dangerous, job.[54]

[50]AG Wilkinson to BBC, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. WIB-WILfol. 89-90.
[51]Walter Ostler, IWM Interview 39 (1973).
[52]George Truphet, IWM Interview 693 (1975).
[53]AG Allen to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. ALL-ANT, fol. 263-264; L Malpass to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. MAB-MAR, fol. 150.
[54]FK Escritt to BBC, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. ELC-EYE, fol. 176; RR Powell to BBC, IWM, BBC/GW. vol.POL-PRE, fol. 166-167; Gerrard, Notes on telephone conversation with BBC Southampton Newsroom, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. GAD-GIT, fol. 228.

We have very few accounts concerning the many men who would not have been doing important war work, but those we have suggest family ties kept them at home. Perhaps for the family man, in contrast to unmarried men, masculinity was framed much more in terms of domestic responsibility rather than physical bravery, but they still felt varying degrees of guilt. George Taylor had been married for two years, had a son aged 20 months, and his wife was expecting another baby. He was employed in a City Stockbrokers and 'to be perfectly truthful was not keen to join the Forces' but on receiving lots of white feathers, 'notwithstanding my home ties I must confess that I felt terribly guilty & made up my mind to join up.'[55] The daughter of Robert Smith wrote that after her father received a feather 'he came home and cried his eyes out.' His pregnant wife had delivered the day after she heard of her brother's death at the Dardanelles, and the baby died after a few weeks. Again, the letter is written to refute the implication of cowardice: 'So you can see that it was through these circumstances and not cowardice that my father was still in civilian clothes'.[56]

From the 1950s onwards the predominant sense was that the First World War had been meaningless and futile.[57] These attitudes pervade the narratives of surviving relatives who often blamed the white feather for the deaths of their loved ones. Olive Shapley's brother Frank was out with his scout troop when a woman asked him 'What's a big chap like you out playing, you get out and fight,' and gave him a white feather. Though only seventeen, 'he went and joined the navy before he came home that night,' and was drowned at the battle of Jutland.[58] Speaking in 1986 John Dorgan tells how his brother Nicol received a white feather through the post. The family believed they knew the girl who had sent the feather. Dorgan intones his story in a very deliberate, ponderous manner:

> Nicol opened his letter and a white feather dropped out. Nothing else in that envelope, just a white feather. Remember, Nicol, was in a reserved occupation, working down the colliery, down the pit. A good living lad. He got up off that table, white faced, and he went out of the house. That was the last time I ever saw him alive. He left the house and went to the recruiting agent in Newcastle and joined the Durham Light Infantry - never once came home.[59]

[55]GF Taylor to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. TAB-THO, fol. 194.
[56]J Upjohn to BBC, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. UDA-VOS, fol. 32.
[57]Todman, *Myth and Memory*, p. 144.
[58]Olive Shapley, IWM Interview 8555 (1984).
[59]John Dorgan, IWM Interview 9253 (1986).

Nicol died in France. His parents did manage to see him when visiting their other son Tom when he was wounded. However, John never saw him again and he never came home. Years later John met the woman who the family believed had sent the white feather when she was still a girl. She visited with her husband asking if John could find a job for her son on a training scheme he ran. He made excuses for not helping them and could not even come out to meet them. He never found out why she sent the white feather. The anger and shame are still very much alive in his account despite the story having been honed by years of retelling. He is angry at the injustice, yet the family was too ashamed to confront the perpetrator. They 'just wanted to live it down.' What the relationship between Nicol and the girl had been remains a mystery. The shame has become a family affair with multiple dynamics shifting through the story. Nicol is initially shamed by the girl. His withdrawal from the family is a function of this shame, but in itself then shames the family. This shame paralysed the family who seemed unable to engage in anti-shame and so the emotional impact of the whole affair is unresolved. Giving voice to shame is immensely difficult and this may explain why the preponderance of stories reflect the minimisation of the insult or agentic anti-shaming. Listening to John Dorgan's story we are drawn in to the third point of the triad, drawn in to act as witnesses to what John solemnly calls 'the story of the white feather.'

White Feathers for Soldiers

The white feather stories that have entered into popular culture feature soldiers back from the front who may have been out of uniform because they were on leave, had been wounded, or invalided out. There seems to have been a definite preference to get into 'civvies' when on leave, which often had the very practical purpose of allowing the uniform to be cleaned. AG Lewis stayed at the Union Jack Club the first night on leave, frightened to go home because of the lice.[60] R Gorrell arrived home, had a bath and then set fire to his uniform and underwear.[61] Aware that they had nothing to be ashamed of some soldiers brushed off the incident as amusing. Others found ways to turn the tables on their humiliators, and some became overtly angry at the insult. Those who were able to rise above the insult, at least according to their report years later, recounted vague memories of the incident when asked questions about white feathers. These were often officers who presumably held positions of control and power which helped them minimise the affront. Bertram Steward was amused to be given a white feather on the Strand by 'quite a nice young lady'. William Shipway was given one by 'a little gaggle of girls' aged about 15: he accepted it and stuck it in his buttonhole. He didn't say anything to them because he did not want to embarrass

[60]AG Lewis to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW, LEC-LEW, fol. 305-306.
[61]R Gorrell to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW, GLA-GOW, fol. 215-216.

them![62] William Benham, in his 1973 interview, says he was on leave when 'some little girl came up and presented me with a white feather'. He laughs, then after a pause adds, 'But that was quite common'.[63] His earlier letter to the BBC in 1964 told a different version of the story. He had enlisted in 1916 but could not go to France until he was 19; he finished officer training in June 1917, and while waiting for a posting his mother took him to visit a cousin in Wales to cheer him up. He was out of uniform because he 'hated wearing the white patches of a cadet', and was shopping in Harlech when:

> a young flapper with fair hair hanging down her back came darting across the road. She pushed a white feather into my hand and at the same time asked, 'Why aren't you in khaki fighting for the country?' Before I had time to make any sort of reply the brave little lassie had darted away again; my mother was simply furious and urged me to run after the wench, but I was too late starting and she got away.[64]

His earlier written account has none of the nonchalance of his later interview. It seems a much 'thicker' description of a young man sitting uncomfortably on the boundary of filial and martial identity. If he had perceived the girl as unthreatening, as in his later report, no action would have been necessary. But at his mother's instigation he needed to engage in some form of anti-shaming. These two accounts of the same incident illustrate the vagaries of reconstructed memory. Had the passage of 10 years dimmed his recollection or was it easier to create a more detailed and nuanced narrative in writing? Counter shaming can take various forms in the white feather narratives. Stories of turning the tables with the bon mot are common. William Parry-Morris, given a white feather on his way to a recruiting office, told the woman she could 'have it back in half an hour'.[65] Thomas Painting escaped from a Prisoner of War camp and on his return to England was given a white feather by a young woman:

> 'Oh,' I said, 'I see what you're doing now. […] this white feather is because I'm chicken hearted. So, I […] showed her my paybook which was shot to pieces on the Aisne and I said, 'Well, I said, I'm a soldier.' I said, 'You can see where I've come from. I was a prisoner of war,' I said, 'and I escaped from Germany. I'm going back to the regiment now to do a little bit more'. […] The poor girl

[62]Bertram Steward, IWM Interview 9279 (1986); William Shipway, IWM Interview 10118 (1988).
[63]William Benham, IWM Interview 95 (1973).
[64]WG Benham to BBC, May 1964, IWM/GW vol BEL-BEX fol. 101.
[65]William Parry-Morris, IWM Interview 9488 (1986).

> didn't know where to put her face (laughs). I kept that white feather for a long while, but it's gone now.[66]

Unsurprisingly, written accounts tell of more eloquent responses than the oral accounts. Letters to the *Daily Mail* from relatives tell of brothers or fathers calmly showing their uniform under their greatcoat, or coming up with a witty riposte: when asked why they were not in khaki, a sailor replies, 'Because I prefer Navy blue, madam.' In his letter to the BBC, F Bicknell says he was asked why he was not in uniform and replied, 'Madam, when your breeches get as lousy as mine were, you'll probably be glad to change them for a while,' and FW Noble told them the army wouldn't accept him because he kept getting 'blotto'.[67] Others, highlighted in Gullace's article, tell of wounded men revealing their amputated limbs or lifting their shirts to show their wounds.[68] H Owen promised his accuser he would join up the next morning and suggested they shake hands on it – 'When I gave her my dummy hand to shake she nearly fainted and I am quite sure she was permanently cured'.[69] Norman Demuth was wounded and discharged. He always wore his ex-service badge, but this did not prevent him receiving 15 white feathers in all, while he was looking in shop windows, on buses, or walking along the road 'even with a limp'. His reaction was varied and fluctuated – 'At the beginning I got very, very angry. Then I got a little bit aggrieved, then I got angry again and I decided that something had got to be done about it. If they were going to be rude to me, I was going to be rude back.' His solution was to take the next feather he was given, use it to clean his pipe, and give the filthy pipe cleaner back to the woman who had given it to him. His account is richer than many of the briefer stories and reminds us that for many the repeated irritations were frustrating and disempowering.[70]

These men were able to respond assertively, calmly telling the white feather women the facts, with mixed results, from disbelief to apologies and rewards. More often, though, the soldiers' response was one of anger. The letter writers are too polite to reveal too much of what they said ('I will not mention what my reply was. It was in a new language which we spoke on the Somme'), but they speak of telling the women

[66]Thomas Painting, IWM Interview 212 (1974).
[67]Miss R. Mainwaring, *Daily Mail* 21st May 1964; Ethel Hackworth, *Daily Mail* 21st May 1964; F Bicknell to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. BIC-BLY, fol. 7; FW Noble to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. NAG-NYW, fol. 273.
[68]Gullace, 'White Feathers' pp. 200-201.
[69]H Owen to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. OAK-OXL, fol. 218.
[70]Norman Demuth, IWM Recording 4077, catalogued as 'The Great War', (1964).

what to do with their feathers – 'close your eyes and imagine you're a fantail pigeon'.[71] Sometimes the anger spilled over into violence with slaps and punches, or even pushing the feather in a woman's mouth and forcing her to swallow it.[72] Tolerating the abuse may have been easier in certain instances because others got angry on the recipient's behalf. Leonard Mundy just 'done a grin' to himself when some girls gave him a feather, but his mother's fury extracted an apology from them. Alfred Irwin's wife got angry for her wounded husband when he was given a white feather in a restaurant while on leave.[73]

Penrose Fitzgerald created the 'Order of the White Feather' as an ironic gesture of shame, but quite soon the soldiers who received them began to reappropriate the feathers by ostentatiously accepting them as a favour and putting them in their buttonhole. They often took them back to the trenches with them and even incorporated them into trench art. A common ending to a white feather story is, 'I kept that feather for years. I don't know what's become of it now.' H Jackson carried his feather 'through the worst battles of Ypres & Arras' and at the end of the war gave it to a Flemish girl. He writes wistfully, 'I often wonder if she still has it.'[74] Families sometimes failed to appreciate the double irony in this reclamation of the feather

> My parents on being told were indignant & annoyed with me for insisting on wearing it. It went back to the trenches with me for luck & I kept it till I was wounded. Was it lucky? I think it was for I came home and was in hospital during the Somme offensive, where my regiment was badly cut up. I rejoined them after the battle.[75]

George MacKenzie Samson was given a feather on the day he received the Victoria Cross and kept the two together in the same box![76] FA Riddell, on leave recovering from being wounded 8 times was given a 'beautiful chicken feather' outside East Ham Palace of Varieties. His mother kept it for years with the bullets taken from his lung.[77]

[71]WF Lester to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. LEC-LEW, fol. 236; L Laister to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. LAB-LAZ, fol. 19.
[72]A Paine to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. PAC-PAR, fol. 75.
[73]Leonard Mundy, IWM Interview 5868 (1980); Alfred Irwin, IWM Interview 211 (1973).
[74]H Jackson to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. JAC-JIN, fol. 3-4.
[75]A Everett to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. ELC-EYE, fol. 275.
[76]Kilday and Nash *Shame and Modernity,* p.43.
[77]FA Riddell to BBC, May 1964, IWM, BBC/GW. vol. RIC-RIX, fol. 116-118.

In these examples, the humiliation dynamic is turned inside out. The feather becomes a symbol of bravery, bestowed by a lady who is unconscious of her admiration, and witnessed by family or fellow soldiers. Riddell's mother kept the feather and bullets together, strange companions, one insubstantial and delicate, the other all too substantial and deadly. Both symbols to her of her son's bravery.

Conclusions

Twenty first century sensibilities may find it hard to comprehend the depth of injury felt by these men when they were accused of cowardice. Their masculinity was not only impugned, but the feminine source of the attack deprived them of the assertive response they might have given to a man. There was a range of shame management strategies employed by the men who received white feathers. Some, often the officers, seemed able to rise above the insult, portraying the white feather women as silly and non-threatening. They were able to construct a narrative in which they were confident in their role as a soldier out of uniform and stepped out of the humiliation triad altogether. Others knew they were not shirkers but still felt humiliated. They felt unjustly accused and responded with some form of action to reverse the humiliator-humiliated dyad. They exerted agency by humiliating the humiliator in some way: by showing they were wounded or finding the *mot juste* or action at just the right moment to put the girl in her place. They thus regained a sense of self-worth. The tables were turned and those around became witnesses to the restoration of dignity or even joined in the counter-shaming. Some of these stories sound almost too good to be true and may well have been ways to reconstruct an embarrassing incident in a manner that established self-efficacy. But what of men who were not soldiers? The narratives we have suggest that some underage men and men in reserved occupations managed their shame through action: by volunteering they put themselves beyond reproach. The feather achieved its purpose and it became the stimulus to joining up. But these were probably far fewer than the men who had to carry on because of family or work commitments; and what of conscientious objectors? We do not know how many men had to simply put up with abuse. They have not told their stories. Were they able to shrug it off in some way, or did they suffer silently like Nicol Dorgan who bore his shame in silence and died. Did they accept the insult and feel paralysed and helpless? We will never know how many men were unable to verbalise their shame. And missing from the archives are the stories of the feather givers themselves. Only two of 200 letters and one recording is from a white feather girl. Thyra Mitchell admitted to giving an acquaintance a feather: 'I must have been an awful person, and I really made a chump of myself'.'[78] Linda Sanderson however remained unrepentant 80 years after she gave her uncle a white feather because 'he should have enlisted and he didn't'. He reacted with 'fury'.

[78]Douglas, Marlborough, 'Grannie Admits She Branded Man a Coward', *Daily Mail*, 29 May 1964, p.11.

Interviewer: It must have required quite a bit of courage to give your uncle a white feather.
LS: I think we were (…), courageous.
Interviewer: How exactly did you give him it?
LS: I think we tied it on his coat (6 sec pause).
Interviewer: When it was hung up, you mean?
LS: I think it was when he was in it [half sighs, half laughs][79]

Linda Sanderson's disgust had not been tempered by changing attitudes to the war. Penrose Fitzgerald's intervention in August 1914 appealed to a dynamic in which virile men were expected to rescue vulnerable females from the impending barbarian German threat. In so doing the white feather women and girls publicly shamed men out of uniform and appealed to bystanders to be witness to the men's cowardice. The stories recounted in this paper reveal some of methods the recipients of white feathers used to manage the humiliation. Almost as soon as the campaign began public opinion turned on the women and they were seen as abusive. Contemporary accounts vilified the women as foolish but did not condemn their aim - to persuade able bodied men to enlist. White feather girls are now seen as contemptible and shameful, despite having been 'enlisted' as unofficial recruiting agents. The dominant narrative is of noble manhood shamed into sacrifice. Society, witness in the humiliation triad, vilifies white feather women, and sees them now as symbols of heartless patriotism.

[79]Linda Sanderson, IWM Interview 13654 (1993-12-21).

Solving the Riddle of the Anzac Cove Landing

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ABSTRACT
The landings at Gallipoli's Anzac Cove on 25 April 1915 will forever be enshrined in Australian and New Zealand history, but historians remain deeply divided over whether landing in such appallingly difficult terrain was in fact a mistake. While this issue remains unresolved to this day, research based on primary sources proves beyond reasonable doubt that the Royal Navy was in the wrong place before the landings began. Certain naval officers, however, quickly became aware of the error and did their utmost to correct it. Despite those efforts, the landing still took place more than a mile north of where intended. Corroboration of the eye-witness accounts of those naval officers explains why and how this happened.

When the author looked up at the towering cliffs above Anzac[1] Cove for the first time back in 1989, questions about the Anzac landing returned with compelling force. Why did the Anzacs land in such impossible terrain? Was it a mistake? If so, why did it happen? The quest for answers from the vast bibliography was all-consuming but ultimately proved disappointing. While some historians acknowledge there was a mistake, others claim it was providential, sparing the Anzacs from slaughter on the beach that had originally been selected. Then why select that beach in the first place? And which beach was that? There is controversy about that too! In 1921 the official history of naval operations explained that an unforeseen sea current had carried the Anzacs a mile and a half north of the intended beach.[2] Both the British and Australian official histories accepted this, and it stood unchallenged for over 50 years until Eric Bush, and then Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, pointed out that the wind-free conditions at the time of the landing could not have produced a current strong enough to affect

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[1]A.N.Z.A.C. is the correct acronym for the Australian & New Zealand Army Corps, but the accepted convention 'Anzac' for both the Corps and the troops is used throughout this article.
[2]Sir Julian Corbett, *History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Volume II,* (London: Longmans Green, 1921), p. 321.

the landing to such an extent.[3] This was followed up by the naval historian Tom Frame's research in the late 1990s, which proved beyond all doubt that the sea current story was fallacious.[4] This did not prevent the Gallipoli Association from retaining the sea current story on its website until 2015 when it was finally removed.

Figure 1: The 400 foot high cliffs above Anzac Cove.[5]

Historians are still trying to separate fact from fiction. In 2015, Chris Roberts wrote, 'Hopefully, future histories and documentaries will place the landing at Anzac in an historically accurate frame, free from the mythology that dominates the present view.'[6] Why mythology should dominate such a definitive moment in Australian and New Zealand national history, is anyone's guess. While on the subject of mythology, Robin Prior claims the misplaced landing is a myth.[7] Peter Williams, on the other hand, maintains the primary objective of the landing was to draw in and engage the enemy reserves, therefore where the Anzacs did or did not land was not important and has

[3]Eric Bush, *Gallipoli*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975), p. 111; Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli,* (London: Papermac edition, 1995), pp. 54-55.

[4]Tom Frame, *The Shores of Gallipoli: Naval Aspects of the Anzac Campaign*, (Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 2000) p. 199.

[5]https://collections.slsa.sa.gov.au/resource/PRG+381/1. Accessed 17 June 2021. State Library of South Australia, PRG 381/1. The 'Sphinx' can be seen to the left with the razor ridge to Plugge's Plateau on the right.

[6]Chris Roberts, *The Landing at Anzac 1915,* (Sydney NSW: Big Sky Publishing, 2015) Introduction to second edition.

[7]Robin Prior, *Gallipoli The End of the Myth*, (Yale: Yale University Press 2009) p. 124.

received unwarranted attention.[8] Steel and Hart concluded that where the landing was intended to take place is an insoluble question.[9]

Such conflicts of opinion motivated visits to repositories in Britain and Australia that held primary-source material relating to the landing, in the belief there had to be some indisputable facts.[10] In whatever format, primary sources are often the only traces of the past left behind. Eye-witness accounts, letters, diaries, service and battalion records, ships' logs, written orders and reports, tend not to have an agenda, but they can, of course, mislead. Chris Roberts discovered that Albert Facey's eye-witness account of the landing, in his acclaimed memoir *A Fortunate Life*, was fabricated, because Facey arrived at Gallipoli on 7 May, twelve days after the landing.[11] Official reports, although written within days of the events, sometimes contain thinly disguised bias in defence of decisions and actions taken. Such 'noise' can hamper the search for facts, but through corroboration and cross-referencing, a credible picture of events can be constructed. Months of research did not conjure up any new primary sources. Ships' logs, however, have rarely been scrutinised, and while they provide some fresh insight, more surprising was the discovery that important evidence had sometimes been overlooked or misinterpreted in more familiar primary sources.

A good starting point was to establish the plans and objectives for the Anzac landing. Primary sources were the orders issued by General Sir Ian Hamilton's General Headquarters (GHQ), and Anzac Headquarters' (HQ)'s orders to subordinate commanders, and finally the naval orders of Vice-Admiral Cecil Thursby, whose amorphous fleet was tasked with organising some 400 small-boat journeys from warships and transports, to put some 23,000 Anzacs ashore.[12]

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[8]Peter Williams, *The Battle of Anzac Ridge 25 April 1915* (Loftus NSW: Australian Military History Publications, 2007), p. 72.

[9]Steel and Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli*, p. 58.

[10]Research conducted at The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA), the Imperial War Museum, London (IWM), the National Maritime Museum, London (NMM), the British Library, London (BL), the National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth (NMRN), the Australian War Memorial, Canberra (AWM), the Mitchell Library, Sydney, Archives New Zealand, The National Archives of Australia, and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC).

[11]Roberts, *The Landing at Anzac 1915*, Appendix 3, 'Turkish Machine Guns at the Landing'.

[12]C.E.W. Bean, *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Volume I*, (Sydney NSW: Angus & Robertson, 1921), p. 261 gives a detailed composition of the Corps.

On 13 April 1915, GHQ issued orders to General William Birdwood, GOC A.N.Z A.C:

> A landing in force is to be made by the A. & N.Z. Army Corps on the beach between KABA TEPE and FISHERMAN'S HUT. The objective assigned to the Army Corps is the ridge over which the GALLIPOLI – MAIDOS and BOGHALI – KOJADERE roads run, and especially MAL TEPE.[13]

The distance from Gaba Tepe to Fisherman's Hut is just over three miles.[14] There are three separate beaches along this stretch of coastline, not just the one implied in GHQ's orders. GHQ ordered that the Anzac first wave 'will be transferred … to H.M. Ships Queen, London, and Prince of Wales, which will steam during the night to a position off KABA TEPE.'[15] A rendezvous position off Gaba Tepe, the southern extremity of GHQ's target area, tends to suggest a landing in that vicinity rather than further north.

GHQ's first-day objective was the ridge that runs diagonally from the Sari Bair Heights in a south-easterly direction down to the waters of the straits at Khelia Bay, including Mal Tepe, the high point at some 500 feet on the southern slopes of this ridge. GHQ provided a clear definition of the holding position they expected Birdwood to establish before pushing on to Mal Tepe.[16] This holding position encompassed the Sari Bair Heights from which steep ridges run down to Fisherman's Hut on the left flank, while a much longer, far less steep ridge slopes down to Gaba Tepe on the right flank. This triangular position formed a natural fortress that could be held against enemy counterattacks or provide a strong platform from which to push on to Mal Tepe.[17]

[13]Instructions for GOC A. & N.Z. ARMY CORPS, General Headquarters, 13 April 1915, signed by Major General Walter Braithwaite, GSO 1. Copy No. 9 sourced from Admiral Thursby's papers at the NMM, paragraph 2.
[14]Kaba Tepe is an alternative spelling for Gaba Tepe.
[15]Instructions for GOC A. & N.Z. ARMY CORPS, General Headquarters, 13 April 1915, Copy No. 9 from Thursby's NMM papers, paragraph 3.
[16]Ibid., paragraph 6.
[17]It was from Mal Tepe in 480 BCE that Xerxes watched his armies crossing the Hellespont on their way to invade Greece.

Figure 2: GHQ's Defined Holding Position[18]

As the day of the landing approached, Birdwood grew less confident of advancing to Mal Tepe. 'He decided his first task was clear. It was to seize the mass of the mountain comprising Hill 971 and its seaward spurs.'[19] Consequently, there was not one mention of Mal Tepe in Major General William Bridges' operational orders to 1 Australian Division, the first division ashore.[20] An assessment of the strength of enemy forces convinced Anzac commanders they would probably have to fight a defensive battle from the holding position before advancing to Mal Tepe. The perimeter of the holding position measured just over seven miles, some 12,500 yards. The 13,000-strong 1 Australian Division could hold this perimeter comfortably, even without the 8,500-strong New Zealand & Australian Division. British army field service regulations in use

[18]Sketch prepared by the author based on various sources and subsequent visits.
[19]Bean, *Volume 1*, p. 225. Hill 971 was the high point, so-called because of its height in feet.
[20]Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations, Gallipoli, Volume I*, (London: Heinemann, 1929) Appendix 16, Operation Order No. 1 issued by Major-General W. T. Bridges.

at that time stipulated a ratio of one man per yard for a defensive position, or fewer, if the position was a strong one, which this one was.[21]

Birdwood, Thursby, and their staffs reconnoitred the target area from *HMS Queen* on 14 April. They noted the three ridges that sloped downwards from the Sari Bair Heights from north to south. First Ridge, nearest the coast, was the steepest by far. Cliffs, 400 feet high in some places, fell away sharply to sea level at Hell Spit, the promontory at the southern end of Anzac Cove. Behind First Ridge were the much longer Second and Third Ridges. Second Ridge was not as formidable as First Ridge but was still very rugged, and broadened out onto 400 Plateau, so-called because of its height in feet. Air reconnaissance had revealed a battery of guns there, which Birdwood noted as a prime objective.[22] About 1,000 yards beyond Second Ridge lay the critical Third Ridge, the front bastion of the holding position. As the longest of the three ridges at some five miles, it was the easiest in terms of terrain. Beyond Third Ridge a plain stretched for about three miles to Maidos and the waters of the Straits. Enemy reserves would advance from this direction, highlighting the importance of establishing the holding position before their arrival.

A more immediate objective was the enemy outpost at Gaba Tepe, protected by trenches, barbed wire, and artillery. Barbed wire extended 500 yards along the sand dunes, north of the outpost, then plunged across the beach down into the sea.[23] Any landing, therefore, had to be made north of this wire. The elimination of this outpost on the right flank was confirmed in Bridges' orders to Colonel Ewen MacLagan whose 4,000-strong 3 Brigade would be the first ashore as the covering force.[24]

As viewed from Gaba Tepe, the intended landing beach can be seen in Figure 3. Reconnaissance showed it offered an easy and open route to Third Ridge but was threatened by enfilade from enemy guns positioned behind the headland in the foreground. This beach later became known as Brighton Beach. Advancing up and over the appalling terrain of First and Second Ridges to get to Third Ridge made no sense when there was an easier, direct route from Brighton Beach. The Turkish General Staff History confirms a landing north of Gaba Tepe favoured the enemy, and the loss

[21] *Field Service Regulations, Part I, Operations 1909, Reprinted with Amendments 1914,* His Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), p. 149.
[22] Bean, *Volume I*, p. 225.
[23] Ibid., pp. 557-562; Map No. 23 opposite p. 561; footnote on p. 557.
[24] Major-General Bridges (via Chief of Staff, Colonel Cyril White) 'Instructions to Officer Commanding Covering Force' (MacLagan).

of the Sari Bair Heights would compromise the Turkish defence of the southern peninsula.[25]



Figure 3: The Intended Landing Beach. [26]

Birdwood issued his Operational Order No. 1 on 17 April stating that the 'Corps is to land North of Gaba Tepe.'[27] The following day, his orders to Bridges GOC 1 Australian Division were more specific. 'The covering force will have to advance and occupy the ridge running first east from Gaba Tepe and then north-east in Square 212, towards the crest in Square 238 [Chunuk Bair].'[28] These orders made it clear that the beach to the north of Gaba Tepe was the easiest place from which to reach Third Ridge. The ridge running 'east from Gaba Tepe', and then 'north-east to Chunuk Bair' could only be Third Ridge. The numbered squares to which Birdwood referred were on the War Office maps that both GHQ and Anzac HQ were using.[29]

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[25]*Turkish General Staff History, English Volume I*, (General Staff Publications: Ankara, 1978) pp. 135-136; p. 151.

[26]Australian War Memorial. Accession No. PO 3631.340

[27]Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations, Gallipoli, Volume I*, Appendix 14. General Birdwood's Order for Anzac Landing, dated 17 April 1915.

[28]Ibid., Appendix 15. Birdwood's Instructions to Bridges GOC 1 Australian Division, dated 18 April 1915.

[29]War Office Map No. 683, scale 1: 40,000 was not 100% accurate, but was used until July/August 1915 when it was replaced by the 1: 20,000 series, based on more accurate maps captured from the Turks.

The landing was planned as a surprise dawn assault with no preliminary naval bombardment. MacLagan's covering force would disembark from warships into strings of open boats towed by small steam pinnaces, and would land at around 04:30 in two waves. The first wave, some 1,500 Anzacs, would disembark from the battleships, *Queen*, *London,* and *Prince of Wales* into 36 open boats at a rendezvous point off Gaba Tepe. Twelve pinnaces would each take three open boats in tow, and attach themselves to the battleships, two to each side, fore and aft. The battleships had orders to head due east at five knots towards the target beach.[30] *HMS Queen*, Thursby's flagship, would signal when to stop and release the pinnaces and their tows. The pinnaces would then get into line, numbered one to twelve from right to left, and tow the open boats the rest of the way to shore. Thursby's orders were specific about the landing echelon of the first wave, '*Queen's* boats will land on the beach about 1 mile north of Kaba Tepe. *Prince of Wales's* boats four cables north of *Queen*. *London's* boats four cables north of *Prince of Wales*.'[31] A cable is 202 yards. The three battleships, therefore, had to keep some 800 yards between them. This would ensure the first-wave boats would land on a front of at least 1,600 yards.

The second wave would not enjoy the first wave's element of surprise. Some 2,500 second-wave Anzacs would disembark from seven destroyers into the destroyers' own boats and the boats returning with the pinnaces from landing the first wave. The destroyers' shallow draught would allow them to approach to about 500 yards from the shore, giving the pinnaces a short tow to the beach.[32] The covering force would then advance to Third Ridge. 11 Battalion on the left had orders to advance northeast towards Chunuk Bair. 10 Battalion would take up a central position on Third Ridge after capturing the guns on 400 Plateau, while 9 Battalion would hold the right flank after taking care of the Gaba Tepe outpost. 12 Battalion would act as reserve and take up a position near 400 Plateau.

MacLagan's covering force expected to be in possession of Third Ridge, from just short of Chunuk Bair down to Gaba Tepe by 05:30, when the first part of the main body, Colonel James M'Cay's 2 Brigade, would start landing, disembarking from transports into open boats, again towed by pinnaces.[33] M'Cay's orders were to extend to the left of MacLagan's covering force, and complete the planned holding position by shoring up the left flank from Hill 971 and Chunuk Bair down to Fisherman's Hut. Colonel Henry MacLaurin's 1 Brigade would land next, and act as divisional reserve to be used

[30]TNA ADM 137/40 - Memorandum A/32, Thursby's Naval Orders, Appendix IV, paragraph 5.
[31]Thursby's Naval Orders, Appendix IV, paragraph 6.
[32]Bean, *Volume 1*, p. 264.
[33]Steel and Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli*, p. 65.

as the situation demanded. All three brigades of 1 Australian Division planned to be ashore and in position by 09:00.[34] The New Zealand & Australian Division, providing two more brigades, an additional eight battalions, would land immediately thereafter.

