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Special Issue: New Researchers

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EDITORIAL*

One of the key aims of the British Journal for Military History is to support the development of a new generation of researchers. The Journal, and the British Commission for Military History (BCMH) more broadly, supports both postgraduate students and postdoctoral researchers in a number of ways. For some years the Commission has hosted a New Research in Military History conference and provided grants to postgraduate researchers who wish to speak at the annual International Congress of Military History. More recently, it has run a Three Minute Military Thesis event at the Institute of Historical Research. This event, the initiative of Zack White – part of that new generation himself, highlighted the research of current PhD students working in military history. This issue forms a natural bridge between that initiative and the ethos of the Journal and we are delighted that Zack has offered this Special Issue.

We are grateful for the immense amount of work Zack has carried out in seeking contributions and organising them. Many contributions were submitted which we could not publish in this issue, but we hope to see some of those appear in the future. The contents point to a bright future for military history – broadly defined – and beyond this special issue, we urge all new researchers to consider the British Journal for Military History as a place to publish work in the future.

RICHARD S. GRAYSON & ERICA WALD
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Introduction: New Researchers and the Bright Future of Military History

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Sir Max Hastings's recent article bemoaning what he considers to be the demise of military history in the United States of America's academic community generated significant controversy.[1] The veracity of his suggestion is, of course, highly debatable, but the same cannot even be claimed of the study of military history in the UK (a point that Hastings himself acknowledges).[2]

In fact it would seem that the military history community is thriving. A perusal of the profiles of academic staff in 85 UK universities shows that some 68 institutions (80%) employ at least one lecturer with expertise relating to military history. Equally, when examining the *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research's* lists of PhD theses produced on British Military History in the UK, the numbers appear to be on the rise.[3] Between 2006 and 2009, 82 such theses were listed. A decade later, for the period 2016-2019, the figure is 112. Whilst the increase may be partially attributable to factors such as a greater accessibility of theses through online repositories, and growing opportunities for individuals to embark on PhDs, the fact remains that the evidence of military history being on the decline is scarce.

Why therefore do a number of military historians harbour concerns about the future of the sub-discipline? Hastings's comments actually form part of a longer conversation on the nature of military history and its value in both popular and academic circles.

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[1]Max Hastings, 'American Universities Declare War on Military History', *Bloomberg*, 31 January 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-31/max-hastings-u-s-universities-declare-war-on-military-history Accessed 27 May 2021.
[2]Ibid.
[3]See for example Ian Beckett, 'Doctoral Dissertations and Research Theses on British Military History', *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, 96, 387 (2018), pp. 289-291. To compile these figures, the equivalent articles for every year between 2006 and 2019 were examined.

NEW RESEARCHERS AND THE BRIGHT FUTURE OF MILITARY HISTORY

Writing in 2004, Christopher Coker commented on a growing 'disenchantment' with war, resulting from society's growing emphasis on the dehumanising facets of conflict.[4] Whilst Hastings suggests that studying war may assist in its prevention, Lawrence Freedman has previously dismissed this notion as 'too easy'.[5] From this it would seem that military history is struggling to define its purpose, yet such an assessment is too simplistic.

Part of this protracted discussion revolves around the contested definition of what really constitutes 'military history'. The traditional, narrow, perception of the sub-discipline being limited to campaign narratives and strategic studies has remained, despite military history having long since embraced what might be termed the cultural turn. Studies of gender, soldier experiences, and emotion within military contexts, in addition to those exploring the social and political implications of conflict, have extended scholarly frontiers, embracing inter-disciplinary approaches which highlight the field's relevance to a multitude of historical and contemporary discussions.[6] Yet questions have been raised over the extent to which this is 'true' military history, with Frederick Kagan acknowledging their value whilst suggesting that they 'are not a substitute […] for the serious study of war itself'.[7]

The reality is that military history has diversified, mirroring developments in wider historical discussion by seeking to be a conduit for the understanding of both events and processes, rather than one or the other. The supposed dichotomy between strategic and social military history is arguably an unhelpful distraction, which, as Mark Moyar has argued, 'has harmed the field [of military history] by turning other historians against it'.[8] Just as military history has long since embraced the notion of 'history from below' first articulated by Marxist historian E. P. Thompson, so it has also embraced the new perspectives offered by the cultural turn engaged in by colleagues of social

[4]Christopher Coker, *The Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. xi-xii.
[5]Lawrence Freedman (ed), *War*, (Oxford: OUP, 1994), p. 5.
[6]See, for example, Joshua S. Goldstein, *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Edward Coss, *All for the King's Shilling,* (Norman, Oklahoma University Press, 2010); Gavin Daly, *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Richard S. Grayson & Erica Wald (eds), 'Editorial', *British Journal for Military History*, 6, 2 (2020), p. 1 (p. 1).
[7]Frederick W. Kagan, 'Why Military History Matters', *American Enterprise Institute* (June, 2006), pp. 1-5 (pp. 2-3).
[8]Mark Moyar, 'The Current State of Military History', *The Historical Journal*, 50, 1 (2007), pp. 225-240 (p. 240).

history.[9] That diversification of thought is a positive development, which simply serves to emphasise the value of studying military history as a way of understanding human experiences across time.

Nowhere is the value of this multitude of perspectives more apparent than amongst the emerging talent of the post-graduate community, as showcased at the annual 'New Researchers' Conferences and the 'Three Minute Military Thesis' competitions organised by the *BJMH*'s parent organisation the 'British Commission for Military History'. It is within this rich research environment that this 'New Researchers' special issue of the *BJMH* provides a welcome and timely reminder of the variety and rigour of academic military history research, and the bright prospects for the sub-discipline's future.

It was a testament to the scale of research being conducted in the field that over 20 submissions were received in response to this issue's Call for Papers. As editor, choosing between them was a considerable challenge, though one made fractionally easier by the generous commitment of the journal's Co-editors to take worthy articles, which did not make the final issue, forward for publication at a future date, such was the quality of the pieces submitted.

The chosen articles reflect the multitude of approaches that are being embraced by emerging military historians. Covering some 700 years of history, they demonstrate the value of embracing inventive approaches to better understand conflict. From Pia Henning's use of word frequency analysis to shed new light on the development of Prussian wargaming, to Andrew Dorman's employment of detailed data analysis to assess the capabilities of British troops stationed in Ireland during the eighteenth century and Stephen Moore's equivalent study for the RAF in the 1940, these articles offer engaging methodologies that can be applied across the entire history community. The multi-faceted nature of modern military-historical study is also apparent, from Anna Glew's and Megan Kelleher's studies of memorials and their creation to better understand memory-making in the aftermath of conflicts, to Ryan Barnett's examination of fourteenth century legal texts to shed new light on notions of justice in the aftermath of war. Nuanced discussions and stimulating theories are equally exhibited throughout, with Jayne Friend's examination of the use of the Royal Navy's destroyers following the First World War raising questions of identity and nation building, whilst agency and mental health lie at the heart of Kelsey Power's exploration of Napoleonic Prisoners of War's dress. Nor is the operational side of war neglected in this issue. Tristan Griffin examines the weaponisation of hunger by Parliamentarian forces whilst exploring Royalist efforts to counter siege famine during the English Civil

[9] E. P. Thompson, 'History from Below', *Times Literary Supplement* 65 (1966), pp.279-280.

War, whilst Stefan Quiroga sheds new light on the US Army's willingness to employ combatant women during the Vietnam War, and Michael Broughton explains how early information wars over English involvement in the 1580 assault on Mechelen exploited the undefined principles of the fledgling English newspaper industry. That such a varied and insightful collection of rigorous research could be brought together in one publication bodes well for the vibrant future of the military history sub-discipline.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank a number of individuals for their assistance throughout this project. Firstly I am very grateful to the BJMH Co-editors Richard Grayson and Erica Wald for entrusting me with the rare honour of guest-editing this issue, and for providing a platform through which these emerging scholars could showcase their talent in a prestigious publication. Thanks also go to everyone who submitted pieces, the reviewers for their perceptive advice on the submissions, and the BJMH Managing Editors, Alasdair Urquhart and George Wilton, for their patience and attention to detail. I am particularly indebted to the authors for their tireless enthusiasm and the professionalism with which they all approached the, at times challenging, task of embracing suggestions raised at peer-review. Finally, I would like to thank the military history community as a whole for their support and collegiality, which not only contributed to the success of this issue's Call for Papers, but which makes the sub-discipline such a pleasure to be a part of.

Jus Post Bellum: Justice After War in Fourteenth-Century War Treatises

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ABSTRACT
This article examines the legal and moral framework concerning justice after war in Giovanni da Legnano's De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello and Honoré Bouvet's L'Arbre des Batailles. Throughout these works various principles can be identified which are similar to the modern term jus post bellum. The authors presented various objectives determining the correct time to end a conflict. They also established specific actions concerning the seizure of property, the treatment of prisoners, and the negotiation of treaties. These actions balanced justice and mercy allowing previously warring nations to be reconciled.

Introduction

The just war tradition has developed legal assertions grounded in both pre-modern and modern intellectual history, which philosophers and social scientists have argued should govern the international law of war.[1] Traditionally, this set of theories was supported by two categories labelled *jus ad bellum* (justice when going to war) and *jus*

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[1]See: Rosemary B. Kellison and Nahed Artoul Zehr, 'Tradition-Based Approaches to the Study of the Ethics of War', in Brent J. Steele and Eric A. Heinze (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and International Relation,* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 208-220; David D. Corey and J. Daryl Charles, *The Just War Tradition: An Introduction*, (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2012); Alex J. Bellamy, *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008); Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg (eds.), *Ethics Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives*, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007); Brian Orend, *The Morality of War*, (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006); Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2015).

in bello (justice within war).[2] However in 2000, the Canadian philosopher Brian Orend added the term *jus post bellum* (justice after war) to produce new principles that might guide modern armies out of increasingly complex conflicts.[3] Orend produced ethical principles which included the correct moment to end a conflict and how to negotiate the proportional punitive and remedial actions against a defeated enemy.[4] Orend argued that Immanuel Kant's book *Perpetual Peace* (1795) was the first to discuss claims similar to *jus post bellum*.[5] Other philosophers have traced its beginnings to other early-modern thinkers including the neo-scholastic theologian Francisco de Vitoria (d. 1546), the Anglo-Italian Jurist Alberico Gentilli (d.1608), and the Dutch Humanist Hugo Grotius (d.1645).[6] This continual investigation demonstrates the importance of historical reference to the *jus post bellum* debate.

Despite medieval thinkers being previously linked to *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, currently few have attempted to locate *jus post bellum* principles within medieval

[2]Cian O'Driscoll, 'Security and the Ethics of War', in Steele and Heinze (eds.), *Handbook of Ethics*, p. 179; Carsten Stahn, '*Jus Post Bellum*', *American University International Law Review*, 23, 2 (2008), pp. 311-347 (pp. 311-312); Robert Kolb, 'Origin of the Twin Terms *Jus Ad Bellum/ Jus In Bello*', in *International Review of the Red Cross*, 37, 320 (October 1997), p. 553; Geoffrey Best, *Humanity in Warfare: Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1983), pp. 8-9; Bellamy, *Just Wars*, pp. 124-128; Corey and Charles, *Just War Tradition*, pp. 72-74.

[3]Brian Orend, '*Jus Post Bellum*', in *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 31, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 117-137, pp. 123-124, pp. 128-129.

[4]Ibid., pp. 123-124, 128-129.

[5]Orend, '*Jus Post Bellum*', pp. 118-119; Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', trans. David L. Conclasure, in Pauline Kleingeld (ed.), *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 67-109, esp. pp. 67-71, pp. 94-109.

[6]Orend, '*Jus Post Bellum*', pp. 118-119; Larry May, '*Jus Post Bellum*, Grotius and Meionexia', in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), *Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 15-26, pp. 20-21; Alexis Blane and Benedict Kingsbury, 'Punishment and the *ius post bellum*', in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (eds.), *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 241-265; Stephen C. Neff, 'Conflict Termination and Peacemaking in the Law of Nations: A Historic Perspective', in Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (eds.), *Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition*, (The Hauge: Asser Press, 2008), pp. 77-92; Carsten Stahn, "'*Jus Ad Bellum*", "*Jus In Bello*"… "*Jus Post Bellum*"? – Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force', *European Journal of International Law*, 17, 5 (2006), pp. 925-934.

sources.[7] These academic works are helpful and add much to the current discussion of the just war tradition, but more could be added with further investigation of medieval peace making and post-war principles. These may produce new perspectives on the ending of war both analogous and distinct to today's theories. It may also help date the origins of the theory to an earlier time. Previous studies have used medieval canon law (ecclesiastical legal codes) to recognise corresponding principles to *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.[8] This article likewise uses canon law to describe the moral and legal implications for late-medieval actions after warfare. Two figures stand out as obvious choices to provide an initial analysis of medieval *jus post bellum*, Giovanni da Legnano and Honoré Bouvet.[9]

Arguably one of the most celebrated jurists of the fourteenth century, Giovanni da Legnano was a doctor of canon and civil law from the University of Bologna and wrote

[7]Most historians have rejected this premise as the prevailing theory has been there was no complete 'just war theory' in the Middle Ages; see: James Turner Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-1740*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 21-22, p. 36; Robert C. Stacey, 'The Age of Chivalry', in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman (eds.), *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 27-39, pp. 30-31; however it was criticised in: Rory Cox, 'Historical Just War Theory up to Thomas Aquinas', in Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 99-117; one of the few historians researching the end of war in this period is the early-modern legal historian Randall Lesaffer, see: Randall Lesaffer (ed.), *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Randall Lesaffer, 'The Three Peace Treaties of 1492-1493', in Heinz Duchhardt and Martin Peters (eds.), *Europäische Friedensverträge der Vormoderne*, (Mainz: Institute for European History, 2006), pp. 41-52; only one scholar has addressed *jus post bellum* from the perspective of the Ancient Greeks: Cian O'Driscoll, 'Rewriting the Just War Tradition: Just War in Classical Greek Political Thought and Practice', *International Studies Quarterly*, 59, 1 (March 2015), pp. 1-10; also see: James Brundage, 'The Hierarchy of Violence in Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Canonists', *The International History Review*, 17, 4 (December 1995), pp. 670-692; Frederick Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Maurice Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages*, (London: Routledge, 1965).

[8]Cox, 'Historical Just War', pp. 99-117; Russell, *Just War*, pp. 55-212.

[9]Modern practice has addressed him as Bouvet; however, older sources have named him as Bonet. In this essay I have referred to him as Bouvet unless otherwise used in the sources.

treatises on a wide range of legal topics.[10] One of these works, *Tracatus de Bello, de Represaliis, et Duello* systematically described the law of war according to Roman and canon law as well as natural philosophy and astrology.[11] Legnano most likely wrote the treatise during Barnabo Viconti's siege of Bologna in 1360 as a handbook for practical legal exercise for his students.[12] Legnano was famous in his lifetime and his work has been long lasting, largely due to the work *L'arbre des batailles* by Honoré Bouvet.[13] Bouvet was a late fourteenth-century Benedictine prior, doctor of decretals, and French royal official.[14] His work was written between 1386 and 1388 as a didactic text intended to popularise canon legal texts (like the *de Bello*) for a secular audience.[15] To this end, he wrote in the vernacular middle-French and popularised the ideas of Legnano, while adapting them to the unique French martial experience during the Hundred Years War.[16] Bouvet in part wrote the work as a guidebook to restore France to its pre-war status, and to instruct soldiers after seeing the destruction caused across the French countryside during the war against England.[17] Both works presented complex attitudes towards warfare and passionately desired the end of war.

This article argues that there was a legal structure which presented principles to be followed at the conclusion of warfare in the works of Giovanni da Legnano and Honoré Bouvet. It begins with their theories determining when it is the correct

[10]Legnano advised four Popes and was later regarded as 'another Aristotle' by Iohannes Garzon in 1450, it is also likely that he was referred to in Chaucer's 'Clerk's Tale' and that he was one of the jurists that advised Charles V in his resumption of the Hundred Years War in 1369 see: Rory Cox, 'Natural Law and the Right of Self-Defence According to John of Legnano and John Wyclif', in Christopher Given-Wilson (ed.), *Fourteenth-Century England VI*, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010), pp. 149-170 , p. 152; Thomas Holland, 'Introduction', in Giovanni da Legnano, *Tractatus de Bello, de Represaliis et de Duello*pp. trans. and ed. Thomas Holland, (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein & Co., 1995), pp. xvii-xxi; John P. McCall, 'Chaucer and John of Legnano', *Speculum*, 40, 3 (July 1965), pp. 484-489; G.M. Donovan and M. H. Keen, 'The "Somnium" of John of Legnano', in *Traditio*, 37 (1981), pp. 325-345, p. 327. For a list of Legnano's surviving MSS see: John P. McCall, 'The Writings of John of Legnano with a List of Manuscripts', in *Traditio*, 23 (1967), pp. 415-437.

[11]Legnano, *de Bello.*

[12]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 354; Holland, 'Introduction', pp. xii-xiii, xxvii.

[13]Honoré Bonet, *L'arbre des batailles d'Honoré Bonet*, ed. Ernest Nys, (Brussels: Muquardt, 1883); Honoré Bonet, *The Tree of Battles*, trans. G.W. Coopland, (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1949).

[14]G. W. Coopland, 'Introduction', in Bonet, *Battles*, p. 15-16, p. 25.

[15]Ibid., p. 21.

[16]Around 84% of the work is a paraphrase of the *de Bello*; Ibid., p. 21, p. 26.

[17]Bonet, *Battles*, p. 79.

moment to cease a conflict and who should instigate its end. Next the article looks at the punitive actions after the conclusion of active warfare. This section examines the limitations and legalities surrounding the seizure of property and the exchange of prisoners. The article finishes with Legnano and Bouvet's comments concerning truces, treaties, and the relationship between people groups.

Just Cause for Termination

The first aim of the *jus post bellum* theory is to identify the correct moment to cease hostilities and begin the transition to peace. This period begins after the reasonable defeat of the enemy or after the defeat of one's own side. Within this moment, violence has largely ceased, but peace has not yet been established. This period is what *jus post bellum* principles are designed for, to guide the process to a fair and lasting peace. The first designation of the just war tradition, *jus ad bellum*, determines the timing of this moment.[18] *Jus ad bellum* requires a just cause with the intention of peace, and this likewise dictates the cessation of violence.[19] Accordingly, Orend argued that *jus post bellum* should govern actions after the aggressor's gains had been eliminated, the rights of victims had been reasonably restored, and the aggressor had willingly accepted the cessation of hostilities.[20] Without achieving these goals, justice would not be complete and the war would need to continue. Similarly, to continue past those accomplishments would risk future injustice.[21]

Although not identical to modern *jus post bellum* theories, Legnano and Bouvet did argue that war could have either legitimate or illegitimate goals. In a just war, combatants needed to strive for a just cause and cease fighting when it was achieved. Legnano and Bouvet defined all wars (both just and unjust) as 'a contention arising by reason of something discordant offered to human desire, tending to exclude discordancy.'[22] In order for a war to be classified as lawful, it would need to be publicly declared by a *princeps*, or one recognising no higher earthly authority, through the

[18]This is often the major criticism of *jus post bellum*; in that it is unnecessary as the goals have already been stated within the stated just causes of the conflict. See: Mark Evans, 'Moral Responsibilities and the Conflicting Demands of *Jus Post Bellum*', *Ethics and International Affairs*, 23, 2 (22 June 2009), pp. 147-164; Alex J. Bellamy, 'The Responsibilities of Victory: *Jus Post Bellum* and the Just War', *Review of International Studies*, 34, 4 (October 2008), pp. 601-625; Brian Orend, '*Jus Post Bellum*: The Perspective of a Just-War Theorist', *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 20, 3 (September 2007) pp. 571-591, pp. 573-74.

[19]Orend, '*Jus post bellum*', pp. 119-21.

[20]Ibid., pp. 123-24, pp. 128-29.

[21]Orend, 'Perspective', p. 580.

[22]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 216; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 81, Bouvet used slightly different language but was generally the same definition.

pursuit of a just cause against a deserving target.[23] Unlike earlier medieval attempts at limiting warfare, these later thinkers largely focused on justified authority, with only peripheral attention given to just cause and just intention. Both the pope and the emperor (or other temporal rulers) had the authority to declare different types of war.[24] In the same way, the end of war was also determined by that same authority who had the responsibility to gain and maintain peace within their own spheres of influence. The pope was obligated to maintain peace within Christendom, to protect Christian doctrine and Christian pilgrims, to punish non-Christian violations of the law of nature and Christian sins against the gospel. The pope also had the duty to fight heretical and schismatic emperors and restore previously held Christian lands.[25] Meanwhile the emperor's legal power extended over lands previously held by the Western Roman Empire, with the primary obligation of defending the 'mystical body [*corporis mystici*] ', or the church and the empire.[26] In both treatises, the emperor was specifically able to make war on his enemies [*hostes*].[27] *Hostes* was a Roman legal term, defined as public declared enemies.[28] In other words, the emperor was supreme in defending the Holy Roman Empire against both external invaders and internal rebels.[29] These detailed examples demonstrate that those in authority decided the correct moment when a just victory had been achieved.

Besides maintaining a clear hierarchy of authority, both Legnano and Bouvet considered specific examples of a just victory. Although the end of war would be determined by authority, those persons still needed to act within the law. The pope would be required to end any conflict he had ordered upon the conquest of the Holy Land, or the submission of heretical sects. He also needed war to cease after the repentance of sinners against the gospel and offenders of natural law. While all people could legally protect themselves and their property, the emperor had the ultimate obligation to protect the political community of Christendom.[30] Therefore, secular rulers fighting a defensive war would need to declare victory after the repulsion of the

[23]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 276.
[24]They also allowed *de facto* sovereign princes to declare war; Legnano, *de Bello*, pp.231-33; Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 126-30.
[25]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 232; Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 126-28.
[26]Legnano, *de Bello*, pp.155, 232-33, pp. 307-08; Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 128-29.
[27]Legnano, *de Bello*, pp. 93-94, pp. 232-33, '*cum Imperator sit princeps saecularis, superiorem non habens in saecularibus, nisi forte, ut dixi, quod ipse potest indicere bellum contra hostes* suos'; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 128.
[28]*The Digest of Justinian*, ed. Theodor Mommsen and Paul Krueger, trans. Alan Watson, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 49.15.24.
[29]Legnano, *de Bello*, pp. 232-33, Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 126-27.
[30]Legnano, *de Bello*, pp. 297-99; for further discussion about medieval self-defense see: Cox, 'Right of Self-Defence', pp. 149-69.

enemy, the retrieval of stolen goods, or after oppression had been punished.[31] These rules are very similar to the modern principle of proportionality, stating that armed conflict is used only necessarily as a last resort and that it does not go beyond its specific requirements.[32] These proportionally sanctioned actions determined the just actions during and after conflict. To pursue victory in an unjust manner would not only risk the future relationships between peoples, but also the purity of the combatants' souls. Both internal and external concord was required in the medieval definition of peace.[33] As some victories were neither just nor legal, an unjust peace would make the entire conflict unjust. Bouvet was especially poignant on condemning this type of victory. Bouvet stated: '[I say that] a man or a people is more victorious in battle when in a state of grace... even though the sinner is stronger in body than he who is in a state of grace.'[34] Although good and evil means could achieve victory, only the just could gain the true goal of peace. Bouvet included seven biblical and historical examples of victorious but immoral men as proof that while an unjust victory could be achieved, its benefits were short lived.[35] These seven rulers were not content with the justice gained from their conflicts but lusted after more lands to conquer and more wealth to horde.[36] Although such successes gained earthly wealth and status, they

[31]Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 128-129, pp. 139-140.

[32]An example of the modern concept of proportionality is in Article 52 of Protocol I in the Geneva Convention, see: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 'Article 52', *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)*, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=F08A9BC78AE360B3C12563CD0051DCD4. Accessed: 26 April 2021; see also: Henry Shue, 'Last Resort and Proportionality', in Lazar and Frowe (eds.), *Ethics of War*, pp. 260-76; Adil Ahmad Haque, 'Necessity and Proportionality in International Law', in Larry May (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of the Just War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 255-272.

[33]For example, Aquinas argued that even when the wicked were outwardly at peace inwardly they were at war, see: St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologiae: Charity, Vol. 34*, trans. by R. J. Batten, (London: Blackfriars Press, 1974), pp. 197-99; Gregory M. Reichberg, *Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), esp. pp. 17-33.

[34]Bonet, *Batailles*, p. 149, '*je dy aussi que vraiment selon l'escripture en bataille ung homme ou ung peuple est assez plus victorien quant il est ne estat de grace...combien que le pecheur soit aussi plus fort de corps comme celui qui est en estat de grace*'; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 157.

[35]Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 156-157: Nimrod, Nebuchadnezzar, Alexander the Great, Saul, Assur, Octavian, and Holofernes.

[36]Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 156-157, similar explanations to Augustine's concept of the lust to dominate, *libido dominandi*, see: St. Augustine of Hippo, *City of God*, trans. Gerald G.

would also perpetuate the cycle of conflict and injustice. Post-war justice was not only a political action but a spiritual reality. A victory done with the wrong intention and in the wrong way would be short lived and punished by God. It would be better to be defeated, yet protect the purity of one's soul, than to be victorious in an unjust conflict.

A defeat would be justified in two instances, when there was no chance of victory, or upon the realisation of one's own injustice. Actors in a legal war were still required to adhere to the cardinal virtues of justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence.[37] In the face of overwhelming odds, this meant that sometimes surrender was the only moral option.[38] One should face the enemy in accordance with all the virtues not only courage.[39] Legnano stated: 'And that a brave man should sometimes flee is obvious by reason, for one should flee from dangers which are beyond man's strength.'[40] To continue to fight beyond one's power would not be prudent; it would be reckless and would turn virtue into vice and a just war into an unjust war. Legnano reasoned that the preservation of a virtuous life was better than a needless death.[41] It would be better to accept defeat and pursue justice at a later date than to needlessly die. In another example, Legnano argued that that one-hundred men in a defensive position should not surrender to one-hundred attackers, since they had a reasonable chance of winning that battle.[42] Although this demonstrated when not to surrender, it implied that surrender was an option given the right circumstances. If the end of war was not glory, then only a just victory could achieve war's virtuous end. When necessary, it would be more prudent to choose temporary defeat and pursue justice, than die and forfeit the possibility of rectifying the just cause forever.

However, Bouvet was more restrictive in his allowance of surrender.[43] For example, if fighting the Saracens, death would mean the salvation of one's soul and therefore surrender should never be an option.[44] Additionally, combatants were obligated to their lords and were bound to courageously serve them, even to death.[45] However, Bouvet also argued that the just could surrender. He used the defeat and capture of

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Walsh and Grace Monahan, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), pp. 51-52.

[37]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 241.

[38]Ibid., p. 241; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 122.

[39]Legnano, *de Bello*, pp. 241-244.

[40]Ibid., pp. 106, 248, '*Et quod Aliquando fugiendum sit forti, patet ratione, nam pericula supra hominem sunt fugienda*.'

[41]Ibid., p. 252.

[42]Ibid., p. 239.

[43]Bonet, *Battles*, p. 122.

[44]Ibid., p. 122.

[45]Ibid., p. 122.

St. Louis during the Seventh Crusade (1248-1254) as an example of a just defeat.[46] If the saintly king of France could be overcome, then any conflict could end in any way according to the unknowable will of God.[47] Bouvet attempted to rationalise this by stating, 'And if sometimes wars oppress the good and the just, it is for the increase of their glory.'[48] Even the just were human and therefore sinners. War disciplined and corrected their small personal sins and unjust actions, destroying their earthly ambitions yet saving their souls.

The second possibility of defeat was the intentional ending of war upon the realisation of injustice on one's own side. While questioning fortitude as a virtue, Legnano found a complex range of emotions and intentions that could be present during a war. Legnano found that the courage which allowed soldiers to attack was only virtuous when used towards a moral end. [49] 'For the end of fortitude in war is the common good. And any man who makes war for the sake of gain is not brave, but rather avaricious.'[50] Upon discovering the presence of an immoral goal, the previously virtuous side would need to cease the conflict and begin the process towards peace. Bouvet concurred with this statement and added that virtue was more important than worldly honour. Bouvet said, 'Yet it is better that he [the one in the wrong] should incur some little shame, rather than defend his ground in a false quarrel.'[51] This means that a premature end to an unjust war was better than the potential for sin. Along these lines, Bouvet also required immorally attained possessions to be returned immediately.[52] This rule even applied to inherited property.[53] To continue a defensive war over illicit possessions would be immoral and needed to end upon realization of wrongdoing. Importantly, in all of these situations the decision to end a conflict (either in defeat or victory) needed to remain just and affected the overall legitimacy of the conflict. A just war fought for too long (after the just cause) or too short (a defeat without honour) would become unjust.

These late-medieval authors demonstrated the correct time to end a conflict, either in victory or defeat. The justified ending of war was connected to its beginning,

[46]Ibid., pp. 157-158.
[47]Ibid., pp. 157-158.
[48]Bonet, *Batailles*, p. 150, '*Et se aucunesois less guerres grisvent les bons et les justes c'est leur accroissement de gloire*'; Bonet, Battles, pp. 157-158.
[49]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 240.
[50]Ibid., pp. 99, 240, '*Nam finis fortitudinis in bellicis est bonum commune. Et si aliquis bellat propter lucrum, non est fortis, immo avarus*.'
[51]Bonet, *Batailles*, p. 236, '*Mais encore lui est il mieulx prendre ung peu de honte que defendre le champ sur faulse querelle*'; Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 202-203.
[52]Ibid., p. 140.
[53]Ibid., p. 140.

ensuring that the causes for the conflict were resolved. A just victory would resolve the illegal actions done against the 'moral' side. It remained within the realm of virtuous punitive action and would not transgress into individual vengeance. When one was found not pursuing the 'common good [*bonum commune*]', but personal gain, the only prudent action was to stop fighting and sue for peace. Alternatively, if one faced overwhelming odds, it was most prudent to retreat or surrender and fight another day. Nevertheless, the end of fighting would not restore the relationship between enemies. The pursuit of justice needed to continue after the actual war, providing post-war punishments and reconciliations.

Just Punishments After War

In the next phase of *jus post bellum*, Orend has said an international commission should be established to ensure punishment of crimes committed during and after the war.[54] Continuing with its peaceful intention, his principles demand reasonable punishment of criminals with the goal of rebuilding a defeated nation and restoring its relationship with the rest of the world.[55] Reparations and reconciliation allow justice to be made but they also prevent future conflicts by refusing to demand unreasonable concessions.[56] Likewise both Legnano and Bouvet demonstrated the continued need for justice after the completion of violence within the correct control of property seized during war and the proper treatment of prisoners of war.

When discussing captured soldiers, Legnano acknowledged that according to Roman civil law captives should become the slaves of their captors.[57] However, Legnano did not agree with this from a Christian standpoint. Instead, he used canon law to argue that mercy should be given to captives. Although captors gained the temporal right to own their prisoners this would endanger their souls and place doubt on their just intentions. Legnano used a quote from Gratian's *Decretum* to argue this stating, 'as violence is rightly meted out to one who fights and resists, so quarter is granted to the vanquished or the captured.'[58] Thus the text argued that unarmed, captured solders should be given mercy. This treatment of captured soldiers had also changed within contemporary customary law. Legnano stated that modern customs no longer

[54]Orend, '*Jus post bellum*', p. 124.
[55]Ibid., pp. 128-29.
[56]The classic example of this is the Treaty of Versailles (1919), see: Larry May, *After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 9-10; Catherine Lu, 'Reconciliation and Reparations', in Lazar and Frowe (eds.), *Ethics of War*; pp. 545-46.
[57]Legnano, *de Bello*, pp. 254, 270; *Digest*, 49:15.
[58]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 254, '*Sicut debellanti et resistenti violentia debetur, sic victo vel capto venia conceditur*.'; Gratian, *Decretum*, in A. Friedberg (ed.), *Corpus Iuris Canonici, Vol. 1*, (Leipzig: Bernhardi Tauchnitz, 1879), C.23, q.1 c.1.

allowed for captured soldiers to become slaves, providing further protection to captured soldiers.[59] However, beyond these statements, Legnano was largely silent on the rights of returned soldiers. For example, he only gave scant attention to '*postliminium*' a Roman law code which guaranteed the restoration of rights and property to captured soldiers.[60]

Nevertheless, Bouvet expanded on this silence and provided contemporary context for the treatment of prisoners. He agreed with Legnano about captured soldiers. Although Roman law allowed the enslavement of captives, it could no longer be permitted in a Christian society.[61] He denounced the enslavement of captured enemies as a 'most inhuman, and cruel thing [*tres grant inhumanité et tres laide chose*].'[62] In place of enslavement, the custom of ransoming (returning captives for a certain price) had arisen throughout the Middle Ages, and by Bouvet's lifetime had become a major source of revenue during war.[63] Although better than enslavement, Bouvet commented that it could also tend towards cruelty through the extortion of money.[64] Bouvet accepted this custom, but said it should be limited. Prisoners were to be given food and companionship while incarcerated.[65] When asking for the ransom price, the cost should not be so high 'as to disinherit his wife, children, relations and friends, for justice demands that they should have the wherewithal to live after the ransom has been paid.'[66] Bouvet also limited the types of persons who could be captured. He exempted the insane, children, clerics, the blind, and women.[67] To attack and capture such people would be considered illegal pillaging, not a just contribution to warfare.[68] Surprisingly, Bouvet also extended this protection to ploughmen and their assistants.[69] Bouvet protected them because all of society relied on them for food despite their likely contribution of supply to the enemy.[70] Attacking ploughmen at work undermined the foundation of the economy, creating more misery than was necessary. This helps

[59]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 270.
[60]*Digest*, 49:15.
[61]Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 134, 151-152; Legnano, *de* Bello, pp. 254, p. 270.
[62]Bonet, *Batailles*, p. 137; Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 151-152.
[63]See: Rémy Ambühl, *Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years War: Ransom Culture in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
[64]Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 152-153.
[65]Ibid., pp. 152-153.
[66]Bonet, *Batailles*, p. 140, '*non mie lui desheriter ne sa femme ne ses enfans ne ses parens et amis, car droit veult qu'ils aient de quoy vivre apres ce qu'il aura payé sa finance*'; Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 152-153.
[67]Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 182-185.
[68]Ibid., p. 183, p. 185.
[69]Ibid., pp. 188-189.
[70]Ibid., p. 188.

explain Bouvet's underlying principle of post-war justice. The end goal of a just war was the restoration of peace; therefore, the victor's actions should not threaten the future survival of the enemy's population, economy, and society. In this same vein, punishment in the form of retaining despoiled property would also be limited in order to restore peace.

In this period, the most-common form of post-war punishment was the taking of spoils. Legnano commented that Roman civil law declared that all captured goods became the property of the captor in a 'public war [*bellum publicum*].'[71] This was also based on the law of nations.[72] Yet, as with the laws concerning captured persons, canon law changed the victor's moral obligation. Just as prisoners were no longer slaves of their captors, so too the taking of enemy property was limited. In a public war only the moveable goods of the enemy could be seized, thus leaving the buildings and land.[73] This meant that private conquest of enemy territory was both illegal and immoral and brought undue suffering on the enemy. Legnano also included the 'prince's portion [*principis porcio*] as a limitation when discussing captured property.[74] Legnano stated: 'he [the prince] may decree that anyone capturing anything in war shall become the owner of things captured and shall detain persons until he can present them to his superior.'[75] He confirmed that this was both for punishment and rewards after the war.[76] This duty of distributing captured goods was placed on the leaders to give to the deserving.[77] This process separated simple theft from despoliation and provided a system where a side could more easily prove just intentions. Soldiers could not be thought to have fought for financial gain after willingly surrendering their spoils to their commanders. In the same way, leaders who redistributed those goods could not be seen as acting immorally.

Bouvet also allowed limited spoilation of the enemy. This corresponded to contemporary practice as raiding across the enemy's countryside (*chevauchée*) was

[71]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 269.
[72]Ibid., p. 269.
[73]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 270.
[74]The prince's portion was mentioned in the *ius militare* see: Gratian, *Decretum*, D.1 c.10; Isidore of Seville, *The Etymologies*, trans. Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, and Oliver Berghof (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 118.
[75]Legnano, *de Bello*, pp. 123-24, 269, '*Principis...potest statuere quod quilibet capiens aliquid in bello illo efficiatur dominus rerum captarum, et personam detineat doec praesentet superiori*.'
[76]Ibid., pp. 269-70.
[77]Ibid., pp. 254 & 270.

one of the most common tactics during the Hundred Years War.[78] Bouvet consented that sometimes the taking of civilian property was necessary for justice to be achieved, since non-combatants helped the unjust side with aid and supplies. [79] Not only were soldiers' goods liable to seizure but also the property of all culpable civilians. It is likely that Bouvet allowed despoilation out of contemporary military necessity. He agreed that the innocent could often suffer in war, and these actions could not be blamed in every instance.[80] Nevertheless, he seemed to have abhorred it personally and clearly forbade illicit raiding: For example, he wrote:

> [soldiers should] not bear hard on the simple and innocent folk... for these days, wars are directed against the poor labouring people and against their goods and chattels. I do not call that war, but it seems to me to be pillage and robbery.[81]

This might seem contradictory. However, Bouvet was making a distinction between licit despoilation and illicit raiding. There were several ways to distinguish between the two. As already seen in Legnano's *de Bello*, the 'prince's portion', protected both leaders and soldiers from accusations of illegal intentions.[82] Bouvet likewise said all spoils should be given to the king or the 'duke of battle [*duc de la bataille*]' and distributed by desert. [83] Bouvet also forbade the taking of plough animals.[84] Like their human counterparts, these animals were essential for the future survival of the community. Bouvet acknowledged the contemporary military necessity of raiding, but also wanted to limit it to ensure that the future peace was not threatened by these punitive actions. Although it might seem problematic to allow the victorious leaders to determine just and unjust spoilation, Bouvet was assuming that these leaders had already declared a legal war and had fought in a moral manner. Accordingly, the virtuous prince would also be able to determine what was legal and illegal spoilation. The prince was also responsible for confiscating the wages of those deemed fighting

[78]Bonet, *Battles*, p. 189; C. Allmand, 'The War and the Non-Combatant', in Kenneth Fowler (ed.), *The Hundred Years War* (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 163-183.
[79]Bonet, *Batailles*, p. 141, '*se vraiment les subgets du roy d'Angleterre lui donnent ayde et faveur pour faire guerre à l'encontre du roy de France, les François peuvent bien guerroier le peuple anglois et gaingnier de leurs biens et prendre des biens sur leur pays et ce qu'ils en pourront avoir ne ja ne sont tenus quant à Dieu de les rendre*'; Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 153-154.
[80]Bonet, *Battles*, p. 154.
[81]Bonet, *Batailles*, pp. 142, 211, '*se doivent bien garder à leur pouvoir de traiter durement les simples gens et innocens... car aujord'huy toutes les guerres sont contre les povres gens laboureurs, contre les biens et meubles qu'ils ont. Pourquoy je ne l'appelle pas guerre mais tres bien me semble estre pillerie et roberie*.'; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 154, p. 189.
[82]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 269.
[83]Bonet, *Battles*, p. 134, p. 149, p. 150.
[84]Ibid., pp. 188-189.

for illegal reasons like wealth or glory.[85] This again limited theft and gave a greater chance for a peaceful relationship to exist in the future.