Thursby's orders to *Triumph*, the marker ship for the rendezvous point, were precise. 'On the night before the landing takes place, you will proceed to a position Latitude 40°-13′ N. Longitude 26°-10′ E. and anchor on that spot.'[35] Captain Fitzmaurice confirmed anchoring *Triumph* on those co-ordinates at 22:30 on 24 April.[36] Anchoring on set co-ordinates in 1915, however, was not the exact science it is today. After consulting Iain Mackenzie at the NMRN, it would have been perfectly acceptable practice at that time for *Triumph* to anchor within 500 yards of the co-ordinates in any direction. Plotting the co-ordinates on a modern Admiralty chart, the rendezvous point is exactly 5.33 statute miles or 4.63 nautical miles west, and 1230 yards north of Gaba Tepe.[37] Given that *Triumph* could well be off by 500 yards in any direction, the History of Naval Operations cites the rendezvous point as 'five miles west of Gaba Tepe'.[38] A naval history would use nautical miles rather than statute miles, but there is little difference between 4.63 nautical miles and 5.33 statute miles. Most Gallipoli narratives quote 'five miles west of Gaba Tepe' for the rendezvous point. Again, none of them are specific as to nautical or statute miles.[39] The battleships carrying MacLagan's covering force stood off to port, north of *Triumph*. The rendezvous and landing points would obviously be in proximity i.e. just to the north of Gaba Tepe as ordered.

Because of potential navigational and positional variances like those mentioned, Thursby took special precautions. He appointed a specialist navigation officer, Lieutenant Commander John Waterlow, and gave him licence to alter the course of the first-wave boats by up to four compass points, port or starboard, to keep the landing on track.[40] Waterlow had sole discretion for both course and speed, and in effect had an enormous 90-degree arc in which to manoeuvre. Waterlow would not need that much latitude, but as will be seen, the licence to change course, as necessary, turned out to be absolutely crucial.

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[34]Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations, Gallipoli, Volume I,* p. 171.
[35]TNA ADM 137/40 - Memorandum A/33 Orders for "Triumph" 21 April 1915.
[36]TNA ADM 137/4, p. 374, Capt Fitzmaurice report, to Rear Admiral Thursby, 1 May 1915.
[37]Plotted and confirmed by Captain Mike Thomson, navigation specialist, South African Navy. One nautical mile is equivalent to 1.1508 statute miles.
[38]Corbett, *Naval Operations*, *Volume II*, p. 319.
[39]Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations, Gallipoli, Volume I*, p. 172; James, *Gallipoli*, p. 102 ; Bush, *Gallipoli*, p. 99.)
[40]Thursby's Naval Orders, Appendix III, paragraph 10.

There is evidence that Thursby sent a signal at 19:05 on the eve of the landing, moving the landing *one thousand yards closer* to Gaba Tepe, in effect about 800 yards north of Gaba Tepe. Presumably, this was with Birdwood's agreement, as he was on board *Queen* at the time. Thursby's signal appears as a handwritten amendment on all copies of his naval orders which can be found in the Admiralty records held at the UK National Archives.[41] Unfortunately, the naval signal logs were destroyed after the war by order of the Admiralty. The History of Naval Operations, however, seemed aware of the change because it confirms the right wing of the landing was to be 800 yards north of Gaba Tepe.[42] A surprise landing 800 yards from Gaba Tepe made good sense. Units detailed to capture the outpost and its guns would have less ground to cover, but they had to keep clear of the barbed wire, which as mentioned earlier, extended 500 yards north from the outpost.

Since Birdwood had sensibly sidelined the advance to Mal Tepe as a first-day objective, the overall plan was sound rather than overly ambitious, as so many narratives have claimed. The Anzacs could now simply focus on securing the holding position. Intelligence had revealed the Anzacs might be facing 20,000 enemy infantry, but the actual figure was no more than 13,000.[43] The bulk of these were held in reserve about ten miles inland at Boghali and Maidos. The Anzacs, therefore, would have ample time to secure the holding position before those reserves arrived, as well as enjoy a numerical superiority when they did so. Hamilton had planned landings and feints across a wide panorama of more than 100 miles up and down the peninsula. Enemy commanders would have to decide how best to divide their forces to meet what appeared to be multiple threats. The holding position itself, encompassing the Sari Bair Heights, was a major tactical asset. Enemy commanders would be desperate to re-gain these heights, deflecting their attention away from the landings at Cape Helles.[44] The Anzac operation had the potential to make an immense contribution to the success of the invasion.

Even more in the Anzacs' favour, only one enemy battalion was on duty where they planned to land, one company of which was south of Gaba Tepe and would take no part in the first day's action. A second company was based further inland and fell back to Third Ridge as soon as the Anzacs landed, and waited there for reinforcements. Effectively, therefore, the 4,000-strong covering force would face only a half battalion of enemy troops, two platoons of which, some 160 rifles, made up the garrison at

[41]Ibid., Appendix IV, paragraph 6.
[42]Corbett, *Naval Operations*, *Volume II*, p. 320.
[43]Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations, Gallipoli, Volume I*, p. 165, footnote 2.
[44]*Turkish General Staff History, Volume I*, pp. 135-136, & p. 151, which confirm the tactical value of the Sari Bair Heights.

Gaba Tepe.[45] A third platoon, after leaving a few pickets on the beach itself, occupied a trench on Bolton's Ridge overlooking Brighton Beach. The remaining company had platoons in position at Fisherman's Hut, Plugge's Plateau, and one in reserve on Second Ridge. These few units would face the brunt of the Anzac assault. Despite many Anzac and naval reports of machine gun fire, there were no enemy machine guns present at the time of the landing, either at Gaba Tepe or Fisherman's Hut, or anywhere in between.[46]



Figure 4: Anzac First Wave Landing.[47]

The landing was supposed to surprise the enemy but instead ended up surprising the Anzacs because it was not what they expected. Figure 4 shows the planned versus

[45]David W. Cameron, *25 April 1915*, (Crows Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2007) pp. 25-26, pp. 55-56. (Turkish platoons at some ± 83 men, were larger than Anzac and British platoons, and were three per company, as opposed to four per company for Anzac and British companies.)

[46]Mesut Uyar, *The Ottoman Defence Against the Anzac Landing*, (Sydney NSW: Big Sky Publishing, 2015), Chapter 3, The Initial Defence on the Coast; Roberts, *The Landing at Anzac 1915*, Appendix 3; *Turkish General Staff History, Volume I*, p. 136. All three sources confirm no Turkish machine guns were operating at the time of the landing, although the Turkish reserves brought machine guns with them later in the day.

[47]Bean, *Volume I,* sketch p. 255.

actual landing. Anzac first-wave units landed well to the north of where they should have been. Commander Charles Dix, the naval officer in overall command of the first-wave flotilla, shouted out as the boats were about to land, 'Tell the colonel, the dam' fools have taken us a mile too far north.'[48] He thought Colonel MacLagan was in one of the first-wave boats, but MacLagan had made a last-minute decision to land with the second wave. Dix was in no doubt that the landing had been made in the wrong place, 'We were ordered to land with the right-hand boat some 500 yards to the north of Gaba Tepe.'[49] This suggests Dix knew about the last-minute change to move the landing closer to Gaba Tepe, although his 500 yards differs slightly from the 800 yards intimated by Thursby's alleged signal. All the boats of the first wave landed clustered around Ari Burnu, directly in front of the daunting First Ridge, the very place that reconnaissance had sought to avoid. They also landed bunched together on a front of about 500 to 600 yards instead of the planned 1,600 yards. Dix never did explain who the 'dam' fools' might be. After the war, he accepted the sea current explanation, as did everyone else.

The most immediate, and serious consequence of the misplaced landing was that Gaba Tepe and its guns were out of reach. From after 05:05, i.e. some 35 minutes after the first-wave boats grounded, these guns started to harass all follow-up landings. Curiously, some narratives cite the strength of this firepower from Gaba Tepe as proof of the providential nature of the landing. Given that the original plan was to nullify this strongpoint, and given that the misplaced landing had made this impossible, by what logic could this now be perceived as providential? Less than ten percent of the covering force actually landed on Brighton Beach. These were all second-wave Anzacs comprising one 9 Battalion company and a half-company from 12 Battalion that landed from the destroyer, *HMS Beagle*.[50] The Gaba Tepe garrison gave *Beagle* a hot reception. According to *Beagle's* log, the time was 05:05.[51] Commander John Godfrey, in command of *Beagle*, confirmed heavy rifle and machine gun fire but no shrapnel.[52]

There were two obsolete Nordenfelt, rapid-fire guns at Gaba Tepe, and Godfrey must have mistaken these for machine guns.[53] Importantly, the Gaba Tepe artillery did not open fire on *Beagle* as it did later during subsequent landings when Godfrey did report shrapnel.[54] This is a key finding because it confirms the Gaba Tepe guns did not

[48]Ibid., p. 252.
[49]Captain C. C. Dix, 'Efficient Navy: How Troops Were Landed', *Reveille*, *Journal of the Returned Soldiers League,* (Sydney NSW, March 1932).
[50] Bean, *Volume I,* Map No. 11 opposite p. 256.
[51]TNA ADM 53/34912 - *Beagle's* log for 25/04/1915.
[52]TNA ADM 137/40 - Commander Godfrey's report dated 27/04/1915 sheet 396.
[53]*Turkish General Staff History, Volume I*, p. 182, footnote.
[54]TNA ADM 137/40 - Godfrey's report, sheet 396.

threaten landing on Brighton Beach until well after 05:05, some 35 minutes or more after the first wave had landed and would have penetrated some way inland. Moreover, the first-wave Anzac units detailed to destroy the guns would have been bearing down on them from the flank and rear by at least 05:00, if not before.

Figure 4: 9 & 12 Battalion Anzacs Landing from HMS Beagle.[55]

Beagle's second-wave Anzacs did take some casualties getting ashore, but not enough to hinder their progress. Within a matter of minutes these 350 or so Anzacs put the enemy defending Brighton Beach to flight, including the platoon entrenched on Bolton's Ridge, and without sustaining heavy casualties.[56] The Anzac first wave, with the added element of surprise, would surely have fared even better. This constitutes strong evidence that a full-scale landing on Brighton Beach would not have entailed the high casualties predicted by those who claim avoiding Brighton Beach was an act of providence.

Most senior commanders admitted there had been a mistake with the landing. In his report to Lord Kitchener at the War Office, Hamilton stated, 'The actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs.'[57] In other words, there had been an

[55]Australian War Memorial, Accession No. WDJ0157.
[56]Cameron, *25 April 1915*, p. 76; Bean, *Volume I,* p. 356.
[57]*The Dardanelles Commission Report,* as reproduced in *The World War I Collection*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office 2001), Military Despatch Describing the

error. Robin Prior makes a case that since the landing took place 'within the Fisherman's Hut-Gaba Tepe parameters' which 'were all that the higher commanders [including Hamilton] seemed concerned about,' the landing error is therefore a myth.[58] If this was the case, why did Hamilton report to Kitchener that the landing was rather more than a mile north of where he had selected? Hamilton could have made the same case that Prior makes, namely, the landing had taken place within the parameters set by GHQ therefore there was no error. Hamilton chose instead to report what had actually taken place.

It was common knowledge among soldiers and sailors alike that there had been a mistake with the landing. MacLagan was certainly aware of it.[59] Eric Bush, as a midshipman in one of the first-wave tows, confirmed he knew about it on the afternoon of the first day.[60] Even the Dardanelles Commission acknowledged there had been an error.[61] Many of today's historians agree. David Cameron, Edward J. Erickson, and Tim Travers, to name a few.[62] Finally, here is Charles Bean's diarised dawn encounter with General Birdwood on 26 April:

> Birdwood told me that he had been all round the line last night and seen all the men – they were fairly comfortable now. But he was obviously most disappointed by the result of the venture. 'First there was the mistake of landing us a mile and a half north of where we should have landed.' He said, 'In this ghastly country.'[63]

One cannot be sure how much more evidence is needed to convince those who still doubt there was a landing error, when Hamilton, Birdwood and the Commission of Inquiry confirm there was. Several primary sources already quoted, clearly defined the intended landing place as the open beach to the north of Gaba Tepe. Admittedly, *exactly how far to the north of Gaba Tepe* remains unresolved because several different

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Landing of the Army dated 20/05/1915 from GHQ Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to Secretary of State for War, p. 372.

[58]Prior, *Gallipoli The End of the Myth*, p. 114.

[59]Bean, *Volume I,* p. 363.

[60]Eric Bush, *Bless Our Ship*, (London: George Allen & Unwin 1958) p. 48.

[61]*The Dardanelles Commission Report*, as reproduced in *The World War I Collection*, p. 139.

[62]Cameron, *25 April 1915*, p. 31; Edward J. Erickson, *Gallipoli, Command Under Fire,* (Oxford: Osprey 2015) p. 130; Travers, *Gallipoli 1915*, (Port Stroud: Tempus, 2004) p. 106.

[63]*Bean's Gallipoli, The Diaries of Australia's Official War Correspondent,* Edited and annotated by Kevin Fewster, (Crows Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2007), Third Edition, p. 92.

distances from 500 yards, 800 yards, to one mile have all been mentioned. Such differences, however, would not have affected operations significantly. If the right flank of the landing had touched down *anywhere* between 500 yards and a mile north of Gaba Tepe, the entire landing would have taken place on Brighton Beach as planned. The question remains why was Brighton Beach so badly missed?

Eric Bush spent many years researching this very issue. His personal papers in five boxes at the Imperial War Museum are a priceless record of eye-witness testimony from veterans who had all taken part in the landing, three of whom were retired admirals.[64] One of the focal points of Bush's research was the suspicion of a course alteration to the north during the flotilla's run-in to shore. Bush had made a note of it in his diary at the time.[65] One of Bush's correspondents was Captain John Metcalf. As a midshipman, Metcalf had been in command of No. 2 Tow, immediately to the left of Waterlow's No. 1 Tow, as illustrated in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Intended Landing Order of the First-Wave Tows.[66]

[64]IWM DOCS 7481, Private Papers of Captain E.W. Bush, five boxes. Vice-Admirals Aubrey Mansergh and Eric Longley-Cook, as midshipmen, were in command of No.1 Tow and No. 5 Tow respectively. Rear-Admiral Philip Sidney Smith, as a midshipman, was aboard one of the open boats.

[65]Bush, *Gallipoli*, p. 114. Bush was about to land when he noted this course alteration.

[66]Author's diagram.

Metcalf made an astonishing admission that must have shocked Bush and his colleagues. Against orders, Metcalf admitted he had deliberately altered course to the north on his own initiative, without recourse to Waterlow, the navigation officer in the tow immediately to Metcalf's right.[67] Metcalf submitted a written account and a hand-drawn chart of the landing.[68] Metcalf's chart can be seen in Figure 6, showing how his course alterations allegedly skewed the landing towards the north. Metcalf's first course alteration was two compass points or 22½ degrees to the north, followed by a second course alteration, one compass point and a half, also to the north. His motive was to save the landing from enfilading fire from Gaba Tepe, which was an extraordinary judgment for a junior naval officer to make, when senior Anzac commanders had been planning how to deal with Gaba Tepe for weeks.



Figure 6: Metcalf's Chart.[69]

Eric Bush concluded Metcalf's course alterations were largely responsible for the landing error, but he also believed the battleships must accept some of the blame for being out of position too far to the north.[70] Bush's conclusion that Metcalf's course alterations were largely responsible for the landing error is puzzling, because in his own papers there is evidence to the contrary. Steel and Hart, who consulted the same source material, concluded that Metcalf's chart was misleading.[71] As proof, Steel and

[67]IWM DOCS 7481, the Bush Papers, letter from Metcalf to Bush, 4 March 1965.
[68]Ibid., 'My Account of the Landing' by Captain J. S. Metcalf, a typed essay with an accompanying chart.
[69]Ibid.
[70]Bush, *Gallipoli*, p. 114.
[71]Steel and Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli*, endnote 4, pp. 425-426.

Hart cited the eye-witness accounts of Commander Dix and Major Hedley Vicars Howe who were in tows Number 12 and 9 respectively.[72] Dix confirmed that the left wing of the flotilla held its course all the way to shore.[73] Howe corroborated this and sent Bush his own diagram of the landing, which is shown in Figure 7.[74]



Figure 7: Major Hedley Vicars Howe's Diagram.[75]

Howe and Dix both confirmed that the tows on the left held their course and did not veer off to the north as Metcalf claimed. Howe, who had close links with the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, refused to forward a copy of Metcalf's chart to the

[72]Major Hedley Vicars Howe was an Australian officer who served with distinction in both world wars. He was a lance corporal in 11 Battalion in No. 9 Tow at the landing and was commissioned later in France.
[73]Dix, article in *Reveille*, March 1932.
[74]IWM DOCS 7481 - the Bush Papers, diagram attached to a letter from Howe to Bush dated 10 July 1968.
[75]Ibid., Howe's diagram was attached to a letter from Howe to Bush dated 10 July 1968.

Memorial because he believed it was incorrect.[76] Metcalf's course alterations forced some of the tows to his left to cut across the bows of the central tows, displacing some of them to the right.[77] This, of course, ruined the landing echelon, but had no influence on the overall direction of the flotilla. Therefore, Bush's conclusion that Metcalf's course alterations were largely responsible for the landing error was mistaken.

Bush, however, was on much stronger ground with regard to the battleships. If Metcalf's course alterations did not swing the flotilla northwards, it must already have been off course to the north after its release from the battleships. Therefore, the battleships themselves must have been off course to the north both before their due-east run-in, and later when they released the tows. The due east run-in was confirmed in the logs of all three battleships.[78] *Prince of Wales*' log also confirmed an anchorage position 1.82 statute, or 1.58 nautical miles, due west of Ari Burnu at 04:25 that morning.[79] Captain Robert Bax, in command of *Prince of Wales*, also made a note in his personal diary, 'When daylight came, we found we had anchored one mile too far north.'[80] The support role of the battleships was to cover the landing with their guns, so Bax naturally anchored where the first wave had gone in. Both his anchorage position off Ari Burnu and his diary entry confirm his battleship was considerably north of the intended landing location. How had this come about?

As alluded to earlier, *HMS Triumph* could well have been 500 yards north of the intended rendezvous point. All three battleships stood off to the north of *Triumph*. Thursby had also ordered the battleships to keep a distance of four cables or 800 yards between them. Adding these distances together is already 2,100 yards, which could well place the battleships and their tows in the vicinity of Ari Burnu, which is about 2,400 yards north of the rendezvous point. From such a position north of the rendezvous point, the battleships then set off on their due east run a few minutes after the moon had set at 02:57.[81] They stopped at 03:22, and made ready to release the

[76]Ibid., letter from Howe to Bush, dated 11 February 1973. Howe was member of Bean's Historical Mission to Gallipoli in 1919.
[77]Both Metcalf's chart and Howe's diagram confirm this.
[78]TNA ADM 53/47099/55828/56781 - ship's logs for *HM Ships London, Prince of Wales,* and *Queen* respectively for 25 April 1915.
[79]Ibid., TNA ADM 53/55828 - *Prince of Wales*' ship's log 25 April 1915, anchorage position plotted on a modern Admiralty chart, making allowance for the 3º West compass variation that obtained at Gallipoli in 1915, confirmed by Captain Mike Thomson, navigation specialist, South African Navy.
[80]Bush, *Gallipoli*, p. 114. As a naval officer, Bax must have meant a nautical mile.
[81]Steel and Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli*, p. 53.

tows.[82] At a speed of five knots, the battleships would have covered about two nautical miles or about 2.4 statute miles in ± 25 minutes, leaving about two and half nautical miles or three statute miles to go. Most narratives quote 'two and a half miles' to go, without specifying nautical or statute miles.[83] The steam pinnaces with their tows would have taken some time to get into line and position before setting off at about 03:40.[84] The open boats then landed at 04:30, giving a total journey time of ± 50 minutes for the first-wave flotilla.

As the pinnaces approached the shore, they had to slow down so as to check with boathooks where the water shoaled before releasing their tows. The open boats were then rowed the last 100 yards or so to the shore. The History of Naval Operations suggests that the time was about 04:15 when the boats, with oars muffled, began to row towards the shore.[85] Subtracting these fifteen minutes or so from the total journey time of ± 50 minutes, gives the pinnaces a total journey time of ± 35 minutes. To travel ± two and a half nautical miles or ± three statute miles in ± 35 minutes, requires a speed of ± five knots, a realistic speed for a steam pinnace of that era towing three open boats loaded with some 125 Anzacs, each carrying a 40 kg pack.[86] The battleships had also executed their run-in at five knots. The pinnaces would have registered the same speed during this run-in, because slipping one's tow at the same speed as the towing vessel is standard good seamanship.[87] It is also well documented that the twelve steam pinnaces did not keep to the prescribed 150-yard gap.[88] It was pitch dark, and the pinnaces closed the gap to about 50 yards in order to remain in sight of one another, facilitated by the phosphorescenct glow from their bow waves. Because the tows closed to port towards *HMS London's* tows, which held their course, this effectively reduced the landing frontage from the planned 1600 yards to the truncated frontage of only 500 to 600 yards.

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[82]TNA ADM 53/47099 - ship's log for *HMS London*, 'stopped 3.22', the only battleship to log a stopping time.

[83]Corbett, *Naval Operations*, *Volume II*, p. 320 states 'two to three miles'. The following sources all state 'about two and a half miles'. Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations, Gallipoli, Volume I*, p. 173; Steel & Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli*, p. 54; Robert Rhodes James, *Gallipoli*, (London: Pan Books Edition, 1984), p. 103.

[84]IWM DOCS 7481 - the Bush Papers, 'about 03:40' was the time the tows set off, as recorded in Metcalf's account.

[85]Corbett, *Naval Operations*, *Volume II*, p. 321.

[86]Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations, Gallipoli, Volume I*, footnote p. 172.

[87]This insight is from Commander Andy Schroder of the Royal Australian Navy, the Navy Fellow at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra,

[88] Thursby's Naval Orders, Appendix III, paragraph 10.

All the first-wave boats landed at more or less the same time, therefore, the journey time of the twelve tows must have been about the same, i.e. ± 35 minutes, with perhaps the exception of Waterlow's tow, which, as will be seen, was last to arrive. Metcalf confirmed he made his second course alteration at 04:10, by which time he must have been quite close to the shore.[89] Bush diarised this second course alteration as taking place at 04:20 when he was very close to shore.[90] Dix's account more or less corroborates this. He confirmed the right wing started to cut across the central tows when 'three-quarters of the way ashore'.[91] This must have been Metcalf's second course alteration, the one that Bush had noted. Given that the flotilla had approximately two and half nautical miles or three statute mile to travel, three-quarters of the way would be in the region of about 1,300 yards from the shore. At ± five knots, the pinnaces would close this distance in about seven or eight minutes. Therefore, they must already have been slowing down at this stage to begin their landing procedure. When three separate primary-source accounts tally in this way with a difference of only a few yards, it constitutes strong evidence for the actual events they describe. Dix's journey time, with his side of the flotilla holding its course was the same as Metcalf's i.e. ± 35 minutes. This is further proof that Metcalf's course alterations did not skew the flotilla northwards, because the course depicted in Metcalf's chart was a longer journey, and would have taken more than ± 35 minutes.

Further evidence of the flotilla being too far north after its release by the battleships, is given in Dix's account when he wrote, 'Some of us were awake to the fact that we were *already some way port of our objective*. [author's italics added].'[92] Dix, and presumably other naval officers in the flotilla, noticed they were north of where they should have been. Therefore, when the tows to the right started their Metcalf-inspired movements *further* towards the north, Dix did his utmost to hold his course because, as he confirmed in his article, 'the less would be the error.'[93]

As navigation officer, Waterlow must have made the same judgment as Dix and others, namely that the flotilla was already some way port of its objective when released by the battleships. Judging by the course and bearing that Waterlow immediately set for the flotilla, a very important piece of his eye-witness testimony may have been overlooked:

[89]IWM DOCS 7481 - the Bush Papers. On Metcalf's chart, 04:10 is the time recorded for his second course alteration.
[90]Bush, *Gallipoli*, p. 114.
[91]Dix, article in *Reveille*, March 1932.
[92]Ibid.
[93]Ibid.

> All the other 11 steam pinnaces were to keep station on me, and we started off about *two points on the starboard bow of Queen, trying to make Gaba Tepe* [author's italics added]. It was now so dark we could see but little, but … it did seem as if a prominent headland, such as I had been given to understand Gaba Tepe was, loomed ahead of us, so we went gaily on.[94]

Waterlow here confirms he deliberately set a course, *two compass points on the starboard bow of Queen*, i.e. 22½ degrees in a *south-east direction*. By setting such a course, Waterlow, as he says, was trying to make Gaba Tepe because, as Dix had also noted, they were some way to port of their objective. Waterlow was acting within the licence given him by Thursby to alter course as necessary to keep the landing on track.



Figure 8: Waterlow's Change of Course towards the Intended Landing Beach.[95]

The short block form arrow indicates Waterlow's attempt to get the landing back on track by steering two points, 22.5 degrees, off the starboard bow of *Queen* towards Gaba Tepe, when approximately two and a half miles nautical miles or three statute miles from shore. Metcalf confirmed Waterlow's change of course, because in his own account, he admits he complied with this change of course, at least to begin with:

> About a quarter of an hour later I realized *we were* heading *very close to the north side of Gaba Tepe* which, because of its height, is very conspicuous. [Author's Italics added.] Knowing that there were Turkish troops there, and we would get an enfilading fire all along our starboard side as well as from ahead, I was

[94]IWM DOCS 7481 - the Bush Papers, extract from Waterlow's diary. Waterlow was killed during the Battle of Jutland in 1916. In 1970, Waterlow's nephew, Captain Peter Norton RN, found his uncle's Gallipoli diary among some family papers and made parts of it public.
[95]Author's diagram.

> confident that we must be heading for a wrong place. There was no one to consult and I felt the lives of the men I was towing were my responsibility. Without any delay I altered course two points to port to get away from Gaba Tepe. [96]

Metcalf confirmed the flotilla was on course heading towards the north side of Gaba Tepe and therefore on course towards the intended landing place. Metcalf's course alteration two points to port, however, cancelled out Waterlow's two points to starboard. The net result of this was that the greater part of the flotilla, certainly those over to the left, were unaware of any change of course. Bush, for example, in Tow 8 did not notice any change of course, either to starboard or port, until Metcalf made his *second course alteration,* by which time Bush and the flotilla were very close to shore. In hindsight, if Waterlow had been on the extreme left of the flotilla instead of the extreme right, the landing would have taken place where intended, regardless of Metcalf's apprehensions. However, being on the extreme right, Waterlow found himself isolated when Metcalf changed course in the opposite direction. For a while, Waterlow remained on the course he had set back towards Gaba Tepe, but then noticed the gap between himself and the other tows widening very quickly. He had no choice but to follow after them in the hope of drawing them south again:

> At last I altered course and went down the line astern trying to draw them to the southward with me. This failed, and I was now convinced [this] was not Gaba Tepe. It was too high … the one place on the whole coast on which we would have decided not to land … in despair I dashed straight for the frowning cliffs now straight ahead.[97]

Waterlow's description of 'frowning cliffs' can only be the terrain above Anzac Cove. Vice-Admiral Aubrey Mansergh, as a 16 year-old midshipman, was at the helm of Waterlow's pinnace and he confirmed that No. 1 Tow with 9 Battalion Anzacs ended up on the far left of the flotilla.[98] This explains something that has puzzled readers over the years. Namely, how Major S.B. Robertson and his 9 Battalion men managed to take part in the subsequent fight for Baby 700 on the far left flank, when the rest of 9th Battalion took part in the fight for 400 Plateau on the far right. The most probable landing order of the tows is shown in Figure 9. Waterlow's 9 Battalion tow is placed on the far left in accordance with Mansergh's testimony. Bush's tow is the solitary 10 Battalion tow in the centre, because Metcalf and the two 9 Battalion tows to his left, cut across the bows of the 10 Battalion tows, displacing three of them to the far right.

[96]IWM DOCS 7481 - the Bush Papers, extract from Metcalf's account of the landing.
[97]Ibid., the Bush Papers, extract from Waterlow's diary.
[98]Ibid., letter dated 29 January 1962 from Vice-Admiral Mansergh.

The only tows that landed together in the correct order were the four 11 Battalion tows on the left.



Figure 9: Most Probable Landing Order of First Wave Tows.[99]

In summary, the Anzac first-wave flotilla was off-station to the north when it was released by the battleships because the battleships themselves were off-station to the north before and after their due east run-in. The anchorage position recorded in *Prince of Wales'* log confirms this, as does Captain Bax's diary entry. Dix's testimony that the first-wave tows were already some way port of their objective after the battleships released them corroborates this. Vice-Admiral Thursby had made provision for such an eventuality, having given Waterlow licence to alter course, as necessary, to put the landing back on track. There seems little doubt this was what Waterlow was doing when he set a southeast course *back towards Gaba Tepe,* which was corroborated by Metcalf before he changed course in the opposite direction. The battleships were in the wrong place - too far north, but they would have followed in the wake of Waterlow's revised course, had it been sustained. Then they would then have been in the right place, providing fire-support off Brighton Beach as planned. The destroyers too, following closely behind the first wave, would have landed the second wave on Brighton Beach as planned.

Metcalf's course alterations were not responsible for skewing the landing off to the north, but they did destroy the planned landing echelon. More importantly, Metcalf prevented Waterlow from executing his role as navigation officer. Metcalf must accept the blame for his actions, and *ipso facto* so must the Royal Navy. Eric Bush and Christopher Pugsley set the blame squarely on the Royal Navy. Bush wrote, 'It is

[99]Author's diagram.

beyond my understanding why the Army … took pains to shield the Royal Navy from its responsibility for putting the Anzacs down in the wrong place.'[100] Pugsley concluded, 'At Anzac the Navy failed …the mistake was primarily due to the Navy being in the wrong place.'[101] It seems harsh to blame the Royal Navy for the misguided actions of one junior officer. At the same time, one must bear in mind that amphibious assaults were breaking new, unfamiliar ground in 1915. Edward J. Erickson points out:

> Nothing like this had ever before been attempted nor were there any doctrines, training or similar experiences available from which to draw conclusions. After the Second World War, historians and the public were so familiar with successful assault landings that it became easy to forget how difficult these operations were, and fashionable to characterize Hamilton's landings as badly planned and poorly executed.[102]

Because of the misplaced landing, the Anzacs had to negotiate the appalling terrain above Anzac Cove. This used up valuable time, but they still had time enough to occupy Third Ridge and the Sari Bair Heights as planned. Some of their senior commanders, however, seemed overly disorientated by the misplaced landing. MacLagan, M'Cay and Bridges failed to grasp and rectify the new situation in line with original plans and objectives. Halting his covering force on Second Ridge and ordering it to dig in, was MacLagan's first mistake, made worse by his second, namely, persuading M'Cay to deploy 2 Brigade on 400 Plateau instead of following original orders to secure the left flank and the high ground. These poor tactical decisions handed the initiative to the Turkish reserves who occupied Third Ridge and the Sari Bair Heights ahead of the Anzacs. Once the enemy had possession of the strongest points of the Anzacs' own holding position, the game was virtually over.

The Royal Navy was in the wrong place, but if Metcalf had obeyed orders and allowed Waterlow to execute his, this would not have mattered a jot. The landing on Brighton Beach would have gone ahead as planned. Given a direct, easy route to Third Ridge and the Sari Bair Heights, the Anzacs could have been in a winning position, achieving all their objectives instead of failing to achieve any.

[100]Bush, *Gallipoli*, p. 110.
[101]Christopher Pugsley, *Gallipoli The New Zealand Story* (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 1998) p. 141.
[102]Edward J. Erickson, *Gallipoli, Command Under Fire,* pp. 116-117.