Although different from modern punitive actions, medieval thinkers also saw the need for continued punishment after the war. They argued that the taking of property both punished the enemy and compensated the victors. Similarly, captured soldiers were not to be enslaved, but ransomed for a reasonable price. Above all, these actions had two goals: to correct both the original injustice which caused the war and the injustices committed during the conflict. However, they also wanted to ensure punitive actions did not go too far and so destroy the likelihood of peace. In this way, captives and despoilation were limited by type and ransoms were checked by individual affordability. These measures punished the enemy but still allowed the defeated nation to rebuild, preventing future war. This new relationship would be determined through fair negotiations and legally binding treaties that restored the peoples' relationship to each other and so doing, re-established peace.

Truce and Treaty Negotiation

The final stage in by *jus post bellum* is the return of the defeated nation to the international community.[86] In this period the immediate post-war relationship of reparations and reconciliation ends, with a legally binding agreement which ideally restores the status quo prior to the crimes which began the conflict.[87] These treaties redefine the aggressor state, discourage further aggression, and decentralise power away from the criminals in the goal of creating a more just country.[88] Likewise, Legnano and Bouvet both provided guidelines by which the ends of medieval conflicts were agreed and established.

The *de Bello* only slightly touched on the topic of truces and treaties. However, Legnano did demonstrate their importance through the special treatment given to ambassadors and through several examples of international relationships. Ambassadors were responsible for the important job of negotiating with former enemies.[89] Legnano described this office as requiring both tough 'labour' and 'high intellect, and knowledge' and were deserving of a high salary.[90] Having praised their

[85]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 269.
[86]Orend, '*Jus post bellum*', p. 124; May, *War Ends*; pp. 19-22.
[87]May, *After War*, pp. 183-186; Lu, 'Reconciliation', pp. 538-552.
[88]Christine Bell, *On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 105-126, p. 108.
[89]Legnano, *de Bello*, pp. 236-238.
[90]Ibid., p. 265.

position, Legnano demonstrated high regard for the arbitration of peace.[91] He also exempted them from reprisals (punitive actions within states), indicating strict legal protection while negotiating truces and treaties.[92] Like today, these treaties were designed to restore the status quo. Legnano provided several categories for relationships between nations including enemies, neutral nations, and allies.[93] Treaties would have been designed to change enemies into either neutral nations, or allies. Legnano's example of a non-aligned relationship was the Tartar Khanate, which maintained a trading relationship with the Latin west.[94] This restoration of trade would likely have been the main ambition of ambassadors outside of Christendom. However, Legnano considered the 'Roman' people as constituting one legal entity.[95] As Christians, they ought to recognise each other almost as one nation. Yet Legnano indicated this was not realistic, as not all western princes recognised the authority of the emperor.[96] However, it is likely that Legnano desired Christian nations to be allies. Within this relationship he argued that agreements of friendship ought to be made and observed to the letter.[97] These negotiated legal contracts provided the exact guidelines by which future relationships would exist. Thus, allies were not obligated to go to war with their friends unless specifically agreed to beforehand. [98] In the context of finalising peace, future relationships needed to be strictly defined by the treaty, returning sovereignty and authority to the defeated nation.

Bouvet more precisely discussed truces as a part of warfare. He defined a truce as a 'royal surety', or a promise made by the king on behalf of his followers to the temporary end of a conflict.[99] This promise signified three things, 'first, it gives surety to persons, secondly, to goods, and thirdly, to a hope of peace.'[100] In order to be effective, truces needed to make peace through a sealed oath holding rulers to the promise of moral intentions and the realistic abilities to stop the conflict. However, Bouvet's experience of truces was far from perfect. He claimed that all soldiers

[91]Ambassadors were also supposed to be paid at the beginning of their mission for maintenance and if they refused to go should give back all of the money. Ibid., pp. 266, 268.
[92]Ibid., p. 319.
[93]Ibid., p. 233.
[94]Ibid., p. 233.
[95]Ibid., pp. 232-33.
[96]Ibid., pp. 232-33.
[97]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 258; Bouvet also made the same argument, Bonet, *Battles*, p. 137.
[98]Legnano, *de Bello*, p. 258; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 137.
[99]Bonet, *Battles*, p. 189.
[100]Bonet, *Batailles*, p. 212, '*car premierement elle donne seureté aux personnes, secondement aux biens et tiercement esperance de paix*'; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 190.

attempted 'a thousand ways of degrading their faith and their safe-conduct; so that it is very difficult to make with them a truce or safe conduct so secure that, by trickery, they do not find some flaw in it.'[101] Medieval soldiers were portrayed as attempting to find as many ways as possible to bypass their legal obligations. He gave two specific examples of immoral ceasefires. In the first, leaders used a flag of truce to lure an unexpecting enemy into an ambush or imprisonment.[102] In the other, an army attacked a town despite a previous agreement to the contrary.[103] Both led to unjust victories and were described by Bouvet as being equal to perjury.[104] By not keeping faith with the enemy, the 'royal surety' could not be trusted, and put the prospects of peace into doubt. In order to stop these violations, Bouvet recommended two punishments for the breaking of truces. On the individual level, he said that anyone seizing anything over five shillings during a time of truce should be executed.[105] This would prevent anyone from disobeying their leaders and continuing the war without permission. On the national level, if one king broke the truce, then the other king could also legally break the truce.[106] Thus the benefit of a 'fake' truce would be negligible, as it would be considered an unjust action that justified another declaration of war.

The Tree of Battles also considered the protection of diplomatic envoys. In the treatise, clergy were forbidden from fighting and were primarily seen as peace makers.[107] For this reason, Bouvet gave those in clerical offices free and legal movement between Christian lands[108] Legally, clerics represented a separate hierarchy and were able to arbitrate discussions through their neutral status.[109] However, because of their 'neutral' position, they could not legally represent sovereigns, thus secular officials would also need to be present in negotiations. These secular ambassadors required temporary permission to enter the opposing king's lands.[110] Rulers were expected to

[101]Bonet, *Batailles*, p. 212, '*Si treuvent mille manieres de barater leur foy et leur saulfconduit tant que à tres grant paine peut on avoir avec eulx treves seures ne saulfconduit que par cautele ils ne trouvent en lui à dire*'; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 190.
[102]Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 154-155.
[103]Ibid., pp. 154-155.
[104]Ibid., pp. 154-155.
[105]Ibid., p. 190.
[106]Ibid., p. 192.
[107]Ibid., p. 187.
[108]Ibid., p. 188; these included prelates, chaplains, deacons, *conversi*, hermits, and pilgrims.
[109]However, in practice they were far from neutral during the Hundred Years War. See Rory Cox, 'The Hundred Years War and the Church', in Anne Curry (ed.), *The Hundred Years War Revisited*, (London: Macmillan, 2019), pp. 85-110.
[110]Bonet, *Battles,* pp. 161-162, pp. 164-165.

be generous, allowing permission to enter their kingdom within reason.[111] However, like truces, the allowances and protections of envoys were not always adhered to. Ambassadors were responsible for their own protection and were advised to only reluctantly trust their hosts.[112] If captured, the envoys could not always count on being ransomed and could be impoverished during missions.[113] Bouvet also advised kings not to trust their counterparts and to not travel to other kingdoms unless absolutely necessary.[114] In an ideal situation the kings themselves would be present, but due to dangers posited by peace negotiations, medieval treaties involved a long process of negotiation, ratification and publication between envoys and royal courts.[115]

Although Bouvet did not extend his discussion of truces to final peace treaties, he did provide guidelines for how kings should justly interact with other rulers. Bouvet characterised the ideal king as treating all matters wisely, '[able] now to do rigorous justice, another time to grant mercy, according as the time and case shall require...'[116] Specifically, this would mean the king should be temperate to his enemies and charitable to the poor.[117] He should also protect the Church by handing over all heretics, schismatics, miscreants and infidels to the ecclesiastical courts.[118] During negotiations, the king would need to be slow to anger and not too light in his responses to ensure that other princes regarded him as wise with a worthy purpose.[119] During arbitrations the king was to only act towards truth and light and not be moved by earthly persuasion.[120] In this way, peace was again determined by the sovereign and its justice was dependent on his character.

Through treaties, a just war would end in the same way it began, decided by one having no higher authority, and for the sake of peace and truth. Both Bouvet and Legnano demonstrated the importance of truces by giving special privileges to diplomatic

[111]Ibid., pp. 164-165; this was similar to Gratian, *Decretum*, C.23 q.1 c.3.
[112]Ibid., pp. 162-163, pp. 190-191.
[113]Ibid., pp. 162-163.
[114]Ibid., pp. 190-191.
[115]This was best described by Pierre Chaplais, 'The Making of the Treaty of Paris (1259)' in Pierre Chaplais (ed.), *Essays in Medieval Diplomacy and Administration*, (London: Hambledon Press, 1982), p. 238; see also: Jenny Benham, *Peacemaking in the Middle Ages: Principles and Practice*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), pp. 11-12.
[116]Bonet, Batailles, p. 254, '*fois faire justice rigoreuse, une aultre fois misericorde, selon que le temps et le cas le requerront...*'; Bonet, *Battles*, p. 212.
[117]Bonet, *Battles*, pp. 211-21.
[118]Ibid., p. 211.
[119]Ibid., p. 213.
[120]Bonet, *Battles*, p. 212.

envoys and by making treaties the final word of obligation between nations. Bouvet also provided a more in-depth description of negotiations including a guarantee through 'the royal surety' ideally providing confidence that a peace would realistically be made and kept. Finally, Bouvet also provided advice to kings, encouraging them to be wise, just, and merciful in their relationships with others. Although these tenets look different from post-war justice described today, these authors did understand the need for guidelines between war and peace and they provided various limits on combatants in order to ensure a longer lasting peace.

Conclusion

Legnano and Bouvet both had complex ideas when it came to the waging and ending of war. Several principles could be identified between these two authors. Throughout their post-war philosophy they continued to emphasise the power and responsibility of the *princeps* as the instigator towards peace, the final judge of post-war punishment and mercy, and the final authority in truces and treaties. They also argued that all actions in war (including its end) needed to be negotiated with intentions guided by the cardinal and Christian virtues. Limitations like the 'prince's portion" and legal punishments for thieving soldiers practically ensured just goals were being pursued. The idea of 'true peace' was also present throughout these texts. The authors did not simply want the fighting to stop, they wanted relationships restored, and souls returned to God's instructions. These texts balanced the need for justice and mercy and provided a framework by which an imperfect reconciliation was possible.

Beyond the context of this present article, Legnano and Bouvet's work requires additional academic attention. They continued to influence writers into the fifteenth century and beyond. Most notably, large sections of Christine de Pizan's *Fais d'armes et de chevalerie* was sourced from Bouvet (and therefore Legnano as well).[121] This in turn was made popular through early printed editions by Antoine Vérard and William Caxton.[122] Study of these authors' influence on the work of Gentili, Grotius, and Kant would greatly add to scholarship surrounding *jus post bellum* as a whole. Further studies would also add to the history of early-modern warfare, providing greater context of past legal and moral perspectives. Finally, these authors' intellectual theories should be compared to the actual practices demonstrated at the end of warfare, especially during the periods of their authorship. Just as warfare is a universal experience, so too is the ending of war and more needs to be understood about the legal, moral, and practical norms which have long been established throughout history.

[121]Charity Cannon Willard, 'Introduction', in Christine de Pizan, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, trans. Sumner Willard, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 4-6.
[122]Ibid., p. 1.

Siege Famine in Northern England during the British Civil Wars, 1644–1649

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ABSTRACT
During the 1640s several Royalist fortresses in Northern England were subject to length sieges, particularly after the defeat of the major Northern Royalist field army at Marston Moor in 1644. The difficulty of directly assaulting these strongholds lead to starvation becoming the Parliamentarian and Covenanter besiegers' main weapon. This article analyses the methods used by the Royalist garrisons to try and alleviate siege famine, including raiding, rationing and ersatz foodstuffs, and their consequent collapse owing to hunger-induced popular unrest or the effects of famine diseases such as scurvy, starvation and dehydration on the soldiers themselves.

Introduction, Historiography and Method

A fortified space is, by definition, a space for the execution of warfare. This meant that during the British Civil Wars, or the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, they became *foci* for conflict. The fortified spaces of Northern England, when properly garrisoned, supplied and organised could withstand the limited capabilities of most besiegers for significant periods. Starvation, or the diseases associated with malnourishment such as scurvy, was common in lengthy sieges.[1] The lack of food, which was the eventual cause of the collapse of resistance in most prolonged sieges, would result in famine conditions within the walls.[2] If the fortified space was a town or city this meant that there was a large civilian population who had to be fed, reducing food stocks, and thus the period the garrison could resist, opening the possibility of food riots once the last

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[1]Isaac Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle,* (Whitehaven: Michael Moon's Bookshop, 1988), pp. 13–14, 34–35; C. H. Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', *English Historical Review*, 42, 128 (1917), pp. 568–587 (pp. 585–587).

[2]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 13–14, 34–35; Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', pp. 585–587.

victuals ran out.[3] If a siege was forced to a storm, such as was attempted at Scarborough and successfully carried out at Bolton, the attacker was forced into the most personally dangerous form of warfare, namely attacking defended positions designed to give every advantage to the defender.[4] As a consequence, ultimately the most common reason that a fortress surrendered was due to the defenders running out of food and water. No matter how great the courage of the besieged, it was not possible to sustain resistance if they were too weak to walk.[5] Furthermore, if there were many non-combatants within the defences famine conditions would occur more quickly, and potentially resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties.

Following the collapse of the northern Royalist field army at Marston Moor, the various Royalist garrisons of England from the Trent to the Borders were isolated.[6] While the Parliamentarian and Covenanter armies progressively reduced them each in turn, ultimately most were put to siege before they surrendered. Famine was an essential weapon in subduing these isolated garrisons as the new rulers of the North lacked the forces to systematically storm all of them owing to the continued successes of the Royalists in Western England, Northern Scotland and parts of Eastern Ireland.[7] The employment of starvation as a weapon of war in Northern England was motivated by pragmatic military necessity and not as a deliberate means of destroying a potentially rebellious population. It should also be clarified that contemporary military ethics did not regard starving besieged civilians as improper; there was no equivalent of the common denunciations of supposed atrocities – typically massacres or the use of torture – that filled polemical newsbooks.[8]

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[3]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

[4]Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', pp. 584–586; David Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton,* (Stroud: Amberley, 2011) pp. 116–118.

[5]Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 587.

[6]Richard Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645,* (Otley: Smith Settle, 1991) pp. 66–67; Jack Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century* (Pickering: Blackthorn Press, 2007), pp. 83–85; Charles I, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland [attributed], *The Kings cabinet opened: or, certain packets of secret letters & papers, written with the Kings own hand, and taken in his cabinet at Nasby-Field, June 14, 1645, By victorious Sr. Thomas Fairfax; wherein many mysteries of state, tending to the justification of that cause, for which Sir Thomas Fairfax joyned battell that memorable day are clearly laid open; together, with some annotations thereupon,* (London: Robert Bostock, 1645), p. 13.

[7]Jack Binns, *Yorkshire in the Civil Wars: Origins, Impact and Outcome* (Pickering: Blackford Press, 2012), pp. 83–87.

[8]For contemporary military ethics see Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations, translated from the Original Latin of Grotius, with Notes and Illustrations from Political and Legal Writers, by A.C. Campbell, A.M. with an Introduction by David J. Hill* (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), pp. 323–345, 359–

Famine has no place as a separate subject of analysis in the historiography of the British Civil Wars. The only entries in the Bibliography of British and Irish History (BBIH) on the subject are general histories, normally of Ireland, stretching from as far back as 900 to 1900.[9] This is noteworthy considering the importance of hunger as a weapon of war and the relatively abundant historiography of massacres; despite their similar concentration in Ireland, massacres continue to form an important, if minor, component of the historiography of the wider conflict.[10] This is largely owing to the lack of significant wider famines in Great Britain during the Civil Wars despite bad harvests in the 1640s and significant troop movements.[11] Similarly, siege-famine's historiographical position is limited to a place in local histories of particular sieges; these local histories are generally excellently researched – this article does not seek to criticise or even significantly revise their work – but their narrow focus prevents

372; Barbara Donagan, 'Codes and Conduct in the English Civil War', *Past and Present*, 118 (1988), pp. 65–95 (pp. 73–74); Anon, *A True and Perfect Relation of A victorious Battell Obtained against the Earl of Cumberland And his Cavaliers, By the Lo: Fairfax and Capt: Hotham. Also. The manner of the Lo: Fairfax his besieging of the City of York; with divers other remarkable Passages concerning the same. And. The Taking of Eight of Sir John Hothams Souldiers prisoners by the Cavaliers, and the tormenting deaths they put them unto. With. The Resolution of Captain Hothams Souldiers thereupon,* (London: William Ley, 1642).

[9]Online search of the Bibliography of British and Irish History (https://www.history.ac.uk/publications/bibliography-british-and-irish-history [Subscription service]) 10 January 2020.

[10]Mark Stoyle, 'The Road to Farndon Field: Explaining the Massacre of the Royalist Women at Naseby', English Historical Review, 123, 503 (2008), pp. 895–923; Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*; John Morrill, 'The Drogheda massacre in Cromwellian context', in David Edwards (ed.), *Age of atrocity: violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland,* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2007), pp. 242–265; Micheál Ó Siochrú, 'Propaganda, rumour and myth: Oliver Cromwell and the massacre at Drogheda', in Edwards, *Age of atrocity*, pp. 266–282; Inga Jones, 'Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms', in Philip Dwyer & Lyndall Ryan (ed.), *Studies on War and Genocide*, 30 vols., *Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity throughout History,* (New York: Berghahn, 2012), vol. XXX, pp. 63–78.

[11]Jonathan Healey, 'Coping with Risk in the Seventeenth Century: The First Age of the English Old Poor Law: A Regional Study', in Masayuki Tanimoto, R. Bin Wong (eds.), *Public Goods Provision in the Early Modern Economy: Comparative Perspectives from Japan, China, and Europe,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019), pp. 100–117 (p. 111–112).

them from providing a broader analysis of siege famine on a regional basis.[12] The wider, global historiography of siege-famine is more extensive, famous case studies such as Kut-al-Amara or, most infamously, Leningrad have resulted in significant historical analyses.[13]

This article seeks to incorporate the British Civil Wars into this wider historiography through a comparison of the sieges of Carlisle, Scarborough and Chester, with supplementary information from the siege of Pontefract; analysing how the besieged secured supplies, organised rationing systems amidst tensions between urban and military governments and how these systems ultimately failed, and resistance collapsed, amidst varying degrees of localised famine. While all three main case studies were Royalist fortresses held to the bitterest extremity between 1644 and 1645, there were otherwise some considerable differences. At Scarborough, the Royalists withdrew quickly into the castle and did not contest the town.[14] By contrast, at Carlisle the entire city was held by the Royalists until the final surrender and the Royalists actively raided the surrounding countryside for victuals until a few weeks before their surrender. At Chester the Royalists were forced back within their defences and were unable to secure additional foodstuffs by raiding, contributing to the brevity of the siege compared to Carlisle.[15]

Securing Supplies

The main source for the siege of Carlisle, October 1644–June 1645, is the account written by Isaac Tullie, a young resident of the city during the fighting.[16] Throughout Tullie's narrative, food was one of his central preoccupations. He wrote that 'Some 6 weeks past without much action, except for catching now and then of a few Cowes, some Foles accompanied wth carousing, and some scirmishing w[i]th the Scotch hors[e] w[i]thout order.'[17] Throughout his narrative Tullie recounts multiple battles over cattle, often resulting in casualties. In a siege situation, such 'meat on the hoof' was an extremely valuable resource. Before withdrawing inside the fortress, the Royalists had scoured the surrounding countryside of 'Corn from all the adjacent fields, besides

[12]Jack Binns, *A Place of Great Importance*: *Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660* (Preston: Carnegie Publishing, 1996), pp. 131–182

[13]Ilona Koupil, Dmitri B. Shestov, Pär Sparén, Svetlana Plavinskaja, Nina Parfenova, and Denny Vågerö. 'Blood Pressure, Hypertension and Mortality from Circulatory Disease in Men and Women Who Survived the Siege of Leningrad', *European Journal of Epidemiology*, 22, 4 (2007), pp. 223–234; W. H. Ogilvie, 'Effects Of Chronic Starvation During The Siege Of Kut', *The British Medical Journal*, 2, 3214 (1922), p. 237.

[14]Binns, *A Place of Great Importance*, pp. 131–182; Firth, 'Siege of Scarborough', p. 581.

[15]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle,* p. 7.

[16]Ibid., p. 7.

[17]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle,* p. 12.

meat, salt, coles and cowes'.[18] Interestingly, there was a punitive as well as pragmatic motive behind this process. Tullie stated that the confiscations were 'cheifly from about Wigton, y^{e} nest of the Roundheads'.[19]

Even without the added motive of punishing dissent and weakening potential allies of the invading Covenanters, confiscated cows represented a ready source of essential victuals for the garrison. Indeed, so many cattle were seized that 'an Oxe might have been bought in their towne for 18d at this time', a bargain considering that a pound of beef normally cost around two and a half pence in this period.[20] But the defenders' cattle had to be grazed outside the city and were therefore at risk of attack from the besiegers' cavalry troops. Royalist troopers were assigned to protect the livestock, resulting in repeated small skirmishes. Indeed, these battles are the most common single feature of Tullie's narrative, being mentioned 13 times in all.[21] Battles over cows, set to graze beyond the walls, were a relatively common occurrence at sieges and often posed a significant risk to civilians. At Pontefract, on 26 May 1645 during the second of the castle's three Civil War sieges, a boy cutting grass to feed the animals within the walls was shot in the face. Likewise on 10 June 'the enemy shott a boy of ours [who] was houlding of a Cow at gras'.[22]

Local civic officers, primarily constables, were also used to secure supplies. In late 1648, when Royalist insurgents retook Pontefract from its Parliamentarian garrison, they relied on coercion to ensure the compliance of the local constabulary.[23] In one such directive the governor, John Morris, ordered that a constable report to the castle 'to doe such service as shall be appointed', a sufficiently open-ended order that it could imply almost anything.[24] Dozens of these receipts, unsorted, are held by the UK National Archives.[25] Six demanded that foodstuffs, typically various types of grains but also beef, butter and cheese, be brought to the castle.[26] Four demanded that the constables collect wood, presumably for fuel in the winter of 1648/9, along with a

[18]Ibid., p. 7.
[19]Ibid.
[20]Ibid., p. 7; Gregory Clark, 'The Price History of English Agriculture, 1209–1914', *Research in Economic History,* 22 (2004), pp. 41–123 (p. 63).
[21]See Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle,* pp. 7, 12–14, 18, 25–34, 42.
[22]Alison Walker (ed.), *The first and second sieges of Pontefract Castle: Nathan Drake's diary* (Pontefract: Gosling Press, 1997), p. 41.
[23]The UK National Archive, Kew, ASSI 47/20/11, *John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract.*
[24]The UK National Archive, Kew, ASSI 47/20/11, *John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract.*
[25]Ibid.
[26]Ibid.

single demand for coal.[27] The problems of transporting these goods were settled by a pair of orders for horses, oxen and their attendant wains and wagons. There was even a single warrant for plaster, indicating that the castle required some renovations after the previous sieges. There were also five orders that constables escort 'draughts', presumably conscripts, to the castle for the garrison.[28]

Only obliquely, through threats, did any of Morris' warrants want money. This is significant, for the use of constables to collect money for garrisons was ubiquitous and a majority of surviving receipts, such as the large collection in the Morley Archive, concern the collection of such 'contribution money'.[29] The contrast with the Morley receipts is due to the very different conditions in which they were issued. Morris was the governor of an isolated insurrectionist stronghold, in need of emergency renovation and resupply before the inevitable siege, not a component of a wider fiscal-military system that had to support a field army in addition to various garrisons.[30] Given these circumstances, a focus on the essentials, men, transport, food and fuel, was rational. However, he was still dependent on the local constabulary to gather these resources and it is not credible that he would have been able to sustain resistance through the bitter third siege of Pontefract without their compliance.

Urban rationing at Carlisle and Chester, a comparison in urban military administration

While one would expect the cost of meat to skyrocket during a siege, and therefore beef to be out of reach of all but the wealthier citizens, this was reportedly not the case at Carlisle, owing to the governor's imposition of rationing in Christmas 1644.[31] Tullie wrote that:

> Now was all the corn taken from the Citizens, and carried to the Magazeene, a portion thence distributed weekly to every family according to their Number,

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid.

[29]The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15, *Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc.,* B I–IV.

[30]Thomas Paulden, *Pontefract Castle: An account how it was taken: and how General Rainsborough was surprised in his quarters at Doncaster, anno 1648. In a letter to a friend / By Captain Tho. Paulden. Written upon the occasion of Prince Eugene's surprising Monsieur Villeroy at Cremona* (London: Edward Jones, 1702), pp. 2–6; B. Boothroyd, *The History of the Ancient Borough of Pontefract, containing an interesting account of its castle and the three different sieges it sustained, during the civil war, with notes and pedigrees of some of the most distinguished Royalists and Parliamentarians, cheifly [sic] drawn from Manuscripts never before published* (Pontefract: Boothroyd, 1807), p. 260.

[31]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 13.

> and their Cattell w[he][n] they were to be killed, taken to the Castle thence from time to time distributed, no more to y[e] owner, but y[e] head, heart, and liver; then to any other.[32]

The Royalist military administration's concern for private property was secondary to their concern for keeping the city adequately provided with foodstuffs, although it should be noted that the head and organs of the slaughtered cows were retained by the owner. This kept the majority of the meat within the castle's magazine, whilst providing some material compensation to the original owners, helping to reduce the impact of the policy on the cattle owners, who may have been wealthy and connected to the urban oligarchy of Carlisle and consequently pose a possible threat to the Royalist military authorities.

That administration was fragmented between two officials, the first being the military governor, Sir Henry Stradling. He was the son of the first Stradling baronet, the Glamorgan MP Sir John Stradling.[33] Stradling had a military career before the Civil Wars, serving as a naval officer as early as 1628 and commanding warships throughout the later 1630s, with his most prestigious appointments being during the Spanish war scare of 1637.[34] Stradling briefly served in the army during the First Bishops' War, while in the Second Bishops' War he was back at sea.[35] He was also active in the Irish Rebellion, attempting a relief of Limerick by river before he was 'called away from that employment by His Majesties Command'.[36] With the outbreak of civil war in England

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[32]Ibid.

[33]Michael Baumber, 'Stradling, Sir Henry (*d.* 1649?)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* Oxford University Press 2004 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-26627?rskey=gTbKZo&result=2. Accessed 30 January 2018.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Anon, *A list of his Majesties Navie Royall, and merchants ships their names, captaines and lievtenants, their men and burthens in every one, now setting forth for the guard of the narrow seas, and for Ireland this yeare, 1642. With an order, for the speedy rigging of the navie for the defence of the kingdome. Algernon Percy, Earle of Northumberland, Lord Percy, Lucy, Poynings, &c. Knight of the most noble order of the garter, and one of his Majesties most Honourable Privy Counsell, Lord high Admirall of England, and Lord Generall of his Majesties Navy Royall,* (London: John Rothwell, 1642).

[36]Tristram Whetcombe, *A true relation of all the proceedings in Ireland, from the end of April last, to this present: sent from Tristram Whetcombe, mayor of Kinsale, to his brother Benjamine Whetcombe, merchant in London. With a certificate under the hand and seal of Sir William Saint-Leger, lord president of Munster. As also the copy of an oath which was found in a trunck in Kilbrittaine Castle neer Kinsale, after the rebels were fled from thence, the first of June, 1642,* (London: Joseph Hunscott, 1642), p. 8.

in 1642, Stradling sailed to Newcastle with four warships; he was forced ashore at the Tyne when his crew mutinied at the approach of a larger Parliamentarian squadron.[37] This brought Stradling into the proximity of William Cavendish, the First Earl of Newcastle, soon to become Charles I's deputy in Northern England, suggesting that Stradling found service with Newcastle around this period. However Stradling met Newcastle, the Earl had a high enough opinion of his capabilities to commission him as colonel and deputy commander of a foot brigade raised in Northumberland and Durham.[38] However, Stradling only briefly served in this position, for in October of that year Newcastle made him governor of Carlisle.[39] He had no connections to the local civic oligarchy, regarded by contemporaries as an important prerequisite to effective governorship, but succeeded in maintaining the compliance of the city without difficulty late in the siege despite his position as an alien. This was most likely due to the city's recent history of militarisation during the Bishops' Wars and its previous existence as a border fortress, the corporation was used to cooperating with military authorities and raised few objections.[40]

Stradling's assistant, competitor and possible rival during that siege was Sir Thomas Glemham, the former governor of York who had travelled to Carlisle with the remains of his command following the city's surrender.[41] Glemham evidently took control of some of the military functions of the garrison but the, admittedly sparse, evidence suggests that Stradling retaining his control over the city governance, despite Glemham's prior history of staging an armed putsch against the York corporation on Newcastle's (and Charles I's) orders in January 1643.[42] This was demonstrated when in mid-January 1645 the garrison also assumed control over the city's alcohol supply at Stradling's command, which both conserved valuable victuals and helped to cut down on drunkenness amongst the townsfolk and soldiers alike.[43] Tullie recorded that:

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[37]Baumber, 'Stradling, Sir Henry (d. 1649?)', *ONDB*.

[38]Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre (CAC), DPH/1/89/1, *Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King's Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643*.

[39]CAC, DPH/1/89/2, *Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643*.

[40]R.T. Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', *Northern History*, 31, 1 (1995), pp. 138–156.

[41]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle,* pp. 8–9.

[42]York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, *Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36*, ff. 81–82; Tristan Griffin, 'The Guildhall Putsch: The York Civic Corporation and Royalist Military Government, 1643-44', *Northern History* 58 (2021), 27-45.

[43]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 15.

> About this time, Dr. Basire, in his sermon, seasonably reproving the Garrison's excessive drinking, called drisling, prevailed so, that the Governours forthwith appointed a few brewers in every street, to furnish each family sparingly and p'portionablely.[44]

Control over both food and drink was centralised under the control of the governor and his officials, before being distributed to the townspeople as they required it.[45] It is important to note that the restriction of alcohol occurred after there had been a noticeable problem of drunkenness in the garrison itself, but that the response was implemented across the entire town.[46] As well as consuming resources, drunkenness amongst the soldiery could potentially cripple the fighting capabilities of the garrison, encourage mutinous dissent, or poison relations between the soldiers and the townspeople. As a result, the punishments for drunkenness according to the Royalist articles of war were severe. 'In an Officer shall be punished with losse of place: in a common Souldier with such penalties as the Lord Generalll or Court=Marshall shall see fit.'[47] Stradling also limited the supply of alcohol to the general populace, helping to extend the available supply and preventing popular drunkenness from undermining public order.

While owing to the normal paucity of garrison records, most of which were destroyed before the Royalist surrender in line with normal practice, it is unknown how exactly these requirements for both food and drink were calculated, the implementation of rationing marked the end of normal market relations in Carlisle. The same policy was also attempted by the Royalist garrison of Chester but with far less success. The Chester Royalists did not enjoy the same hegemony of force as did their counterparts at Carlisle and York; a succession of short-lived governors and an assertive civic corporation combined to weaken military officials control over the garrison.[48] John Byron, 1st Baron Byron was appointed by Charles I's Council of War to take charge of Chester on 7 November 1643.[49] Byron was an active governor, bringing the corporation into closer cooperation with the garrison, establishing a fire brigade and

[44]Ibid.
[45]Ibid.
[46]Ibid.
[47]Anon, *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army* (York: Robert Barker, 1642), p. 4.
[48]Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, *Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684,* 56–66; John Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 128–133.
[49]Eliot Warburton (ed.), *Memoirs of Prince Rupert, and the cavaliers: Including their private correspondence, now first published from the original manuscripts* (London: Richard Bently, 1849), p. 329.

putting the city's militia under the control of his own officers.[50] Even in his self-exculpatory account he admitted that this relationship rapidly soured, particularly as he took measures to control the supply of foodstuffs within the town.[51] There was apparently 'Noe publick Magazin of Victuall', and, since the year was drawing to a close with 'Seventeene *thousand* ~~hundred~~[52] mouths att the least to feede, whoe would not bee regulated in their dyett, because they had their provisions in their own custody', efforts at imposing rationing were both critical and difficult.[53]

In response, Byron had summoned his officers, the Mayor and the Commissioners of Array, before making proposals for the steps required to eke out the city's supplies.[54] This case demonstrates the complex relationship between civil and military authorities in Royalist Chester. Byron's assertation of supremacy did not entail the wholesale exclusion of the Mayor from military affairs, but his incorporation within a hierarchy of officers as Byron's subordinate. According to Byron, the Mayor rejected his suggestion of a central stockpile of victuals because, since a large number of townsmen formed the garrison 'whoe would not suffer it [their foodstuffs] to bee in any custodye butt their owne', there was a danger of mutiny if the plan proceeded.[55] The most obvious caution that must be raised in the analysis of this source is that it came from Byron. The essence of his narrative is that he was correct in everything that he did and that everything that went wrong for the Royalists in general, and him in particular, was the fault, in no particular order, of court intrigues, other Royalists' incompetence, the Chester Corporation and citizenry, and the Welsh.[56] However, it should be noted that the Royalists in Chester were ultimately forced to surrender after around four months in the second siege of the city, 20 September 1645–3 February 1646, comparing unfavourably with the over six months of resistance offered by Carlisle; Byron's failure to establish a centralised rationing service, supported by its absence from extant corporate records, helps to explain this as part of a wider pattern of a dysfunctional civic-military relationship at Chester.

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[50]Bodleian Libraries, Oxford (BOD), MS. Rawlinson B. 210, *Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, ff. 55–57.
[51]Ibid., ff. 58–59.
[52]Note that 'hundred' is crossed out and 'thousand' inserted in the manuscript.
[53]BOD, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 58
[54]Ibid., ff. 58–59.
[55]Ibid., f. 59.
[56]For Lord Byron blaming court intrigue see, BOD, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, *Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, ff. 54, 63; for Lord Byron blaming other Royalists' incompetence see, ibid., ff. 56, 61, 63; for Lord Byron blaming the Chester corporation and citizenry see, ibid., ff. 55–56, 58–59, 63–64; for Lord Byron blaming the Welsh see, ibid., f. 55.

Starvation, popular unrest and the collapse of gubernatorial authority at Carlisle

Ultimately even the best system of rationing will fail if no new victuals are being added to stockpiles, which occurred at Carlisle in Spring 1645. The last time that Tullie mentioned a skirmish over cattle was dated 29 May, and once the supply of beef ran out the Royalists were forced to resort to less wholesome sources of meat.[57] Tullie stated that they reduced to a 'small quantity of hors flesh without Bread or Salt', and that 'Hempseed, dogs, and rats were eaten'.[58] Dogs and rats may be stringy and not particularly good eating, particularly in the case of the latter, but at least they actually had edible meat on their bones. It is difficult to see how much nutritional value hempseed could have provided, and the entire episode demonstrated the desperate condition of the defenders. Indeed, by this stage in the siege, the state of famine in the city became acute for both garrison and townspeople alike. Tullie's entry for 6 June recounted that:

> Now were Gentlemen and others so shrunk that they could not chuse but laugh one at another to see their close hang as upon men on gibbets; for one might have put theire head and fists between the doublet and the shirts of many of them.[59]

Black humour as a coping method for dealing with trauma was a common feature of warfare, and indeed of the history of suffering in general.[60] However, this humour belied the desperate state of the Royalist soldiery. The fact that both 'Gentlemen and others' were so emaciated that they resembled corpses demonstrates that rank was no guarantee of sufficient nutrition at this point in the siege.[61] While this illustrates that the ration system was still succeeding in producing an equitable distribution of the remaining victuals, given that the gentlemen of the garrison were starving to death alongside their men, it also meant that the fighting quality of the Royalist soldiers would have begun to drop. While it could be that the gentlemen in question were simply losing excess body fat, it could also demonstrate the loss of muscular tissue owing to

[57]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 43.
[58]Ibid.
[59]Ibid, p. 44.
[60]Cameron Nickels, *Civil War Humor,* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010), pp. 83–114; Rosmary Gallager, "'All this happened, more or less": Making Sense of the War Experience Through Humor in "Slaughterhouse-Five" and "The Sirens of Titan"', *Studies in American Humor,* 3, 6, *Special Issue: Kurt Vonnegut and Humor* (2012), pp. 73–78.
[61]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 44.

low nutrition.[62] Even long before this condition becomes life-threatening, typically due to the heart muscle weakening, this would result in a precipitous decline in the sufferer's physical fitness.[63]

Despite and because of these conditions, it was necessary to continue the raids on the surrounding countryside to acquire more foodstuffs. At the beginning of June, six troopers were sent to gather sacks of grain from a mill, to bring back into the town.[64] While they did possess some draft horses in addition to their mounts, it is difficult to see how such a small party of men could carry enough grain back to Carlisle to sustain the garrison for very long. Neither was the expedition without violence, for they were blocked on their return by Covenanter horsemen. Incredibly the charge of six Royalists managed to scatter their opponents, and they made it back into Carlisle.[65] Tullie, with his typical 'spin' on events, declared that 'What could [nt] these worthies have atchieved, if they had not co in a pinfold and pined with hunger?'[66] While undoubtedly valorous, the troopers' actions only bought the garrison a few more weeks. By the end of June, Carlisle was essentially out of foodstuffs, and as a consequence, civic order began to collapse. Tullie recorded that on 28 June:

> The towns men humbly petitioned S[i]^{r} Tho[ma]^{s} Glenham y[a]^{t} their horse flesh might not be taken from them as formerly; and informed him y[a]^{t} they were not able to endure y^{e} famine any longer; to w[i]^{ch} he gave no answer, nor redresse, in 4 dayes space; at which time, a few women of y^{e} scolds and scum of the citty, mett at y^{e} cross, braling against S^{r} Henry Stradling there p'sent; who first threatned to fire upon them; and when they replyed they [would] take it as a favour, he left them wth tears in his eyes, but could not mend their commons.[67]

Two days after this second protest, Carlisle surrendered. The first protest had maintained the normal forms of civic-military relations, with the townsmen 'humbly'

[62]Ancel Keys, Josef Brožek, Austin Henschel, Olaf Mickelsen, Henry Taylor, Ernst Simonson, Angie Sturgeon Skinner, Samuel M. Wells, J. C. Drummond, Russell M. Wilder, Charles Glen King, and Robert R. Williams, 'Nature of the Physiological Problems', in *The Biology of Human Starvation,* 2 vols., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950), vol. I, pp. 575–586.
[63]Ancel Keys et al, 'Circulation and Cardiac Function', in *The Biology of Human Starvation*, vol. I, 607–634; Ancel Keys et al, 'The Capacity for Work, in *The Biology of Human Starvation,* vol. I, 714–748.
[64]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 46.
[65]Ibid.
[66]Ibid.
[67]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

petitioning the commander-in-chief of the garrison, Sir Thomas Glemham.[68] However, the contents of the petition, which regrettably, but typically, has not survived, were far from normal. The fact that the Royalists were collecting the horsemeat from the entire town, presumably as part of their rationing efforts, shows the level of control the garrison had over the town's foodstuffs during the siege.[69] Furthermore, the fact that the citizens, after six months of rationing, were no longer willing to see their last remaining stocks of food confiscated by the garrison for distribution demonstrates that this control had fallen apart.[70] Given everything else Tullie said about the near-complete absence of foodstuffs at this stage in the siege, the collapse of the rationing system was clearly due to the garrison no longer having any real stocks of food left to ration.