Static and Dynamic Strategy Making: Egypt, Singapore, Dill and Brooke

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ABSTRACT
In 1941 Britain faced the strategic dilemma of how to apportion forces between the defence of the British Isles, the Mediterranean and its interests in Australasia. Determining the priorities between these theatres and the required balance of forces was the cause of disagreement between Churchill and his successive Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill and Sir Alan Brooke. Ultimately, Brooke was successful in maintaining the trust of Churchill, and retained his job; while Dill was unsuccessful and was sacked. This paper examines the different analytical processes, static and dynamic, that Dill and Brooke employed to determine strategy.

Introduction: ways, means and ends

During the 1920s and 1930s Britain wrestled with the problem of how best to defend the home islands as well as its commercial and imperial interests across the globe, and all this at a time of economic depression and severe limitations in defence expenditure. This problem was initially managed through the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty which limited the naval ambitions of France, Japan and Italy compared to a superior naval parity agreed between Britain and the United States of America (USA). However, in 1923, the USA insisted on the abrogation of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. More than ten years of stability followed until, in the 1930s, Nazi Germany began to re-arm while at the same time Japan pursued an expansionist policy under a series of governments dominated by the military.[1]

By mid-1940, with the fall of France, Britain found itself on the horns of a strategic dilemma as it faced Germany and Italy alone, with the Soviet Union in a pact with

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[1]See Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vols I & II,* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2016; Andrew Boyd, *The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters,* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017).

Germany and the USA remaining a neutral. Before the USA joined the war, the Mediterranean was the only theatre where Britain and the Axis Powers were directly engaged on land. Up to that point, Britain's strategic problem was essentially how to allocate resources between the defence of the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean while still providing some sort of defence, assumed to be of a deterrent nature, for its Empire in the East. This delicate calculation was dramatically upset when in December 1941 Japan moved against British interests in South East Asia and threatened India, Australia and New Zealand.

Japan's moves greatly increased Britain's strategic concerns of how best to apportion its limited military forces between the needs of homeland defence and its overseas commitments. The consensus between Whitehall and the military was that Britain lacked the capability to simultaneously conduct operations to defend Egypt and defend its Imperial possessions in South East Asia and Australasia. The question of which overseas theatre to resource and which to hold at risk caused much angst and soul searching among politicians and commanders; for Churchill it was a 'tragic issue, like trying to choose whether your son or your daughter should be killed.'[2]

This paper reviews the different approaches adopted by Sir John Dill and Sir Alan Brooke, the successive Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) during this period. We consider military strategy in terms of how the contextual ways, means and ends form a relationship between different theatres of conflict and the prioritisation of resources between them. While previous researchers have examined how strategic disagreements between Dill and Churchill led to a premature ending of Dill's tenure as CIGS, they did not consider the analysis that led to these disagreements.[3] To set the context for their thinking, we first review British strategic thinking from the outbreak of war to Dill's appointment as CIGS in May 1940.

Muddling Through: British Strategic Thinking 1939-1940

From the outset of the war, Britain's strategic direction was subject to disruptions and revisions. The immediate cause of this turbulence can be appreciated by considering how the ways, means and ends open to Britain were viewed at the time.

Defining the ends at the beginning of the war was complicated by Prime Minister Chamberlain's unwillingness to state any clear idea of what an acceptable outcome of

[2]W. S. Churchill, *The History of the Second World War*, *Volume III, The Grand Alliance,* (London: Cassell, 1948-54), p. 372.

[3]Alex Danchev, *'Dilly-Dally', or having the last word: Field Marshall Sir John Dill and Prime Minister Winston Churchill*, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22 (1987), pp. 21-44; Jeffery, Keith (1982) *The Eastern arc of empire: A strategic view 1850–1950*, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 5:4, pp. 531-545.

the war would look like for Britain. Chamberlain avoided discussion of grand strategy and long-term war policy as the price of maintaining consensus within the War Cabinet. In this approach he was aided by Churchill, probably out of fear that his views on strategy would not be accepted by the cabinet as a whole.[4] Similarly, once Prime Minister, Churchill did not state any explicit war aims but instead talked vaguely about *principles* for the conduct of the war, which included war aims, but did not articulate either these principles or aims.[5]

An immediate consequence of a lack of clear thinking on ends, other than vague statements about the defeat of Germany, was that the military advice received by the cabinet, principally through the Chiefs of Staff (CoS), tended to be disjointed and could not be strategically framed in the absence of any overall policy set by the Cabinet.

From a strictly military point of view, the ways by which Germany should be defeated revolved around two main problems: when to start offensive operations, and where to conduct those operations.

The question of when was dictated by the decision to wage a long war versus a short war. The prevailing view in 1939 was that although Germany held the immediate advantage through arming and mobilising first, the latent power of Britain and France's combined financial and industrial capability would be converted into sufficient military power to achieve success.[6]

A complicating factor was that defence policy in the interwar years relied on a series of treaties, particularly naval ones, and had also evolved to take advantage of the flexibility and reach of maritime and air power to secure Britain's wider global interests. This was especially true in South East Asia, where the Navy's dominance, was enabled through a permanent base at Singapore, and which protected British Malaya and the approaches to India and Australasia.[7] The planning assumption that had

[4]John Kiszely, *Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 43.
[5]Churchill referred to guiding principles which included war aims in speech in September 1941, see Wm. Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945,* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), pp. 129-32.
[6]This argument was widely aired and agreed upon across British society as a whole, see *War and Postwar Economics*, The Economist, 2 September 1939, pp. 434-436.
[7] Malcolm Murfett, *Living in the Past": A Critical Re-examination of the Singapore Naval Strategy, 1918-1941*, War & Society, 11 (May 1993), pp. 73-10.

held since the 1920s and Japan's invasion of China in 1937 was that the dispatch of a British fleet to Singapore would be sufficient to prevent any aggression.[8]

This created a tension in British strategy, even if it was not aired in these terms at the time: how to reconcile the preference for a long war with Germany against the need to prepare for possible future Japanese aggression. Planning assumptions in 1939 considered three years to be the time required to fully equip and train an army of around 50 divisions, which would be capable of launching a joint offensive with France and defeat a Germany by then weakened by an effective economic blockade.[9] It is debatable whether Japan would have risked invading Malaya if Britain and France were on the cusp of the offensive against Germany in December 1941.[10]

Once the BEF deployed to France, it is widely held that the strategic arguments concerning what type of war to fight and where to fight it had been resolved as a long war and with the land fighting to be conducted in Flanders.[11] However, no sooner than the BEF had taken up its positions in France, political and military leaders began to agitate against this perceived passive approach to the war.[12] It was not a reappraisal of long-term global issues, such as those described above, that cast doubt in the belief in a long war approach, but uncertainties as to the true condition of Germany's capability, which in the absence of analysis, allowed legend to lead strategic thinking.

As to where to fight, debates on the need for an alternative or second front were based on echoes of the Westerners versus Easterners arguments of the Great War, rather than the fundamentals of the contemporary situation. The Allies' lack of understanding of their own military and economic position was matched only by their inability to assess Germany's strengths and weaknesses.

The verdict that 'the War Cabinet appeared to have a very limited understanding of strategy or to have an overall guiding policy for the conduct of the war' is unsurprising given that ministers and their senior advisors lacked a suitable framework to even

[8]Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and the Coming of the Pacific War, 1939-1941*, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 24 (1974), pp. 43-62.
[9]Talbot Charles Imlay, *A Reassessment of Anglo-French Strategy during the Phony War, 1939-1940*. The English Historical Review Vol. 119, No. 481 (Apr., 2004), pp. 333-372 - for a review of the strategic disputes between Britain and France during this period.
[10]Lowe, *Coming of the Pacific War*, pp. 43-62.
[11]Imlay, p336. See also Adrian, W. Preston, *General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second World War,* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 41–64.
[12]Imlay, pp. 333-372.

begin to consider the problem.[13] There was no single organisation within Whitehall capable of conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the permutations of ways, means and ends. Given the high degree of uncertainty as to Germany's true strengths and weaknesses at the time, it follows that confidence in any such assessment would also have been low. Politicians struggled with how to interpret, and where necessary challenge, military advice. Similarly, civil servants and military leaders were unpractised in how to assess proposed military courses of action in terms of their political benefits.

Assessment was conducted on many issues relating to these strategic questions but by different bodies, and at different times. As such, the conclusions were often disjointed and sometimes relied on contradictory assumptions, which made it impossible to aggregate the different pieces into a strategic whole.

These uncertainties in British thinking were amplified by disagreements between the Allies. Both the questions of when and where the war should be fought were debated with France almost continually from the deployment of the BEF until the fall of France.[14]

These decisions were made on preconceptions of strategic ideas more often coloured by memories of 1914 than by an understanding of the contemporary landscape. One consequence of this was that Britain and France often drew very different conclusions when presented with similar evidence on an issue. As an example, Britain was opposed to conducting any military operations in the Balkans on the grounds that it might cause Italy's entry into the war on the side of Germany; at the same time there was a strong opinion within the French military that action in the Balkans would deter Italy from involvement in the war.[15]

Britain was relieved from the conundrums of where and when to fight following Germany's invasion of Norway and France in 1940. Reacting to these events as the main form of resolving strategic decisions was soon to be repeated.

Dill: A Question of Priorities

A significant share of the blame for Britain's inability to clearly formulate strategy in the first year of the war undoubtedly lay with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This body, consisting of the de facto heads of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force, had the role of providing military advice to the War Cabinet. At the start of

[13] John Kiszely, *Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p 39.

[14] See Imlay, pp. 333-372 for a review of the strategic disputes between Britain and France during this period.

[15] Imlay, pp. 333-372

the war this advice was delivered through the Military Co-ordination Committee which was established in October 1939 to review and report to the War Cabinet on the strategic situation and the progress of operations.[16]

The invasion of France in May 1940 swept away Chamberlain's government which was replaced by a coalition headed by Churchill. One of Churchill's first acts as Prime Minister was to disband the Military Co-ordination Committee and replace it with a Defence Committee with two functions: operations and supply. The Defence Committee retained the Chiefs of Staff but removed the service minsters; in their place Churchill combined the role of Prime Minster with that of Minister of Defence.[17] From this point the development of strategy became increasingly influenced by the personal relationship between the Chiefs of Staff and Churchill.

The need for his Chiefs of Staff to be an acceptable personal fit to Churchill's thinking was demonstrated by the dismissal of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Sir Edmund Ironside. He was replaced by his deputy, the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS) Sir John Dill, on 27 May 1940.

A former Commandant of the Staff College and instructor at the Imperial Defence College, Dill was regarded by his peers as one of the leading strategic thinkers in the military.[18] Following his appointment as CIGS, Dill quickly established himself as the font of strategy among his fellow Chiefs of Staff, his 'authority derived from a study and experience of the central direction of war unmatched at that juncture by any other serving officer.'[19] As yet there is no biography of Dill to explain how exactly he developed this authority or his expertise in strategic thinking; although a brief examination of his military career prior to appointment as CIGS offers some clues.[20]

[16]The Military Co-ordination Committee did not enjoy a good reputation and was "otherwise known as the Crazy Gang", see Danchev, pp. 202-230.

[17]John Gooch, *The Chiefs of Staff and The Higher Organization for Defence in Britain, 1904-1984*. Naval War College Review, JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1986, Vol. 39, No. 1 (JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1986), pp. 53-65.

[18]Basil Liddell-Hart, BLH papers, King's College London. Quoted in Danchev, pp 21-44.

[19]Danchev, pp. 21-44.

[20]Historical research into Dill's life and personality is unusually sparse for a man who was to have such influence on strategic thinking during the war. The only biographical reference is Danchev, pp 28-39. Otherwise, pieces of Dill's life require reconstruction from official documents and the lives of others, notably Churchill's mainly autobiographical *History of the Second World War* and Brooke's *War Diaries*. All of these sources have been heavily drawn on for this work, along with unpublished thoughts regarding the different influences on Dill's thinking and how his mindset developed

First and foremost we can consider the influence of the Army Staff College on Dill's development. A student on the 1913 course, Dill's cohort were informed by the Commandant, Sir William Robertson, that they were very lucky to have a definite war to train for.[21] The theoretical basis that Camberley taught him was immediately reinforced with practical experience of staff work during the Great War, as Dill rose through a succession of staff appointments at the brigade, division and corps levels, finishing as a (brevet) Brigadier of BEF Operations at GHQ. The First World War influenced a generation of soldiers and helped the brightest among them work out how to fight a war, or at the very least, how *not* to fight a war.[22]

As well as academic exertions at Staff College, Dill's time as Director Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I) at the War Office was important to developing his practical understanding of the application of high-level strategy and logistics. In particular, as DMO&I Dill had to deal daily with multiple theatres and global problems. This gave Dill a full appreciation of the essentials of military strategy: how different theatres of operations are related and how they interact with each other. Dill's ability to master these essentials was noticeably superior to that of his peers - following a conference to brief Commanders-in-Chief on the world situation in 1941, Brooke noted that 'I knew of no man who could marshal strategic events and situations better than he could.'[23]

When Dill joined the Chiefs of Staff Committee, he had spent the majority of his military career either training and instructing on high-level thinking or in roles that required him to apply that thinking. But unparalleled knowledge and experience alone were not sufficient to maintain Churchill's approval. Dill lasted barely 18 months as CIGS before the Prime Minister replaced him with Brooke. The heart of the dispute between them was the question of strategic priorities.

This fatal disagreement on strategic priorities first appears to have arisen due to a telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia, Menzies, on 24 April 1941.[24] Menzies

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that have been provided by Dr E D G Smalley from his research into the history of the BEF between 1939-40.

[21]*Field Marshall Sir John Dill: The Early Years,* Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. 67, No. 269 Spring 1989, pp 28-39.

[22]E. D. G. Smalley, (private communication to author August 2019).

[23]Alex Danchev & Daniel Todman (Eds), *War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke*, (London, Phoenix, 2002), pp 196-197. Note added after the war to the entry for 6 Nov 1941.

[24]The UK National Archive (hereinafter TNA) CAB 79-11-12, Telegram 242, in Annex to JP (41) 335, 28 April 1941.

requested a 'candid and outspoken' appreciation of what assistance Australia could expect from the UK in the event of Japanese aggression in the South Pacific and a German expulsion of Allied forces from the Mediterranean and Iran; the Chiefs of Staff were requested to prepare an appreciation of the global situation.[25] Prior to this, the strategic priorities agreed to by the Chiefs of Staff were the defence of the UK, followed by the protection of Egypt from attack through Libya.[26]

Churchill had previously stated that Britain would prioritise assistance to Australia over the Mediterranean. But in Canberra, concerns were growing that reverses in North Africa and Greece in 1941, and the US recognition of Germany as a bigger threat than Japan, had reduced the priority that the defence of Australia had in the minds of both Britain and the USA.[27]

On 6 May 1941 Dill sent a paper to Churchill, his fellow Chiefs of Staff and General Ismay titled *The Relation of the Middle East to the Security of the United Kingdom.*[28] Dill argued that the order of priorities was the defence of the British Isles, followed by Singapore, and then Egypt. In his reply a week later Churchill did not agree, placing Egypt before Singapore. This then was the 'nub of the strategic issue between them.'[29]

Understanding how Dill derived his priorities is complicated as he did not, unlike his successor Brooke, keep a diary complete with retrospective comments, to justify his thinking to posterity. Instead we are left trying to hear his inner thoughts at a distance of almost 80 years, through the staff reports and appreciations that he endorsed and approved. From these sources, the kernel of Dill's strategic reckoning appears to have been armoured strength: and, specifically, Britain's number of tanks relative to Germany.

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[25]As well as to inform Australia, an appreciation of the situation of the Middle East was required to brief the UK Military Mission in Washington (TNA CAB 79-11-10, TNA COS (41) 150th Meeting 28 April 1941).

[26]TNA COS (40) 1004, 2 December 1940, TNA CAB 80/24.

[27]Dominion Office Cable No. 510, 23 Dec 1941, quoted in Telegram 242. The idea that Egypt had strategic priority over Singapore appears to have been shared by Churchill as well as senior British officers from late 1940. A telegram dated 30 November 1940 from the Air Attaché in Washington to CAS, Portal, stated that the strategic priorities for patrols were the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean and then Singapore (Telegram No. Briny 1693, 29/11/40, CAB 80/24). This may explain the relative neglect of Malaya's defences that soon would become a national scandal.

[28]TNA CAB 65/22 reproduced in Churchill, *The History of the Second World War, Volume III,* p. 373, followed by Churchill's reply on 13 May.

[29]Danchev, pp. 21-44.

Despite the German invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Dill was concerned that the security of Britain remained at risk and that German air and land forces could concentrate for invasion within six to eight weeks after their release from the Balkans.[30] This view was not shared by his fellow Chiefs of Staff: Portal had disagreed previously when Dill raised the point that the flexibility of air power could enable the Germans to concentrate quickly for an invasion of the UK, arguing that maintaining Allied Air Forces in the Middle East would also compel Germany to retain a considerable portion of their air forces in the Mediterranean.[31]

While the sudden collapse of the French and the retreat of the BEF clearly came as a shock to Dill and reduced his confidence that the Army could resist an invasion attempt, it is also possible that Dill's pessimism was influenced by memories of the behaviour of Germany in March 1918 when it launched Operation Michael. This was to be Germany's last major offensive on the Western Front in an attempt to defeat the Allies before Germany was overmatched by reinforcements from America. Dill's appreciation commented that 'As US aid grows the enemy must be closely watching for an opportunity to launch the campaign which might win him the war.'[32]

For Dill, Germany's ability to bring superior armoured forces to bear supported by a powerful air force, which had been demonstrated in the contrasting terrains of France, the Balkans and Libya, was something to be wary of in strategic planning. Dill calculated, probably based on assessments from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), that Germany could threaten the UK with six armoured divisions, comprising 2,400 tanks. This assessment of the likely numbers of German armoured strength was reasonably accurate: a few weeks later on 22 June 1941, around 3,350-3,795 tanks deployed for the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa. Dill's appreciation was reasonably correct in terms of quantity of armour available to Germany, but ignored likely German intentions and the fact that these tanks were located in Poland and east Prussia at the time.

The June 1941 forecast for armour available in the UK was 1,250 tanks. Of these, 150 were light tanks and 490 were not in front-line units but in tank schools and training establishments.[33] This was the equivalent of three fully effective armoured divisions for the defence of the home base versus six German armoured divisions.

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[30]TNA CAB 65/22.

[31]TNA CAB 79-11-10, TNA COS (41) 150th Meeting, 28 April 1941.

[32]TNA CAB 65/22.

[33]Of these 490 tanks, 360 could be made fit for action given three weeks' notice. At the time, the C-in-C Home Forces – Dill's protégé and successor as CIGS, Alan Brooke, – believed that 2,600 tanks were required to defend the UK. These were to be organised into six armoured divisions and four independent tank brigades. In

By considering only the number of tanks Dill, and the Joint Planners, implicitly assumed that all German tanks committed to an invasion of Britain were instantly available on the beachheads without considering British air and maritime interdiction. Dill made the point that 'air attack cannot be relied on to break up disembarkation anymore than it did our embarkation at Dunkirk.'[34] However, this ignores a key fact: that only personnel were evacuated from Dunkirk, not armour nor heavy equipment. In the absence of the capture of a port facility by infantry alone, the Germans would have had to delay an invasion until they had developed and manufactured specialised landing craft to deploy armour onto the invasion beaches.

Dill and the planners suggested that the Germans may be 'willing to absorb heavy losses' however, there was no calculation of likely German casualties in men and tanks during disembarkation and how that might alter the ratio of armour deployed in favour of the defenders.[35]

In the end, the discussion of tank numbers on which Dill's strategy was based was highly abstract and made no attempt to sort through the possible vignettes that might reasonably occur during an invasion scenario such as initial landings, breakout from the beaches, armoured counter-attacks and the effect of terrain, and how these might compensate for actual tank numbers, as the relative advantage passes between attacker and defender throughout each stage.[36]

While it could be argued that the possible number of invasion scenarios made such detailed assessment impossible at the strategic level, it should have been possible to incorporate at least the high-level concept of the operations planned to meet the invader. Brooke, who as C-in-C Home Forces was responsible for providing Dill with estimates of the required British armour strength needed to defeat an invasion, and

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comparison, the size of a typical German armoured division before Barbarossa was around 400 tanks. (This provides a useful example of the influence of the thinking of subordinates on decision-makers, a practice that has received less attention from researchers than it merits.)

[34]TNA CAB 65/22.

[35]TNA CAB 65/22.

[36]A limited appreciation on a possible invasion scenario that described a German invasion and build-up of armour up to three days after the invasion was developed by the Interservice Committee on Invasion, supported by the Joint Planning Staff and Joint Intelligence Staff (TNA COS (41) 283(0), *Invasion 1942: Form and Scale of Attack*, TNA CAB 80/60). Its findings do not appear to have been considered by Dill when forming his arguments.

should therefore have also been capable of articulating how he planned to use that armour.[37]

Strangely – given Dill's recognised ability for understanding how actions in one theatre affected another – Dill made no serious attempt to link the use of armour between different theatres as a guide to strategic thinking. At the time, 50 tanks a week were being dispatched to the Middle East just to sustain the current force levels in theatre. This was the equivalent to equipping an armoured division every two months. Indeed, Churchill noted that production of tanks and training was increasing so that by October 1941, there were five armoured divisions and four independent tank brigades in the UK.[38]

While Dill used tank numbers to frame his thinking concerning the defence of the British Isles, he did not extend this argument to justify why the security of 'Singapore comes before that of Egypt.'[39] Nor did he articulate exactly what British interests in the Middle East were. As crucial as control of the Suez Canal was, it was arguably less important to Britain's war making capability than the oilfields of Iraq and Iran.

Germany's invasion of Russia in June 1941 provided a temporary resolution of the strategic debate of the military means required to defend the UK from German invasion. There was agreement among the CoS and Churchill that Germany lacked the capability to mount simultaneous invasions of both Russia and the UK; however, concerns remained that the Germans could transfer some 20-30 divisions from the Eastern front to invade the UK in 1942.[40]

So while there was agreement between Churchill and Dill that the defence of the home base was the main priority, this did not solve the question of the priority of Singapore over Egypt, nor the ways and means required to achieve their defence.

[37]At the time, the operational details of Britain's counter invasion planning were still being developed and practised. Exercise Bumper was designed to give commanders experience in handling armoured formations and to test the invasion defences, but was not held until late September 1941. See Danchev & Todman, *War Diaries,* pp 186-187.

[38]Churchill, Vol III, p. 452.

[39]TNA CAB 65/22.

[40]See Churchill *Second World War*, Vol III p. 446. At the same time, the US was also concerned about Britain's ability to defeat an invasion; see Churchill, *Second World War,* p. 378.

Singapore: 'Cardinal to our strategy'

Britain's policy in the Far East in 1939 was the use of diplomatic means to maintain Japanese neutrality and so provide security for its territories and interests in the region. The means to achieve this strategic end and bring about rapprochement with Japan included attempts to offer facilities in Hong Kong for a peace conference between China and Japan.[41]

These attempts proved fruitless, in part due to Britain's policy of pressing for an honourable peace with China, which was incompatible with Japanese designs on Manchuria and China itself. Other than providing moral support, Britain contributed little material assistance to China, unlike America, Russia and initially Germany. This inherent tension in trying to reconcile Britain's policies towards both China and Japan polarised opinion between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff when Japan demanded that Britain should close the Burma road to Chinese military supplies. The Foreign Office were in favour of resisting closure of the road; however, fears of conflict with Japan caused Dill to press for its closure.[42]

The Burma Road incident led to the Joint Planners' production of an appreciation of likely hostile Japanese courses of action in July 1940.[43] This was the first strategic appreciation of the security of British interests in South East Asia that had been conducted since the outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1937. Its conclusions were not comforting. It considered that naval commitments in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean precluded deploying a fleet to the region; instead air and land forces should be increased to defend Malaya (but not British Borneo), rather than being limited to just the protection of Singapore alone.[44] The report also recommended the close co-ordination of strategy with the Dutch but that Britain should only go to the

[41]Lowe, pp. 43-62.

[42]Chiefs of Staff Committee, Conclusions 1 July 1940, TNA COS (40) 202, TNA CAB 79/5.

[43]'*The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervene Against Us*', report of the chiefs of staff committee, 31 July 1940, TNA COS 592 and TNA WP (40) 302, TNA CAB 80/15 (TNA COS 500 J.P).

[44]The Joint Planners considered that, in the absence of a fleet, air power would be the primary means of defence; however, they recognised that sufficient aircraft would not be available for 'some time to come' and that the substantial numbers of land forces necessary to compensate for the deficiency in airpower would not be available from British or Indian forces, i.e. Britain currently lacked the required means if military ways were to be used to secure Singapore. The necessity for defending Malaya rather than Singapore Island was based on an assumption by the Joint Planners that the population depended on the supply of rice from stores on the north of the Island, not a realistic review of options for the defence of Singapore itself.

defence of the Netherlands East Indies if the Dutch themselves resisted a Japanese invasion.[45] It was recognised that this implied any increase in maritime commitments to the region would require the active support of the United States.

The planners recommended that the British priorities for defence were the sea lines of communication, Australia & New Zealand, Malaya, Burma and the Netherlands East Indies.[46] The regional strategic priority of Singapore and Malaya was therefore ranked only third out of five vital British interests in the Far East.

For the first strategic priority, the Joint Planners noted in passing that the sea lines of the Indian Ocean connected Britain and the Middle East to Australasia but did not expand on the implications for the defence of the UK or operations in the Middle East. The only help the planners provided in integrating the different theatres was to suggest that early defeat of the Italians in the Mediterranean might enable additional maritime forces to be deployed to the Far East. Other than this, it was left to the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet to join the dots and themselves assess the likely relationship of events in the Far East to events in the Mediterranean.

The strategic thinking of the Joint Planners in the Summer of 1940 strongly hinted at, but did not explicitly state, that the defence of Malaya and Singapore was a sufficient strategic way of achieving the strategic ends of securing the vital sea lines of communication with Australasia. Equally, the planners' appreciation did not convey that the defence of Singapore was a necessary condition for achieving this end. On the basis of purely one assessment, it is difficult to understand why in 1940-41 Dill considered the defence of Singapore to be of greater importance than that of Egypt. Dill is likely to have been influenced in his thinking by pre-war planning; in particular, the 1935 and 1937 Imperial Defence Reviews which concluded that security in the Far East "hinged" on the retention of Singapore as a base for the Royal Navy.[47] This conclusion tacitly rested on control of the air over Singapore and assumed that the UK would be fighting without US support. Both of these assumptions were in need of review by the summer of 1940 and certainly by 1941. Although, and in comparison, retention of access to the Persian oil fields was vital to continuing the war, and this required the defence of Egypt.

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[45]'*The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervene Against Us*', report of the chiefs of staff committee, 31 July 1940, C.O.S. 592 and W.P. (40) 302, CAB 80/15 (C.O.S. 500 J.P).

[46]Specifically identified as the Indian Ocean up to the west coast of Australia, South China Sea to the north coast of Australia, and trans-Pacific routes south and south east of Australia.

[47]TNA CAB 53/24 & CAB 53/30,

Regardless of its merits, by July 1940 a tentative strategy had evolved with the policy end of Japan committing to neutrality during a European war and refraining from attacking British, European and American territories in the region. The strategy to achieve this end was based on a combination of diplomatic and economic ways. The diplomatic ways were to co-ordinate diplomatic activity with the USA to achieve a cessation of the Sino-Japanese war and a recognition of China's independence in return for British economic assistance to Japan along with guarantees to supply Japan with oil and other materials.

Coherent and logical as this strategic approach was, it relied on a successful negotiated end to the Sino-Japanese War, something over which Britain could only exert limited influence. More importantly, it did not take sufficient account of Japan's willingness to gamble on achieving rapid military success before the full strength of Britain and the USA could be brought to bear.[48] A change in government in Japan in August 1940 brought a rapid decline in Anglo-Japanese relations and the detention of British nationals in Japan.

A combined British, Dutch and US tactical appreciation of the defence situation of Malaya was produced on 16 October 1940.[49] A key finding of this report was that Britain's ability to hold Malaya in the face of a determined attack was 'very problematical'; moreover, that the defence of Singapore for any more than a short period after a successful Japanese invasion of the mainland was 'very improbable'. The island of Singapore was, therefore, a very shaky foundation upon which to base a regional security strategy.

A summary of Anglo-American technical conversations was prepared for the War Cabinet on 15 December 1940.[50] This set out three British strategic priorities. The first two were the defeat of Germany and Italy, before dealing with Japan. The third priority stated that the security of the Far Eastern position, including the defence of Australia and New Zealand, is essential and the 'retention of Singapore as key to the

[48]The possibility that Japan might consider risking occupation of the Netherlands East Indies along with American and British territory to gain control of rubber and oil supplies to resist economic pressure from Britain was considered by the Joint Planners (TNA CAB 80/15, TNA COS(40) 594, 1 August 1940). However, the Joint Planners did not calculate if Japanese gains from military actions would be sufficient to meet their future needs. Such an appreciation was only conducted after the loss of Malaya which, concluded that Japan's gain in access to oil and rubber more than offset the loss of supply by America, the Netherlands East Indies, and Britain.

[49]The appreciation was not printed for the War Cabinet until December 1940, TNA CAB 80/24-3

[50]TNA COS (40) 1043, TNA CAB 80/24-3.

defence of these interests must be assured.' This suggests a greater emphasis on the importance of Singapore than the Joint Planners had placed on it earlier in the year.

The Chiefs of Staff considered that, from a purely strategic point of view, Singapore was the 'proper place' to base a combined Anglo-American fleet.[51] Their argument for the primacy of Singapore over the existing US naval base at Honolulu was made on the perception that this would increase the likelihood of deterring Japanese moves to the south. It was recognised that the US was reluctant to deploy to Singapore, preferring to remain in their own bases, and that the presence of an American carrier-based fleet in Hawaii would be essential to deter the Japanese. This was effectively a tacit admission that there were indeed alternatives to Singapore.

Around this time a Foreign Office Telegram from the British Ambassador in Tokyo made clear that Italian setbacks in Egypt were making the Japanese anxious that the British could soon be in a position to finish in the Middle East and reinforce the Far East. [52] This raised the risk that the Japanese might try to invade Malaya before British forces there could be strengthened. Events in the Middle East did exert a strong influence in the Far Eastern theatre, at least in the minds of the Japanese.

On 15 May 1941, Dill repeated his strategic priorities to Churchill, arguing that the German intention in attacking British interests in the Middle East was not only to secure Europe, but also to provoke Britain into sending additional forces to the region, increasing the chances of a successful invasion of the UK.[53] Other than to repeat earlier arguments on the number of tanks Dill believed necessary to defend the UK, this was not extended to consider what additional force levels, in terms of numbers of tanks or otherwise, Germany would have to deploy to the Middle East to achieve their aims nor how quickly they could be re-deployed for a direct attack on Britain.

Dill concluded that 'the loss of the Middle East would be a disaster, but would not be vital; on the other hand the retention of Singapore is vital.'[54] Dill's prioritising

[51]The document went out under Sir Robert Haining, VCIGS's signature rather than Dill's.

[52]Telegram 2453, 16 December 1940. Repeated as an Annex to TNA COS (40) 1049, TNA CAB 80/24-3.

[53]15 May 1941, C.O.S (41) 78 (0), *The General Situation, with particular reference to the Mediterranean and Middle East*. CAB 80/57-3. It should be remembered that Dill did not include the loss of Southern Iraq or the Persian oil fields in this assessment of strategic priorities.