Glemham did not offer any succour to the citizens of Carlisle, as there was none to be had. This precipitated the second protest, which did not maintain the normal forms of civic-military relations at all. By contrast with the 'humble petition', which suggests a degree of formality consistent with the actions of the civic oligarchy, the townswomen's protest was drawn from 'y^{e} scolds and scum of the citty', indicating that they were of relatively low social status.[71] Furthermore, Tullie characterised, and condemned, their protest as 'braling' against the governor.[72] It is not clear from Tullie's narrative which he found more offensive, the fact that the protesters were women, the fact that they were poor, or the way their protest against Tullie's beloved cavaliers was carried out. The complete breakdown in the civic-military relationship was borne out by Stradling's threat to order his men to fire upon the small crowd.[73] Killings of protesters in this way were not a usual feature of the Civil Wars, particularly in the case of a small number of unarmed women. Stradling's reaction to the women's declaration that quick death would be preferable to the continued suffering they were currently enduring suggests that he never seriously intended to open fire.[74] As much as the protest, the governor's emotional collapse demonstrated that the strain and privation of the siege had become intolerable. Despite the erosion of antebellum norms to the point of threatening a massacre of starving civilians nominally under the garrison's protection, Stradling ultimately yielded.

[68]Ibid.
[69]Ibid.
[70]Ibid.
[71]Ibid.
[72]Ibid.
[73]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.
[74]Ibid.

Famine diseases and the physical impossibility of resistance at the Great Siege of Scarborough Castle, 1644–1645

While Tullie did not mention diseases such as scurvy in his narrative, it was probably frequent amongst the garrison and the townsfolk alike. A diet of horse, dog and rat meat was ultimately not sustainable, and it is highly doubtful that hempseed would have provided sufficient greenery to make up for the complete lack of fruit and vegetables. This was certainly the case at the contemporaneous Great Siege of Scarborough in Yorkshire. While at Carlisle the garrison's morale finally collapsed owing to the starvation of the civilian population, the garrison of Scarborough Castle continued resistance to the point of complete physical destruction. The Royalist governor, Sir Hugh Cholmley, was a former Parliamentarian who had defected to the Royalists; conscious of his likely death if he was captured and anxious to demonstrate his loyalty to Charles I, he refused to surrender. Cholmley and his garrison had retreated within the castle on 18 February 1645, leaving Scarborough town to be taken by the Parliamentarians.[75] They had then put up five months of fierce resistance, in which the castle was subject to intensive bombardment and repeated assaults launched by the Parliamentarian commander, Sir John Meldrum, who ultimately died of injuries received in one such assault.[76] Outnumbered three to one, the Royalists managed to hold off the enemy despite considerable losses and the destruction of most of the castle due to cannon fire.[77] However, by summer the garrison had run critically low on food and water, and as a consequence, they suffered 'the scurvie which grew to be as contagious as the plague'.[78] In his account of the siege, Cholmley stated that:

> At length the miseries of the Castle began exceedinglie to multiply; halfe of the soldiers were either slaine or dead of the scurvy, of which disease neare the other halfe laid soe miserable handled they were scarce able to stirr hand or foot.[79]

While caution must be taken when relying upon this account, as Cholmley's status as a former Parliamentarian meant that he had good reason to demonstrate the depth of his new-found loyalty to the King, this part of his account is borne out by other

[75]Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 581.
[76]Ibid., pp. 582–583; Charles Carlton, 'Meldrum, Sir John (*b.* before 1584?, *d.* 1645)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press 2004 https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-18525. Accessed 11 June 2021.
[77]Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', pp. 568–587.
[78]Ibid., p. 587.
[79]Ibid., p. 586.

sources.[80] Parliamentarian newsbooks reported that, at the surrender of the castle, many of Cholmley's men were too weak to walk and had to be carried on stretchers down into the town.[81] Furthermore, while Cholmley's men had been given leave to go to Royalist Newark, only a hundred and sixty men and women went south from Scarborough with Sir Hugh.[82] Other sources state that 100 men, too ill to be moved owing to scurvy, were left in Scarborough itself.[83] While many would have defected, or simply gone home, the evidence for as many as 50% casualties, and possibly even fatalities, is strong. Scurvy ravaged the garrison, and it is probable that if the Parliamentarians had had the stomach for another direct assault it would have managed to carry the fortress given that 'there was but 25 of the common soldiors able to doe dutie'.[84] Even the disposal of the mounting piles of dead bodies had become difficult, since 'there dyed ten in a night, and manie layed two days unburied for want of helpe to carrie them to the grave'.[85] Scurvy caused a vicious cycle of famine, as the

[80]For a historical perspective on Cholmley's efforts at self-justification, see Andrew Hopper, 'Fitted for Desperation': Honour and Treachery in Parliament's Yorkshire Command, 1642–1643', *History*, 86, 282 (2002), pp. 140–144 (pp. 147–149); Andrew Hopper, 'The Self-Fashioning of Gentry Turncoats during the English Civil War', *Journal of British Studies,* 49, 2 (2010), pp. 236–257 (pp. 251–252). For original sources relating to the dire situation within the castle, Anon, *An exact relation of the surrender of Scarborough Castle, By Sir Hugh Cholmley, governour of the same; to Coll. Sir Matthew Boynton, Colonell Lassels, and Coll. Needham, commanders in chief of the Parliaments forces in Scarborough. Together with a copy of the articles agreed upon at the said surrender. Also, that Rabs Castle, Sir Henry Vanes houses in the Bishoprick of Durham, with all the armes and ammunition therein, is yielded up to the Parliaments forces,* (London: John Field, 1645), pp. 3–4; Anon, *God appearing for the Parliament, in Sundry late Victories Bestowed upon their Forces, VVich Command and call for great Praise and Thanksgiving, both from Parliament and People* (London: Edward Husband, 1644), pp. 3–5.

[81]Binns, *A place of Great Importance*, p. 162; see James Hopkinson, *The coppie of a letter from major Generall Poines his quarters of the taking of Scarborough. With the coppie of the 12 articles agreed and concluded upon the 22. of Iuly, 1645. between the Honourable Sir Matthew Boynton, Knight and Baronet, one of the militarie committee, for the Northerne Association. And Sir Hugh Cholmneley Knight and Baronet, governour of that castle there, concerning the delivering of the same. As also a list of what was taken in Scarborough. Printed, and published according to order* (London: B. Alsop & J. Coe, 1645).

[82]Bernard Aslop (ed.), *The Weekly Account: Containing, Certain Special and Remarkable Passages from both Houses of Parlimament; And Collectiens of several Advertismeants, 29 July 1645* (London: Bernard Alsop, 1645).

[83]Anon, *Mercurius Britanicus, communicating the affaires of great Britaine for the better information of the people*, no. 91, 21 July 1645–28 July 1645, (London, 1645).

[84]Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 586.

[85]Ibid.

garrison became too weak to carry out the actions necessary to keep themselves alive. Cholmley recounted that:

> there was corne sufficient, but not to make the mills goe, in soe much that most in the Garrison had not eaten a bitt of bread for divers dayes before the render, and the Governour had often in person turned the mills to get himselfe bread.[86]

While it is doubtful that the governor had to grind mills himself, the idea that the surrender was due to the final collapse of the garrison's food production system is very probable. But it was not only bread that was wanting, for the garrison had essentially run out of water. The castle had two wells, a deep one by the keep and a shallow one serving the chapel near the sea cliff.[87] The first had already failed by early 1645, and the second was so shallow that it only filled up with winter rains and was useless in summer.[88] There were springs at the base of the sea cliff that the castle was built upon, but this involved climbing down the cliff, and then back up again holding containers full of water.[89] Amazingly, this was to prove the garrisons' main source of water for the final part of the siege, even if it was collected 'with much paines, difficulty and perrill'.[90] But by July even this supply had been cut off, as the Parliamentarian naval blockade grew tighter, and enemy ships moved into a position to fire directly at the base of the sea cliff.[91] Cholmley wrote that:

> There was a well in the Castle but the water if affoorded us nott considerable, and the shipps had now debarred access to that under the cliff, soe that manie horses had beene with out water for seaven days together, which occasioned contagion amongst them alsoe.[92]

It was now impossible to effect further resistance to the parliamentary forces. While the garrison was, according to Cholmley, also running low on gunpowder, the amount of space he spent in describing the problems imposed by want of food and water makes it clear that he considered lack of those essentials for life the main cause of the garrison's collapse.[93] With the promise of lenient terms, despite Cholmley's status as a turncoat, the garrison finally surrendered on 22 July 1645. Ultimately his refusal to

[86]Ibid.
[87]Trevour Pearson, 'Scarborough Castle, North Yorkshire', *English Heritage, Survey Report, Archaeological Investigation Report Series* AI/11/1999, pp. 6, 11, 22, 53.
[88]Binns, *A place of Great Importance*, p. 159.
[89]Ibid.
[90]Ibid.
[91]Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 586.
[92]Ibid.
[93]Ibid., pp. 586–587.

surrender had secured his own life and confirmed his Royalist convictions as well as inflicting significant losses on the Parliamentarian forces, but at a hideous cost to his garrison. While at most garrisons the signing of the articles of surrender was immediately followed by the defender's vacating their garrison, at Scarborough the pitiful state of the Royalists meant that Cholmley was given three days to evacuate all of the castle's residents.[94] This was made more difficult, since 'the entrance in the Castle was soe barracadoed as they were forced to make a passage through the maine wall into the ditch, where the besiedged passed out, the Governor bringing up the rear.'[95] Over the space of the three days, Chomley moved all of the survivors out of the devastated ruin they had held for five months into Scarborough town. A majority were no longer capable of unassisted movement. He wrote that:

> At the rendor of the Castle there was a hundred and fowerscore sicke personns, of which most of them not able to move, but were carryed out in blancketts, and many of them dyed before they gott into the Towne…Those which had abilitie to march out of the Castle with out helpe, though manie of them infirme in health, were about threescore, most Gentlemen and officers.[96]

Sixty walked out of the garrison, and a hundred and eighty were carried out, some dying on the way.[97] This was just over half of the four hundred soldiers, plus civilians, whom Cholmley had led into the castle five months before.[98] While many had died in the Parliamentarian bombardment, or in repelling the assaults Meldrum had launched against the castle gatehouse, it was the famine that had finished the Royalists. Cholmley did not record the proportion of fatalities attributable to famine, but if only casualties are considered then those incapable of moving on their own outnumbered their able colleagues by two to one.

Conclusions

Ultimately, mass death from famine was not a common feature of Northern England's experience of the British Civil Wars. Only at Scarborough is there any clear evidence of definite famine-related diseases, from which at least some of the sufferers probably died, and there is only evidence of siege-related hunger at Carlisle.[99] Compared to the war-famines in contemporary Ireland or Germany, starvation killed relatively few in Northern England during the sixteen-forties. However, as foci of conflict, besieged fortresses still generated significant localised famines, the experience of which was

[94]Binns, *A Place of Great Importance*, p. 162.
[95]Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 587.
[96]Ibid.
[97]Firth, 'Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 587; Binns, *A Place of Great Importance*, p. 162.
[98]Binns, *A Place of Great Importance*, p. 162.
[99]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

wholly divorced from the rest of Great Britain throughout the period. As a weapon starvation succeeded in reducing otherwise impregnable strongholds such as Scarborough and relieved Leven's army of any need to directly attack 'ye Castle, Citty, and Cittadell of Carlile'.[100] In this way, famine was an essential weapon used by the victorious Parliamentarian-Covenanter forces in subduing the Royalist strongholds that persisted throughout the North even after the catastrophic defeat of the Northern Royalists at Marston Moor.

The Royalists attempted to counter siege-famine through rationing systems and *ersatz* foodstuffs, however establishing such systems relied upon the uncertain cooperation between civic and military authorities and, if there was no possibility of relief by a field army, was utterly futile.[101] The King's Northern loyalists ultimately succeeded in prolonging the war in the North for over a year, hoping to buy time for a renewal in Royalist fortunes. While this failed with the Royalist defeats at Naseby and Philiphaugh, it was not an irrational decision; like the decision to starve garrisons into surrender, continued resistance, even at a severe cost to both military and civilian populations, was justified by the logic of military necessity and the perceived illegitimacy of surrender to 'rebels' without Royal authorisation.[102] The consequence of this decision was a complete breakdown in the relationship between civic and military authorities as their priorities dramatically diverged. Civic corporations' concern was the wellbeing of their town and the urban oligarchy that ran it, both of which were seriously endangered by continued resistance. While rationing both extended a food supply and reaffirmed a hierarchical urban social model, starvation resulted in shocking collapses in societal norms; the protest of the Carlisle women, following a failed petition to Royalist authorities through the normal channels of civil life, demonstrated siege-famine's capacity to inspire popular unrest.[103] Where a significant civilian population was absent, such as at Scarborough Castle, it was possible to continue fighting to the point of literal death by starvation.

[100]CAC DPH/1/89/2, *Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643.*
[101]BOD, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, *Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, ff. 55–57; Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660…*, pp. 128–133.
[102]BOD, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, *Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, ff. 55–57.
[103]Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

'Fit for immediate service': Reassessing the Irish Military Establishment of the Eighteenth Century through the 1770 Townshend Augmentation

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ABSTRACT
The Irish Military Establishment (IME) of the eighteenth century was established in 1699 to protect Ireland from invasion and to secure the Hiberno-Protestant interest from Catholic insurrection. Regiments were rotated to and from Ireland as required, and Ireland played a major part in British strategy as a barracks for its Empire. Despite this crucial role, the Establishment endures considerable historical criticism and is often described as an ill-disciplined rabble. This paper will reassess this negative perception through a case study of the Townshend Augmentation and material held in the returns of regiments in Ireland from 1767-1771.

The Irish Military Establishment (IME) of the eighteenth century was a branch of the eighteenth-century British military which was paid for by the Irish exchequer but remained subservient to the British government and Crown. It was an army that almost never fought a battle on Irish soil, but whose greatest contribution to Imperial military strategy was the supply of soldiers for deployment abroad. Regiments were rotated into and out of Ireland as required, and it is likely that most soldiers in the British army spent at least some time in Ireland. Housed in barracks and tasked to protect an Irish population which at best saw them as defenders of the status-quo and at worst would have viewed them as an occupying force, deployment in Ireland was a unique element of the eighteenth-century British soldier's service.

Despite the commonality of this shared experience across the British army, the IME has been overlooked and neglected by both military and social historians. Historians who engage with the Establishment often emphasise the negatives associated with the

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army in Ireland, describing it as ill-disciplined and prone to desertion.[1] They often quote Lt-Gen Sir Ralph Abercromby who described the IME as 'formidable to everyone but the enemy'.[2] This negativity has hindered the exploration of themes such as the army-societal relationship, army effectiveness and the nuances of military service in Ireland. This article counters the existing narrative surrounding the IME and offers a more balanced perspective of the army in Ireland which goes beyond these familiar pessimistic assumptions. It takes the form of a case study employing a quantitative evaluation of primary source material relating to the 1770 Augmentation. Military augmentations aimed to increase the size of the army either by adding regiments or increasing the size of existing regiments. These often occurred during wartime, but there were also peacetime augmentations as was seen in 1770. The 1770 Augmentation restructured the size of regiments in Ireland and in the process removed the distinctive 'cadre' system which had kept Irish regiments at a reduced size. This article explains how the data presented chiefly in the regimental returns for the army in the late 1760s, alongside qualitative evidence from newspapers and contemporary accounts, can offer a new, more positive perspective of the IME. By compiling these data into tables, this article provides insight into the size and quality of the garrison and how closely these regiments adhered to anti-Irish recruitment legislation. Furthermore, these tables compare the size and readiness of the IME pre and post 1770, illustrating both the effect of the augmentation, and the effectiveness of the recruiting officers across the IME. This focus on the regimental level allows for the refutation of the historical criticisms which have dogged discussion of the Establishment previously.

In theory, the smaller size imposed by the 'cadre' system should have been the only difference between a regiment of the IME and a sister regiment on the British Establishment. Examination of desertions, postings and discharges show that soldiers

[1]Alan J. Guy, 'A Whole Army Absolutely Ruined in Ireland: Aspects of the Irish Establishment, 1715-1773' in *National Army Museum Annual Report [NAM/A4/2/18]*, (1979) pp. 30-43; Alan J. Guy, 'The Irish Military Establishment, 1660-1776' in Thomas Bartlett & Keith Jeffery (eds), *The Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 211-230; Thomas Bartlett, 'Army and society in eighteenth-century Ireland' in W. A. Maguire (ed.), *Kings in conflict: the Revolutionary War in Ireland and its aftermath, 1689-1750* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1990), pp. 173-82; Thomas Bartlett, 'A weapon of war yet untried: Irish Catholics and the armed forces of the crown, 1760-1830' in Keith Jeffrey and TG Fraser (eds), *Men women and war: Historical Studies XVIII* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1993), pp. 66-85; Neal Garnham, 'Military Desertion and Deserters in Eighteenth-Century Ireland.' *Eighteenth Century Ireland / Iris an dá chultúr*, 20 (2005) pp. 91-103.

[2]Abercrombie quoted in Ian Soulsby, 'The Irish Military Establishment 1796-1798. A Study in the evolution of military effectiveness' (MA thesis, UCC, 2018) p. 23.

came from much the same backgrounds in both establishments, and recruiting and training standards were maintained across the army.[3] One major difference identified by Neal Garnham was the speed and willingness with which the regiments adopted reforms. The autonomy of the IME meant that British reforms often failed to be implemented in Ireland, the best example of this being the reforms of the Duke of Cumberland in the 1740s.[4] This led to the perception that the Irish regiments were less advanced than their British equivalents in the middle of the eighteenth century, when many of the contemporary negative reports of its performance were penned.

Past efforts to refute or refine the existing historical criticisms of the IME have been hampered by the realities of researching eighteenth-century Ireland.[5] The greatest difficulty stemmed from the incineration of much of the primary source material during the Four Courts fire in 1922. Thankfully, there is still a large amount of information available in The National Archives in Kew, London. This includes the War Office Papers, specifically WO 27, the inspection returns of the British Army in this period. These contain several volumes dedicated to the IME and these offer the most complete window into the real and comparative performance and issues facing the army in Ireland between 1767 and its dissolution in 1801. This study references the documentation in WO 27 relevant to Ireland from 1767 to 1771. This date range provides control years for the pre-augmentation establishment. This control period can be contrasted with the immediate effect of the 1770 augmentation seen in 1771 and provide quantitative and qualitative information as to the impact of the augmentation on the numbers and effectiveness of the IME.

The Foundation and Mission of the Irish Military Establishment

The IME was instituted in the 1699 in the wake of the Williamite War (1688-91). Its strategic objective was to protect Ireland from foreign invasion, whilst also serving as a martial force to defend the Protestant interest in Ireland from insurrection. It was agreed that 12,000 men would be maintained in Ireland, paid for by the Irish Exchequer and commanded by an independent high command in Dublin.[6] This was the largest

[3]Andrew Cormack, *'These Meritorious Objects of the Royal Bounty' The Chelsea Out-Pensioners in the Early Eighteenth Century*, (Great Britain: Self-Published, 2017) pp. 339-344; Garnham, 'Military Desertion', p. 101.

[4]Garnham, 'Military Desertion', pp. 91-2.

[5]Kenneth Ferguson, 'The army in Ireland from the Restoration to the Act of Union' (PhD thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 1980); Charles Ivar McGrath, *Ireland and Empire 1692-1770* (London: Routledge, 2012); Ian McBride, *Eighteenth Century Ireland, the Isle of Slaves,* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2009) pp. 36-48.

[6]J.A. Houlding, *Fit for Service, The Training of the British Army 1715-1797* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 46-7.

source of expenditure for the Irish Exchequer throughout the century, but fears of French attack rendered it a worthwhile expense in the eyes of the Protestant elite.

While its primary objective was the prevention of French invasion, this threat existed more in the minds of Irish Protestants than reality. [7] The Royal Navy was a strong deterrent to invasion, and the prospect of coordination between Catholic Jacobites and a French invasion was slim, particularly after the battle of Culloden (1746). Prior to the 1798 Rebellion, French soldiers only landed in force once: at Kilrost in 1760. From there Francois Thurot's expedition captured the town and castle of Carrickfergus after a valiant but brief defence by the poorly equipped garrison led by Lieutenant Colonel John Jennings. Thurot's men then demanded supplies from nearby Belfast which had been hastily fortified by the local militia. As the army in Ireland mobilised, the French reboarded their vessels and were eventually ambushed and sunk by a Royal Navy squadron off the Isle of Man.[8]

This episode was the army's sole engagement with an invading force pre-1798 and as such, the 'military' preparedness and effectiveness of the IME is difficult to gauge. This is confounded by a paradox between the battlefield performance and alleged poor quality of the IME. Since the garrison was rarely needed to defend Irish soil, most military actions were seen when regiments were rotated out of Ireland. These regiments conducted themselves adequately on campaign. The ill-fated expedition of General Edward Braddock in 1755 involved the 44th and 48th Foot, which had recently arrived in America from Ireland and were described as showing 'great spirit and zeal for the service'.[9] Other IME regiments performed well in America, such as the 27th and 46th at the battle of Carillon (1758), and seven IME battalions were trained for a proposed siege of Louisbourg in 1757.[10] Clearly a more nuanced picture of Irish service's impact on military performance is needed and given the rarity of battles on Irish soil, effectiveness of the IME should also be measured through interactions with Irish society.

From its inception in 1699 to the 1730s, the IME was primarily deployed in support of the Revenue Commission, aiding Revenue Officers and suppressing bandit activity in the countryside. Whilst these activities were unpopular among both soldiers and

[7]James Kelly, "Disappointing the Boundless Ambition of France': Irish Protestants and the Fear of Invasion, 1661-1815.' *Studia Hibernica,* 37 (2011), pp. 27-105.
[8]Neal Garnham, *The militia in eighteenth-century Ireland: in defence of the Protestant interest* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012), pp. 60-1.
[9]Stanley Pargellis (ed), *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), pp. 82-3, quoted in Houlding *Fit for Service,* p. 356.
[10]Houlding *Fit for Service,* pp. 364-5.

society, the relationship was at least stable, and recorded incidents of soldierly unrest tended to be self-contained and restricted to inner mutinies such as can be identified in the 1710s.[11] This changed in 1739 when ten regiments of foot were transferred to Britain and later to the West Indies and America.[12] Each of these needed 25 new soldiers which were taken from the regiments which stayed behind.[13] Only twelve regiments of foot and ten regiments of cavalry remained, and they were confronted with a rise in urban unrest, particularly in Dublin. The capital's garrison was repeatedly called upon to suppress disturbances prompted by factions such as the 'Ormond Boys' and 'Liberty Boys'.[14] The depleted garrison was hard-pressed to deal with these disturbances, and increasingly resorted to violence when confronted, leading to civilian deaths. The situation reached a nadir in 1750, when the army was ordered to clamp down on illicit cloth markets used by the Liberty Boys whilst also being ordered to adopt a *laissez faire* approach to the rioting in the capital.[15] The Liberty Boys were outraged, joined forces with the Ormond Boys and rampaged through the streets of the capital. Though the army-societal relationship slowly improved during the 1750s, the outbreak of the Seven Years War saw history repeat itself.

The British army performed adequately during the Seven Years War, but the experience of the garrison in Ireland during the war was far from illustrious. Demands for soldiers abroad stretched the Irish garrison again, with ten regiments being shipped out of Ireland in 1755. The soldiers who remained became increasingly ill-disciplined. Local newspapers reported incidents of soldiers misbehaving, often with violent consequences. In Limerick in 1762 five soldiers of General Brown's regiment were arrested and gaoled for fracturing the skull of a corn merchant and robbing him of his day's earnings (six guineas).[16] That same year in Belfast a grenadier of Lord Forbes Regiment was judged to have committed wilful murder after he fractured the skull of a passer-by with his hanger.[17] Even the return to a 'full' regimental complement in 1764 failed to curtail the ill-discipline. Tuckey recalls one incident in April 1770 whereby two soldiers of the 55th Regiment who were quartered in Castle Island, Cork

[11]For examples of these mutinies see: The British Newspaper Archive (BNA) *Newcastle Courant,* 24 March, 1712 p. 2; National Library of Ireland (NLI), SP 63/367, p. 3368, 23 June 1711; NLI, SP 63/370 p. 3369, *Examination of D. Shrewsbury,* 16 May 1714; Francis H. Tuckey, *Tuckey's Cork Remembrancer; or Annals of the County and City of Cork,* (Cork: Osborne Savage and Son, 1837), pp. 125-6.
[12]Houlding, *Fit for service,* pp. 410-414
[13]BNA, *Belfast Newsletter,* 19 June 1739, p.3.
[14]James Kelly, *The Liberty and Ormond boys: Factional Riots in Eighteenth-Century Dublin* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005).
[15]Kelly, *The Liberty and Ormond boys,* p.38; BNA, *Belfast Newsletter*, 10 June 1750 p.2
[16]BNA, *Dublin Courier,* 6 December 1762, p. 1.
[17]BNA, *Dublin Courier,* 8 November 1762, p. 2; ibid., 15 November 1762, p. 1.

approached a priest and asked him to marry one of them to a local girl. The priest 'peremptorily refused' which threw the soldier into a fit of rage, and he stabbed the priest 'in such a manner that there was no hope of him recovering'.[18] These incidents did little to foster a positive army-societal relationship.

Given this pattern of violence carried out by a depleted garrison particularly after severe reductions, a simple solution could have been the proper garrisoning of the country, and the prevention of the IME being overstretched. However, there was a numeric and practical reason as to why the garrison was stretched so thinly which traced back to its inception. This was the practice of maintaining Irish Establishment regiments at a smaller level than their English counterparts in a manner which J.A. Houlding dubbed the 'cadre' system.

The Cadre System

The cadre system was central to the experience of the regiments of the IME and revolved around the dual premises of cost-saving and efficiency. Its core tenet was the reduction of the number of soldiers in the ranks of each regiment in Irish service, whilst maintaining the officers at full strength. In theory, if Imperial demand or invasion threat warranted it, these Irish regiments would be able to recruit rapidly and train soldiers around this core of officers and veteran troops. This kept costs down during peacetime and allowed more regiments to be maintained in Ireland for less.[19]

This system had several serious issues. Firstly, regiments in Ireland were expected to number only 280 compared to a nominal strength of 500 for regiments elsewhere.[20] Additionally, there was an absurdity in expecting regiments in Ireland to rapidly recruit, whilst basing them in Ireland where, with limited exceptions, the recruitment of Irish Catholics was illegal, and the recruitment of Protestants was strongly discouraged.[21] This forced IME regiments to look elsewhere for recruits. The only immediate short-term solution was to 'draft' (transfer) men from regiments that would remain in Ireland before shipping out for service elsewhere. This devastated the remaining regiment, which would be miniscule and unable to replenish its numbers easily. General Edward Harvey was a vocal critic of this drafting process and considered it a

[18]Tuckey, *Tuckey's Cork Remembrancer*, p. 155.
[19]Houlding, *Fit for Service,* pp. 49-51.
[20]Thomas Bartlett, 'The Augmentation of the Army in Ireland 1767-9', *The English Historical Review*, 96, 380, (July 1981), p. 540.
[21]Houlding, *Fit for* Service p. 46; Stephen Conway, *War, State and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 90; Peter Way, 'Militarizing the Atlantic World: Army discipline, coerced labor, and Britain's commercial empire', *Atlantic Studies,* 13, 3 (2016) pp. 345-369 (pp. 345-6).

'murdering system of destroying your regiments'.[22] It was apparent that by the 1760s the cadre system had become an inconvenience rather than a clever method of cost-cutting. Even the supposed savings of the system came under scrutiny, as a parliamentary debate from 1763 demonstrated. That year, wartime inflation had caused 42 regiments to be placed on the establishment which increased costs by £150,000 since 1757.[23] The Lord Lieutenant, George, fourth Viscount Townshend, recognised that reforming the army in Ireland would mean fewer regiments would be needed to defend the island, reducing these inflated costs, and preventing drafts. To this end, he began to campaign for army augmentation in 1767.

Thomas Bartlett has already undertaken a detailed case study of Townshend's role in the augmentation negotiations from 1767-9.[24] In contrast to later reformers such as the Duke of York in the 1790s, Townshend prioritised numerical reform. His objective was to increase the number of soldiers in each regiment in Ireland to 480 while shrinking British regiments from 500 to that figure. This first bill failed, but it paved the way for a substantially revised proposal in October 1769. Of consequence was the decision that the new size of regiments in both Ireland and Britain was to be fixed at 442 men.[25] The passing of the modified bill in 1769 showed that the cadre system had become obsolete. Additionally, this augmentation also presents an opportunity to re-assess the overwhelmingly negative image of the IME. By examining the establishment before and after this augmentation using regimental returns, it is possible to explore regimental size, quality, discipline, and recruitment practices within both a reduced and a newly augmented IME and see whether the army in Ireland in the late 1760s and early 1770s was as ineffective as often portrayed.

The pre-augmentation establishment

Regimental returns within WO 27 conveniently provide quantitative and qualitative data in 1767, the same year negotiations for augmentation began. Table 1 offers a stark illustration of the impact of the cadre system on the IME. Only 7,020 men (excluding officers) made up the IME that year across 21 regiments of foot, four horse and eight dragoons. Given that the country was not involved in any European conflicts, this is still a startlingly small garrison, far fewer than the nominal 12,000 men. Even the addition of the officers would still mean a garrison of fewer than 8,000 men.

Despite the garrison's small size and the disciplinary issues mentioned earlier, the remarks in WO 27 show that from the perspective of military effectiveness, the pre-

[22]Guy, 'The Irish Military Establishment', p. 228.
[23]Sir James Caldwell, *Debates Relative to the Affairs of Ireland: In the Years 1763 And 1764* (London: n.p., 1766), pp. 300-1.
[24]Bartlett, 'The Augmentation of the Army', pp. 540-559.
[25]Houlding, *Fit for Service,* p.129, n. 60.

augmentation garrison in Ireland in 1767 was in good condition. These returns reviewed many measures of a regiment's performance, and there was a comprehensive effort by the reviewers to carefully scrutinise each regiment in the establishment. For example, the 56th Regiment of Foot was described as follows:

> Officers: Salute well and are very attentive
> Men: Not tall but well proportioned and well dressed
> Arms: Good, perfectly clean
> Accoutrements: Clean and well put on, but not of the best
> Cloathing [sic]: Well fitted, hats well cocked
> Exercise: Performed the manual exercise well and in just time. Performed several firings with great exactness and quick in loading.
> Review: The Regiment is in good order, well taken care of and fit for immediate service.[26]

Each return advised whether the subject regiment was fit for immediate service, and the Irish garrison reviewed well in 1767. Not one regiment of Horse or Dragoons was declared unfit for service, and only two regiments of Foot were judged as such. These were the 45th and 49th Regiments. The 45th was severely depleted following service abroad, though the 49th had no such excuse and appeared to just be of poor quality (Table 1). Two Dragoon and two Foot regiments were deemed to require work before being considered battlefield ready but were not categorised as 'unfit for service'. The rest (seventeen Foot, six Dragoon and two Regiments of Horse) were all declared either fit for service or in good condition. Four regiments were not given a review officer's opinion that year.

[26]The UK National Archives, Kew, (TNA), WO 27/11, *56th Regiment Remarks* 1767.

Regiment of Foot	Total	Regiment of Dragoons	Total	Regiment of Horse	Total
1st Batt Royal Reg.	288	Royals	207	1st	129
5th	227	8th	136	2nd	133
18th	288	9th	137	3rd	131
38th	265	12th	135	4th	125
39th	226	13th	135		
40th	241	14th	131		
44th	221	17th	137		
45th	169	4th Light	133		
47th	287				
48th	283				
49th	266				
50th	224				
51st	279				
55th	274				
56th	218				
58th	270				
61st	233				
63rd	254				
64th	286				
65th	281				
69th	271				
Total	5,351	Total	1,151	Total	518
Grand Total	7,020				

Table 1: The Irish Military Establishment[27]

From the perspective of the military, the IME was undermanned but serviceable. Houlding suggested that the nature of service in Ireland provided scant incentive to ensure a high standard of training, yet even pre-augmentation regiments in Ireland were well drilled and ready to be added to and sent on campaign.[28] This correlates with newspaper reports from the year before which describes the garrison performing well during public reviews, much to the delight of the crowds who gathered to watch. The regiments were praised for the 'exactness' with which they performed their

[27]TNA 1767 WO 27/11

[28]Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 57.

manoeuvres, but exactness did not equate to perfection. The review of the Royal Irish and Royal Scottish regiments of foot ended in disaster when:

> During the firing this day in the Royal Square, one James Stuccor, a linen carrier from the county of Antrum (sic), was shot in the upper part of his breast by a musket ball, and killed on the spot; and a soldier was wounded on the knee, and in so dangerous a manner that it is thought his leg must be cut off and he was carried to the infirmary. The deceased had gone to the barracks to see a relation, and has left a wife and four small children behind him.[29]

Though the military may have perceived itself to be a fine body of men, the disciplinary issues, mishaps and deteriorated army-societal relationship reported in newspapers indicate that the military were not as problem free as they liked to portray. Nonetheless, the IME was not on the cusp of falling apart in the run up to the augmentation as implied in the traditional narrative, and most of its regiments were fit for service.

By the time the augmentation was approved in 1769, the IME had a grown slightly, but this was due to the presence of 23 regiments of foot rather than 21 (Table 2). The regiments were of much the same size they had been in 1767, except for the 48th which had shrunk considerably. New arrivals in the shape of the 42nd, 27th, 28th, 53rd, 54th, 57th and the depleted 62nd replaced the 1st Battalion Royal Regiment, the 18th, 39th, 65th and the 69th. The newcomers had been reduced in the Irish manner, and it is against this baseline of Table 2 that analysis detailing the numerical effectiveness of Townshend's reform can be set using the data compiled in Table 3 for 1771, as no records exist for the regiments of foot in 1770.

[29]BNA, *Dublin Courier*, 27 June 1766, p. 1.

Regiment of Foot	Total	Regiment of Dragoons	Total	Regiment of Horse	Total
5th	261	Royals	207	1st	132
38th	261	8th	137	2nd	133
40th	269	9th	138	3rd	133
44th	249	12th	104	4th	128
45th	245	13th	138		
47th	259	14th	136		
48th	153	18th Light	117		
49th	278	17th Light	130		
50th	284				
51st	268				
55th	279				
56th	271				
58th	237				
61st	247				
63rd	269				
62nd	120				
27th	250				
28th	279				
42nd	278				
46th	283				
53rd	260				
54th	271				
57th	256				
Total	5,827	Total	1,107	Total:	526
Grand Total:	7,460				

Table 2: The Irish Military Establishment[30],

[30]TNA 1769 WO 27/17

Numerical impact and the maintenance of quality.

The increase in the size of a marching infantry regiment prompted by the 1770 augmentation was adopted immediately by the IME. 2,649 extra soldiers were added between 1769 and 1771 (Table 3).

Regiment of Foot	Total	Regiment of Dragoons	Total	Regiment of Horse	Total
9th	262	Royals	207	1st	131
5th	381	8th	138	2nd	133
24th	392	9th	138	3rd	133
38th	409	12th	135	4th	133
40th	407	13th	138		
44th	415	14th	137		
45th	382				
47th	400	18th Light	135		
48th	369	17th Light	135		
49th	409				
50th	412				
55th	407				
63rd	401				
34th	376				
62nd	367				
27th	401				
28th	377				
42nd	229				
46th	392				
53rd	404				
54th	424				
57th	390				
Total	8,406	Total	1,163	Total:	530
Grand Total	10,099				

Table 3: The Irish Military Establishment 1771[31]

This increase includes the net loss of one regiment of foot, with the 28th, 51st, 61st and 58th regiments being replaced by the 9th, 24th and 34th regiments. Most of the regiments

[31] TNA WO 27/23, 1771

of the IME had come acceptably close to the new standard of 442 men.[32] Likewise the new augmentations allowed the army to almost reach the target of 12,000 men set out in its inception, without inflating the numbers of regiments on the Establishment. More impressively, the regiments succeeded in maintaining high standards of drill. Only one dragoon and one foot regiment were deemed unfit that year.[33] Given the large influx of new recruits this was impressive and suggests a rapid and effective rate of enlistment and training among the IME during this augmentation period.