[54]15 May 1941, COS (41) 78 (0), *The General Situation, with particular reference to the Mediterranean and Middle East*. CAB 80/57-3. A marginal annotation on the document suggests that CNS (Chief of the Naval Staff, Pound) proposed that Dill's assessment

Singapore over the Middle East was based on the economic assumption that the loss of oil and rubber from Borneo and Malaya would be more damaging to UK and US war production than the loss of Egypt, but made no attempt to further explain or quantify this assumption. For his part, Churchill offered no explanation for the rationale of why he disagreed with Dill on the order of strategic priorities.[55]

Brooke: 'shipping must exercise a stranglehold on all our strategy' [56]

Neither Germany's invasion of Russia in June nor Japanese incursions southwards into Indochina in July caused Churchill or Dill to reassess their strategic thinking. As a result of their disagreement, Churchill lost confidence in Dill and by the Autumn of 1941 he was actively planning to replace him.[57] In November 1941 it was announced that Dill was to be superseded by Brooke as CIGS from 1 December.

To begin with, Brooke's strategic thinking did not differ markedly from Dill's. He wrote in his diary entry for 3 December that

> I am positive that our policy for the conduct of the war should be to direct both our military and political efforts towards the early conquest of North Africa. From there we shall be able to reopen the Mediterranean and to stage offensive operations against Italy.[58]

In a footnote to this entry, written after the war, Brooke congratulated himself on having developed a clear idea of the strategy for the war by his third day as CIGS.[59]

In retrospect, Brooke's self-congratulations appear slightly premature: his thoughts and actions at the time suggest that even if he had determined the ways and ends to

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that the 'loss of Singapore would *vitally* affect our ability to continue the war' should be changed to the 'loss of Singapore would *materially* affect our ability to continue the war' to be consistent with an appreciation earlier in the document.

[55]The issue of strategic priorities appears to have been one to which Churchill was personally rather sensitive. Brooke noted in his diary entry for 27 April 1941 that 'Kennedy [DMO] tried to give PM a rather pompous discourse on strategy in which he contemplated a fairly free evacuation of Egypt! This infuriated the PM and we had some trouble in calming him down!'. Danchev & Todman, *War Diaries*, p. 154.

[56]Danchev & Todman, *War Diaries,* p. 227.

[57]In September 1941 a Private Secretary noted that 'he [Churchill] has now got his knife right into Dill' and by 20 October, Brooke became aware of schemes for the replacement of Dill as CIGS.

[58]Danchev & Todman , *War Diaries,* p. 206.

[59]Ibid. , p. 206.

fight the war, he had not yet established the balance of means between different theatres.[60]

In particular, Brooke's views on the value of Singapore at the time appear uncertain. The policy for the Far East that he signed off on 20 December drew extensively on a Naval strategy report, which downplayed the significance of Singapore for both strategic and operational reasons.[61] Operationally, the report concluded that it was unsound to send capital ships to Singapore owing to the likely strength of the Japanese fleet and air cover from Malaya, Thailand and French Indochina.

Strategically, the report recommended that the ideal solution for the defeat of Japan was to bring together a combined British-American fleet equal or superior to the Japanese. However, it concluded that there was no single naval base in the region where such a joint fleet could assemble that would simultaneously satisfy American and British interests. American vital interests lay in the Pacific, the defence of Hawaii and the US West Coast; while British interests were the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and the defence of Australia and New Zealand from seaborne attack.

While it was possible for Dill to argue in the spring of 1941 that Singapore was the only naval base that could support both of Britain's vital interests, Japanese air supremacy in December 1941 made it operationally obsolete; and the divergent focus of American interests reduced its strategic significance from vital to useful. Although this was not explicitly stated in the Far East Policy Paper, the recommendations imply that the Chiefs of Staff's assessment was that the most likely outcome was for Malaya to fall but for Singapore Island to be besieged.

Despite this apparent relegation of Singapore's strategic value, the question of strategic priorities did not appear to be resolved. On 25 December 1941 the Chiefs of Staff

[60]The previous day Brooke and his fellow Chiefs of Staff had agreed to postpone an operation to raid the Italian coast due to concerns about Japanese action in Malaya. Later, on 23 January 1942, the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed to send 18 Division to Singapore, a decision Brooke later regretted on the grounds it would have been more successful in Burma. As to when Brooke actually formulated his strategy, see Danchev & Todman's footnotes. p. 206.

[61]This report, *Future Navy Strategy*, (CAB 80/60) was produced on the direction of Churchill on 14 December 1941 (i.e. after the Japanese invasion of Malaya); and COS (41) 280(0) *Far East policy Report*, 20 December 1941, CAB 80/60. Brooke signed this as CIGS (Designate) along with the Vice Chiefs of the other two services, as the Chiefs of Staff were in Washington with Churchill at the time for the Arcadia Conference which combined the Anglo-American command structures.

considered the allocation of forces between the Middle East and Far East with regards to Churchill's proposal for Operation Gymnast which downplayed the significance of Singapore for both strategic and operational reasons.[62] Brooke's diary entry for that day noted that

> we laid down that first of all in importance comes the security of this country and its communications and after that Singapore and communications through [sic] Indian Ocean. This is correct as if the latter go the Middle East or possibly India may follow suit.[63]

So at this stage, Brooke appeared to still maintain Dill's strategic priorities, even though the Far East policy he endorsed cast doubt on the primacy of Singapore over Egypt.

It was during the period December 1941-April 1942 that the main difference emerged in Brooke's approach to strategic thinking compared to that of Dill. In February, Brooke began to appreciate that the availability of shipping to transport personnel and equipment was the major constraint on both the ways and means for British strategy.

The shipping shortage was caused by the threat of German U-Boat operations and Axis air attack in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Although it was the need to divert vessels around the Cape of Good Hope and the time spent waiting in port for convoys to form, rather than the number of merchant ships, that limited strategic transport between theatres.[64] Brooke assessed that opening up the Mediterranean would free up the equivalent of a million tons of shipping, which would be vital for the invasions of Italy and France and then later to move forces from Europe to the Far East.

The development of shipping capacity as a strategic metric occurred too late for Brooke to apply it to the relative priorities of Egypt over Singapore. Japan's capture of the island in February 1942 saved Brooke from Dill's dilemma. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that Brooke used his shipping metric to consider the military means required to hold the Japanese from then until the defeat of Germany.

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[62]Operation Gymnast was a British plan presented to the combined Chiefs of Staff during the Arcadia Conference to clear the Mediterranean for allied shipping by gaining possession of Morocco and Tunisia to secure the entire North African coastline (see Douglas E Delaney, *Churchill and the Mediterranean Strategy: December 1941 to January 1943*, Defence Studies, 2:3, (2002) pp. 1-26).

[63]Danchev & Todman, *War Diaries,* entry for 25 December 1941, p. 214.

[64]David, Edgerton. *Britain's War Machine*, (London: Penguin, 2012), Chapter 6.

Consideration of shipping did enable one strategic priority to be established; by August 1942, the Chiefs of Staff, now under Brooke's chairmanship, agreed that the port of Abadan was more important than Egypt.[65] This conclusion appears to have been reached through the consideration that all forces in the Middle East, India & Indian Ocean were dependent on Persian oil. A shortage of tankers meant that oil from the Americas could not make good the losses that would result from the fall of Abadan.

The final refinement of Brooke's strategic thinking, to relate the relative ability of the Allies to move resources between theatres, did not occur until at least a year later. Debates with the US as to the correct course of action to pursue following the securing of North Africa in 1943-44 led Brooke to consider how the connections between theatres affected the rate at which Germany could reinforce threatened areas compared with the speed at which the Allies could build up strength. Brooke's realisation was that in Italy north-south movement for the Germans took longer than transferring forces east-west between Russia and France, this would enable Allied operations in Italy to have a positive effect on operations in Normandy.

Conclusions

As we have seen, there was no standard methodology for making strategic assessments in use by either the War Cabinet or the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1940. Instead, Dill and Brooke both had to derive their own frameworks to consider the balance of ways, means and ends. One theme that consistently emerges from reviewing the appreciations of the Joint Planners is that their work was essentially the production of high-level reviews of the current situation in a given theatre, which contained very little advanced planning at the operational level within each theatre on which to develop an understanding of the means required and the rates of build-up necessary to achieve strategic effects. In the absence of detailed staff work, Dill and Brooke developed two very different approaches to determine strategy.

Dill's use of tank numbers relative to German armoured strength is what is known as a static measure. The greatest weakness of this type of approach is that it did not account for qualitative differences between British and German armour. It also makes no allowance for other factors that affect likely performance in combat, such as control of the air or anti-armour artillery. In short, it was a measure only of quantity, not of effectiveness.

In comparison, Brooke's consideration of the tonnage of shipping capacity for manoeuvre is an example of a dynamic measure of strategic effect. This metric enables the movement between theatres and the rate of build-up relative to the enemy's strength to be considered. As a further refinement, Brooke generalised this to relative

[65]Danchev & Todman, *War Diaries,* entry for 4 August 1942.

movement between different theatres. This enabled him to understand the possible rates of build up for the Germans moving forces between the Italian and Normandy theatres, leading to the non-intuitive conclusion that it was quicker to switch between the Russian and Normandy fronts than from the Italian.

Both of these methods enabled Dill and Brooke to compare the means used; however, there is no evidence that either evaluated how the use of different ways would affect the required means. Neither applied their measures to determine strategic priorities between theatres. For example, the military means required to deter the Japanese from launching attacks on Malaya are likely to have been significantly different from those required to actually defeat their forces.

Similarly, the question of the priority of Egypt over Singapore was decided by the Japanese just as many of Britain's earlier strategic dilemmas were resolved by enemy action rather than through active British decision-making. Retrospective application of Brooke's method suggests that the impact of the loss of Egypt and the subsequent denial of the use of the Suez Canal to Britain would have had a far greater impact on the availability of shipping than did the loss of Singapore.

Hew Strachan has recently observed that strategy is a dialogue (usually of a civil and military nature), as well as an abstract calculation. [66] The importance of being able to maintain an acceptable personal fit to Churchill's thinking can be seen in the fates of both Dill and Brooke: they had to make strategic calculations, but they also had to persuade others. Brooke's method of thumping the table or declaring that he 'flatly disagreed' with a proposal was direct; Dill's approach was more charming and indirect and won over both Brooke and the US.[67]

Given that the basis of Churchill's strategic priorities was derived more from wishful thinking than Dill's understanding of strategy suggests that it may be time to rehabilitate Dill's reputation. Dill's career revolved around high-level thinking and through his time leading the Army's Staff College he influenced a strong informal network, that included not just his immediate successor, Brooke, but also the American Chiefs of Staff and political decision makers.

[66]Hew Strachan, 'Strategy in theory; strategy in practice', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42:2, pp. 171-190.

[67]Anthony Harrison, *Archie Nye* (privately published, 1980), p. 12. Quoted in Alex Danchev, *Waltzing with Winston: Civil-Military Relations in Britain in the Second World War*. War in History (1995) 2 (2) pp. 202 – 230.

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United Kingdom Submarine Nuclear Propulsion

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ABSTRACT
June 2019 saw the fiftieth anniversary of the first Royal Navy 'Continuous at sea Deterrent' patrol which was carried out by a nuclear-powered submarine equipped with the Polaris missile. This article looks at how the UK undertook the development and deployment of the nuclear propulsion plant for such submarines.

Introduction

On 15 June 1968, HMS *Resolution*, the Royal Navy's first Polaris missile armed submarine, sailed from the naval base at Faslane on the Firth of Clyde. It was the UK's first Polaris patrol, and in the spring of 1969 was joined in that task by HMS *Repulse*. So began what has now been a more than fifty-year period of Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CAS-D). In June 1969, a year after the first patrol, the Royal Navy formally assumed responsibility for the UK's nuclear deterrent.[1]

This article will show that it is the legacy of the political, naval, and engineering decisions, made over sixty years ago, that has since enabled the UK to maintain more than fifty years of CAS-D operations. The deterrent patrols of the Polaris, and successor Trident, armed submarines, were recently renamed *Operation Relentless*. This fittingly recognises this sea-borne strategic deterrent as the UK's longest running military operation.

On 21 January 1954 the US President's wife, Mamie Eisenhower, launched the world's first nuclear powered submarine, USS *Nautilus*. The following year, on 17 January 1955, USS *Nautilus* slipped her moorings and sailed down the Thames River and left Groton, Connecticut for sea trials. At 11:33 a.m., her commanding officer, Commander Eugene Wilkinson, sent the signal: 'Underway on nuclear power'.[2] In the intervening sixty-six

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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i3.1571
[1]Peter Hennessy, *Cabinets and The Bomb,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 17.
[2]Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *Rickover,* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 165.

years only five other nations have undertaken the building and operation of nuclear-powered submarines; Russia, Britain, France, China, and India.[3] The nuclear-powered submarine enables those five states to project military power in ways not possible by conventional means. That importance can be seen by the UK having built thirty-two nuclear powered submarines, of which thirty-one have been powered by nuclear reactors designed and built in the UK by Rolls-Royce Plc. A further three *Astute* class SSNs are currently in build, and four successor submarines to replace the Royal Navy's current *Vanguard* class SSBNs have been ordered.[4]

HMS *Dreadnought*, the Royal Navy's first nuclear-powered submarine, was powered by an American S5W reactor bought from Westinghouse. This was made possible by the Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958, which can be seen as one of the foundations of the so-called Anglo-American 'Special Relationship'. The Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) enabled the US Government and the UK Government to co-operate on atomic energy for mutual defence purposes. In effect, this meant the pooling of resources allowing the transfer of nuclear information, equipment and materials for common defence. However, in relation to submarine nuclear propulsion plants, Article III of the Act enabled the UK to purchase a S5W reactor and steam plant which it was intended would allow the UK to produce future propulsion plants of its own without further demands on the USA. Harold Macmillan wrote that the Americans thought the (MDA) would be all give and would receive little information in exchange, however, in some respects the UK was further advanced in the art [of nuclear weapons] than was the US at the time.[5] That lead did not however extend to nuclear propulsion. Unlike nuclear weapons cooperation which has continued since 1958, there would be no nuclear cooperation on propulsion plants until the mid-1990s when both navies began to exchange senior officers to work in their respective propulsion departments.

Conventionally powered submarines rely on batteries charged by diesel engines and are, by their nature, dependent upon access to air. They must surface periodically, or raise a mast, to replenish the submarine's atmosphere and enable the diesel engines to be run to re-charge the batteries that provide the primary source of motive power when submerged. These submarines are submersibles rather than "true" submarines independent of the atmosphere. Nuclear submarines are true submarines which do

[3]Brazil has been in the process of constructing a nuclear-powered submarine for some years but that project has yet to reach operational status.

[4]SSN is an acronym for *Ship, Submersible, Nuclear* - a nuclear-powered submarine whose principal role is hunting other submarines and ships. The acronym SSBN denotes a *Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear* - a submarine armed with ballistic missiles that would normally carry nuclear weapons of a strategic nature.

[5]Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm 1956-1959,* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 565.

not need to surface or raise a mast for air. Their submerged endurance is limited only by the crew's wellbeing and food supplies.

Early Missile Launching Submarines

The first missile to be launched from a submarine was fired from the USS *Cusk,* while lying on the surface off the coast of California on 12 February 1947.[6] Following this success the USA converted two *Balao* class conventionally powered submarines, USS *Cusk* and USS *Carbonero*, to carry the Loon missile, a derivative of Nazi Germany's V1 – a crude form of cruise missile. In 1952 the USA converted the *Gato* class conventional submarine, USS *Tunny*, to carry the improved, and nuclear armed, Regulus missile, and in 1955, another *Balao* class submarine, USS *Barbero*, was also converted to carry the same missile. The nuclear-powered submarine USS *Halibut* was commissioned in 1960 and could carry five Regulus missiles, but she had already been made obsolete by the USS *George Washington* of 1959. This first SSBN carried the solid fuelled Polaris missile system which could be launched when the submarine was submerged, whereas the turbo-jet powered Regulus, and pulse-jet powered Loon missiles both required the submarine to surface before launching, which exposed the submarine to detection and attack.

In the Soviet Union, the first conventionally powered *Golf* class ballistic missile submarine was launched in 1958, it carried three R-11FM Scud missiles. Six *Zulu* class conventional submarines were also converted to carry ballistic missiles but could carry only two R-11FM missiles each. The Soviet Union's first nuclear powered and nuclear missile armed submarines were the *Hotel* class which could carry three improved R13 missiles. The USSR's early ballistic missiles all required the submarines to surface for missile launch. The *Hotel* class were followed by the successful *Yankee* class which were armed with the SS-N-6 ballistic missile. The *Yankees*, as well as the contemporary Polaris submarines of the US Navy and Royal Navy, carried sixteen ballistic missiles. These missiles all had vastly improved ranges compared to the earlier generation. This allowed a greater patrol area, and/or the targeting of areas further from the coast. More importantly, these missiles did not require the submarine to surface in order to launch. This new form of SSBN could make full use of its ability to remain submerged for the several months duration of a typical patrol. SSBNs can in effect disappear in the vastness of the oceans. For a belligerent nation, this poses a strategic threat that can not only survive a pre-emptive strike on land-based weapon systems, but can come from almost anywhere the submarine can go.

[6]John D. Alden, *The Fleet Submarine in the U. S. Navy: A Design and Construction History,* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1979), p. 136.

Nuclear Fission & Application to Submarines

The harnessing and exploitation of the power of the atom began in 1938, when the Nobel chemist, Otto Hahn discovered an isotope of barium produced by the bombardment of uranium atoms with neutrons. However, it was his assistant, Lise Meitner, and her colleague, Otto Frisch, that appreciated the application for this phenomenon.[7] Meitner and Frisch proposed that the atom could be split into two approximately equal, and lighter elements with the simultaneous release of further neutrons. Their theory was published in the journal *Nature* (in which Frisch coined the term fission) in February 1939.[8] Further work at the *College de France* by Frederic Joliet-Curie and others showed that the fission of uranium was accompanied by the release of further neutrons, although he was unable to promote a chain reaction. Only after further experimentation was it determined that it was not natural uranium ^{238}U, but a rarer isotope, ^{235}U, which constitutes about 0.7 percent of natural uranium, that releases its neutrons during the fission process. By May 1939, conditions had been established for maintaining a chain reaction, and patents had been filed in Paris, for a proposed a nuclear reactor. By the end of 1939, Joliet-Curie and his team had been instructed by the French Minister of Supply to continue their work with the object of developing a submarine engine. Joliet-Curie became the first scientist to lead a team to tackle the problem of submarine nuclear propulsion.[9] In America, Meitner and Frisch's theory was already under discussion in January 1939 at the Conference of Theoretical Physics held in Washington D.C. The Nobel physicists Niels Bohr, and Enrico Fermi proposed that if uranium underwent a process of fission, then the energy released would be enormous. Fermi though, was cautious enough not to propose the possibility of a chain reaction, but Ross Gunn, a physicist at the US Naval Research Laboratory, had no such qualms. Gunn thought it possible to utilise nuclear power to propel a submarine and approached the Chief of the US Navy's Bureau of Engineering, Rear Admiral Harold G. Bowen. Gunn secured $1500 of funding which he allotted to his friend, Merle Tuve, at the Carnegie Institution in Washington, to conduct research into the fission process. So began the US Navy's interest in nuclear propulsion.[10]

In the UK, the MAUD Committee's Report on the use of Uranium as a source of power was published in July 1941.[11] Part I of the report deals with the possibility of a nuclear weapon that would provide a rapid release of a large amount of uncontrolled energy. Part II deals with controlling the release of that energy to create a heat source

[7]Rowland Pocock, *Nuclear Ship Propulsion,* (London: Ian Allen, 1970), p. 10.
[8]H. D. Smyth, 'Fifty Years of Atomic Physics', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 90, No. 1, (January 1946), p. 5.
[9]Pocock, *Nuclear Ship Propulsion,* p. 12.
[10]Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Nuclear Navy: 1946-1962*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 17.
[11]Acronym MAUD – Military Application of Uranium Detonation.

which could then be exploited as a power source.[12] The MAUD Report led to the formation of the Tube Alloys (TA) Project, the British and Canadian nuclear weapon research and development programme, which, following the Quebec Agreement of 1943, was subsumed into the US Manhattan Project. One of the authors of the MAUD report, Professor Mark Oliphant, was a member of the Royal Naval Scientific Service (RNSS) and led the Admiralty Radar team at Birmingham University in researching valve technology. After Oliphant was seconded to the TA Project in 1943, further Admiralty scientists became involved with atomic energy research by removing them from Admiralty work for secondment to the TA Project at Chalk River in Canada. Wallace Ackers, the Director of the TA Project, wrote to the University (?) Chancellor, Sir John Anderson, to advise that the TA Project was of special interest to the Admiralty because of the: '…possibility that nuclear energy might be used for ship propulsion. This would radically the design of naval vessels, especially Battleships, Aircraft Carriers and Submarines'.[13] This appears to be the first British document to specifically refer to nuclear energy and an application to ship and submarine propulsion.

In February 1946, the Controller of the Royal Navy, Rear Admiral Charles Daniel, submitted a paper to the Admiralty Board on the 'Consideration of Future Naval Development'. Under the section on research and development Daniel wrote:

> All this research and development covers a vast field, and many years may pass before the new navy will emerge. But I believe that it will emerge, and the change from the present to the future, will be as great as the change from sail to steam. For not only have we to consider atomic attack and defence, but also atomic ship propulsion…[14]

This marked the beginning of the Royal Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Programme, from which point the Royal Navy's primary focus was on a submarine application although that decision was not formalised until 1955. In 1947, many nuclear specialists, such as Professor P. M. S. Blackett postulated the use of nuclear energy: '…for very large ships, such as our great liners'.[15] In the same year, Sir John Cockcroft, Chairman of the

[12]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) AB 4/1014, MAUD Committee Report.
[13]TNA, CAB 126/173, Letter, W. Ackers to J. Anderson, 30 June 1944.
[14]DNP 2 NP184/2011, 'The Dreadnought Project Outline Narrative', 1, 18 February 1946. As a part of the author's PhD research privileged access was granted to unreleased files held by the Royal Navy's Director of Nuclear Propulsion (DNP). At that time the DNP was Commodore Mark Adams RN.
[15]Atomic Challenge: A Symposium, (London: Winchester Publications Limited, 1947), p. 94.

Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) at Harwell spoke of the possibility of applying nuclear power to mobile reactors: 'Ship propulsion would seem to offer a more favourable field'.[16] Also in 1947, on their Third Programme, the BBC broadcast a talk on the subject of *The Propulsion of Ships by Atomic Energy*.[17] However, naval experts envisaged nuclear propulsion in a different type of craft, the submarine. In 1948, R. J. Daniel, a member of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, noted that: 'The atomic reactor is well suited to submarine propulsion, developing full power under all conditions, and quite independent of whether the submarine is on the surface or not'.[18]

Although the Admiralty deferred a decision on the type of platform in which to instal the first nuclear propulsion plant the submarine was, from the outset, the primary focus, of the Admiralty. In 1947, an informal committee known as the 'Tea Party' was created in the Admiralty to keep in touch with developments at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell. In 1949, the Tea Party, now known as the Atomic Propulsion Working Party, issued a report advising that it would be feasible to build a submarine powered by an atomic reactor.[19] The Admiralty undertook design investigation of both ship and machinery whilst the AERE investigated reactor design. By 1950, the Admiralty had affirmed that the development of a nuclear reactor suitable for submarine propulsion appeared practicable and strongly supported the development of a nuclear powered submarine, discussed in further detail below.[20]

Early UK Research & Development

In January 1946, Jack Diamond, a member of the RNSS, became the first Admiralty scientist to be seconded to the AERE at Harwell where he was head of the Naval Section until March 1953.[21] Diamond had previously been seconded to the TA Project in Canada and had worked there with the Director of the AERE, Sir John Cockcroft.

Britain's early research and development on applying nuclear energy to submarine propulsion was hampered for a number of reasons. With a focus on using nuclear power to generate electricity, the AERE had discounted water-moderated and water-cooled reactors from their scope of work and had decided to concentrate their efforts

[16] J. D. Cockcroft, 'The possibilities of nuclear energy for heat and power production', *Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers* (1947), 206-11 (p. 211).
[17]'Broadcasting', *The Times*, 21 June 1947, p. 6, Issue 50793.
[18]R. J. Daniel, 'The Royal Navy and Nuclear Power', *Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects*, Vol. 90, No. 4, (Oct., 1948), 273-90 (p. 285).
[19]Director Nuclear Propulsion File No: NP184/2011The Dreadnought Project Outline Narrative, p. 2.
[20]TNA, DEFE 7/2055 Paper D.R.P. (50)73 5 June 1950.
[21]DNP NP184/2011, p. 2.

on graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactors. At that time, the AERE only had to consider the Admiralty's requirements when deciding on the direction of their higher priority civil nuclear power generation programme. British reactor design was also hampered by a lack of enriched uranium, so the early reactors were fuelled with natural uranium. That choice of fuel resulted in a sizeable amount of uranium being needed, so the reactor vessels were very large, and completely unsuitable for fitting to a submarine.[22] By discounting water-cooled reactors, based on analysis of the nuclear reactors at Hanford in Washington State (which had shown them to be inherently less safe than similar gas-cooled reactors), the AERE focussed their attention on gas powered reactors for electricity generation.[23] In doing so, development of the first designs for a submarine propulsion reactor would prove to be a cul-de-sac and would delay serious investigation into Pressurised Water Reactors by four years.

From the autumn of 1949, the AERE held exploratory meetings with the British firm Metropolitan-Vickers with a view to constructing an enriched uranium gas-cooled, graphite-moderated power plant. Mark 1 was to be a land-based prototype for the Mark 2, which was to be installed in a submarine hull. In June 1950, the Admiralty submitted a paper to the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) in which they stated their support for the development of nuclear powered submarines based on the expected tactical advantages over conventional submarines.[24] The proposed submarine's displacement was put at about 2500 tons, and yet within days, the Engineer-in-Chief's (E-in-C) staff had discussed the lengthening of the provisional engine room from 55 feet to 74 feet, thus increasing the displacement to between 4200 and 4600 tons.[25] Initial design investigations confirmed that the first submarine, known as N.1, would be larger than envisaged, with a 25 feet diameter pressure hull and a surface displacement of 3700 tons. Further studies allowing for naval service factors such as shock, pitching and rolling etc, meant that to maintain criticality, the size of the reactor would have to increase so substantially as to make this type of reactor unattractive. The design for this submarine, N.2, would see an increase in the pressure hull to 31 feet and a surface displacement to 4500 tons.[26] It is recorded in an unreleased narrative file at the DNP's office that some work was also carried out on water-moderated and water-cooled reactors, and another submarine design for that - N.3 - was prepared. This concept had a pressure hull diameter of 22 feet and a surface displacement of 2480 tons. It can be deduced from these examples that the

[22]Enriched uranium involves processing natural uranium to raise the proportion of the isotope ^{235}U.
[23]Rowland Pocock, Nuclear Ship Propulsion, (London: Ian Allen, 1970), p. 50.
[24]TNA DEFE 7/2055, Paper D.R.P. (50)73, 5 June 1950.
[25]TNA AB 6/760, Note, 'N' Class Submarines, 9 June 1950.
[26]DNP 2 NP184/2011, 5.

reactor designers were struggling to reduce the size of the reactor, which in turn was limited by using uranium enriched to only twice its normal 0.7%.

While the Admiralty's designers were increasing the size of the projected submarine to accommodate the 18 feet diameter Mark I reactor core; 'The core diameter of the US submarine was thought by the British to be 6 feet'.[27] The nub of the problem was that the Admiralty required a reactor three times smaller than was technically possible using low enriched uranium fuel. A more compact designed reactor to fit into a submarine hull was only possible with highly enriched uranium fuel, which had already been identified by the AERE in November 1949.[28] At that time ^{235}U was a scarce and expensive commodity in the UK where a small-scale diffusion plant was producing highly enriched uranium solely for Britain's nuclear weapons programme. In September 1951, Jack Diamond conceded that the present reactor design would require a submarine displacement of 5000 tons.[29] In October, Metropolitan-Vickers was requested to submit their final report which was presented in May 1952. With that, the project was effectively mothballed until 1956 when a new high volume diffusion plant became available that could produce enough highly enriched fuel to meet the Admiralty's needs.

In 1953, Diamond resigned from the RNSS to take up an appointment at Manchester University; the Naval Section at Harwell was run down and was staffed only by a Royal Navy engineer, a RNSS scientist and two people from the Admiralty Defence Establishment, Barrow (ADEB). However, by the end of that year the Admiralty decided to commit more resources to the Naval Section, and Captain (E) Harrison-Smith was appointed to head the section in May 1954.[30] In January 1955, Professor Jack Edwards RNSS was appointed senior RNSS representative, and by mid-1955, the Naval Section had increased to eleven personnel; four Royal Navy engineers, five RNSS staff, one from the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors (RCNC), and an engineer from the Yarrow Admiralty Research Department (Y-ARD).[31] This new Naval Section turned its attention towards water-cooled and water-moderated reactor designs using highly enriched uranium as the fuel.

The Pressurised Water Reactor

The use of pressurised water as a coolant and moderator was first proposed by A. M. Weinberg in 1946, and this was chosen by the Americans as the type best suited for

[27]Margaret Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-52 Volume 2: Policy Execution*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 275 footnotes.
[28]TNA AB 6/618, Minute The Enriched Uranium Power Reactor, 14 Nov. 1949.
[29]TNA AB 15/2043, Paper - An enriched uranium reactor for submarine propulsion.
[30]TNA AB 6/1051, Letter F. T. Mason to J. Cockcroft, 24 March 1954.
[31]TNA AB 6/1051, Letter, Capt. Harrison-Smith to J. Cockcroft, 16 March 1955.

application in a submarine.[32] After the false start with the enriched gas-cooled reactor, and possibly encouraged by the launch of the USS *Nautilus*, the Naval Section came to the same conclusion in early 1955.