Given Ireland's role as an Imperial barracks, it is perhaps unsurprising that the officer corps in Ireland was able to recruit and train regiments to a high standard rapidly as shown in 1771.[34] The experiences of the 49th and 45th regiments of foot make for an interesting case study. As mentioned, these regiments were deemed unfit for service in 1767. The 45th Regiment arrived in Ireland that year having spent twenty years in North America.[35] It was described as, 'A regiment not yet disciplined, not well appointed and unfit for service.'[36] By 1768, things had already improved, with it said that 'This regiment labours under disadvantages. It is composed mostly of recruits and hath suffered greatly by desertion, at present it is not fit for service, but probably will soon by the care of the Lieutenant Colonel.'[37] By 1769, the regiment was transformed from what was seen in 1767, and the reviewing officer identified the role which its officers had played in this: 'This regiment is much improved since last review, the officers salute better, the men are steady, well dressed and has a better air, and by the care of the officers the young men will make it a compleat [sic.] fine regiment against the next year, and fit for service.'[38] Newly invigorated, the 45th spent two years in Ireland performing more strenuous activities and reviewed well again in 1771: 'This regiment marched well and manoeuvred well and fired well, and must by its appearance have very good care taken of it. This regiment had but just joined from

[32]It was rare for a regiment to be maintained at 100%, ~90% was far more common. See Houlding *Fit for Service* p. 128.
[33]The 54th Foot was reviewed by Major General Parson who wrote: 'It has laboured under several disadvantages a great dispersion of quarters last year, and 3 companies of the regiment only joined at Galway 3 days before the review, after a long march from Ballyshannon into the County of Antrim. The day they were seen was a very bad one, but the materials are good, and their being assembled this year in one quarter at Galway will it is apprehended and make a considerable alteration in the appearance of the regiment against the next review.' TNA, WO 27/23, 1771.
[34]McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, p. 166.
[35]Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 295.
[36]TNA, WO 27/11, 1767.
[37]TNA, WO 27/14, 1768.
[38]TNA, WO 27/17, 1769.

their separate quarters and have 233 men from under eighteen to twenty years of age. Under the circumstances it is as fit for service as can be expected.'[39]

This success story was repeated in the 49th Regiment of Foot, which was also deemed unfit for service in 1767. Almost every aspect of this regiment was lambasted, from its men 'Low size, ill proportioned and awkward under arms' to its clothing being 'Indifferent and ill-fitted, hats ill-cocked'.[40] The summary read: 'The Lieutenant Colonel, having presented to me, that the men were not sufficiently instructed, to go through the manual exercise or perform their firings.'[41] Much like the 45th it saw slow positive change. Whilst still unfit for service in 1768, there were signs of improvement 'This regiment cannot in any particular be yet called a good regiment, or fit for any service, but it is mending daily by the extreme diligence and good conduct of its Lieutenant Colonel.'[42] By 1769, the 49th had improved substantially.

> There is a total change in this regiment since the last review, and that for the better, the officers are more alert, the men better dressed and disciplined, are of a taller size, very steady and attentive and have a more soldier like appearance, great care has been taken of them, and by the next year will undoubtedly be fit for service. [43]

These two regiments illustrate the positives and negatives of service in Ireland for the maintenance of battle-ready regiments. Although the drafting required by the cadre system, surprise deployments elsewhere and the separation of regiments across Ireland were clearly detrimental, the concentration of officers allowed for the rapid improvement of regiments which had, upon their arrival in Ireland, been rendered strategically useless by long service in hostile conditions. This spoke of the quality of recruiting and drilling of the regiments in Ireland in this period which were clearly no less inferior than those in Britain or elsewhere in the Empire.

Recruitment in Ireland and WO 27

Regiments in Ireland found themselves in an unusual position when faced with the prospect of recruitment during the eighteenth century. Despite being based in Ireland, they were unable to recruit Irishmen of any denomination into its ranks consistently. These obstacles came from a series of legislative restrictions which can be traced back to the Treaty of Limerick in 1691. The Protestant establishment in Ireland was concerned with the possibility of a Catholic uprising, either independently or in

[39]TNA, WO 27/23, 1771.
[40]TNA, WO 27/11, 1767.
[41]Ibid.
[42]TNA, WO 27/14, 1768.
[43]TNA, WO 27/17, 1769.

support of a Jacobite invasion.[44] This fear led to the imposition of anti-recruitment legislation across Ireland for both Protestants and Catholics. Restrictions for Catholics were easy to justify and aimed to prevent the Catholic majority from acquiring weapons and military training. Fear also restricted Protestant recruitment. Since the IME's regiments were required to serve Britain abroad rather than permanently defend the Protestant interest, there was always a chance that a Foot regiment made up of Irish Protestants would be rotated out of Ireland. It was believed that if Protestant numbers were to decrease in this manner, it could encourage a Catholic uprising. While the officers may have been locals, legislation dictated that the soldiers themselves were, as Francis Godwin James described it, alien.[45]

Given the desire among Protestants and indeed some Catholics to serve in the military, it is unsurprising that there were several attempts to circumvent the restrictive legislation. Localised Protestant recruitment was allowed in times of crisis, particularly in Ulster where a reduction in Protestant numbers was less of an issue. The first hints at an official willingness to lift Catholic restrictions only came during the Seven Years War, as demand for soldiers reached new highs. One of the most comprehensive was the proposal for a 'Roman Legion', an effort driven by Lord Trimleston in 1762 to recruit Irish Catholic infantry regiments for service in Portugal.[46] The proposal was for seven regiments to receive training *en route* to Portugal and to be armed on arrival. This was to prevent armed and trained Catholics being present in Ireland at any point during this operation. This Portuguese proposal received approval from both Whitehall and Dublin Castle, highlighting the need for recruits and the changing attitude towards the anti-Catholic Penal Laws. However, it was stopped by suspicious Irish parliamentarians who refused to arm Catholics, even in such a controlled setting.[47]

The restrictions forced regiments in Ireland to either recruit in Britain or bend the rules. The letters of Nicholas Delacherois, an Hiberno-Huguenot officer in the 9th Regiment of Foot, describe the loopholes which were exploited by regiments in Irish service in the 1750s. While tasked with recruiting for his regiment in Scotland, he wrote to his brother and asked him to corral Irishmen in his name and ship them to

[44]Stephen Conway, 'War, Imperial Expansion and Religious Developments in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland', *War in History,* 11, 2 (April 2004) pp. 125-147 (128-30).
[45]Francis Godwin James, *Ireland in the Empire, 1688-1770: A History of Ireland from the Williamite Wars to the Eve of the American Revolution*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 178.
[46]Conway, 'War, Imperial Expansion' p. 137.
[47]McBride, *Eighteenth Century Ireland*, p. 352; McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, pp. 148-9.

Scotland where he could legitimately enlist them into the ranks.[48] To avoid trouble with the authorities, he urged his brother not to issue them uniforms of any kind. He confessed to not having his colonel's permission to do this, but he believed that he could raise 'twenty men in the North (*of Ireland*) for one here'.[49] He was not the only officer to recognise this lucrative source of recruits, and he observed that at least fifty Irishmen passed through the town heading to other regiments in Scotland.[50] Delacherois' experience provides a vivid example of the kinds of rule bending employed by regiments when faced with a dire need for new men.

It is important to note that the cavalry was an exception to these rules, and by 1769 up to and over 90% of certain dragoon and horse regiments were Irish (Table 4). These were overwhelmingly Protestant, and the continuity of their deployment in Ireland meant they were not seen as a risk to Protestant stability in Ireland.[51] This is reflected in the fervour and alacrity with which dragoon regiments policed Whiteboys and other agricultural protestors in the latter half of the 18th century. These regiments had a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo, as many of their ranks and officers were from the Protestant ascendency.

Regiment	English	Scottish	Irish	Foreign	Total	% Irish
Royals	0	0	207	0	207	100
8th	3	5	128	0	136	94
9th	2	2	133	0	137	97
12th	1	0	134	0	135	99
13th	4	10	121	0	135	89.6
14th	5	1	125	0	131	95.4
17th	97	7	26	7	137	19
4th Light	0	3	130	0	133	98

Table 4: Nationalities of Dragoons in 1769[52]

The potential for a case study of army recruitment through the regimental returns in TNA file WO 27 has already been recognised by Houlding.[53] His analysis focussed on

[48]The National Army Museum, NAM 7805 – 63, *The Letters of Nicholas Delacherois to his Brother Daniel during his second year of service in the Ninth Regiment*, pp. 18-19.
[49]Ibid., p. 28.
[50]Ibid., p.28.
[51]Bartlett 'Army and Society', p. 175.
[52]TNA WO27/17
[53]Houlding, *Fit for Service,* pp. 127-30.

the percentage of recruits in the establishment as well as the rapidity with which the IME was able to fill its ranks from 1770 onwards. Less attention has been paid to the men filling those ranks, and careful analysis of WO 27 allows for examination of both the nationality and quality of the recruits that joined regiments in Ireland from 1770-1. It is also a practical illustration of the effectiveness of the legislation designed to prevent Irish recruitment in the eighteenth century and to what extent regiments employed tactics such as those described by Delacherois in 1757-8.

Regiment	English	Scottish	Irish	Foreign	Total	% Irish
5th	187	11	62	1	261	23.75
38th	142	42	67	0	251	47.18
40th	90	135	41	3	269	15.2
44th	119	74	45	11	249	18.07
45th	113	92	31	9	245	12.65
47th	144	19	85	11	259	32.81
48th	95	16	41	1	153	26.8
49th	141	81	54	2	278	19.42
50th	173	60	50	1	284	17.61
51st	180	47	38	3	268	14.18
55th	114	129	36	0	279	12.90
56th	100	118	53	0	271	19.56
58th	144	40	51	2	237	21.52
61st	208	19	20	0	247	8.1
63rd	224	23	21	1	269	7.81
62nd	53	5	62	0	120	51.67
27th	177	13	57	3	250	22.8
28th	225	8	37	9	279	13.26
42nd	0	278	0	0	278	0
46th	181	60	33	9	283	11.66
53rd	202	34	24	0	260	9.23
54th	201	51	17	2	271	6.27
57th	219	20	16	1	256	6.25
Total	3,432	1,375	941	69	5,817	16.18

Table 5: Nationalities of the Foot in Ireland in 1769 (excluding officers)[54]

[54]TNA WO 27/17

Regiment of Foot	English	Scottish	Irish	Foreign	Total	% of Irish
9th	200	35	25	2	262	9.5
5th	288	11	80	2	381	21
24th	311	20	60	1	392	15.3
38th	245	65	99	0	409	24.2
40th	175	178	51	3	407	12.5
44th	189	153	61	12	415	14.7
45th	130	176	71	5	382	18.6
47th	176	18	186	20	400	46.5
48th	192	84	93	0	369	25.2
49th	228	92	88	1	409	21.5
50th	253	96	60	3	412	14.6
55th	178	160	69	0	407	17
63rd	307	66	26	2	401	6.5
34th	272	90	12	2	376	3.2
62nd	247	16	101	3	367	27.5
27th	247	26	124	4	401	30.9
28th	269	7	89	12	377	23.6
42nd	0	229	0	0	229	0
46th	279	33	73	7	392	18.6
53rd	272	99	33	0	404	8.2
54th	297	61	62	4	424	14.6
57th	265	66	58	1	390	14.9
Total	5,020	1,781	1,521	84	8,406	18.1

Table 6: Nationalities of the Foot in Ireland in 1771[55]

The data for 1769 shown in Table 5 details both the composition of regiments in the garrison and how strictly restrictions against Irish recruitment were adhered to. Every regiment had at least some Irishmen in service, except for the uniquely Scottish 42nd Foot. Although only 16% of the soldiers in military establishment were Irish in 1769, some regiments had figures far higher than that. Of note are the 5th, 27th, 49th, 56th and 58th, all of which had around 20% Irish in their ranks. The 38th, 47th and 62nd had even higher percentages. Though the 62nd was severely depleted in 1769, the 38th had no such excuse and this suggests that some regiments did recruit more Irishmen than others. Several of the new arrivals since 1767 such as the 53rd, 54th and 57th all had low

[55]TNA WO27/23

percentages of Irishmen compared to the average, indicating that the temptation recruit Irish soldiers was far stronger if the regiment served there for longer.

A significant conclusion which can be drawn from the WO 27 records of 1771 is that the proportion of Irish soldiers in regiments in Ireland increased during the mass recruitment drive by 2% (Table 6).[56] Almost 600 more Irishmen were recorded that year, and no regiment which increased in numbers from 1769 did not recruit Irishmen during the 1770 augmentation. Even the 53rd, 54th and 57th, all of which had had extremely low numbers of Irishmen, engaged in the practice. Of these three, the 53rd only recorded an additional 9 (6% of 144 soldiers added) soldiers, but the 54th and 57th recorded 45 (29.6% of 152) and 42 (31% of 134) Irishmen respectively.

It is important to acknowledge that most of the soldiers recruited were still English and Scottish. Even the heavily depleted 62nd regiment which enlisted 240 soldiers between 1769 and 1771 only took on 39 Irishmen (16%). Nonetheless, the quantitative data shows that despite restrictions of Irish Catholics and Protestant recruitment, the practice continued regardless among almost every regiment. The WO 27 data cataloguing the mass recruitment drive of 1770-1 illustrates how it came down to the individual regiment's officers to monitor who it recruited into its ranks, and some followed the rules more closely than others. However, most regiments which bent the rules kept their regiments fit for service, as outlined previously. The need for soldiers and the enlistment of 'illegal' Irishmen did not detract from the readiness of the army in Ireland.

Recruit Quality and Desertion

The continuation of Irish recruitment is but one element of the augmentation which can be traced through WO 27. It is also possible to consider the quality of soldiers recruited, and to demonstrate that recruitment standards slacked in 1770-1. From 1768 onwards the number of recruits is recorded for most regiments. This data shows the number of soldiers accepted into the ranks since the previous year. It also details the number of soldiers who were rejected from the ranks, who deserted, died or were drafted elsewhere. When these variables are considered, 52.1% of potential Foot recruits in 1768 were deemed fit for service, rising to 53.87% in 1769 and climbing further to 68.9% in 1771.

There are several possible explanations for this. Increased monitoring of recruiting through reports such as those found in WO 27 could have led to increased efforts by

[56]The rotation of regiments into and out of the country continued, and those new arrivals contained more English and Scottish recruits, the 9th Regiment of Foot being a prime example. Likewise, regiments rotated out of Ireland did have high Irish percentages, such as the 56th. See Tables 5 & 6.

recruiting officers to find suitable recruits. Conversely, the need for more men to fill the ranks after the implementation of the augmentation may have led to an establishment-wide reduction in the standards expected of new recruits. This hypothesis is illustrated in the 27th Regiment of Foot. In 1769 the regiment was discerning, only accepting 83 into the ranks, with 56 deemed unsuitable for service, three dead, 23 deserting and fifteen discharged.[57] In 1771, the regiment adopted a far more generous attitude to its large influx of 180 men. Despite losing twenty to desertion, discharging five and admitting to one dying in service, none are mentioned as being unfit for service.[58] This implies that high demand for recruits led to a drop in recruiting standards. This laxity may also explain the increase in the number of Irish in the ranks in 1771. The need to reach the expected quota outweighed the need to prevent Irishmen from enlisting. Therefore, during the Townshend augmentation, quality control was side-lined by a need for quantity, and it is telling that although 4,136 soldiers were recruited in 1771 compared to only 1,394 in 1769, more soldiers were rejected for not being of acceptable standard in 1769 (372 to 362).

In the eighteenth century the raw recruit was a common sight among deserters.[59] Desertion in the IME is a controversial topic, and the results are confusing across various secondary and primary sources. For example, Garnham quotes Tom Bartlett who claimed that 8% of the IME deserted in 1769.[60] According to WO 27, only 391 Foot (6.62%) deserted, leaving 5,849 men still in the ranks of the infantry. Adding to the confusion, each regiment reported their deserters with varying degrees of accuracy. Some even combined their deserters with their regimental dead.[61] Though inconsistencies exist across WO 27, it is possible to draw interesting comparisons between the desertion figures offered twice within each regiment. The first set of data include all deserters since last review and is found on the third page of each regiment's return. The second number specifies desertions among new recruits and is recorded on page five of each return. This information is again focussed on the regiments of Foot, as the cavalry were far more stable across the sample period.

It is safe to assume that the 'recruit' desertion figures were encapsulated in the regimental figures offered in each return. There are two exceptions to this. Both the 27th and 28th arrived in Ireland in 1768 and suffered 33 and 38 deserters during that year's recruitment efforts. Their regimental return lists four and fourteen deserters in the same time frame. It is conceivable that due to the radical restructuring these

[57]TNA, WO 27/20, 1769.
[58]TNA, WO 27/23, 1771.
[59]Ilya Berkovich, *Motivation in War, The Experience of Common Soldiers in Old-Regime Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) p. 59.
[60]Garnham, 'Military Desertion', pp. 91-103 (p.92).
[61]TNA, WO 27/14, 1768.

regiments underwent after their service abroad, that the figures were listed separately due to administrative error or other consequence. This is the only instance in which this occurs, and further discussion will presume that recruitment desertion figures were included in the regimental figure given in each return.

Year	'Recruit' Deserters	Total Deserters	% of deserters which were recruits	Total Recruits	% of total recruits which deserted
1768	219	309	70.87%	1,786	12.3%
1769	145	391	37.08%	1,394	10.4%
1771	545	1,121	48.60%	4,136	13.2%
Totals:	909	1,821	49.92%	7,316	12.42%

Table 7: Deserters and recruits in Regiments of Foot of the IME[62]

Between 1768 and 1771 1,821 deserters were recorded in the regimental returns of WO 27, with 1,121 (61.56%) of these desertions taking place in 1771 (Table 7). When examining the recruit returns across the same years, 909 men are mentioned as having deserted with 545 of these taking place in 1771 (60%). The ratio of deserters to recruits remained consistent during this period as well, suggesting that a total loss rate of approximately 12% was acceptable across the regiments of Foot in Ireland (Table 7). The stability of this desertion rate among recruits despite the massive surge in recruiting numbers suggests that the officers of the IME were able to balance volume and quality effectively. Given that the desertion loss rate increased only slightly in 1771 despite the number of enlistments doubling that year, the IME's pragmatic attitude to the standard and nationality of its recruits did not detract from the maintenance of the military's effectiveness.

Conclusion

While the IME lacks source material when compared to the British army in the eighteenth century, WO 27 offers an opportunity for a new, positive perspective of the IME. Both WO 27 and newspaper reports describe a force which was more militarily competent than is usually presented. Most regiments on the garrison were fit for service and the fact that a high standard was maintained throughout the augmentation process speaks well of the quality of the training of regiments in the Irish establishment. This is a different image of the IME compared to that seen in the traditional historical narrative.

When the augmentation was implemented, the IME was able to achieve its target and have most of their regiments fit for service in an acceptable timeframe, illustrating the

[62]TNA WO 27/14 1768, 27/17 1769, WO 27/23. 1771.

effectiveness of the officers and recruiters in the establishment. The consistency of the level of desertion among recruits, both before and during the augmentation, speaks favourably of the officers of the IME and questions the assumption that regiments which were based in Ireland were doomed to plummet in quality. Moreover, even while under the pressure of an augmentation, Irish recruiting officers balanced quantity and quality and continued to train and discipline recruits to an acceptable standard. Finally, the statistical data contained in WO 27 provides an insight into the clandestine recruitment of Irishmen into the army for the second half of the eighteenth century and illustrates the futility of anti-Irish recruitment laws given the needs of the military from 1756 onwards.

Historians' reliance on familiar negative quotes and portrayals have led to the assumption that a regiment in Ireland was of an inherently inferior quality to one serving elsewhere during the eighteenth century. It is true that service in Ireland was unique and came with its own set of challenges. The garrison's reputation with its host society was compromised in no small part by the actions of the soldiers themselves in the second half of the eighteenth century. Soldiers were obliged to handle civilian unrest frequently, were rarely called to action and were unsure how long they would be garrisoned alongside their unwilling hosts. Despite this, it was still a competent body of soldiers, albeit prone to ill-discipline. This closer analysis explains an apparent paradox, as had the Irish garrison been as inferior as believed, it could not have fought as well as it did when called upon for service across the colonies and empire.