A pressurised water reactor (PWR) is constructed of the following main components; the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) containing the fuel elements, control rods, and the liquid moderator/coolant. External to the RPV and connected to it by pipework are the main circulation pumps, pressuriser, and heat exchanger which together constitute the primary system. Within the heat exchanger the primary coolant heats water from a separate circuit that produces steam for what is known as the secondary system. Steam is fed to turbogenerators that produce electricity while also supplying the steam turbines which propel the submarine. The choice of fuel element, the control medium and the moderator all have a direct effect on the design and critical size of a reactor. How reactor components are manufactured and shaped, and the position into which they are placed within the RPV are also a part of the reactor problem that had to be solved. 'That is in ensuring that just one neutron can survive to continue the chain, no more and no less'.[33]

As soon as the PWR had been selected the project was reorganised. The Admiralty wrote to the Treasury in December 1955, to advise that they intended to design a nuclear propulsion plant of 15,000-20,000 shaft horsepower (SHP) for use in a submarine. The project was foreseen as taking six to eight years at a cost in the region of £10 million.[34] Treasury approval was forthcoming in January 1956, with an agreed expenditure of £300,000 in 1956/57. The Treasury advised that approval for the project was: '…without prejudice to any decision on an advance beyond the prototype of the nuclear power submarine'.[35]

In January 1956, the Admiralty formally wrote to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) requesting technical advice and assistance in PWR technology. The UKAEA was advised that it was the Admiralty's intention to build a PWR of approximately 80MW output and to commence trials on a land-based prototype by late 1959, with trials in a submarine by 1962. Professor Jack Edwards RNSS observed that the PWR had been chosen as the most feasible reactor for installation in a

[32]A. M. Weinberg, 'High Pressure Water as a Heat Transfer Medium in Nuclear Power Plants' (Atomic Energy Commission Report MonP-93, 10 April 1946) https://technicalreports.ornl.gov/1946/3445605714956.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2021.
[33]Peter M. B. Walker, ed., *Chambers Dictionary of Science and Technology,* (Edinburgh: Chamber Harrap Publishers Ltd, 2000), p. 797.
[34]TNA T 225/1022, Letter McKinnell to I. de L. Radice, 8 December 1955.
[35]TNA T 225/1022, Letter D.M.35/77/01, 6 January 1956.

submarine because of its compactness and the good prospects for completing the project within a reasonable timescale.[36] Edwards also noted that little was known in the UK of such light water-moderated and cooled reactors because; there were considerable gaps in the available knowledge, and little information was available from the USA. This was a consequence of the US Atomic Energy Act (1946), commonly known as the McMahon Act, which had stopped all transfer of nuclear technology and knowledge from the USA.[37] However, British engineers adopted novel ways to collect information on nuclear energy. There being no official channel for the exchange of nuclear power generation information, as much knowledge as possible was gleaned from Congressional reports, United States Atomic Energy Commission reports, press releases and other published documentation. However, by 1956, a considerable amount of data was being openly published. Fortunately, Admiral Rickover USN, who was in charge of the US Navy's nuclear submarine programme, had committed to publishing information on PWRs that was applicable to civil nuclear power generation. This data came from the US Navy's own reactor programmes, and the Shippingport PWR project.[38] The US Navy's programme had selected zircaloy as the fuel cladding material, and it quickly became evident there were applications for it as a cladding material in civil PWRs. As a result, extensive data was declassified and Rickover deliberately instigated publication to encourage industrial research on the metallurgy of zirconium to stimulate its commercial development.[39]

Fuel Element Decision

In 1957, the UK's Rear Admiral Nuclear Propulsion, G. A. M. Wilson, was considering the choice of materials for fuel elements. It had previously been decided to proceed with uranium oxide/steel elements, partly on the grounds of supply security for British refined zirconium, and partly because it was believed that there was a better long-term development potential for uranium oxide/steel elements. The UKAEA had advised that the use of zirconium would add serious complexity to their proposed chemical separation plant for treating irradiated fuel elements, adding £400,000 to the capital cost, and a further £250,000 to increase British production of zirconium to meet Admiralty requirements.[40] Despite the UKAEA's reservations, there was now a

[36]Professor J. Edwards, 'Joint Panel on Nuclear Submarine Propulsion: Initial Problems of the Submarine Pressurized Water Reactor Design and the Related Experimental Programme', Lecture to the Institute of Marine Engineers, 23 January 1962, p. 1.

[37]For further information on the McMahon Act see Goodman, 'With a little help from my friends', p. 155.

[38]The Shippingport PWR in Pennsylvania was the world's first purpose built commercial reactor.

[39]TNA AB 6/2492, Note Naval Policy at Harwell, 15 May 1964.

[40]TNA ADM 1/26740, Paper, RANP/23/8, 30 July 1957, p. 4.

revived interest in zirconium. The main reasons for this were a more favourable supply of zirconium that could be purchased from the US and Japan and the fact that: 'A zirconium core uses a little over half the amount of fissile fuel required by the steel core'.[41] A smaller reactor core design could be achieved, and despite the price of zirconium it was likely to give an overall saving. The economy of operation of either core depended on the value of fissile material ultimately recovered and returned to stock. 'If reprocessing of Zirconium fuel elements is practicable the overall economy will favour this type of core'.[42] Wilson argued that there was little to choose between the fuel elements, and the submarine's completion date was unlikely to be affected by this choice. The recommendation was to proceed with uranium oxide/steel elements and the Admiralty notified the UKAEA that the reactor design should proceed on that basis. However, at a later meeting, Wilson noted that the recent reservation expressed by the UKAEA concerning the reprocessing of zirconium cores was unfounded because the USA had recently reprocessed their first zirconium core.[43] Wilson advised that reprocessing data would be made available to the UK; therefore, they should now proceed with the zirconium core and accept a delay of some six months to the UK's project.

The basis for the Admiralty's decision to proceed with zirconium-based fuel elements remains open to conjecture. The meeting at which Wilson advised changing to zirconium also discussed a threat to the HMS *Dreadnought* SSN Project that was posed by political support for a nuclear-powered oil tanker.[44] Wilson had written an earlier paper for the 'Galbraith' Committee stating the case for a nuclear-powered Fleet Replenishment Tanker.[45] In the paper Wilson argued that machinery developed for the Fleet Tanker would be applicable to a merchant ship. Although the tanker was a paper study and was running some three years behind the Dreadnought Project, the First Sea Lord, Mountbatten, was concerned that once people became aware of it there would be support for the tanker and less for HMS *Dreadnought*.

The first Polaris SSBN, the USS *George Washington*, was launched in 1959, and while the UK continued pursuing a policy of what Macmillan called the 'Great Prize' of nuclear interdependence with the USA, the later USA/UK Polaris Sales Agreement lay six years in the future. It was therefore quite prescient of Mountbatten to tell the

[41]TNA ADM 1/26740, Paper, RANP/23/8, 30 July 1957, p. 1. The core was made of a number of materials including uranium, zirconium and hafnium, and the containment vessel of various other materials.
[42]TNA, ADM 1/26740, Paper, RANP/23/8, 30 July 1957, p. 5.
[43]MB1/1397, Sea Lords' Meeting, 8 Oct. 1957, Item 1.
[44]*HMS Dreadnought*, an SSN was the UK's first nuclear powered submarine.
[45]Full title: First Lord's Committee on the application of nuclear power to marine purposes.

meeting that to adopt the tanker in place of *Dreadnought* would suit the Air Ministry, as it would remove a possible future rival to the RAF's responsibility for the UK's nuclear deterrent.[46] Given these facts it seems entirely probable that while the Admiralty adopted the uranium zirconium element on the grounds of reducing by nearly half the fissile material required for HMS *Dreadnought*, by doing so it also countered possible Air Ministry support for cancelling the nuclear submarine reactor programme in favour of one for the tanker.

Development of the US Navy's Polaris system had begun in 1955, although the US Air Force was influential in providing the RAF and Ministry of Defence with sceptical assessments of its performance.[47] At that time the RAF carried the UK nuclear deterrent in its V- Bomber force and in the late 1950s was developing the Blue Steel stand-off missile system as a means of maintaining the viability of that deterrent in the face of improving air defence systems in the USSR. The UK's own medium range ballistic missile system, Blue Streak, had begun in the mid 1950s and had American support. But this was cancelled in 1960 at a time of cost over runs and the realisation that the need to fuel the missile immediately prior to launch made it very vulnerable to attack. The USA subsequently agreed to allow the UK to join the American Skybolt missile project which was under development at that time. Skybolt was an air launched ballistic missile which the RAF planned to fit to the existing V-Force bombers as a long term and long-range successor to the interim Blue Steel stand-off missile.

The 1950s and 1960s was also a period when the Royal Navy was struggling to define a meaningful role for itself in the UK's defence. It was claimed that any future war with the USSR would quickly turn nuclear and there would be no strategic role for the Royal Navy either during or after a nuclear exchange. The RAF also claimed it could carry out the Navy's maritime surveillance and strike functions from its UK and overseas air stations. Sandys' White Paper on Defence envisaged the Royal Navy undertaking only 'peacetime emergencies or limited hostilities'.[48] But Mountbatten had already discussed Polaris with his US counterpart, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke. Some years later, Mountbatten confirmed that a Royal Navy missile expert had quietly been seconded into the US Polaris programme from its outset.[49] It would appear that Mountbatten wanted to be certain that if and when the Royal Navy had a viable proposal for a sea-based deterrent they could deliver that proposal to Cabinet Ministers confident in the knowledge that both Polaris and submarine nuclear propulsion were proven, safe, and reliable technologies, and that

[46]MB1/1397, Sea Lords' Meeting, 8 October 1957, Item 1.
[47]Laurence W. Martin, 'The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The "Sandys Era"', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 1962), p. 28.
[48]HCPP Defence Outline of Future Policy; 1956-57 (Cmnd.124), p. 6.
[49]MB1/J40 Letter, Mountbatten to Rear Admiral I. J. Galantin USN, 21 January 1965.

moving to sea-based deterrence was the best future option for the UK. In 1957 Mountbatten certainly had an eye on a future deterrent role for the Royal Navy that was not envisaged either by Sandys or within the Ministry of Defence. Mountbatten wrote: '…I hope we shall now have his [Sandys] wholehearted support for the *Dreadnought* and eventually the *Polaris*-type nuclear submarine'.[50] Indeed, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, would later advise the Queen, that his philosophy was to rid the UK of the land-based missiles in the UK which were targets for the USSR, and the best thing was to move the deterrent out to sea: '…in a submarine, [which] is out of sight'.[51]

Purchase of the American S5W PWR

Two unrelated events, months apart, combined to change the Royal Navy's own nuclear reactor design. As a direct result of the Suez Crisis, Macmillan succeeded Eden as Prime Minister in January 1957. Macmillan already had a good working relationship with President Eisenhower dating from the Second World War and he used that well. Within days the Americans proposed a meeting between of the two leaders in Bermuda. As noted, earlier Macmillan's main foreign policy objective was to secure nuclear interdependence with the USA. Eisenhower agreed with this objective but had his own political difficulties within the US Senate. Macmillan's chance to change US political opinion came when the Soviets launched *Sputnik* 4 October 1957. This event caught the USA unawares, and the realisation dawned that the Soviet Union now had an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Macmillan wrote to the US Secretary of State, John Dulles, suggesting that the time was right for pooling defence resources although he refrained from mentioning the McMahon Act.[52] Three weeks later, at a meeting in the White House, Eisenhower surprised the British by producing a directive dealing with nuclear collaboration between the two countries, in effect it was the end of the McMahon Act's restrictions on technology transfer to the UK.

The American Admiral Hyman G Rickover is universally acknowledged as the 'father of the US nuclear navy'.[53] Rickover visited the UK in August/September 1956 to hold discussions with staff at the AERE, and in May 1957 gave a presentation at the Admiralty.[54] Rickover invited the Admiralty to send a Technical Mission to the US to learn more about the US nuclear propulsion project, and that took place between 10

[50]MB1/1300 Quarterly Newsletter, 1 November 1957, p. 9.
[51]Alister Horne, *Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography,* (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 276.
[52]Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm 1956-1959,* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 314.
[53] Vice Admiral Sir Robert Hill, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover USN and the UK Nuclear Submarine Propulsion Programme', *International Journal of Naval History*, Vol. 4, Issue 2, (Aug. 2005), p. 1.
[54]Broadlands Archive MB1/N104, Memorandum Rickover visit, 8 May 1957.

and 25 June. In October, at a meeting with the First Sea Lord, Selkirk, Rickover raised the possibility of the UK purchasing an American *Nautilus* class propulsion plant at a cost of some $11to 15 million.[55] In January 1958, Rickover was back in the UK and suggested that the UK purchase a *Skate* class (S3W) PWR as a means of freeing up his own staff from the numerous queries now coming from the UK.[56] Rickover advised that it was the Admiralty's decision as to which plant to purchase, the S3W or S5W, but he preferred the *Skate* S3W as it was a proven design.[57] The offer was discussed and the merits deliberated before the Admiralty decided that the S5W reactor plant, with a complete machinery set as fitted in the USS *Skipjack*, was the better proposition for meeting HMS *Dreadnought's* requirements. *Dreadnought* had a similar displacement to *Skipjack* and one propeller shaft; more-over, the S3W plant was rated for 6,600 SHP (and designed for two shafts) whereas the S5W plant was more powerful at 15,000 SHP, and closer to the UK's nominal requirement for a 20,000 SHP plant. Importantly, the S5W was the reactor that was to be installed in the US Navy's own SSBN fleet and should therefore have been capable of incorporation into a future Royal Navy SSBN. Fortunately, Rickover had no significant objections to the Admiralty purchasing a *Skipjack* S5W reactor. Macmillan agreed to the purchase and the USA was informed of the Admiralty's preference in April 1958.[58] This was in time for it to be included in the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement which was enacted that July, with Article Three of the Agreement covering the transfer of the S5W propulsion plant it was later fitted into HMS *Dreadnought*. The UK's first nuclear powered submarine, an SSN, was laid down on 12 June 1959, it was launched on 21 October (*Trafalgar Day*) 1960, and commissioned on 17 April 1963. She went out of service in 1980.

The Controller of the Royal Navy, Admiral Sir Peter Reid, directed that development of the Dounreay Submarine Prototype Reactor (PWR 1) was to continue except that no further work should be done on the reactor core and control mechanisms until: experience had been gained with the American S5W design; with expenditure in the next three years not to exceed the £14.85 million already planned.[59] The British development of the S5W core design, Core A, was taken critical for the first time on 7 January 1965.[60] Core A type reactors were subsequently installed into HM

[55]TNA PREM 11/2554, Telegram No. 2138, 19 October 1957. It should be noted that the American offer was for the sale of one PWR plant only. Therefore, the UK had to continue the development of its own reactors and power plants.
[56]TNA ADM 205/178, Memorandum, Mountbatten, 29 January 1958.
[57]Acronym S5W – Submarine 'Fifth Generation Westinghouse' manufactured reactor plant.
[58]TNA DEFE 7/2055, Minute, D-S 535, p. 21 April 1958.
[59]TNA ADM 1/27375, Note P. Reid to R. Baker, 6 August 1958.
[60]Harry Lambert, ed., *Rolls-Royce: the nuclear power connection,* (Rolls-Royce PLC Publication, 2009), p. 56.

Submarines *Valiant*, *Warspite*, *Churchill*, *Conqueror* and *Courageous,* which were all SSNs, and to the four Polaris SSBNs, HM Submarines *Resolution, Renown, Repulse* and *Revenge*. A more powerful British designed Core B, with a longer core life, was installed in the later *Swiftsure* class submarines, and replaced the Core A reactors of the older submarines when they underwent refit. There was one further core improvement for PWR 1 based on enhanced coolant pump performance and a longer core life. Core Z first went critical on 16 December 1974 and was installed in the next generation of *Trafalgar* class submarines, and then also to those older submarines as they came in for refit.[61] Development of PWR 1 had though reached its limits so a new generation of reactor was designed and developed, PWR 2, and this reactor, with Core G, has been installed in the current *Vanguard* class SSBNs which carry the Trident missile system - the successor missile to Polaris. An improved Core H is installed in the current *Astute* class SSNs and allows these submarines to remain in service for 30 years without refuelling.

Conclusion

It has been demonstrated that the legacy of the political, military and engineering decisions, made over sixty years ago, have had a major impact on British political and naval planning and the ability to maintain a continuous at sea deterrent since 1969.

The Royal Navy and its industrial partners in the UK have improved upon the core design of the S5W and have done so independently of the USA. This has justified Rickover's assessment that the UK would in time become technically competent to produce and improve their own nuclear propulsion plants once provided with the initial S5W technology.[62]

Since the late 1990s, the USA and UK have also collaborated on Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information and technology, with each navy seconding a senior naval engineering officer to their respective departments, Director Nuclear Propulsion in the UK and the Office of Naval Reactors in the USA. The next generation UK reactor, PWR 3, is a product of that collaboration, and contains elements of the S9G reactor design which is installed in the USN's latest *Virginia* class SSN.[63] The UK 'Successor Project SSN' is now in the early part of the design stage, and construction of the next generation of UK SSBN – *HM Submarine Dreadnought* has begun, with the three follow-on SSBNs named as; *HM Submarines Warspite, Valiant* and *King George VI*.

[61]Lambert, *Rolls-Royce*, *p.* 64.
[62]TNA DEFE 69/749, Minute Selkirk to Sandys, 24 January 1958.
[63]Julian Turner, Deep Impact: inside the UK's new Successor-Class Nuclear Submarine' (29 July 2013). https://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-nuclear-submarine-successor-uk-royal-navy. Accessed 4 September 2021.

Writing to Vice Admiral Sir Robert Hill some forty years after the events discussed above, Professor Jack Edwards wrote:

> Personally, I am still convinced that we would have built our own nuclear submarine entirely on our own efforts – it would not have been as good as Skipjack, and it would have taken us some 2 years longer to get to sea, but it would have been entirely of our own design and would not have made us so dependent on the whim of the U.S. Congress…[64]

In the same letter to Vice Admiral Sir Robert Hill, Jack Edwards conceded that the purchase of the S5W reactor: 'probably assisted in the subsequent Polaris conversion'.

It can be seen that the ongoing British development of submarine nuclear propulsion has been pivotal, not only to the subsequent access to, and success of Polaris, but to the UK's later Trident based nuclear deterrent, and Britain's nuclear powered hunter killer force.

[64]Professor Jack Edwards and Vice Admiral Sir Robert Hill, personal communication, 10 April 1998.

Wounds & Weapons in the Napoleonic War: a database of the Peninsular War

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ABSTRACT
The research supporting the authors' book Officiers de Napoléon tués ou blesses pendant la Guerre d'Espagne (1808-1814*) has uncovered a database of over 4,000 entries where the wounds, and the weapons that produced them, are described in some detail. This information can be cross-referenced with any of the other data in the book. The note includes tables relating the location of the wound, the different weapons causing the wound and the breakdown by arm (infantry, artillery, cavalry). The authors are ready to provide a suitable version of the database to researchers working in the field.*

Introduction

It is hard even for the most dedicated historian to disregard the images created in books (historical or fictionalized), movies and battle recreations when picturing the reality of Napoleonic warfare. The noise, smoke, thundering horse-hoofs, and bristling steel of the advancing masses is a scenario difficult to dispel, being a part of the Napoleonic myth.

However, what was the truth? How did soldiers become casualties? Was it the musket, an edged weapon, or cannon that was most effective?[1] Unfortunately, research about

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[1] 'Edged weapon' includes swords, bayonets and lances.

the type of wounds and the weapons that caused them is scarce and has been based only on memoirs and witness accounts that cannot always be quantified.[2]

The information contained in the authors' book *Officiers de Napoléon tués ou blesses pendant la Guerre d'Espagne (1808-1814)* lists 12,439 events involving 10,102 individual officers of the French Army during the Peninsula War.[3] The officer records in the 2Yb volumes at the *Service Historique de la Défense* (Vincennes, Paris) and other contemporary documents referenced in the book, describe the injuries in as many as one in three of the cases with sentences like: '*blessé d'un coup de feu à la cuisse gauche'* ('wounded by a shot in the left thigh') and '*blessé d'un éclat d'obus au côté droit et d'une balle au bras droit'* ('wounded by shrapnel in the right side and a bullet in the right arm').[4]

It could be argued that the written source for the information on the wounds and weapons might influence how they are described so as to obtain rewards or other benefits. This is surely not the case with the laconic entries in the 2Yb registers although this might apply in descriptions taken from hagiographic collections of biographies.[5] Even with such sources it is relatively easy to reduce the heroic sentences to a statistically relevant 'what kind of weapon caused a wound in which part of the body'.

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[2]See Jean Morvan, *Le soldat Impérial,* (Paris: Librairie Historique F. Teissedre, 1999), t. II, pp. 282-286; Rory Muir, *Tactics and the experience of battle in the age of Napoleon,* (New York: Yale University Press, 2008); or more recently, Francois Houdecek, 'Combattre sous l'Empire: de la peur du conscrit à la médaille du héros', *Napoleonica, La Revue,* 2016/3 (27), pp. 84-99.

[3]Jorge Planas Campos and Antonio Grajal de Blas, *Officiers de Napoléon tués ou blessés pendant la Guerre d'Espagne (1808-1814), 2e édtion, corrigée et augmentée,* (Legardeta: FEHME, 2020).

[4]Service historique de la défense (SHD), Section 'b' of the *sous-série* 2Y (*Registre des contrôles des officiers*) has the officer records of all infantry units of the French army in all theatres of war between the Revolution and 1880. The quotes relate to Lieutenant Alexande Maximilien d'Abos de Binanville of the 7th *cuirassiers* during the siege of Zaragoza on 23 July 1808 and Captain Pierre Nicolas d'Ambly, of the 40th infantry regiment, at the battle of Orthez respectively.

[5]Such as A. Liévyns, J.M: Verdot and P. Bégat's five-volume *Fastes de la légion-d'honneur, biographie de tous les décorés accompagnée de l'histoire législative et réglementaire de l'ordre,* (Paris: au bureau de l'Administration, 1844-1847).

Altogether 3,995 events detail the nature of the wounds and 4,359 the weapons used. However, in only 230 cases out of the 3,126 officers killed in action (KIA) or died of wounds (DOW), do we have information on what caused their death.

But can the conclusions from the analysis of this detailed database be applied to the rank and file? To address this question the 12,600 entries in the *registres matricules* (regimental returns) of the *100e regiment d'infanterie de ligne* have been analysed.[6] They contain information on the nature of the wounds of 491 individual casualties in the Peninsula, all rank and file, of which 22 were killed or died of wounds. The detailed comparison between the officer and other rank records, broken down by cause and location of wound, is given below (Tables 10 & 11). This supports the view that the officer records are representative of the army as a whole.

Example Data

Twelve different weapons or munitions appear mentioned in the database:[7]

- *Coup de feu* (musket or rifle fire)
- *Balle* (musket or rifle ball)
- *Baïonnette* (bayonet)
- *Sabre* (sword)
- *Lance* (lance)
- *Obus* (howitzer's common shell)
- *Canon* (cannonball)
- *Mitraille* (canister shot)
- *Biscaïen* (grapeshot)
- *Boulet* (round shot)
- *Grenade* (siege grenade)
- *Bombe* (common shell)

For clarity, in some tables the information on the weapons used has been compiled according to three basic categories and not by the projectiles used:

- Firearms (muskets, rifles, pistols)
- Ordnance (cannon, howitzers, siege guns, shrapnel)
- Edged weapons (swords, lances, bayonets)

[6]SHD, SHD/GR 21Yc 727 to SHD/GR 21Yc 731.

[7]Approximate translation of French terms as per B. P. Hughes, *Firepower* (New York: Sarpedon, 1997).

In addition, a fourth category, Contusions, is included in some data sets. This includes all recorded injuries not caused by the weapons or munitions listed above. This would include, for example, a fall from a horse, injuries sustained while scaling a wall or by the stock of a rifle.

Twenty-one different wound locations are referenced. These are:

• *bras*	(arms)	• *main*	(hand)	• *poignet*	(wrist)
• *avant-bras*	(forearm)	• *jambe*	(leg)	• *cuisse*	(thigh)
• *hanche*	(hip)	• *pied*	(foot)	• *genou*	(knee)
• *poitrine*	(chest)	• *tête*	(head)	• *oeil*	(eye)
• *front*	(forehead)	• *col*	(neck)	• *joue*	(cheek)
• *mâchoire*	(jaw)	• *ventre*	(abdomen)	• *épaule*	(shoulders)
• *fesse*	(buttocks)	• *dos*	(back)	• *reins*	(kidneys)

Again, these locations have been collated into eight basic body parts as follows:

- Arms (*bras, main, poignet, avant-bras*)
- Legs (*jambe, cuisse, hanche, pied, genou*)
- Chest (*poitrine*)
- Head (*tête, oeil, front, col, joue, mâchoire*)
- Abdomen (*ventre*)
- Shoulders (*épaule)*
- Buttocks (*fesse*)
- Back (*dos, reins*)

The data can also be divided between the classical arms of the army: infantry, cavalry, and artillery.[8]

Of the 4,129 officers with a record of the weapons that produced their non-fatal wounds, 76.4% were caused by firearms, 8.1% by ordnance 11.4% by edged weapons and 4.1% by contusions. However, the different lethality becomes evident when analysing the weapons that killed or mortally wounded 230 officers: 77.0% by firearms, 19.1% by ordnance, and 3.5% by edged weapons. Relative to death by firearm,

[8]Infantry is taken to include other services: general staff and *aides-de-camp*, *gendarmerie*, medical and administrative services. The artillery includes engineers (*génie, mineurs* and *sapeurs*) as well as horse and field and artillery.

ordnance caused, in proportion, three times more deaths, while edged weapons were slightly less than one quarter as lethal.[9]

	All arms					Cavalry					Artillery					Infantry & other services				
	Tot		b	t	m	Tot		b	t	m	Tot		b	t	m	Tot		b	t	m
feu	2950	68%	2792	94	64	305	46%	295	6	4	54	31%	48	6	0	2591	74%	2449	82	60
balle	381	9%	362	14	5	56	9%	53	3	0	50	28%	45	3	2	275	8%	264	8	3
baïonnette	139	3%	136	1	2	25	4%	24	0	1	3	2%	3	0	0	111	3%	109	1	1
sabre	301	7%	298	3	0	185	28%	184	1	0	5	3%	5	0	0	111	3%	109	2	0
lance	58	1%	56	1	1	30	5%	30	0	0	2	1%	1	1	0	26	1%	25	0	1
contusion	179	4%	178	0	1	14	2%	14	0	0	3	2%	3	0	0	162	5%	161	0	1
obus	100	2%	96	3	1	14	2%	14	0	0	15	9%	12	2	1	71	2%	70	1	0
canon	22	1%	15	6	1	5	1%	4	1	0	5	3%	1	4	0	12	0%	10	1	1
mitraille	36	1%	33	2	1	1	0%	1	0	0	6	3%	5	1	0	29	1%	27	1	1
biscaïen	83	2%	76	4	3	9	1%	8	0	1	9	5%	8	1	0	65	2%	60	3	2
boulet	71	2%	52	14	5	14	2%	11	2	1	14	8%	9	4	1	43	1%	32	8	3
grenade	16	0%	16	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	4	2%	4	0	0	12	0%	12	0	0
bombe	23	1%	19	4	0	0	0%	0	0	0	6	3%	5	1	0	17	0%	14	3	0
	4359		4129	146	84	658		638	13	7	176		149	23	4	3525		3342	110	73

b: *wounded* t: *killed in action* m: *dead of wounds*

Table 1: Breakdown and consequences of wounds by weapon.

[9]This proportion is calculated comparing the total number of deaths with each weapon in the sample with the number of wounded with the same weapon.

	All arms				Cavalry				Artillery				Infantry & other services			
	Tot	b	t	m	Tot	b	t	m	Tot	b	t	m	Tot	b	t	m
bras	678	669	1	8	111	109	0	2	18	17	1	0	549	543	0	6
main	245	242	2	1	44	44	0	0	11	11	0	0	190	187	2	1
poignet	35	35	0	0	12	12	0	0	1	1	0	0	22	22	0	0
avant-bras	63	63	0	0	9	9	0	0	1	1	0	0	53	53	0	0
jambe	621	606	4	11	70	70	0	0	21	18	1	2	530	518	3	9
cuisse	687	669	4	14	57	54	0	3	24	20	2	2	606	595	2	9
hanche	99	97	1	1	9	9	0	0	2	2	0	0	88	86	1	1
pied	201	200	0	1	21	21	0	0	6	6	0	0	174	173	0	1
genou	155	149	1	5	28	28	0	0	6	6	0	0	121	115	1	5
poitrine	169	157	9	3	24	23	1	0	8	7	0	1	137	127	8	2
tête	390	373	12	5	78	76	2	0	34	32	2	0	278	265	8	5
oeil	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0
front	18	16	2	0	5	4	1	0	1	1	0	0	12	11	1	0
col	46	45	1	0	5	5	0	0	3	3	0	0	38	37	1	0
joue	42	42	0	0	8	8	0	0	1	1	0	0	33	33	0	0
mâchoire	41	41	0	0	7	7	0	0	1	1	0	0	33	33	0	0
ventre	102	99	1	2	7	7	0	0	5	5	0	0	90	87	1	2
épaule	341	337	1	3	57	56	0	1	13	13	0	0	271	268	1	2
fesse	16	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	15	15	0	0
dos	10	10	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	8	8	0	0
reins	33	33	0	0	3	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	29	29	0	0
	3995	3902	39	54	556	546	4	6	159	148	6	5	3280	3208	29	43

b: *wounded* t: *killed in action* m: *dead of wounds*

Table 2: Breakdown and consequences of wounds by location.

When collating the information by the eight body parts mentioned, the implications are more apparent:

	Wounded		Killed		Dead of wounds		Total	
Arms	1009	25.9%	3	7.7%	9	16.7%	1021	25.6%
Legs	1721	44.1%	10	25.6%	32	59.3%	1763	44.1%
Chest	157	4.0%	9	23.1%	3	5.6%	169	4.2%
Head	520	13.3%	15	38.5%	5	9.3%	540	13.5%
Abdomen	99	2.5%	1	2.6%	2	3.7%	102	2.6%
Shoulders	337	8.6%	1	2.6%	3	5.6%	341	8.5%
Buttocks	16	0.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	16	0.4%
Back	43	1.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	43	1.1%
	3902		39		54		3995	

Table 3: Location and consequences of wounds by body part.

The data matches quite closely with that found by Nebiha Guiga for Austrian officers wounded at the battle of Austerlitz in her well-documented thesis: 26% of the wounds in the upper members, 45% in the lower members, 6% in the head, 9% in the upper body, 4% in the back.[10]

Although the sample size for those killed in action and died of wounds is small, the numbers confirm the expected lethality of certain wound areas: those in the chest and head were deadly, while those in the arms and legs could cause death probably by amputation or gangrene.

There is additional information in 3,619 cases when the injured body part is cross referenced with the weapons that caused the wounds.

	Total	Arms	Legs	Chest	Head	Abdomen	Shoulders	Buttocks	Back
firearm	2848	692	1343	121	310	78	255	13	36
ordnance	209	37	103	6	34	6	19	1	3
edged weapon	424	155	71	20	131	8	33	1	5
contusion	138	24	66	12	10	7	15	0	4
	3619	908	1583	159	485	99	322	15	48

Table 4: Body part injured by cause of injury.

While 71.5% of the firearm wounds hit the arms and legs and 10.9% the head, edged weapons were the cause of 36.6% of arm wounds and 30.9% of those in the head.

When allocating the 424 edged weapons casualties to the different weapons in this category, there is another important fact: 67.0% of wounds were from swords while only 22.9% were caused by bayonets and only 10.1% from lances.

	Total	Arms	Legs	Chest	Head	Abdomen	Shoulders	Buttocks	Back
bayonet	97	26	40	7	12	4	5	1	2
	22.9%	16.8%	56.3%	35.0%	9.2%	50.0%	15.2%	100.0%	40.0%
sword	284	115	22	7	110	4	25	0	1
	67.0%	74.2%	31.0%	35.0%	84.0%	50.0%	75.8%	0.0%	20.0%
lance	43	14	9	6	9	0	3	0	2
	10.1%	9.0%	12.7%	30.0%	6.9%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	40.0%
	424	155	71	20	131	8	33	1	5

Table 5: Body part injured by type of edged weapon.

[10] NebihaGuiga Le champ couvert de mort sur qui tombait la nuit*: être blessé au combat et soigné dans l'Europe napoléonienne (1805-1813)* (doctoral thesis, EHESS, 2021), p. 134.

The relatively low number of bayonet wounds suggests that either close-quarter combat only happened occasionally or that wounds inflicted by the bayonet were slight and not worth recording.

Dividing the data by arm, the following tables provide food for thought regarding the effectiveness of the different weapons and the vulnerability of foot soldiers versus cavalry and artillery.

		All arms		Cavalry		Artllery		Infantry & other	
Firearms		*feu*	*balle*	*feu*	*balle*	*feu*	*balle*	*feu*	*balle*
bras	469	430	39	49	3	3	3	378	33
main	156	144	12	12	1	2	1	130	10
poignet	18	16	2	2	0	0	0	14	2
avant-bras	49	45	4	2	1	1	0	42	3
jambe	466	433	33	46	6	5	3	382	24
cuisse	545	478	67	32	11	6	3	440	53
hanche	72	67	5	7	0	1	0	59	5
pied	145	123	22	11	4	0	3	112	15
genou	115	99	16	15	3	0	1	84	12
poitrine	121	97	24	9	4	4	2	84	18
tête	205	180	25	14	5	6	5	160	15
oeil	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
front	10	8	2	1	1	0	1	7	0
col	36	31	5	3	0	1	1	27	4
joue	28	26	2	3	1	0	0	23	1
mâchoire	30	25	5	3	1	0	1	22	3
ventre	78	67	11	3	1	1	2	63	8
épaule	255	229	26	31	5	2	6	196	15
fesse	13	12	1	0	0	0	0	12	1
dos	8	6	2	0	0	0	1	6	1
reins	28	24	4	2	0	0	1	22	3
	2848	2541	307	245	47	32	34	2264	226

Table 6: Firearms – wounds recorded to each arm by location of wound.

		All arms			Cavalry			Artillery			Infantry & other services		
edged weapon		*baïonnette*	*sabre*	*lance*	*baïonnette*	*sabre*	*lance*	*baïonnette*	*sabre*	*lance*	*baïonnette*	*sabre*	*lance*
bras	76	14	54	8	2	38	4	0	0	0	12	16	4
main	57	10	43	4	4	26	1	0	1	0	6	16	3
poignet	13	2	10	1	0	8	1	0	0	0	2	2	0
avant-bras	9	0	8	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	3	1
jambe	11	6	4	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	3	1	1
cuisse	35	23	10	2	6	5	0	1	1	1	16	4	1
hanche	6	4	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	1
pied	6	1	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	1
genou	13	6	4	3	2	3	2	0	0	0	4	1	1
poitrine	20	7	7	6	2	3	4	0	0	0	5	4	2
tête	108	7	95	6	1	48	3	0	2	0	6	45	3
oeil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
front	6	2	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
col	5	1	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
joue	9	1	6	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	4	1
mâchoire	3	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
ventre	8	4	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	3	0
épaule	33	5	25	3	0	14	3	0	0	0	5	11	0
fesse	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
dos	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
reins	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
	424	97	284	43	22	163	22	1	4	1	74	117	20
		22.9%	67.0%	10.1%			207			6			211

Table 7: Edged weapons – wounds recorded to each arm by location of wound.

		All arms							Cavalry							Artillery							Infantry & other services						
Ordnance		*obus*	*canon*	*mitraille*	*biscaïen*	*boulet*	*grenade*	*bombe*	*obus*	*canon*	*mitraille*	*biscaïen*	*boulet*	*grenade*	*bombe*	*obus*	*canon*	*mitraille*	*biscaïen*	*boulet*	*grenade*	*bombe*	*obus*	*canon*	*mitraille*	*biscaïen*	*boulet*	*grenade*	*bombe*
bras	23	6	0	5	5	5	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	4	0	5	5	2	0	0
main	13	4	0	2	4	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	2	4	0	1	0
poignet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
avant-bras	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
jambe	37	13	3	5	7	6	1	2	2	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	11	1	5	4	2	1	2
cuisse	33	10	1	3	12	4	3	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	3	0	0	2	1	0	0	6	1	3	9	1	3	0
hanche	8	2	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	1	0
pied	18	9	0	2	4	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	2	4	1	0	0
genou	7	3	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	1	2	0	0	0
poitrine	6	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0
tête	24	3	1	7	5	3	2	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	2	3	1	5	3	2	1	1
oeil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
front	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
col	3	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
joue	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
mâchoire	5	0	0	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	0
ventre	6	2	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0
épaule	19	5	0	1	7	5	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	5	0	1	3	5	0	0
fesse	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
dos	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
reins	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
	209	63	6	27	60	33	12	8	7	1	0	7	7	0	0	7	1	2	10	8	4	4	49	4	25	43	18	8	4
					209							**22**							**36**							**151**			

Table 8: Ordnance - wounds recorded to each arm by location of wound.

Contusion	Tot	Cavalry	Artillerie	Infantry
bras	20	1	0	**19**
main	3	0	0	**3**
poignet	0	0	0	**0**
avant-bras	1	0	0	**1**
jambe	21	1	1	**19**
cuisse	19	0	0	**19**
hanche	12	0	0	**12**
pied	3	0	0	**3**
genou	11	0	0	**11**
poitrine	12	3	0	**9**
tête	6	1	0	**5**
oeil	1	0	0	**1**
front	0	0	0	**0**
col	1	0	0	**1**
joue	1	0	0	**1**
mâchoire	1	0	0	**1**
ventre	7	0	0	**7**
épaule	15	0	0	**15**
fesse	0	0	0	**0**
dos	0	0	0	**0**
reins	4	1	0	**3**
	138	7	1	130

Table 9: Contusions - wounds recorded to each arm by location of wound.

Finally, comparing the summary figures for wounds to officers against those to the rank and file:

Weapons	Officers	Rank and file
Firearms	79%	78%
Cold Steel	6%	5%
Ordnance	12%	11%
Other	4%	6%

Table 10: Wounds to officers and rank and file by cause of injury.

Body Areas	Officers	Rank and file
Arms	26%	22%
Legs	44%	40%
Chest	4%	6%
Head	14%	24%
Abdomen	3%	1%
Shoulder	9%	7%
Buttocks	0%	0%
Back	1%	0%

Table 11: Wounds to officers and rank and file by location of injury.

Conclusions

Much more information can be retrieved from the original database as 93% of the recorded events contain other information relevant to the circumstances surrounding each specific action. This includes:

- Name, place and date of birth, rank and unit.
- Location and date of the action that ended with a wound or a death.
- Whether the action was against regular or irregular forces.
- If the subject was a graduate of one of the military schools or an elite corps.
- Match, when applicable, with Martinien's work.[11]
- Sources for the information on each individual.

There remain many avenues for novel research, studying, for instance, the wounds received by French officers in some of the significant combats during the War, e.g. Salamanca (202 casualties with wound reports), Talavera (151), the sieges of Zaragoza (159), Albuera (160), etc. The numbers are high enough to be statistically useful in verifying or complementing the eye-witness accounts of how those battles were fought. Further, the database could be used to study the effectiveness and lethality of the various weapons in comparison to other theatres of war and other epochs. One final example of a question that could be explored using this data would be, what were the weapons of choice used by guerrillas against the French Army?

The authors are ready to provide a suitable version of the database to researchers interested in pursuing any of these or related lines of investigation.

[11] Aristide Martinien, *Tableaux par Corps et par batailles des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805-1815),* (Paris: H. Charles-Lavauzelle, 1899).

French Torpedo Development before 1914

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ABSTRACT
France embraced the promise of self-propelled torpedoes in the early decades of development. Proponents of the Jeune École put it at the centre of naval strategy, tactics, and fleet composition, as a way for a weaker navy to challenge a stronger. Even as the French Navy fell under the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan and constructed a big gun battlefleet, the advanced torpedo still maintained its prominence. A contemporary publication distributed within the French Navy provides technical details, capabilities, and quality of design for standard French model types before the First World War.

Introduction

The French Navy (*Marine nationale*) was an early adopter of torpedo technology and pursued its development enthusiastically through arrangements with leading innovators, and also with its own refinements. In contrast to the close industrial relations between navies and private concerns in Great Britain and the United States as described by Katherine Epstein, French manufacture and maintenance of torpedoes was largely done in or near state-run arsenals connected to major ports under maritime prefects.[1] Designs were at first foreign in origin and were then adapted to specific requirements for operating on a variety of warships.

France constructed large numbers of torpedo boats organised into flotillas, trialled submarines from experimental novelties to an operational ready force, and incorporated torpedoes into larger ships within squadrons and the battlefleet. As a

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[1]Katherine C. Epstein, *Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain,* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014).

preferred weapon of choice, torpedoes and their deployment involved dedicated infrastructure, specialized training, and personnel assignment inside the French Navy.

French torpedoes, like those of other countries, were marvels of engineering and technical complexity designed with one purpose, to deliver an explosive charge against the hull of another ship, in a more-or-less straight line, and at a distance safe enough for those launching to avoid direct fire and countermeasures. The most critical factors were speed, bearing, sea conditions, and reliability. Early torpedoes were notorious for failures and misses until the technology advanced and settled.[2] How good then were French *torpilles*? By the start of the First World War, the French Navy possessed reasonably reliable models that had been thoroughly tested and operationalised and compared favourably with those of other navies. A manual on automotive torpedoes was approved in November 1913 and published in 1914. Meant for internal use, it furnishes an insight into the design and technical aspects of the French Navy's conventional 450-mm torpedoes (Figure 1). At the time, they were state-of-art and admirably reflected the talents of French maritime and engineering industries but the French Navy's subsequent use of torpedoes in the war at sea was very limited.


RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

MARINE NATIONALE

INSTRUCTION

SUR

LES TORPILLES AUTOMOBILES

DEUXIÈME FASCICULE

TORPILLES DE 450mm MODÈLES 1904 ET 1906

PREMIÈRE ÉDITION

APPROUVÉE LE 15 NOVEMBRE 1913

CONFIDENTIEL

Toute personne qui détient ce document sans avoir qualité pour le connaître tombe sous le coup de la loi du 18 avril 1886 sur l'espionnage.

PARIS

IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE

1914

Figure 1: Front cover of the *Instruction sur Les Torpilles Automobiles*.[3]

[2]Edwyn Gray, *19th Century Torpedoes and Their Inventors,* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004).

[3]*Instruction sur les torpilles automobiles,* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1914). All translations from the *Instruction* are by Chris Madsen.

The Democratic weapon of the Republic

The torpedo appealed to France's republican character as a leading continental and maritime nation. Since before and then after the French Revolution, the French Navy had operated under the threat of Great Britain's aggressive and dominant Royal Navy. The French fleet was split between two long coasts, one in the Mediterranean based out of Toulon and Algeria, and the other facing the Atlantic and English Channel. In the event of war, the British intended to keep the Mediterranean component bottled-up and incapable of reinforcing the Atlantic front, where the Royal Navy could descend on French harbours and ports and wreak havoc on commerce. Equally, units of the French Navy would be available to transport land forces from the French Army and its own naval artillery and marines across the short sea distance for raids in force or invasion, either in surprise movements, or once British sea control was contested or ceded.

Naval operations during the wars against the Russians in the Crimea in 1854-56 and the Prussians in the Baltic in 1870 highlighted the limitations of close blockade, the difficulties behind planning and conduct of combined amphibious landings, and the dangers of mines, obstructions, and fixed artillery in coastal fortifications. In the second half of the nineteenth century the British and the French traded qualitative advantage back and forth in building first ironclads and then the newer battleships incorporating the latest advances in naval architecture and armaments. However, strained French finances and constant organizational churn due to political instability from the frequent turnover of the Third Republic's governments and navy ministers meant the French Navy experienced difficulty staying ahead.[4] How to overcome the basic strategic dilemma of divided fleets, address material inferiority as ships aged and present a cohesive doctrine for their employment preoccupied opinion-makers and tacticians within the French Navy. The arrival of the self-propelled torpedo offered new defensive and offensive opportunities to those thinkers.

French enthusiasm for the new innovation bordered on infatuation and fed into a classic underdog narrative that inspired new thinking inside and outside the French Navy. Although spar and towed torpedoes had existed for some time, the challenge of making an autonomous device, launched under its own power that could then travel to an intended target, was not solved until a working prototype was made by a British engineer, Robert Whitehead, who was managing the Fiume works in the Austro-

[4]Hugues Canuel, 'From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune Ecole: French Naval Policy and Strategy under the Second Empire and the Early Third Republic (1852-1914)', *Naval War College Review*, 71, 1, (Winter 2018), p. 103.

Hungarian Empire.[5] Whitehead's torpedo ran on compressed air, and was capable of reaching an advertised effective range of about 400 meters in good conditions. Other engineering features of the automotive torpedo were considered trade secrets, so the French government negotiated rights to the plans and started manufacture in 1873.[6]



Figure 2: Torpedo trials on an old warship in Toulon attracted large crowds of spectators.[7]

Vice-Admiral Siméon Bourgois, the celebrated inventor of a steam propeller whose technical and operational knowledge was extensive, proved instrumental in the early French adoption of the torpedo. The torpedo training establishment (*école des défenses*

[5]Edwyn Gray, *The Devil's Device: Robert Whitehead and the History of the Torpedo,* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991). Alan Wolstencroft, 'The Whitehead Story', *Mariner's Mirror*, 59, 3 (1973), p. 345. Paul Halpern, 'The French Navy, 1880-1914', in Phillips Payson O'Brien (ed.), *Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond,* (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 38.
[6]Theodore Ropp, Stephen S. Roberts (ed.), *The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904,* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 112-113.
[7]Lithograph print in author's possession.

sous-marines) at Boyardville on the Isle of Oléron, was headed by the up-and-coming Captain (*Capitaine de vaisseau*) Amédée Courbet who, under the maritime prefect of Rochefort, reorganised it in 1876 to carry out advanced studies and provide opportunities for experimentation. Trials of French-procured Whitehead torpedoes invited considerable public interest and spectacle as can be seen in Figure 2. To the public and advocates of the new weapon, here finally was a truly revolutionary and democratic weapon that could challenge British superiority and tyranny (and incidentally aristocratic elements in the French Navy).[8] That the Royal Navy also had its own Whitehead torpedoes and was vigorously pursuing the procurement of torpedo boats and eventually torpedo boat destroyers (larger counter-torpedo boats) was merely inconvenient.[9]

Wild claims about the effectiveness of torpedoes and torpedo boats gave rise in part to the *Jeune École*, the 'young school', that found virtue in the small and the many. Its main champion was Vice-Admiral Théophile Aube who argued that any naval war against Great Britain could be best waged by attacks on commerce by cruisers while flotillas of torpedo boats provided for coastal defence and, when opportune, offensive operations.[10] Journalist Gabriel Charmes, an Aube confidant, went one step further and argued that boats carrying torpedoes could operate independently to strike opposing naval forces and mercantile trade. Although Bourgois pointed out the evident technical and legal impediments, the *Jeune École*'s allure rose when Aube became Navy Minister in 1886. Thereafter support peaked periodically whenever ministers and admirals of similar views came into positions of influence and decision making, in particular under the reformers Édouard Lockroy and Vice-Admiral Ernest Fournier.

Great Britain's determination to build up to a two-power standard was formalised by the Naval Defence Act of 1889.[11] This determination meant that French shipbuilding capacity was unable to compete in the construction of larger warships to add to the battlefleet. This situation solidified the French Navy's already inferior position, so that only a wholly different strategy could hope to defend against and to challenge a clearly

[8]Gabriel Sauvé, 'La pensée navale et le débat sur la torpille en Angleterre au cours de la décennie 1880', MSc History (Montreal: Université de Montréal, 2010), p. 32.
[9]Mark Briggs, 'Innovation and the Mid-Victorian Royal Navy: The Case of the Whitehead Torpedo', *Mariner's Mirror*, 88, 4 (2002), p. 453. Joseph Zeller, 'Redefining the Naval Seascape: The Emergence of the Torpedo Boat', MSS, (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2009), pp. 29-30.
[10]Arne Røksund, *The Jeune Ėcole: The Strategy of the Weak,* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2007), p. 18.
[11]The two-power standard required Britain to maintain a fleet at least equal to the naval strength any two other countries, in this period, effectively France and the next largest European navy.

superior Royal Navy. The emergence of the torpedo presented a seductive justification for the *Jeune École*'s advocacy of a form of naval warfare that addressed France's strategic position.

Incremental advances in torpedo technology and establishment reorganizations gradually caught up with the initial hype surrounding the weapon and its possibilities. French engineers improved the original models through a system of trial-and-error, and Whitehead adopted a small gyroscope invented by Ludwig Obry to increase stability and depth-keeping.[12] The 1892 model installed on French warships could run beyond 1,100 metres in a straight line. The main consideration was the supply of compressed air for propulsion, as this affected both speed and range.



Figure 3: Schematic for the Whitehead torpedo, its internal mechanisms and launch tube.[13]

[12]Roger Branfill-Cook, *Torpedo: The Complete History of the World's Most Revolutionary Naval Weapon,* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2014), p. 40.
[13]Graphic in author's possession.

Regular inspections of torpedo boats and crews distributed in *défense mobile* flotillas around the coasts identified glaring technical, material and training deficiencies. These forces relied upon stocks of torpedoes held in local arsenals, where most first-line and second-line maintenance occurred. The older torpedoes often presented hazards to the personnel handling them, and specialised training was required to develop a minimum of familiarity with these weapons. The older armed steamer *Algésiras* served as a torpedo school ship for many years, and a torpedo school (*école des torpilles*) was established ashore, under the Director of Underwater Defences at Toulon, which trained an allotted number of lieutenants every year. Torpedo advisors were attached to commands, squadrons, flotillas, and even larger ships to provide expertise and ensure standards in training. The Whitehead torpedo (Figure 3), much improved by the French, was still the mainstay of the French Navy.

Echoes of the *Jeune École* in a Mahanian fleet

After the discomfiture that resulted from the stand-off with Great Britain over Fashoda in 1898, the *Marine nationale* underwent a major reorganisation and transformation. In 1900, Navy Minister Jean-Marie de Lanessan secured political and financial commitments for a comprehensive plan to build a balanced fleet with new capital ships for the battlefleet, additional torpedo boats for the flotillas and longer-range submarines of new types.[14] From 1904 the subsequent diplomatic rapprochement with Great Britain, following with their mutual recognition of Imperial Germany as a threat, resulted in the Royal Navy becoming a friend and ally rather than the likely enemy. Even the drama associated with Camille Pelletan's tenure as the last of the *Jeune École* navy ministers from 1902 to 1905 barely marked a significant departure from the French quest for a battlefleet sufficient to defend France proper, secure the colonies, and deter the Triple Alliance, even though the Italian Navy (*Regina Marina*) was waning in power and was less critical in French calculations.[15] French naval officers were now reading Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose major historical and theoretical work had been translated into French by *Capitaine de vaisseau* Émile Boisse in 1899.

Observations from naval actions during the Russo-Japanese War seemingly reinforced Mahan and the importance of command of the sea and the concentration of force in numbers. In this quest for the biggest and the best, the gun competed with the torpedo as the preferred weapon. Torpedoes were typically associated with smaller and faster warships, able to close rapidly with the enemy rather than taking and inflicting a pounding from behind the protective armour of larger battleships and cruisers. The

[14]Ray Walser, *France's Search for a Battle Fleet: Naval Policy and Naval Power, 1898-1914,* (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1992), pp. 88-89.

[15]Jean de Préneuf, 'Du rival méprisé à l'adversaire préféré: L'Italie dans la stratégie navale française de 1870 à 1899', *Revue historique des armées*, 250, (2008), pp. 45-46.

transition to Mahanian thinking was, however, never wholesale in the French Navy, which still subscribed to lingering elements of the *Jeune École*.[16] The torpedo remained the primary weapon of the torpedo boat and destroyer flotillas, and the new submarine service (Figure 4).



Figure 4: Practice torpedo being hoisted onto a torpedo boat.[17]

[16]Martin Motte, *Une education géostratégique: la pensée navale française de la Jeune École à 1914,* (Paris: Economica, 2004), p. 573.
[17]Photograph in author's possession.

France's platforms carrying torpedoes certainly multiplied in these years. Designers and constructors of larger warships felt obliged to add the capability, if only because ample room was available as warships in general grew larger and larger. Deck-mounted tubes gradually supplanted submerged tubes for launching torpedoes.[18] These tubes drew upon the ship's steam power supply or pneumatic resources to boost the exit velocity on launching. The launch tube was also redesigned to have a downward curve to better direct the torpedo into the water and prevent fish-tailing. These deck mounted tubes on larger vessels were vulnerable to exploding shells as were the personnel serving them and holding a torpedo in a tube represented some risk of explosion or serious damage during combat. Torpedo boats and destroyers, on the other hand, relied upon speed and manoeuvrability, and submarines submerged stealth, to get in range and optimal firing position to launch torpedoes and most importantly retire after the deed was done. Nevertheless, they too were susceptible to gunfire in close-quarter naval combat.

Standardisation of torpedo types greatly eased manufacturing, maintenance and repair, although French production of this very specialised armament was done on a virtually craft-like basis, requiring skilled craftsmen and precision machining. After Whitehead's death in November 1905, the *Marine nationale* augmented state manufacturing facilities in Toulon with a privately-run adjustment workshop at Saint-Tropez, and a torpedo factory at La Londe-les-Maures built by armaments firm Schneider in 1912.[19] Since the quantities required were modest, mass production or line assembly methods were never really tried in peacetime.

Even though most French naval officers acquired a modicum of knowledge about torpedoes at various points in their careers, technical complexity favoured specialists and those more familiar with the workings and refinements of successive torpedoes (even the standard 450-mm *torpille* came in multiple types). In 1909, the torpedo schools fell under a division based in Toulon, with Rear-Admiral Alphonse Guillou as commandant on the armoured cruiser *Brennus*. Whereas the Royal Navy drew a

[18]Gabriel Darrieus, *La guerre sur mer: stratégie et tactique,* (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1907), p. 422.

[19]Nabil Erouihane, 'Un enjeu géostratégique: l'implantation des industries d'armement sur la côte méditerranéenne français de 1871 à 1940', *Cahiers balkaniques*, 45 (2018), pp. 6-7, doi.org/10.4000/ceb.10740. During the First World War, 330 women were employed in the La Londe factory, and 140 at Saint-Tropez, to replace male workers conscripted into the army and navy. Schneider had constructed a fixed platform torpedo testing station constituting the offshore *Batterie des Maures* there in 1908-09. Schneider and Co., *Les établissements Schneider: matériels d'artillerie et bateaux de guerre,* (Paris: Imprimerie de Lahure, 1914), pp. 54-60. Claude Beaud, 'Les Schneider marchands de canons (1870-1914)', *Histoire, économie et société*, 14, 1 (1995), p. 120.

distinction between gunnery and torpedoes, the French Navy's training was much more integrated in nature, even as France's Mahanian battlefleet took shape.

Mechanical fish with many complicated parts

The five-part *Manual on Automotive Torpedoes* was basically an authoritative technical guide for the use and maintenance of the newest types of French torpedo.

An opening section described the improvements:

> FIRST ARTICLE. PROGRESS SINCE THE 92 MODEL
>
> The 1904 model torpedo is distinguished from earlier models at first glance by its much more pronounced ends.
>
> These forms make it possible to concentrate the charge forward and place the centre of gravity of the charge closer to the point of action; the shattering power of the explosive mass is multiplied.
>
> The machine's power has been increased due to the fact that its dimensions are larger and the motor consists of four cylinders.
>
> Finally, an increase in the resistance of the metal in the air reservoir, obtained by use of nickel steel, made it possible to increase the air pressure to 150 kilograms per square centimetre, and consequently, to get: either 36 knots from 5 to 600 metres, or 24 knots from 5 to 2,000 metres.[20]

Reshaping the front point of the torpedo accommodated the cone, which came either as a combat cone made of bronze phosphorous or a practice cone made of steel. The newer combat cone dispensed with a cartridge and anchored the cotton powder directly into the bronze phosphorous, the charge consisting of seven rings of 81 millimetres in thickness and an eighth ring of 21 millimetres, as well as a priming channel 52 millimetres in diameter and 443 millimetres in length. (Figure 5).

[20] *Instruction*, p. 1.



Figure 5: Practice and combat cone cutaways.[21]

The publication's subsequent sections gave very detailed technical specifications of the internal components of the torpedo and changes made. The torpedo's rear part was devoted to mechanical and hydraulic mechanisms for propulsion and depth-keeping. The nickel steel air reservoir held increased pressures, the regulator fed into bronze tubes, a hydrostatic system with chambers and pistons governed immersion and transmission rotations translated through a differential. A primitive servomotor maintained constant speeds (Figure 6). The parts were delicate, small, and extremely precise. Yet, they had to be rugged enough to be carried on board ship in all weathers and operate flawlessly together in the final run toward a target.

[21] Ibid.



Figure 6. Intricate parts of the servomotor.[22]

The 1906 model torpedo incorporated three cones, adding a practice combat cone made of steel. Changes improved upon the 1904 model with increased air pressures, simplified motor parts and a better balance in the overall torpedo obtained through modification and trial. The 1906 M (for modified) model provided for more improvements and greater numbers. They were produced in Fiume and Toulon in five batches, serial number runs indicated in the brackets:

Manufactured in Fiume:
80 torpedoes from batch F/61 (9532 to 9611)
120 torpedoes from batch F/69 (9709 to 9828)
180 torpedoes from batch F/74 (9829-10,008)

Manufactured in Toulon:
150 torpedoes from batch T/32 (2694 to 2743)
50 torpedoes from batch T/33 (2744 to 2793)

[22]Ibid.

In total 580 torpedoes of the modified 1906 model were manufactured.[23]

These figures demonstrate that upwards of a third of the latest-model torpedoes in the French inventory were manufactured in France in the years leading up to 1914. Besides reducing France's dependence on a foreign source, having its own specialised engineering capacity allowed the French Navy to improve the production lines with greater ease and rapidity. This model of torpedo was also suited for the new larger and more advanced cruising submarines.[24] French 450-mm torpedoes were technically advanced and became more so to the point where they provided a relatively predictable and reliable performance.



Figure 7: Rear propeller section of a 1904 model torpedo.[25]

Torpedo performance and striking power

By the outbreak of the First World War the French Navy possessed considerable experience with torpedoes. *Torpilles* and torpedo-carrying boats – both surface and submerged – were a centrepiece in French thinking on naval strategy and tactics. The *Jeune École* in particular identified closely with the torpedo and its potential as a ship

[23]Ibid., p.46.
[24]Georges Blanchon, 'Les progress de la torpille et la question des sous-marins', *Revue des deux mondes*, 11, 4, (15 October 1912), pp. 889-890.
[25]*Instruction*.

killer and commerce destroyer. Those attitudes carried over into the later Mahan inspired battlefleet and the coastal defence flotillas that operated during the war. In terms of design quality, technical advancements and manufacturing workmanship, French torpedoes were neither worse nor better than torpedoes in other navies.[26]

Strategy, however, limited the opportunities for their use in naval combat. The Royal Navy, in accordance with pre-war plans, intercepted German shipping and isolated Germany economically through a distant blockade.[27] The German High Seas Fleet for its part declined to leave port save in the most favourable circumstances and Germany resorted to launching a campaign of submarine warfare instead, very much in the spirit of *Jeune École*. In 1915 retired Rear-Admiral Robert Degouy wrote a controversial article in the *La Revue de Paris* criticizing the 'mentality' of the French and British navies for not taking more direct action against the Imperial German Navy in its bases at the start of the war.[28] Even in the Mediterranean, while French soldiers lost their lives by the thousands on the Western Front, the French Navy played junior partner to the Royal Navy and saw little opportunity for offensive action. France's continental and maritime commitments were irreconcilable. French torpedoes were certainly advanced for their time and capable of inflicting great harm in capable hands, but as a result of the way that France chose to fight the war at sea the technology could not reach its full potential during the First World War.

[26]Norman Friedman, *Naval Weapons of World War One,* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2011), p. 345.

[27]James Goldrick, *Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914-February 1915,* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015).

[28] *Contre-amiral* Degouy, 'Les Mentalités', *La Revue de Paris*, 22, 4, (July 1915), pp. 329-351. 'Allies' Naval Strategy: French Admiral's Criticism', *Daily Record and Mail* (London), (19 July 1915), p. 1. Robert Degouy, *La guerre navale et l'offensive*, (Paris: R. Chapelot, 1917). Jean-Noël Grandhomme, 'Du pompon à la plume: l'amiral Degouy, commentateur de la guerre et de la "paix d'inquiétude" (1914-1919)', *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporaine*, 227, 3, (July 2007), p. 47.

Missing Links or Left Behind? Reassessing Research on the Bundeswehr's Military Capabilities and Operational History

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ABSTRACT
Reports about lacking operational readiness have haunted the German Armed Forces ever since the core mission reverted to collective defence. New research even suggests that deficits in conventional warfighting capability emerged long before this shift in strategic focus. The Bundeswehr's operational history however has, unlike other topics, not yet been sufficiently addressed from this changed perspective. This research note therefore argues that more attention on issues pertaining to military capabilities is warranted and makes the case that scholars will find both academic and practical relevance in the pursuit of such research.

Introduction

When historians think of German soldiers using mock-weapons for training, they would most likely recall the Reichswehr's attempts to bypass armament restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, rather than the Bundeswehr's recent lack of resources.[1] Reports about broomsticks used in place of vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns on Exercise Cold Response 2014 in Norway however made international headlines and are regarded as a low point of the German military's operational readiness.[2] For an

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[1]For historical background on the Reichswehr see Matthias Strohn, *The German Army and the Defence of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918-1939*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
[2]While the German Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*) denied that lack of equipment played a role in this incident, the matter has been widely reported, not least due to corroborating evidence in other official reports. The specific example regularly resurfaces, most recently for example as the introductory thought to Constantin Wißmann's book *Bedingt einsatzbereit: Wie die Bundeswehr zur*

army that was once praised as a formidable fighting force during the Cold War, this seems like a significant fall from grace. What could have caused this decline? Academics and defence experts today point quickly to the military reforms of the early 2010s formalised in the *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien* (Defence Policy Guidelines, DPG) from 2011.[3] These introduced a definitive shift away from conventional high-intensity operations towards an increased focus on out-of-area deployments. In this context, the Bundeswehr also adopted a structure which was characterised by what has been called a leaner order of battle. The corresponding *Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr*, which also encompassed the suspension of compulsory military service, was certainly an ambitious approach and has left a lasting mark on the German Armed Forces.[4] However, the Bundeswehr had already undergone considerable changes prior to that. This research note therefore argues that a substantial part of these current issues can be traced back to the decade that followed the end of the Cold War and finds that from today's perspective, a reassessment of the German military transformation since that time is merited.

The years after the fall of the Iron Curtain presented the Bundeswehr with a variety of challenges. These included the integration of the East German *Nationale Volksarmee* and the hasty reduction in manpower and weapon systems to comply with the Two Plus Four Agreement after German reunification.[5] Several deliberate defence policy processes, such as those of the DPG from 1992 or later the *Weizsäcker-Kommission*, further sought to address the tension between a Cold War structure of the Bundeswehr within a changed security context. While far-reaching, the measures did not explicitly abandon collective national defence as the main task of the Bundeswehr, even though this was a hotly debated topic in the political domain, for example

Schrottarmee wurde, (München: Riva Verlag, 2019), pp. 11-16. The unhelpfully sensationalist title references readiness problems in the early Cold War and the Spiegel affair of 1962.

[3]The DPG lay out the conceptual basis of German defence policy and activities in the *Bundesministerium der Verteidigung* and are republished irregularly. For context on the DPG of 2011 see Reinhard Mutz, 'De Maizières Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien: Wendepunkt für die Bundeswehr oder alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen?', in Reinhard Mutz and Sabine Jaberg (eds.), *Schießen wie die anderen?': Beiträge für eine friedensverträgliche Sicherheits- und eine sicherheitsverträgliche Friedenspolitik*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019), pp. 239-241.

[4]Joachim Hesse, *Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr: Ansatz, Umsetzung und Ergebnisse im nationalen und internationalen Vergleich,* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), p. 211.

[5]For the history of the dissolution of East German defence structures see Frederick Zilian, *From Confrontation to Cooperation: The Takeover of the National People's (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr*, (Westport: Praeger, 1999) and Jörg Schönbohm, *Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee*, (Berlin: Siedler, 1992).

between then Defence Minister Volker Rühe and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.[6] Nevertheless, reports of shortcomings on these obligations soon made their way through the chain of command, as the latest research by Sönke Neitzel's shows. By 2001, the German military leadership had assured knowledge not only about lacking operational readiness of entire units or availability of sophisticated weapon systems such as aircraft and naval vessels, but also about deficiencies that ultimately concerned everyday military activities, such as ammunition shortages for training purposes.[7] A critical deterioration of the readiness of conventional military capabilities that cannot be explained solely by the political dimension of the post-Cold War reforms had clearly taken place. With the emphasis on out-of-area deployments, these deficiencies were tolerated and the limited deployments in places such as Afghanistan seemed to suggest that the Bundeswehr could adapt successfully even with a general lack of material and personnel. The flaws only became publicly obvious when the pendulum swung back to collective defence after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2014 Wales Summit Declaration in reaction to Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The current operational realities of the Bundeswehr could be well addressed by scholarship in military history. Pertinent research topics may include operational performance, procurement efficiency, transformation and learning processes, and implementation of adaptions in force structure. At present however, there is not enough work on these issues that a definitive history of the Bundeswehr's operational readiness can be conclusively established. Of course, this should by no means suggest that the Bundeswehr or the history of German defence and security policy are neglected by the academic community. Research on topics ranging from political-military affairs to social issues has been extensive as will be shown in this note. This is not least due to the fact that research on the Bundeswehr cuts across many academic disciplines, a constellation that characterises military history in general. Just as the field 'has diversified, mirroring developments in wider historical discussion by seeking to be a conduit for the understanding of both events and processes, rather than one or the other', related research questions about the Bundeswehr are covered from the perspectives of political science, strategic studies, law, education sciences, management studies, and even sociology.[8] This diversity, often culminating in joint research efforts, benefits the field as a whole. As it was mentioned in the preface of the inter-disciplinary volume on the history of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in

[6]Franz-Josef Meiers, *Zu neuen Ufern? Die deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik in einer Welt des Wandels 1990-2000,* (Paderborn: Schönigh, 2006), p. 280.
[7]Sönke Neitzel, *Deutsche Krieger: Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik - Eine Militärgeschichte,* (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2020), pp. 461-464, pp. 566-569.
[8]Zack White, 'Introduction: New Researchers and the Bright Future of Military History', *British Journal for Military History*, 7, 2 (2021), pp. 2-5 (p. 3).

Afghanistan 2001-2014, the amalgamation of the various discipline's 'expertise, their individual perspectives and their different methodologies and sources' must be commended.[9]

Notwithstanding these successes, gaps in research about military capabilities and operational readiness become evident on closer inspection. The decisive shift in strategic focus following the 2014 NATO summit, which exposed the German military's lack of operational readiness, has so far not led to increased attention to these aspects of the Bundeswehr's history. Of course, many publications have studied the large defence policy processes in the post-Cold War period over the years. Yet most of them either refrain from a detailed military analysis or are simply *passé* in the sense that they predate the pivotal events of 2014, after which conventional warfare turned out to be fundamentally relevant once again. Even for recent scholarship that is produced with this in mind, it is common that little emphasis is put on this perspective. As a testament, the critically acclaimed two current introductory works on the Bundeswehr, one originating from the military research domain by Rudolf Schlaffer and the other directly out of academia by Wilfried von Bredow, barely cover this period and hardly reflect on the current issues of lacking operational readiness at all.[10]

It would be short-sighted to blame this nuanced gap solely on the increased political and military importance of the Bundeswehr's deployments abroad, for example in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Many of those publications have assessed pertinent topics revolving around those deployments, which massively contributed towards discussions about force structure and provided insights about the Bundeswehr's capability to adapt to new challenges. Rather, the notion prevails, at least among the German academic community, that the failure to adequately address existing and emerging military issues is due to the country's strategic culture.[11] For background, the use of (military) force as a political tool has generally been frowned upon in German society ever since the end of the Second World War. The popularity among the German public of the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, who instead argues that all conflicts can actually be resolved

[9]Hans-Hubertus Mack, 'Preface', in Bernhard Chiari (ed.), *From Venus to Mars? Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experience in Afghanistan, 2001-2014,* (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 2014), pp. 9-10.

[10]See Rudolf Schlaffer and Marina Sandig, *Die Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2015: Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte in der Demokratie,* (Berlin: Rombach Verlag, 2015); Wilfried von Bredow, *Die Geschichte der Bundeswehr,* (Berlin: Palm Verlag, 2017).

[11]Heiko Biehl, 'Zwischen Bündnistreue und militärischer Zurückhaltung: Die strategische Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Ines-Jacqueline Werkner and Michael Haspel (eds.), *Bündnissolidarität und ihre friedensethischen Kontroversen*, (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019), pp. 37-58 (pp. 44-45).

through communication and without forceful measures, is a testament to this.[12] This manifests itself in a peculiar, partly dysfunctional relationship of society with the Armed Forces and, as Oxford political scientist Andrew Hurrell determined, 'is inexplicable outside of the social, political and historical consciousness of Germany'.[13] Even the long and extensive political-military commitments abroad to Afghanistan, did not jumpstart a more nuanced discussion, as researchers once hoped. On the contrary, particularly the Bundeswehr's out-of-area deployments remain controversial, and veterans regularly bemoan society's dismissal of issues related to this.[14]

This sentiment has left a lasting mark on German academia as well. More generally, it prevented the establishment of disciplines that are closely associated with the topic of war. Through what is best described by Max Hastings' observation of the currently popular yet misguided notion that the study of war implies a certain approval of it, disciplines inherently connected to the military could never thrive in Germany as they did in other parts of the world.[15] For the case of strategic studies (*Strategielehre*) and operational history (*Operationsgeschichte*), this has been well observed.[16] Further considering that the international war studies programme at the University of Potsdam is the only one of its kind in the country, the perspective looks bleak for the discipline of war studies and military history as well. The higher education landscape in Germany rather tends to be dominated by degrees in peace and conflict studies, which have a not insignificantly different curriculum and research focus. Ultimately, the reluctance to engage with operational history and military capabilities is even evident in research that deliberately deals with topics related to the Bundeswehr. For German publications it is a regular occurrence that they purposefully restrict themselves to topics outside of the analysis of the military as a fighting organisation or reflect

[12]See Jürgen Habermas, trs. Thomas McCarthy, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
[13]Cited from Maximilian Terhalle, 'Strategie und Strategielehre', *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 11, 1 (2018), pp. 83-100 (p. 86).
[14]Marcel Bohnert, 'Ich war für Deutschland im Krieg: Ein Afghanistan-Rückkehrer berichtet', *Der Spiegel*, 7 August 2021, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afghanistan-ich-war-in-einem-krieg-den-es-nicht-geben-durfte-a-dd795eba-0002-0001-0000-000178686056. Accessed 12 August 2021.
[15]Max Hastings, 'American Universities Declare War on Military History', *Bloomberg*, 31 January 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-31/max-hastings-u-s-universities-declare-war-on-military-history. Accessed 6 August 2021.
[16]For operational history see Stig Förster, 'Operationsgeschichte heute: Eine Einführung', *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 61, 2 (2002), pp. 309-314; For strategic studies see Terhalle, 'Strategie und Strategielehre', pp. 83-100.

excessively critical on the role of the forces.[17] The purpose of this research note is of course not to dismiss the importance of historical-critical reconstruction or depict existing and future work in other domains as unwarranted. Rather, the argument remains that works about these issues are oftentimes only partially useful in developing research about operational history of (conventional) military capabilities. Since German-language publications dominate the field, this exacerbates the need for detailed research on issues of operational readiness.

At this point though, it is necessary to point out the body of scholarship that already exists in this domain and on which future research may build upon. Over the years, researchers from many fields have produced relevant empirical work on the post-Cold War transformation of the Bundeswehr. These include historians who have studied the effects of the end of the Cold War on the European militaries, political scientists who used the changing global security landscape as an occasion to shed light on Germany's defence and security policy, and many more scholars who explored specialist topics from various angles beyond the realm of military history. In essence, four different backgrounds to these sources can be found. First, there are influential individual researchers in academia who are interested in this research focus. Representative for them is the previously mentioned Sönke Neitzel, who chairs the war studies programme at Potsdam. His latest work on the social history of the Bundeswehr includes meticulous research on the operational aspects of the forces and has gained popular attention in Germany.[18] Secondly, many relevant research activities are based at the Centre for Military History and the Social Sciences (*Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr*, ZMSBw), which emerged from the Military History Research Office (*Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt*) and the Bundeswehr Institute for Social Sciences (*Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr*) in 2013. Through the funding of the German Ministry of Defence and privileged access to archives and military documents, essential contributions to post-Cold War military change and the operational history of the Bundeswehr have been produced over the years. The impressive list of affiliated scholars includes not only experts specialising in current missions such as Philipp Münch on Afghanistan.[19] Many researchers writing on German defence and security policy more generally, such as

[17]See Detlef Bald, *Die Bundeswehr: Eine kritische Geschichte 1955-2005*, (s.l.: C.H. Beck, 2005).

[18]See Neitzel, *Deutsche Krieger*.

[19]See Philipp Münch, *Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Militärische Handlungslogik in internationalen Interventionen*, (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 2015); On this topic also see Carolin Hilpert, *Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy: Germany and the Bundeswehr's Deployment to Afghanistan*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Ina Kraft and Heiko Biehl, can also be found here.[20] Thirdly, the numerous specialised works on conventional military capabilities usually involve research outside the classical field of military history or even the social sciences altogether. An interesting example is the contributions of economics and management studies to defence and operational readiness issues at various points in the Bundeswehr reforms during the last 30 years.[21] Finally, the role that international authors assume in the field is particularly noteworthy. While the modern German military has so far not attracted as much attention as those militaries of the past such as the Imperial Army or the Wehrmacht, they contribute high-quality scholarship to all aspects of the Bundeswehr, and it was mainly these authors who studied important operational aspects and strategic considerations. Research efforts include both original research about the Bundeswehr and comparison with other militaries in NATO or the European security architecture.[22] These are well-suited to address the shortcomings identified thus far and prove that the Bundeswehr as a research subject is by no means reserved for German academia.

All in all, the evidence gathered in this research note affirms that greater and more current consideration of the Bundeswehr's operational history is warranted. The research context lastly suggests two main reasons why the pursuit of this looks promising: First, the academic and practical relevance of the research topic cannot be understated. The need for Western militaries to address questions about operational readiness is as high as ever now that they decisively align force structures and core tasks towards collective defence and near-peer level conflicts. Scholars contributing

[20]See Ina Wiesner, *German Defence Politics*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013); Ina Kraft, 'Germany', in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss (eds.), *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 52-70; Heiko Biehl, *Die neue Bundeswehr: Wege und Probleme der Anpassung der deutschen Streitkräfte an die außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges*, (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 1998).

[21]See Wolfgang Heydrich (ed.), *Die Bundeswehr am Beginn einer neuen Epoche: Anforderungen an die Streitkräfte und ihre rüstungsindustrielle Basis*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996); Gregor Richter (ed.), *Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr: Beiträge zur professionellen Führung und Steuerung*, (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012).

[22]See Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Tom Dyson, *The Politics of German Defense and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post-Cold War Era*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Tom Dyson, *Organisational Learning and the Modern Army: A New Model for Lessons-Learned Processes*, (London: Routledge, 2020); Tom Dyson, 'The Challenge of Creating an Adaptive Bundeswehr', *German Politics*, 30, 1 (2021), pp. 122-139; Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

to these issues from today's perspective will not only be at the spearhead of academic research, they can also be sure to achieve a high level of practical relevance. Historical-critical reconstruction of the defence activities during the last three decades may for example result in an understanding of how (un)successful proposed reforms factually were or lead to a better understanding of how certain capabilities which are relied upon today, such as close air defence, mine laying and long-range reconnaissance were once lost in the process. The result of such post-mortem analysis will be of significant interest to defence planners today since the institutional memory of the armed forces should embrace all possible lessons learned in order to be prepared for the next period of war or peacetime.[23] Given that many other disciplines in the broader field of military innovation studies take up similar research questions, the contributions of history with its relevant strengths should not be overlooked. Secondly, research in this field is encouraged by the substantial academic groundwork and the diversity of sources. This is where the Bundeswehr, as a research topic at the crossroads of various disciplines, can play to its strengths. Original research so far includes a great volume of both qualitative interviews with contemporary witnesses and extensive analysis of documents and archives with the aim of reliably tracing defence processes or producing quantitative data. The possibilities to expand on the existing foundations is growing, both by the availability of military documents such as internal reports or deployment logs, and the willingness of the German Ministry of Defence to accommodate academic research.[24] The increase in insight from stakeholders during pivotal times in Germany's defence policy reorganisation decisions, who increasingly enter the phase of reflecting on their careers through autobiographies or other publications, should further contribute to this. In this context, the utilisation of these sources should not be limited to any scientific discipline alone. Rather, scholars across the wider field of military innovation studies can draw on common references and engage in fruitful cooperation over individual or joint research projects. Finally, as these trends continue, the history of the Bundeswehr's operational readiness is bound to gain relevance apart from institutional interests and present defence policy challenges. After all, the fall of the Iron Curtain did not manifest itself to be the end of conventional military operations as most defence planners at the time envisioned.

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[23]For the current relevance of a military institutional memory with regard to the contemporary operational environment see Matthias Strohn, 'Threshold, Sub-Threshold: We Have Been Here Before or 'New Wine in old Bottles'', *Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research*, 15 April 2021 https://chacr.org.uk/2021/04/15/threshold-sub-thresholdwe-have-been-here-before-or-new-wine-in-old-bottles-2/. Accessed 29 April 2021.

[24]Bernhard Chiari, 'Die Bundeswehr als Zauberlehrling der Politik? Der ISAF-Einsatz und das Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz 2003 bis 2012', *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 72, 2 (2013), pp. 317-352 (p. 320).

Ellora Bennett, Guido M. Berndt, Stefan Esders and Laury Sarty (eds.), *Early Medieval Militarisation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021. viii + 367 pp. ISBN 978-1526138620 (hardback). Price £90.00

This useful collection of essays sets out to chart the gradual transformation – here, characterised as militarisation – from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. Militarisation is explained, in a lengthy introduction by the editors, as implying characteristics like 'the lack of differentiation between the military and the civil…as well as the prominent display of weapons and military training of children' (p. 10), but also as a tool used to describe and analyse what happened in a specific period or region and why society underwent specific changes without necessarily applying all the characteristics. The starting point of this militarisation is seen as the provincial societies of the late Roman Empire while its end can be found in the ninth century, 'when new tendencies of professionalisation of the military, new recruitment methods and new types of warfare are attested throughout Europe (p. 11). In short, a period spanning roughly 400 to 900.

The editors assert that early medieval militarisation can be studied through two complementary approaches: the first, considers society's external relation to the military and warfare (e.g. organisation and recruitment, military roles of the population); while the second, examines contemporary ideas, perceptions and values relating to warfare and the military (e.g., common patterns of behaviour and thought). These two approaches are reflected in the division of the collection into four parts, with parts I and II (the military and society; warfare and society) corresponding to the first approach, and parts III and IV (ethics of war; perceptions of the warrior) corresponding to the second. However, there is clearly a certain amount of overlap between some of the issues raised in individual chapters within the different parts (e.g., the contributions of Berndt and Gasparri on the Lombards), and overall, one has to wonder the extent to which either approach and the militarisation lens provide an alternative to the, now, unfashionable 'Germanisation' and 'barbarisation' terms of earlier scholarship. They all certainly beg the question as to why a specific label is needed as opposed to simply looking at the transformation of society in all its multi-faceted perspectives.

There is much to praise in this collection. The broad geographical coverage allows easy comparisons across space, and many of the best contributions are from scholars examining areas less well-explored by previous generations of scholars, such as the excellent and interesting chapter by Whately on Byzantine Arabia. Other noteworthy chapters trace trends across both time and space, including Rance's interesting essay on the division between soldier and civilian in Byzantine society between 600 and 900,

and Hamm's clear analysis of what can and cannot be concluded from European weapon burials 300-500. Some contributions make strong efforts to bring the literature on particular aspects up to date (e.g. Bourgeois on western European fortifications 750-1000, Summer on early medieval warrior images), while others highlight well the need to use our evidence with considerable caution (e.g. Coupland on the blinkers of militarisation in ninth-century Frankia, Bennett on the construction of the enemy in pre-Viking England). These are mere examples of some of the many good essays in this collection, which apart from ranging widely across time and space also manages to cover a very wide range of primary material: from poetry and narrative sources to imagery, fortifications and material culture in burials. Furthermore, this book also does what the most useful edited collections should do: frame the essays with an introduction, setting them within relevant historiographical literature(s) and conceptualising the overall idea, and with a conclusion, summarising the whole but also questioning and raising points of future research.

One issue perhaps required further consideration by both authors and editors; namely, why so many contributions focus on the sixth and seventh centuries. It could be that this is an accident of case studies picked by the authors, or the availability of surviving evidence, or there might be something specific happening in those two centuries. Whatever the reason, it would have been useful for editors/authors to have reflected and/or commented on this a bit more. Moreover, many of the chapters could usefully have cited well-known primary sources, for which several editions and/or translations exist, by books and chapters, so as to facilitate easy access to the evidence examined for students. Nevertheless, there is no question that this edited collection is a welcome contribution to the historiography on the subject, especially for the wide comparative perspective that it offers.

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Stephen M Miller (ed.), *Queen Victoria's Wars: British Military Campaigns, 1857-1902*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Xiii + 322pp. 13 maps. ISBN: 978-1108490122 (hardback). Price £29.99.

This collection of essays, edited by Stephen M. Miller, represents a useful addition to the literature on Victorian wars of empire. Miller opens the introduction to the book by referring to Brian Bond's edited volume, *Victorian Military Campaigns* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1967). The aim of *Queen Victoria's Wars* is to provide a much-

needed updated version of Bond's work. As Miller notes, Bond's volume 'made great inroads in expanding the body of literature and influencing scholars for years to come' (p.1). However, since Bond's book came out, scholars have benefitted from increased access to archival materials. Perhaps most important among the developments is the much-needed attention given to the 'other side of the hill': the story of these imperial wars should no longer be told from the British perspective only. Miller's volume, therefore, incorporates the five decades of scholarship since Bond's book.

Each chapter of the book examines a different conflict. There are thirteen chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion written by Miller. The book examines the Indian Revolt of 1857 (Douglas M. Peers); the expeditions to China, 1857-60 (Bruce Collins); the expedition to Abyssinia, 1867-68 (Christopher Brice); the New Zealand Wars, 1845-72 (John Crawford); the Anglo-Asante War of 1873-74 (Ryan Patterson); the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1878-80 (Rodney Atwood); the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 (Ian Knight), the First Anglo-Boer War, 1880-81 (John Laband); the conflicts in Egypt and the Sudan, 1881-85 (Rob Johnson); the Third Anglo-Burmese War and the Pacification of Burma, 1885-95 (Ian F.W. Beckett); the Tirah Campaign of 1897-98 (Sameetah Agha); the Reconquest of the Sudan, 1896-98 (Edward M. Spiers); and the South African War of 1899-1902 (Stephen M. Miller).

Edited volumes often lack the coherence of monographs, but that is not the case here. The chapters are all of similar lengths, around 20 pages each; Peers' and Johnson's chapters are just over 30 pages each. All chapters have the same structure. Each begins with a brief overview of the background to the conflict. A short literature review outlines how the historiography has developed. A section on the 'outbreak of war' explains how each conflict began. There is a discussion of the organisation of the armed forces of both sides, and an exploration of each side's strategy and war aims. Each chapter explains the course of the war and has a section called 'anatomy of a battle', in which a particular engagement is explored as a case study. Each covers the use of technology, and the role of the Royal Navy. Finally, each chapter ends with a section on the aftermath of the war. The chapters all include a list of further reading and a map – both features are especially useful. The uniform structure means that it is easy to pick out individual relevant sections, something that will be much appreciated by both researchers and students. For those wishing to read cover to cover, the uniform structure makes the book easy to digest.

The introduction and conclusion, both written by Miller, are fairly brief, but nonetheless useful in pointing out some key themes. In particular, Miller highlights the importance of the broader political context; the use of the 'tools of empire' (borrowing from Daniel Headrick's book of that name); and the relationship between the use of armed force, and the expansion and maintenance of empire (and the role military leaders had as agents in that process). In an edited collection, some degree of

variety is, of course, inevitable. Some chapters cover longer periods of time (Crawford's on the New Zealand Wars is the obvious example here). Some cover conflicts that were larger in scale and are the subject of a vast literature: Peers' chapter on the Revolt of 1857 and Miller's on the South African War come to mind here. Other chapters cover wars on which relatively little is written in English: as Ian Beckett notes, the Third Anglo-Burmese War has been little studied (p.222). Indeed, the interesting variety of the conflicts presented together here may help to redress such imbalances. Obviously, there are limitations on space, and so some battles and campaigns do not make the cut; but the editorial choices here make sense. It is worth noting that the Revolt of 1857, the New Zealand Wars, the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the Anglo-Zulu War, the Sudanese Campaign of 1884-85, the Third Anglo-Burmese War, Tirah, and the South African War of 1899-1902 are additions to what was covered in the Bond volume.

What these chapters do, then, is provide a 'way in' that one hopes will lead to further enquiry. Overall, this volume is a welcome addition to the historiography. It will be immensely useful for students studying courses on the history of the Victorian era British Empire, and will be especially helpful for students looking at the military history of the period. Moreover, Miller concludes by noting the hope that the book 'will have opened up new questions and debates' (p.311). The book shows how much our understanding of Victoria's wars has grown since Bond's volume came out in 1967; but it also shows that there is still plenty of room for fresh perspectives.

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Christopher Phillips, *Civilian Specialists at War: Britain's Transport Experts and the First World War*. London: University of London Press, 2020. 444 pp. ISBN 978-1909646902 (hardback). Price £50.

Logistics and transportation during war often make for rather dull reading, especially when academic studies underestimate the human element imperative to its success. However, this is where *Civilian Specialists at War: Britain's Transport Experts and the First World War* deviates. Christopher Phillips has produced an accessible and compelling monograph that examines how British transport specialists were 'redirected [during the First World War] from the pursuit of profits towards the production of military power' (p. 372). Drawing on years of pre-war experience, as well as established

operating practises and procedures, these men enhanced and refined transport infrastructures across the principal theatres of war.

To achieve this, Phillips focuses on three main areas: Britain's preparation for war; the expansion of the British war effort on the Western Front between August 1914 and October 1916; and the globalisation of the conflict, as well as the British army's response to the increasing ferocity of industrial warfare from January 1917 onwards. Mining a rich vein of archival material, including government memorandum, parliamentary records and personal papers, along with a broad range of post-war literature, including autobiographical accounts and transport histories, Phillips offers a nuanced yet balanced examination of a contentious and misunderstood element of the First World War.

His main contention is that far from 'reluctantly [engaging] with the myriad talents and abilities prevalent in Britain's sophisticated industrial economy' (p. 5), the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) instead valued the abilities of the civilian specialists, leveraging modern business techniques to their advantage. Phillips rightly emphasises the longstanding relationship that existed between British transport companies and the state as early as 1830, thereby demonstrating the longevity of civil-military relations. Of particular interest is the fact that such collaboration though advantageous in general was not always fruitful. A lack of alternatives to the 'with France' (WF) scheme formulated between 1910–14, 'constrained the government's freedom of action' (p. 91). Likewise, South-Eastern and Chatham Railway (SECR) operators at the port of Boulogne, proved incapable of servicing Britain's expanding continental commitment, forcing military authorities to intervene. The author also demonstrates that though critical to the prosecution and success of British operations, these specialists were often problematic individuals, lacking the requisite tact and sensitivities required when cooperating with senior British commanders and their French counterparts. Sir Eric Geddes, for example – architect of the BEF's transport infrastructure on the Western Front – 'struggled to adapt to the requirements of diplomacy and conciliation upon which coalition warfare depended' (p. 295). By situating transportation within the wider context of coalition strategic planning, *Civilian Specialists* expands on research conducted by scholars such as William Philpott and Elisabeth Greenhalgh into the Entente and Allied military alliance. This is an important consideration and acknowledges that the First World War was a 'war of coalitions'.

It is important to note that Phillips similarly emphasises the unquestionable success of these men in refining transport infrastructures globally, including the establishment of the Cherbourg-Taranto line, intended to convey passengers and goods between the Western Front and the Italian Front. Though it 'did not achieve the ambitious targets set for it' (p. 289), he identifies, the line did however, afford an alternative to the perilous sea voyage, reducing casualties and providing opportunities for leave. This is

a significant point that is often overlooked within studies of logistics, that efficacious transport infrastructures provided a bilateral channel for supplies in one direction and the evacuation of wounded servicemen in the other. The author, in fact, demonstrates throughout how divergent forms of transportation, including inland waterway transport (IWT), eased congestion and enabled the conveyance of men to the rear without obstructing the provision of munitions. Understanding the organisation and management of this infrastructure throws light on the treatment of and contemporary attitudes towards the wounded, further revising modern interpretations of British commanders as callous and unsympathetic.

Finding fault in this otherwise detailed, comprehensive and stimulating monograph is difficult. One area for further exploration is the transport arrangements that were undertaken for the demobilisation of the armed forces and the role of Britain's civilian specialists following the Armistice. Such research remains neglected within the Anglophone historiography and would have supplemented Phillips' illuminating examination of the pre-war WF scheme and the contribution of these men to the mobilisation of the BEF in August 1914. However, given the range and depth of *Civilian Specialists*, omission of these arrangements and the period was doubtless a consequence of time and a word-count rather than academic oversight.

Notwithstanding these minor reservations and reviewer bias, *Civilian Specialists* is an important contribution to historiographical discussions concerning transportation and the difficulties of coalition strategic planning throughout the First World War. By evaluating logistics through the lens of prominent transport specialists, Phillips broadens our understanding of the complexities of industrial warfare and the nuanced relationships that manifest. This engaging and thought-provoking monograph is essential for those interested in logistics generally as well as those interested in the men who shaped, organised and enhanced Britain's transport infrastructure on the Western Front, in Palestine, Salonika and Sinai.

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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i3.1577

Nick Lloyd, *The Western Front: A History of the First World War.* London: Viking, 2021. xxiv + Index + Notes + Bibliography + 657pp. ISBN: 978-0241347164 (hardback). Price £25.

The Western Front is an imposing work of what might be termed traditional military history. It is focussed on key commanders and views war through the prism of their

decision making. There is some consideration of the wider politics of the conflict but for the most part the focus is firmly upon the events on the battlefield. A brisk narrative carries the reader through the war of movement in 1914, the bloody stalemate of 1915, the earth-shaking clashes at Verdun, the Somme and Ypres in 1916-17, and the final Allied advance to victory in the Hundred Days in 1918. The casualties involved in these battles continue to astound and there is a risk that a reader will be left numbed by the staggering statistics. Lloyd avoids this danger by providing just enough quotation from the front lines to remind us that the decisions of the generals had profound consequences for the men that they commanded.

When studying the war, Lloyd provides a grand narrative rather than a detailed point-by-point analysis or 'abstract theorising or lengthy commentaries on differing interpretations' as noted in the introduction to the book. This stands in contrast to his earlier volumes such as *Loos 1915* and *Passchendaele* but is perhaps inevitable given the greater scale of his current work. Yet this does not mean that the volume lacks depth. To a keen-eyed reader Lloyd's analysis and assessment is revealed by the lines of argument which he puts forward. For example, he views the performance of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 in a much more favourable light than the line taken by Max Hastings in *Catastrophe* and inclines towards the viewpoint, advanced by Robin Prior, Trevor Wilson and Paul Harris amongst others, that Haig's influence during the planning process for the Battle of the Somme made a major contribution to the disaster on 1 July 1916.

Lloyd's analysis is anchored on his source material. His research for the volume is worthy of praise. The historiography of the First World War has grown exponentially in recent years. Lloyd's research shows a thorough grasp of the keystones of First World War history in national archives, official histories, memoirs and contemporary or near-contemporary accounts. To this is added a valuable selection of the specialist literature that has emerged in the last twenty years. Of particular note is Lloyd's ability to draw upon English language studies of French and German commanders, notably the work of Elizabeth Greenhalgh on French command and Jonathan Boff on German leadership. When combined with Lloyd's work in relevant national archives it allows the author to present a broad narrative that considers the multi-national nature of the war in the depth which it deserves.

Too often traditional histories of the war have been written by non-specialists who rehash enduring myths and add little light to the debate. This is not the case with Lloyd's work. He has produced a traditional narrative history presented with all the benefits of modern scholarship. He does not dwell on the tired debate about whether the commanders of the First World War were callous butchers but makes clear that most of the generals on the Western Front were tough professionals grappling with a war of unprecedented scale where national survival was at stake. There were

incompetents amongst them, but there were also intelligent and innovative leaders who did much to lead the Allies to victory. The pace of technological change is another theme of Lloyd's work. In 1914 the armies had often fought and manoeuvred in a manner that would have been recognisable to Napoleon, or at least Napoleon III. But by 1918 the Allies had developed a style of combined arms warfare that drew upon the available technologies of the age, deploying artillery, armour, aircraft, and platoons of infantry that remains a mainstay of warfare in the 21st century.

This is an impressive book. It covers a vast and complex period of history at brisk pace without becoming superficial. As a grand narrative it serves as an excellent single volume history of the Western Front and provides a useful corrective to some of the popular histories written by non-specialists during the centenary period. It is traditional in its approach but thoroughly modern in its scholarship.

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John Spencer, *Wilson's War: Sir Henry Wilson's Influence on British Military Policy in the Great War and its Aftermath.* Warwick: Helion, 2020. 215pp + 16 b/w photos + 1 b/w map. ISBN: 978-191286627 (hardback). Price £35.

The relationship between politicians and the military in Britain has invariably been fractious, never more so than during the First World War. One of the prominent players in the cast of 'brass hats and frockcoats' was Sir Henry Wilson. In this new book, John Spencer rebuilds Wilson's reputation by challenging the traditional view of this controversial character. The historiography of the war has previously tended to label him as a meddling, untrustworthy schemer. Someone prepared to criticise both his enemies and allies to benefit his own cause. Spencer has cast a different light on this senior soldier whose role in the war was undermined by Charles Callwell's publication in 1927 of Wilson's private diaries in unedited form. Critics seized upon these often-frustrated personal reflections as an opportunity to malign Wilson. He was accused of putting French interests before British and pursuing his own career at the expense of others. It has been an enduring characterisation. The central theme of this book is that, far from being a political intriguer and dissembler, Henry Wilson was a soldier diplomat who possessed strategic vision coupled with a keen sense of the importance of the alliance with France. He was a key influencer in fighting coalition warfare. Spencer argues that Wilson's collaborative acumen and his clear view of high

level strategy played a crucial role in the formation of a unified system of command, a key component in the Allied victory of 1918.

This study traces Wilson's career from pre-war planning to the aftermath of the conflict. It expands upon the work of Keith Jeffrey in his biography entitled *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier* (Oxford University Press, 2006). Spencer's important new research, based on his doctoral thesis, has a firm focus on Wilson's impact upon military strategy rather than his involvement in Irish politics or his undistinguished spell as a field commander. We are given further insight into this complex character whose impact upon Allied policy has previously been underestimated. Early on in the book, Spencer dismisses the charge that Wilson was an overtly political figure, by pointing out that prior to the war military networks held sway in the form of several different 'rings'. He makes the case that most senior officers were aligned with one or another and had a penchant for lobbying. Politicking within the military was commonplace. Unfortunately for Wilson, he was seen as a ringleader in the 1914 Curragh Incident, which set Prime Minister Asquith against him. Spencer explains that as a result he spent the early years of the war in a series of unrewarding roles. One of these was as GOC IV Corps. While he did not cover himself with glory as a field commander, this work goes some way to defend Wilson as a victim of circumstances during this episode. By the end of 1916 his spell in the field had come to a close leaving him disillusioned and resentful with little chance of promotion. Following a period as senior liaison to French headquarters he was appointed head of Eastern Command back in Britain. This could hardly be seen as a move up the ladder but it transpired to be a golden opportunity.

Spencer's investigation breaks fresh ground by explaining the pivotal part played by Wilson in the development of military policy. He sheds new light on Wilson's role in establishing the Supreme War Council (SWC) and as a consequence of this, his influence over grand strategy in 1917-18. The author delivers a compelling argument that Wilson saw the war more holistically than his counterparts. As early as 1915, he had been advocating a body similar to the SWC to oversee Allied decision-making. Crucially, Spencer outlines how Wilson's communication skills and his ability to explain his ideas succinctly to politicians played to his advantage. To back up these contentions, this account has a detailed analysis of the papers submitted to the War Cabinet by Sir Douglas Haig, Lord French, Sir William Robertson and Wilson in autumn 1917. This offers a fascinating insight into how British strategy was developed. Spencer highlights how Wilson came into his own after his paper led to him becoming favoured advisor to Lloyd George, Asquith's successor as Prime Minister. This was the catalyst that reset his career and led to his ascent to the top table. A vital element that Wilson brought to this forum was his strong relationships with the French military and political leaders, the senior partner in this coalition war. As Spencer points out, even after victory was achieved Wilson continued to mould post war policy about how Britain

might win the peace. Described here as 'the war after the war', some of these proposals still have ramifications today.

This study reveals that Wilson was a far more nuanced character than previously believed and reveals his role as the prime mover behind the establishment of the SWC. Not only has Spencer gone some way to redeem Wilson's somewhat tarnished reputation, he has provided a masterly exposition of his influence over Allied military strategy in the final year of the war. The interaction between politicians and the military is seen at close quarters. This book is an indispensable guide for anyone with an interest in how war policy was formulated during the First World War.

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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i3.1579

Radhika Singha, *The Coolie's Great War: Indian Labour in a Global Conflict, 1914-1921*. London: Hurst & Company, 2020. 392 pp. ISBN 978-1787382152 (hardback). Price £45.

By the end of 1919, over 1.4 million Indians had served in the war. Of this number, 563,369 were followers or non-combatants. The demand for their labour was constant. 'Coolies', supposedly unskilled menial labourers, filled these ranks and form the focus of Radhika Singha's richly detailed and compelling *The Coolie's Great War: Indian Labour in a Global Conflict, 1914-1921*. Indian followers served myriad essential roles including *kahars* (stretcher-bearers), *syces* (grooms and grasscutters), *mehtars* (latrine cleaners) and *drabis* (mule-drivers). The 'Coolie Corps' performed both porterage and construction work. In all, non-combatant labour formed a critical, though hitherto ignored, structure of the war.

In the past twenty years, historians have increasingly argued the ways in which the First World War must be understood as a global conflict. Whether this was through the experiences of the one million Indian sepoys who served in the conflict or a broader reframing of the war as a one among global empires, our understanding of the war has been reframed. Moreover, as Bruno Cabanes has argued, while the Armistice in Europe was agreed in November 1918, related regional conflicts continued beyond this date. Radhika Singha's work is a valuable contribution to this debate, addressing the global flows of labour in and beyond the European war. Singha shows how these frameworks, or regimes of labour, sustained the military infrastructure of the British Empire in India and, we can extrapolate, across and behind conflict lines.

A key focus of the book is the geographies of labour – globally and within India – during the war. Using a wide range of archival sources, Singha details recruitment patterns; debates over caste, race and the composition of the corps; and the internal geopolitics which both informed and was reinforced by recruitment. As the war intensified, so too did the demand for followers. Recruiters turned to contested tracts along India's land frontiers – the United Provinces, North-West Frontier Province, Afghanistan and areas between Assam and Burma were tapped for war service. Labour was recruited extensively from even the most thinly populated hill tracts, with recruitment from these areas serving a two-fold purpose. First, it went some way to satisfy the calls for labour, but second, and significantly for rule within India, it was a move by the colonial government to demonstrate the hold its officers held over the hill tribes, thus demarcating inner borders in the region.

By 1916, followers were in such short supply that there was a move made to increase pay (though not, it seems, to address the gruelling conditions in which they worked). In an attempt to attract new recruits, a Central Follower Depot was established in Meerut and salaries were allowed to rise. At the same time, reflecting the realisation of the absolute dependence of the army on this legion of labourers, the image of the unskilled bazaar follower also began to shift.

Indian followers served in every theatre of war, with an overwhelming number serving in Mesopotamia. Sepoys and followers remained in Iraq long after the Armistice, involved as they were in crushing the Arab uprising which followed the war. As Singha shows, not all of this labour was 'free'. The Indian Labour Corps (ILC) was joined in Iraq by over fifteen thousand 'volunteer' prisoners, mainly in the Jail Porter and Labour Corps, who were even more susceptible to exploitation and violence than their free peers. This 'volunteer' group of prison labourers was thrust into Mesopotamia to serve as, among other things, latrine-cleaners in the midst of a cholera outbreak. However, prison recruitment alone could not meet the needs of the army, leading some to suggest the use of impressment to make up numbers. However, this came as indentured labour was restricted and the Home Office resisted this suggestion, arguing that such impressment would be politically detrimental.

While the 'homecoming' of Indian soldiers is often (briefly) mentioned in histories of Indian nationalism, Singha focuses on what this return meant in practice for soldiers and non-combatants. Following long years of service, sepoys and followers returned to face the same forms of discrimination as before the war. Non-combatants, working without rest in Mesopotamia were denied leave requests, while the Maharaja of Bikaner complained that his officers were refused entry to the British officers' mess on board the ship which brought them back to India after nearly five years of service.

The book is an important and timely contribution to the history of the First World War. Not only does it build on the growing body of literature on India's contribution to the war, but it speaks to the importance of recognising the global body of non-combatants who served, but rarely form the focus of commemorations or histories.

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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i3.1580

Michael Robinson, *Shell-shocked British Army Veterans in Ireland, 1918–39: A Difficult Homecoming*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020. xiv + 253 pp. ISBN: 978-1526140050 (hardback). Price £80.

Michael Robinson's book makes a valuable contribution to two fields of study that have seen significant attention over the last decade or so: the treatment of physically and mentally disabled British ex-servicemen during and after the Great War, and the experiences of Irish veterans returning home from that war. Both are potentially difficult areas of study, if for different reasons. 'Neurasthenia' was potentially wide-ranging and ill-defined, while, unlike physical injuries, diagnosis was often subjective. Records are also comparably scant. A focus on Ireland – where conflict continued after 1918 and the island was ultimately partitioned into two new jurisdictions – brings additional complications. Robinson has done a fine job in meeting these challenges.

The book 'considers, contextualises and comprehends the lived experiences of disabled people in a past society' (p. 6). Its primary focus is on the treatment of shell-shocked veterans in Ireland. The opening chapters are chronological. Chapter 1 examines attitudes to mental illness and to the Irish soldier during the war, followed by Chapters 2 and 3 which treat the veteran experience and official policy in Ireland before and after partition. Chapters 4 and 5 offer case studies of the Richmond and Belfast war hospitals and the Service Patient scheme respectively.

The disabled Irish veteran is worthy of focused study because, as Robinson points out, the social and political context in Ireland was markedly different to Britain. Wider social stigma surrounding mental illness could be exacerbated by pre-existing prejudices, unfounded but regularly articulated in official circles, that regarded the Irish soldier as child-like, as more prone to emotional instability, and more susceptible to breakdown and shell-shock. After the Great War, the Irish War of Independence (1919–21) and Civil War (1922–3) hindered efforts to rehabilitate ex-servicemen, with disruption to transport and government infrastructure, the personal risk faced by staff

travelling around the country, and the potential targeting of ex-servicemen by republicans. Southern and western Ireland would thus 'provide the neurasthenic pensioner with the least favourable homecoming conditions in the UK' (p. 79). The creation of the twenty-six county Irish Free State in 1922 meant that the Ministry of Pensions was the only British institution left operating in this new jurisdiction, creating its own practical – and potentially political – problems.

As interesting as the Irish example is in its own right, Robinson does an impressive job of placing it in its wider context and demonstrates a firm command of several different strands of relevant literature. The book is well-grounded in work on mental illness and disability. Discussion of the provision of treatment and benefits outside of Britain is also introduced when evaluating British success and failure. The conditions and outcomes for ordinary patients in Irish asylums similarly provides important perspective on the treatment of ex-servicemen. Conditions for Service Patients in Ireland were worse in the Irish Free State than in Britain, and this was linked to specifically Irish circumstances. The delay in implementing the Service Patient scheme in Ireland caused problems, and experiences were ultimately local – shaped by the conditions in individual Irish asylums. These had deteriorated significantly during the war, and some – like Clonmel in Co. Tipperary – were particularly appalling.

One of the main arguments running through the book is that the British Ministry of Pensions' approach to mentally ill ex-servicemen was characterized by a mixture of progressive and conservative ideas and policies. Robinson does not hide from British failures, but nor does he ignore efforts at innovation and genuine efforts to provide suitable treatment for patients. Of the Service Patient scheme, for instance, the author concludes that if it was 'a disappointment, then it was, at the very least, a pioneering failure on behalf of a previously disregarded population' (p. 216).

The extent to which ex-servicemen of all shades suffered threat, harm, and discrimination on their return to the twenty-six counties has been a topic of some debate in the historiography of the Irish Revolution. In his examination of shell-shocked veterans in this context, Robinson's analysis is balanced and ultimately convincing. British army veterans were not openly victimized by the new state, but nor were they given any concessions or favours (unless they had subsequently joined the state's National Army, in which case they received the same benefits as other National Army veterans). The reasons ex-servicemen were targeted for violence were complex, and not necessarily always linked to service in the British forces. But, as Robinson suggests, perceptions about and the fear of violence was also significant, and perhaps even more so when it was widely recognised that the surrounding environment played such an important part in the recovery of mentally ill patients.

Similarly, finding meaningful employment – again deemed a crucial part of the treatment process – was more challenging in the Irish Free State where unemployment was significantly higher. There were some cases of discrimination, and the King's National Roll system was not introduced owing to resistance by republicans and trade unionists, but there is little evidence of systemic efforts against ex-servicemen (indeed, anti-Treaty republicans would also complain about unemployment in the aftermath of the Civil War). Importantly, societal prejudice and reluctance to accept the potential financial impact of hiring shell-shocked veterans whose symptoms could be unpredictable also fatally hampered the Ministry of Pensions' policy of voluntarism and cooperation from civil society.

This is a book that will be of great interest to scholars of the Irish Revolution and its aftermath, those interested in the welfare of Great War veterans across Europe, and the history of medicine more generally. It deserves a wide readership, and it is to be hoped that the publisher releases an affordable paperback soon.

BRIAN HUGHES
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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i3.1581

Jeremy A Crang, *Sisters in Arms: Women in the British Armed Forces during the Second World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. xii + 341pp + Index + 46 images. ISBN 978-1107013476 (hardback). Price £25

600,000 women served in the British armed forces during the Second World War. Entering the most masculine of realms, these women took on a variety of roles. These ranged from the resolutely feminised (for example cooking and cleaning) to, despite the enduring combat taboo, near combatant roles (such as gunners in anti-aircraft batteries). Their service threw up often intractable questions about femininity, masculinity, British society and even the role and construction of the military itself. In *Sisters in Arms* Jeremy Crang presents a new history of these militarised British women during the Second World War. *Sisters in Arms* is a comprehensive analysis of the organisation and experiences of British women's military service during the Second World War, covering their service from volunteering or conscription until their demobilisation at the war's end. Looking collectively at the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS), Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS), and the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), Crang presents a wide-ranging study of the operational decision making in these forces themselves as well as discussing state level opinions and decisions regarding the auxiliary services.

The book also neatly incorporates the experiences and views of the women who served in all three services. The book's scope and themes are, therefore, diffuse. Crang covers the operational history in depth from the re-establishment of the services, recreated from their First World War counterparts, in the 1930s to the decisions around their permanence in the post-war period. Yet this is far from a straightforward top-down history of the organisations as Crang also explores the lived experience of the 600,000 women who served, exploring topics as far ranging as food, menstruation, leisure pursuits and uniforms. Indeed, Crang places women's military experience firmly in its socio-cultural context, showing the symbiotic relationship between the military and society in this period. To this end the book is meticulously researched, drawing on a variety of official and private sources to build a carefully considered portrait of women's wartime military service and the wider impacts of such service. *Sisters in Arms* is also well written and extremely readable. Indeed, despite the often lengthy discussions of policy and policy making, often tedious in the wrong hands, the book remains engaging throughout.

Sisters in Arms is a welcome addition to the already profuse scholarship on Britain's Second World War. Indeed, one of the key strengths of the book is its successful merging of military, social and women's history, fields of study which often remain frustratingly separate despite the obvious intellectual benefits of taking a holistic approach such as Crang's. As such this book presents a useful companion to the more extensive work on women's civilian work which exists in this vein as well a necessary addition to the military historiography. Moreover, Crang's decision to tackle all three services, rather than the more common approach of examining them in isolation works well. What could have become confusing or fragmented is skilfully woven together to highlight the key institutional similarities and differences at both a policy and experiential level which serves to nuance what could have been rendered as simply 'women's military services' and, moreover, presents an important dimension to what could have at points felt like well-worn ground. Similarly, Crang does not treat wartime serving women as a homogenous mass, instead he seeks to distinguish experience and treatment based on, for example, class, rank and wartime role therefore presenting an impressively holistic view of female military wartime service.

Sisters in Arms will almost certainly become the standard text on the women's auxiliary services during the Second World War. It's scope, breadth and detail mean it will be of use to many different types of scholars and researchers working on the military and socio-cultural histories of the Second World War as well as of interest to women's

historians and gender historians alike. Moreover, given its scope and readability, it will be an essential addition to many university reading lists on courses which cover Britain's Second World War or British social history for years to come.

LINSEY ROBB
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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i3.1582

Bair Irincheev, *Vyborg 1944: The Last Soviet-Finnish Campaign on the Eastern Front,* translated by Kevin Bridge. Warwick: Helion, 2020. Index, 233pp, Bibliography. ISBN 978-1912390274 (paperback). Price £29.95.

On the wall of Marshall Carl Gustaf Mannerheim's wartime operations room in Mikkeli, Finland there was a large map of Western Russia. During what the Finns refer to as the Continuation War (1941-44), a member of Mannerheim's staff would periodically use a different coloured pencil to shade in the territory occupied by the German *Wehrmacht*. The summer of 1941 is represented by broad swathes of red, blue and green. As Barbarossa progressed so the gains diminished and the shaded areas around Leningrad and Moscow became a mess of different colours on the map. This important historical document serves as a striking metaphor reflecting the dilemma faced by the Finns following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Would it be best to invest in an alliance with Nazi Germany in the hope that territorial gains would ensue, or should a more nuanced position be taken, so that an accommodation with the Soviet Union could be reached in the event of Barbarossa failing? Opinions differ as to what Mannerheim's real intent was but, having pushed the Red Army back down the Kerelian Isthmus to the gates of Leningrad in September 1941, the Finnish High Command must have been increasingly anxious as the Axis forces faltered and then, in early 1944, began to retreat through the Baltic states. This book critically examines Finnish and Soviet responses to this reversal of fortunes.

After the Siege of Leningrad lifted in early 1944 Stalin offered the Finns a proposal which would have involved a reinstatement of the pre-Barbarossa border and a number of other concessions. Mannerheim refused and, on 10 June, the Red Army launched a massive attack which, upon the signing of a peace treaty three months later, resulted in a settlement which was not dissimilar to the one that had been proposed.

Irincheev presents a useful overview of this historical context before offering up a detailed account of *the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk* offensive operation. The book focuses on

the period 9 June to 13 July 1944, and the action takes place within the narrow confines of the Karelian Isthmus. The narrowness of the Isthmus and the fact that the flanks of the defending force extended to the shorelines of Lake Ladoga, enabled the Finns to deploy in strength along a series of fixed defensive lines. For the Red Army, manoeuvrability was limited and so costly attacks on well defended strongpoints were unavoidable.

Irincheev does an excellent job in describing the sophistication of Soviet tactics. During the 1939 *Winter War* offensives the poorly led Soviet aggressors suffered grievously when they used unsupported tanks to breach Finnish lines and, when successful, pushed columns into the densely wooded interior. The columns were invariably immobilised, segmented, surrounded and destroyed by the Finns in a tactic known as *Motti.* Fast forward to the summer of 1944 and, as Irincheev demonstrates, the Red Army's capabilities had been transformed, mainly through lessons learnt in fighting the *Wehrmacht* over the course of the previous three years. A combined arms approach had been adopted in attack, the weaponry was much improved (particularly armoured vehicles) and command at all levels was extremely effective. One of the strengths of this book is that it enumerates this transformation in a richness of detail.

On the Finnish side, Irincheev opines that the troops were well-led and highly proficient. Whilst they did not have much by way of heavy equipment, the Finns became highly skilled in using what artillery they did have and used German supplied *Panzerfaust* anti-tank weapons to best advantage. However, as Irincheev says, armoured vehicles like the T34-85 tank and the massive JSU-152 self-propelled gun posed much bigger threats than the highly vulnerable T26s which had formed the vanguard of Red Army attacks five years previously. There were some tactical errors in the defence of the main *Vammelsuu-Taipale* (VT) Line and Irincheev is particularly critical of Finnish delays in redeploying reserves from east to west as the Red Army forced its way up the main Leningrad to Vyborg highway.

The fall of Vyborg came as a shock to the Finns and served as something of a wake-up call to the Finnish General Staff. The planned Soviet breakout into the *Lake Saimaa* area was, however, thwarted. Indeed, as Irincheev concludes, the Battle of *Tali-Ihantala* can be seen as a defensive victory for the Finns in that it demonstrated to the Soviets that they would pay a heavy price for pushing on further. In the face of protestations from their German partners and a Soviet appetite to settle the matter, the Finns signed an Armistice a couple of months later.

As an appendix in this book, Irincheev has produced a table which compares the 4 September Armistice with the earlier Soviet Peace Proposal. Finnish historians in particular have argued that the original proposal, although roughly comparable with the final outcome, was lacking in scope and was probably unworkable. On the other

hand, Irincheev reminds us that some of the later conditions marked a significant deterioration in the terms despite lower reparations. Whether Mannerheim was right in not settling earlier does become something of a moot point however when one considers the impact of this last offensive on those who whose lives were shattered by it. As well as providing great insight into a fascinating theatre of war – accompanied by a selection of striking contemporary photographs, Irincheev has done an excellent job in describing what it was like to live, fight and die during this violent final stage in Finland's evolution as an emerging nation.

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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i3.1583

S P MacKenzie, *Bomber Boys on Screen: RAF Bomber Command in Film and Television Drama*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. 256pp. 8 bw illus. ISBN: 978-1350024847 (hardback). Price £85.

The history and memory of RAF Bomber Command has been overshadowed by concerns about the high number of casualties it inflicted on civilians during night raids over selected German cities in the later stages of the conflict. It has been more palatable to Britain's modern memory of the 'People's War' to concentrate on 'The Few' who fought in the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, rather than 'The Many' of RAF Bomber Command and their controversial commander Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Harris. While the Battle of Britain memorial in Capel-le-Ferne, Kent was unveiled in 1993 and another Battle of Britain monument in London in 2005, the memorial to RAF Bomber Command was not unveiled by the Queen until June 2012. The memorial to the 55,573 of its aircrew, from Britain and allied nations including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, that lost their lives was vandalised a year later. During a service for the 70th anniversary of the bombings in Dresden, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, was heavily criticised for appearing to apologise for the actions of Bomber Command, and the BBC were also accused of presenting media coverage which was biased in favour of German victims rather than the British and Allied air crews who lost their lives during the conflict.

Over the last three decades there have been a number of histories examining how aerial warfare during the Second World War has been represented in film and on television. However, the on-screen treatments of the heroes of Britain's 'finest hour' have been favoured, with a relatively small number choosing to examine representations of Bomber Command. S. P. MacKenzie's book, *Bomber Boys on Screen:*

RAF Bomber Command in Film and Television Drama, seeks to redress this imbalance by making film and television dramas of Bomber Command at the centre of this fascinating study. *Bomber Boys on Screen* is MacKenzie's third book published in this area, having produced *British War Films: 1939-1945* (2006) and *The Battle of Britain on Screen: 'The Few' in British Film and Television Drama* (2016), so he is well placed to fill the lacuna in academic discourse on the place of Bomber Command in films and television dramas.

Bomber Boys on Screen adopts a chronological approach, examining the development, presentation, and reception of significant dramas decade-by-decade. The scope of material is impressive, going from the films of the RAF Film Production Unit in the 1940s to the televisual treatments of Bomber Command veterans in the 2000s. However, this book does more than satisfy the requirements of a work which seeks to highlight the existence of an overlooked screen subgenre. MacKenzie explains how developments in everything from characterisation, storylines, film technology, and the availability of vintage aircraft have changed over time, alongside other representations in historical context such as novels, histories, war comics, television documentaries, campaign memorial and commemorative statues. This study also considers how representations of Bomber Command have been received in allied countries, including America, but judges it best to leave discussions of the German perspective to other scholars such as Alex Bangert and David F. Crew.

While the introduction feels rather succinct, the detailed notes will help signpost readers to material which outlines the basis of the book. Indeed, the weight of research underpinning this work makes it an ideal resource for students of media representations of war. The chronological treatment of the material by chapter also makes this work more accessible, and I would recommend anyone teaching or studying courses on war, media and memory to add Bomber Boys on Screen to their reading lists.

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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i3.1584

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES (November 2021)

General

The British Journal of Military History (the BJMH or Journal) welcomes the submission of articles and research notes on military history in the broadest sense, and without restriction as to period or region. The BJMH particularly welcomes papers on subjects that might not ordinarily receive much attention but which clearly show the topic has been properly researched.

The editors are keen to encourage submissions from a variety of scholars and authors, regardless of their academic background. For those papers that demonstrate great promise and significant research but are offered by authors who have yet to publish, or who need further editorial support, the editors may be able to offer mentoring to ensure an article is successfully published within the Journal.

Papers submitted to the BJMH must not have been published elsewhere. The editors are happy to consider papers that are under consideration elsewhere on the condition that the author indicates to which other journals the article has been submitted.

Authors must provide appropriate contact details including your full mailing address.

Authors should submit their article or research note manuscript, including an abstract of no more than 100 words, as an MS Word file (.docx) attached to an e-mail addressed to the BJMH Co-editors at editor@bcmh.org.uk. All submissions should be in one file only, and include the author's name, email address, academic affiliation (or 'Independent Scholar' as appropriate) and country, with the abstract, followed by the main text, and with any illustrations, tables or figures included within the body of the text. Authors should keep in mind that the Journal is published in A5 portrait format, and any illustrations, tables or figures must be legible on this size of page.

The BJMH is a 'double blind' peer-reviewed journal, that is, communication between reviewers and authors is anonymised and is managed by the Editorial Team. All papers that the editors consider appropriate for publication will be submitted to at least two suitably qualified reviewers, chosen by the editorial team, for comment. Subsequent publication is dependent on receiving satisfactory comments from reviewers. Authors will be sent copies of the peer reviewers' comments.

Following peer review and any necessary revision by the author, papers will be edited for publication in the Journal. The editors may propose further changes in the interest of clarity and economy of expression, although such changes will not be made without

consultation with the author. The editors are the final arbiters of usage, grammar, and length.

Authors should note that articles may be rejected if they do not conform to the Journal's Style Guide and/or they exceed the word count.

Also note that the Journal editors endorse the importance of thorough referencing in scholarly works. In cases where citations are incomplete or do not follow the format specified in the Style Guide throughout the submitted article, the paper **will** be returned to the author for correction before it is accepted for peer review. Note that if citation management software is used the footnotes in the submitted file must stand alone and be editable by the Journal editorial team.

Authors are encouraged to supply relevant artwork (maps, charts, line drawings, and photographs) with their essays. The author is responsible for citing the sources and obtaining permission to publish any copyrighted material.

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Articles

The journal welcomes the submission of scholarly articles related to military history in the broadest sense. Articles should be a minimum of 6000 words and no more than 8000 words in length (including footnotes) and be set out according to the BJMH Style Guide.

Research Notes
The BJMH also welcomes the submission of shorter 'Research Notes'. These are pieces of research-based writing of between 1,000 and 3,000 words. These could be, for example: analysis of the significance a newly accessible document or documents; a reinterpretation of a document; or a discussion of an historical controversy drawing on new research. Note that all such pieces of work should follow the style guidelines for articles and will be peer reviewed. Note also that such pieces should not be letters, nor should they be opinion pieces which are not based on new research.

Book Reviews
The BJMH seeks to publish concise, accessible and well-informed reviews of books relevant to the topics covered by the Journal. Reviews are published as a service to the readership of the BJMH and should be of use to a potential reader in deciding whether or not to buy or read that book. The range of books reviewed by the BJMH reflects the field of military history, taken in the widest sense. Books published by academic publishers, general commercial publishers, and specialist military history imprints may all be considered for review in the Journal.

Reviews of other types of publication such as web resources may also be commissioned.

The Journal's Editorial Team is responsible for commissioning book reviews and for approaching reviewers. From time to time a list of available books for review may be issued, together with an open call for potential reviewers to contact the Journal Editors. The policy of the BJMH is for reviews always to be solicited by the editors rather than for book authors to propose reviewers themselves. In all cases, once a reviewer has been matched with a book, the Editorial Team will arrange for them to be sent a review copy.

Book reviews should generally be of about 700 words and must not exceed 1000 words in length.

A review should summarise the main aims and arguments of the work, should evaluate its contribution and value to military history as broadly defined, and should identify to which readership(s) the work is most likely to appeal. The Journal does not encourage personal comment or attacks in the reviews it publishes, and the Editorial Team reserves the right to ask reviewers for revisions to their reviews. The final decision whether or not to publish a review remains with the Editorial Team.

The Editorial Team may seek the views of an author of a book that has been reviewed in the Journal. Any comment from the author may be published.

All submitted reviews should begin with the bibliographic information of the work under review, including the author(s) or editor(s), the title, the place and year of publication, the publisher, the number of pages, the ISBN for the format of the work that has been reviewed, and the price for this format if available. Prices should be given in the original currency, but if the book has been published in several territories including the UK then the price in pounds sterling should be supplied. The number of illustrations and maps should also be noted if present. An example of the heading of a review is as follows:

Ian F W Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army*. Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2018. Xviii + 350pp. 3 maps. ISBN 978-0806161716 (hardback). Price £32.95.

The reviewer's name, and an institutional affiliation if relevant, should be appended at the bottom of the review, name in Capitals and Institution in lower case with both to be right aligned.

Reviews of a single work should not contain any footnotes, but if the text refers to any other works then their author, title and year should be apparent in order for readers to be able to identify them. The Editorial Team and Editorial Board may on occasion seek to commission longer Review Articles of a group of works, and these may contain footnotes with the same formatting and standards used for articles in the Journal.

BJMH STYLE GUIDE (July 2021)

The BJMH Style Guide has been designed to encourage you to submit your work. It is based on, but is not identical to, the Chicago Manual of Style and more about this style can be found at:

http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html

Specific Points to Note

Use Gill Sans MT 10 Point for all article and book review submissions, including footnotes.

Text should be justified.

Paragraphs do not require indenting.

Line spacing should be single and a single carriage return applied between paragraphs.

Spellings should be anglicised: i.e. –ise endings where appropriate, colour etc., 'got' not 'gotten'.

Verb past participles: -ed endings rather than –t endings are preferred for past participles of verbs i.e. learned, spoiled, burned. While is preferred to whilst.

Contractions should not be used i.e. 'did not' rather than 'didn't'.

Upon first reference the full name and title of an individual should be used as it was as the time of reference i.e. On 31 July 1917 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), launched the Third Battle of Ypres.

All acronyms should be spelled out in full upon first reference with the acronym in brackets, as shown in the example above.

Dates should be written in the form 20 June 2019.

When referring to an historical figure, e.g. King Charles, use that form, when referring to the king later in the text, use king in lower case.

Foreign words or phrases such as *weltanschauung* or *levée en masse* should be italicised.

Illustrations, Figures and Tables:

- Must be suitable for inclusion on an A5 portrait page.
- Text should not be smaller than 8 pt Gill Sans MT font.
- Should be numbered sequentially with the title below the illustration, figure or table.
- Included within the body of the text.

Footnoting:

- All references should be footnotes not endnotes.
- Footnote numeral should come at the end of the sentence and after the full stop.
- Multiple references in a single sentence or paragraph should be covered by a single footnote with the citations divided by semi-colons.
- If citation management software is used the footnotes in the submitted file must stand alone and be editable by the editorial team.

Quotations:

- Short (less than three lines of continuous quotation): placed in single quotation marks unless referring to direct speech and contained within that paragraph. Standard footnote at end of sentence.
- Long (more than three lines of continuous quotation): No quotation marks of any kind. One carriage space top and bottom, indented, no change in font size, standard footnote at end of passage.
- Punctuation leading into quotations is only necessary if the punctuation itself would have been required were the quotation not there. i.e. : ; and , should only be present if they were required to begin with.
- Full stops are acceptable inside or outside of quotation marks depending upon whether the quoted sentence ended in a full stop in the original work.

Citations:

- For books: Author, *Title in Italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year of publication), p. # or pp. #-#.
- For journals: Author, 'Title in quotation marks', *Journal Title in Italics*, Vol. #, Iss. # (or No.#), (Season/Month, Year) pp. #-# (p. #).
- For edited volumes: Chapter Author, 'Chapter title' in Volume Author/s (ed. or eds), *Volume title in italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year), p. # or pp. #-#.
- Primary sources: Archive name (Archive acronym), Catalogue number of equivalent, *'source name or description' in italics* if publicly published, p. #/date or equivalent. Subsequent references to the same archive do not require the Archive name.

- Internet sources: Author, 'title', URL Accessed date. The time accessed may also be included, but is not generally required, but, if used, then usage must be consistent throughout.
- *Op cit*. should be shunned in favour of shortened citations.
- Shortened citations should include Author surname, shortened title, p.# for books. As long as a similar practice is used for journals etc., and is done consistently, it will be acceptable.
- Ibid., with a full stop before the comma, should be used for consecutive citations.

Examples of Citations:

- Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 21.
- Michael Collins, 'A fear of flying: diagnosing traumatic neurosis among British aviators of the Great War', *First World War Studies*, 6, 2 (2015), pp. 187-202 (p. 190).
- Michael Howard, 'Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 510-526.
- The UK National Archives (TNA), CAB 19/33, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, evidence to Dardanelles Commission, 1917.
- Shilpa Ganatra, 'How Derry Girls Became an Instant Sitcom Classic', *The Guardian*, 13 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/feb/13/derry-girls-instant-sitcom-classic-schoolgirls-northern-ireland Accessed 20 April 2019.

Note: Articles not using the citation style shown above will be returned to the author for correction prior to peer review.