Dress, Identity, and Negotiation by British Prisoners of War in France, 1803-1812

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ABSTRACT
British prisoners of war captured during the Napoleonic Wars were preoccupied with dress. This is unsurprising given clothing's relationship to physical and mental health and to identity. However, the discussion of clothing by prisoners during this period goes beyond the passive engagement with these concepts to a conscious manipulation of how dress could be used, and how it could be 'read' by others. This paper argues that British prisoners of war used their knowledge of dress, and the skills learned during their incarceration, and from their professions, to turn clothing into escape technologies, and a means to assert agency.

Diaries written by British prisoners of war (POWs) captured during the Napoleonic Wars frequently mention their clothing. While the importance of appropriate clothing to the comfort and care of prisoners is self-evident, prisoners could also frequently use clothing for their benefit in other, more creative, ways. Clothing often played a role in escape, and prisoners displayed a surprising amount of ingenuity in their attempts to smuggle tools and money, make rope from scraps of cloth, and use the many skills they had learned adapting to ship-board life to their advantage. The skills necessary to becoming a competent sailor were of great use when it came to planning an escape from captivity in the citadels of France. Sewing, ropemaking, navigation, climbing and handling ropes, and creative problem solving were all useful.

Aside from these concrete manipulations of textile, prisoners also used clothing's ability to obscure or embody identity to disguise or assert their power. The fluidity of these signifiers suited prisoners who could either divert notice of their activities or elicit sympathy and help from their captors or from the local populace. Escaped prisoners passing checkpoints on their way to the coast might assume the dress of a different class, claim a different nationality, or even a different gender. Occasionally,

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these disguises were too convincing, and prisoners had difficulty in providing credible evidence of their true identity. Successfully pulling off these escapades required paying close attention to dress. Prisoners needed a keen eye for quality, cost, fit, cut, styling, construction, and class, gender, and national markers, when selecting what clothing to purchase, alter, steal, or wear. Examining the manipulations of textiles and other materials by prisoners reveals how prisoners used their knowledge of dress to exert agency during their captivity. This paper argues that prisoners manipulated textiles and other materials both to reproduce or repurpose identity and to facilitate escape. This article aims to explore this three-fold 'manipulation': first, the assertion of identity to manipulate the experience of capture, second, the expert use of seamen's skills to manipulate available textiles into useful objects; and third, the manipulation of identity to assume the guise most useful to the moment.

Prisoners of war during this period have not had their clothing closely examined for meaning. This is due, in part, to the lack of extant examples, and in part to the somewhat unregulated nature of the clothing prisoners were given or were allowed to wear. However, the link between clothing and survival, mental and emotional health, and identity, has been closely examined in the cases of prisoners from later conflicts, and in the case of criminal incarceration. The importance of the Napoleonic period to the development of the treatment of prisoners of war is an important link that has been overlooked in the study of material culture. What prisoners owned or had access to depended both on their social status, namely how connected they were to their banking and personal support systems which determined how much and how regularly they could obtain funds as well as on the location and duration of their imprisonment as these would determine what kind of clothing were regularly issued and how often. Nevertheless, the existing records provide a wonderful variety of perspectives, and accounts from Naval officers (particularly of the midshipman and lieutenant ranks), merchant officers and men, pressed and skilled seamen, and civilian *détenus* are all used for this study.

What items prisoners had with them when they were captured, and what they could acquire was based primarily on class. A distinction existed between officers in the navy and their subordinates, as well as merchant officers, seamen, and *détenus*.[1] The

[1] *Détenus* were British civilians who were living in France when the hostilities reignited in 1803, men between the ages of 18 and 60 were declared prisoners of war based on their eligibility to serve in the militia. This was an attempt by Napoleon to create a new definition of 'civilian' and 'combatant', and which did not sit well with the English government, or those detained. In practice, this group included far more than those formally 'captured' and included men and boys younger and older than the stated age limits, as well as women and girls. Likewise, many of those detained had been resident

accounts written from these diverse perspectives show a wide variety in control over how many of their belongings prisoners were allowed to keep after capture, and how many they could retain during the journey to the depots. Edward Fraser argues that something like half a million prisoners were taken by the French throughout the war. Of these, the number of British were probably less than 12,000.[2] The experience of British prisoners was also significantly different to that of other nations, as they were given special privileges, the main one being parole for officers and gentlemen, as well exclusion from employment in hard labour. In the beginning, officers and *détenus* were housed primarily in the city and citadel of Verdun. Lower-class prisoners, those who were not officers or gentlemen, were housed in the smaller depots like Valenciennes, Longwy, and Metz, and were kept closely confined.[3] Closely confined meant living in the citadel, whereas gentlemen trusted to give their parole were merely required to attend periodical roll calls and could find their own lodging. Living in the town on parole, as well as having more money to spend, allowed officers and *détenus* some flexibility to purchase their own clothing. The amount of money flowing into Verdun caused the town to flourish, as wealthy prisoners sought to make their confinement more bearable by paying bribes for fewer restrictions. They describe forming social clubs, organising dinners and balls, competing in horseraces, picnicking, establishing language, dancing, and navigation schools, putting on their own theatre productions,

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in France for a considerable amount of time and were surprised to see themselves suddenly classed as British, and enemies of France.

[2]Edward Fraser, Napoleon the Gaoler: Personal Experiences and Adventures of British Sailors and Soldiers During the Great Captivity, (London: Methven and Company Ltd., 1914), p. 1.

[3]Michael Lewis, *Napoleon and His British Captives,* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962); Élodie Duché, 'Charitable Connections: Transnational Financial Networks and Relief for British Prisoners of War in Napoleonic France, 1803-1814,' *Napoleonica La Revue* 21, 3 (2014), pp. 74-117 (p.74); Elodie Duché, 'A Passage to Imprisonment: The British Prisoners of War in Verdun Under the First French Empire', PhD Thesis, (University of Warwick, 2014), https://pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2753731~S1. Accessed 21 June 2021; Clive J. Lloyd, *The History of the Napoleonic and American Prisoners of War 1756-1816: Hulk, Depot and Parole,* (Woodbridge: Antique Collector's Club Ltd., 2007); Renaud Morieux, *The Society of Prisoners: Anglo-French Wars and Incarceration in the Eighteenth Century,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Renaud Morieux, 'French Prisoners of War, Conflicts of Honour, and Social Inversions in England, 1744-1783,' *The Historical Journal* 56, 1 (2013), pp. 55–88,; John Goldworth Alger, *Napoleon's British Visitors and Captives. 1801-1815,* (Westminster: Archibald Constable and Company, Ltd., 1904); Edward Fraser, *Napoleon the Gaoler: Personal Experiences and Adventures of British Sailors and Soldiers During the Great Captivity,* (London: Methven and Company Ltd., 1914).

and shopping. In effect, creating a community that had all the pastimes and many of the freedoms that were available in London.

Lower-class prisoners were more restricted, as well as less affluent. While they could be granted permission to travel to town from the citadel in order to purchase food, clothing, or other goods, access was dependent on the good behaviour of all the prisoners and the whims of the Commandant. Regulations meant they could expect a regular issue of clothing provided by the French, that according to John Tregerthen Short, a merchant sailor from Cornwall, consisted 'of a grey jacket and trousers and a straw hat.' A journal written by an unknown Scottish seaman describes the clothing served out, the quality, and the frequency with which it was received. This sailor complains that he had 'been upwards of five years a prisoner and have only had two shuits of clothes viz. two Jackets, two waistcoats, three pars of pantelouns two pair of shooes three shirts and an hatt which is all I have had in five years and in that time I have travelled upwards of one Thousand one hundred miles.'[4] The rest of his account is punctuated with similar complaints, for example, he comments in 1809 that he had received but 'two pairs of shoes this four years, which is verrey little.'[5]

It was vital to retain as many of one's belongings as possible when captured, and to then maintain them over the course of several years of what was often daily wear. Uniforms were designed for life at sea, and personal narratives frequently decry their deterioration over long marches to prison depots on land. Shoes quickly wore out, leaving prisoners to march barefoot unless they 'jerry-rigged' something, or acquired another pair.[6] If prisoners were blessed to have more than one suit of clothing, they might be tempted to gamble or trade it away for alcohol.[7] Accusations flew back and forth between France and England about this problem of insufficiently clothed or naked POWs, both to shame the enemy nation into charitable assistance, and to show that the incarcerated prisoners were so poorly behaved as to deserve none.[8] Both

[4]National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, UK, (hereinafter NMM) JOD/224/1, p. 58.
[5]NMM JOD/224/1, p. 37.
[6]Peter Gordon, *Narrative of the Imprisonment and Escape of Peter Gordon,* (London: Josiah Conder, 1816), p. 131.
[7]Élodie Duché, 'Charitable Connections: Transnational Financial Networks and Relief for British Prisoners of War in Napoleonic France, 1803-1814,' *Napoleonica La Revue* 21, no. 3 (2014); Paul Chamberlain, *Hell Upon Water: Prisoners of War in Britain 1793-1815*, 1st ed., (Stroud: The History Press, Spellmount Publishers Ltd., 2008).
[8]For an example of such accusations, consider 'The Statesman', the London newspaper, which on 19 March 1812 published a letter by an anonymous French prisoner accusing the Transport Board of inadequately providing for the prisoners in its care and embezzling the funds meant for their benefit. The letter resulted in a libel case prosecuted against the owner of 'The Statesman', which is covered in the 10

governments had some motivations in protecting the belongings of newly captured POWs, since it could save them the expense of a new suit of clothes later. These factors all mean that establishing an 'average' prisoner's clothing is next to impossible. Unlike in later wars, the concentration camp, or within the penal system, the prisoner of war during the Napoleonic period did not wear a widely recognised uniform. There were some attempts at establishing a prisoner's uniform. At Valenciennes, prisoners were issued numbers and asked to wear tin badges on their grey prison clothes, and were barred from dyeing or altering their clothing. [9]

Work on the uniforms of military prisoners of war has been more concentrated on later periods and concerned with these uniforms as networks of control or resistance. The lack of a recognisable POW uniform for this period complicates the research, by making generalised discussions difficult. However, it also clearly shows the lack of a concerted project of dehumanisation like that developed in later conflicts or in other theatres.[10] The concept of prison clothing as an axis of power is discussed in Juliet Ash's 'Dress Behind Bars', where she considers the prison uniform as 'embodied punishment'. Lacking a uniform, and thus a physical symbol of the loss of identity as active, unconfined, and successful military men means that the gradations of humiliation or dishonouring of captured soldiers and sailors are subtler, even if their implications were quite clear to contemporaries. Therefore, what seem like outsized reactions to comparatively small humiliations require close study. These reactions fit into the broader framework of honour culture and indicate that more was at stake than is readily visible, and that prisoners could exert their influence in different ways. Even when these articles of dress were not crucial to survival, they were crucial to the structure of social hierarchies and to the customs of war.

August 1812, 17 September 1812, 20 November 1812, and 12 December 1812 editions of the same newspaper. These accusations, especially when they were in the public eye, were taken very seriously.

[9]NMM JOD/224/1, p. 105; NMM JOD/224/1. 'This day the Commandant put severals in the Cashot for getting their prison clothes dyed, and one man lost his general permission by it.' (pp. 84-85) and 'This day the Commandant commenced serving out shoes and shirts by the prison books to all the prisoners in his depot. He has likewise stuck up an order informing the prisoners that if any of them sell or alter what is served out to them, they are to be tried by the military laws &c.' (p. 85).

[10]Lloyd, *History of the Napoleonic and American Prisoners of War*, Standards of care varied wildly, Clive's survey work on the lives of prisoners during the period gives an excellent picture but comparing Napoleon's slaughter of Turkish prisoners during the Egypt campaign, and British descriptions of starving or chained Spanish prisoners show that the British experience was far from universal.

Clothing has been well established as a tool for the outward manifestation of inner beliefs about identity. Multiple masculine ideals existed in tandem with each other, as well as changed over the course of the eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries.[11] Joanne Begiato shows that these bodily ideals variously valued grace, dexterity, and physical power, as she traces the relationship of these forms to morality and manner. Karen Harvey, likewise, argues for the importance of sensibility, emotionality, and politeness to the ideal male comportment. These modes were often expressed through fashion.[12] Excellent scholarship has, likewise, been done on the gendered problems of crossdressing, with the primary focus on the interplay between this act and sexuality.[13] Articles, like that by Rachamimov, analyse the importance of gender, emasculation, and cross-dressing in the prisoner of war camp setting.[14] However, this

[11]Joanne Begiato, 'Between Poise and Power: Embodied Manliness in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century British Culture,' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 26 (2016), pp. 125–47 Karen Harvey, 'The History of Masculinity, circa 1650-1800,' *Journal of British Studies* 44, 2 (2005), pp. 296–311; Tristan Bridges and C. J. Pascoe, 'Hybrid Masculinities: New Directions in the Sociology of Men and Masculinities,' *Sociology Compass* 8, (2014), pp. 246–58; Ben Griffin, 'Hegemonic Masculinity as a Historical Problem,' *Gender & History* 30, 2 (2018), pp. 1–24.

[12]Michèle Cohen, *Fashioning Masculinity: National Identity and Language in the Eighteenth Century,* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); Michèle Cohen, ''Manners' Make the Man: Politeness, Chivalry, and the Construction of Masculinity, 1750-1830,' *Journal of British Studies* 44, 2 (2005), pp. 312–29; Katherine Aaslestad, Karen Hagemann, and Judith A. Miller, 'Introduction: Gender, War and the Nation in the Period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars- European Perspectives,' *European History Quarterly* 37, 4 (2007), pp. 501–6,; Joane Nagel, 'Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, 2 (1998), pp. 242–69.

[13]Leslie J. Jansen, 'When the Clothes Do Not Make the Man: Female Masculinity and Nationalism in Eighteenth-Century British Literature', PhD Thesis, (University of Maryland, 2006); Pauline Greenhill, ''Neither a Man nor a Maid': Sexualities and Gendered Meanings in Cross-Dressing Ballads,' *The Journal of American Folklore* 108, 428 (1995), pp. 156–77; Ula Lukszo Klein, 'Eighteenth-Century Female Cross-Dressers and Their Beards,' *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 16, 4 (2016), pp. 119–43; Marian Füssel, 'Between Dissimulation and Sensation: Female Soldiers in Eighteenth-Century Warfare,' *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 41, 4 (2018, pp. 527–42.

[14]Alon Rachamimov, 'The Disruptive Comforts of Drag: (Trans)Gender Performances among Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914-1920,' *American Historical Review*, 111, 2 (2006), pp. 362–82.

paper takes a different approach to focus on cross-dressing as a utilitarian act.[15] Indeed, in the case of these prisoners, cross-dressing is a form of imposture rather than a revelation of sexual preference or desired gender presentation.

Because the extant examples of prisoner's clothing from this period are virtually non-existent, the result is that prisoner accounts have become the sole source of information about the specific items prisoners wore, and how they altered them. Luckily, these personal accounts are rich with detail about the unique relationship these prisoners had with their clothing. Nevertheless, crucial details about the material culture of prisoner of war dress were not recorded. Matching objects with similar garments from personal accounts can help to build a picture of the material culture of a group for whom the material culture has not been preserved. Looking at details from the journals and diaries in the context of similar, physical objects can help explain how textiles were experienced by those who wore them. It is important to use these examples even though they are not the same because clothing is so intimately connected to the body.[16] In order to understand the practical problems prisoners faced when manipulating textiles, it is imperative to have a sense of the weight, texture or weave, fit and function of the garments they were working with. The visceral experience of these details used in accord with the accounts can allow the researcher

[15]For more on the practice of imposture see: Natalie Zemon Davis, 'From Prodigious to Heinous: Simon Goulart and the Reframing of Imposture,' in *L'Histoire Grande Ouverte: Hommages a Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie,* (Paris: Fayard, n.d.), pp. 274–83; Natalie Zemon Davis, 'Remaking Impostors: From Martin Guerre to Somersby,' *Hayes Robinson Lecture Series,* (London: Royal Holloway, University of London, 1997); Jennine Hurl-Eamon, 'The Westminster Imposters: Impersonating Law Enforcement in Early Eighteenth-Century London,' *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 38, 3 (2005), pp. 461–83; Füssel, 'Between Dissimulation and Sensation: Female Soldiers in Eighteenth-Century Warfare'; Judith Surkis, 'Carnival Balls and Penal Codes: Body Politics in July Monarchy France,' *History of the Present* 1, 1 (2011), pp. 59–83; Patricia Fumerton, 'Making Vagrancy (In)Visible: The Economics of Disguise in Early Modern Rogue Pamphlets,' *English Literary Renaissance* 33, 2 (2003), pp. 211–27; Gary R. Dyer, 'Reading as a Criminal in Early Nineteenth-Century Fiction,' *The Wordsworth Circle* 35, no. 3 (2004), pp. 141–46; James H. Johnson, 'The Face of Imposture in Postrevolutionary France,' *French Historical Studies* 35, no. 2 (2012), pp. 291–320; 'Military Imposture and Social Mischief,' *Bristol Selected Pamphlets, 1897* (Bristol: University of Bristol Library, 1897); John M. Steadman, 'Satan's Metamorphoses and the Heroic Convention of the Ignoble Disguise,' *The Modern Language Review* 52, 1 (1957), pp. 81–85; Amy Milka, 'Impostors: Performance, Emotion and Genteel Criminality in Late Eighteenth-Century England,' *Emotions: History, Culture, Society* 1, 2 (2017), pp. 81–107.

[16]Karen Harvey, 'Men of Parts: Masculine Embodiment and the Male Leg in Eighteenth-Century England,' *Journal of British Studies* 54, no. October (2015), pp. 797–821, p. 820.

to 'read' the object and imagine the steps actually required to alter a garment for new use. For instance, replacing a button on a waistcoat with a coin might include matching the size and weight of the coin to the button, or increasing the size of the buttonhole so that the apparel remained fully functional. The skill required for sewing something into the lining or the seams of a shirt or coat becomes more apparent when fit is considered. Prisoners often had to use pieces cut from other cloth or hang them from tapes securely attach these objects, and the increased bulkiness or weight would need to be considered so that the lines or fit of the attire did not become noticeably distorted. These objects provide all manner of supplemental information, like how men interacted with the clothing they wore in their profession on a daily basis, the most common areas of wear, reinforcement, alterations for comfort, standards of dress and undress, and finally evidence of their habitual level of interaction with altering or repairing clothing.

Capture and Search

Prisoners were, in many ways, most vulnerable at the point when they were captured. Their change in status had to be symbolically reinforced by observing the familiar traditions. These rituals made it clear where the power to command had been relinquished and revolved around recognition respect, or the acknowledgement that one's enemy was just as honourable and deserving of respect as oneself.[17] However, multiple accounts, like those of George Richard Casse or Peter Gordon, show that despite laws to the contrary, stealing clothing from prisoners of war frequently occurred. Casse describes the experience of the captain of the merchant vessel on which he had bought passage: Immediately after being captured, 'they were greeted with great indignity on board the privateer; the men being allowed to strip the captain's coat from his back and rifle his pockets with impunity.'[18]

Peter Gordon, who was second mate, and also on board a merchant ship, had his clothing similarly inspected.[19] Privateers came aboard and began inspecting the goods under the pretext of seizing them for the customs-house.[20] On-board searches took place under the cover of looking for British manufactured goods. As an embargo had been placed on their import, British prisoners and merchantmen were particularly susceptible to having their clothing seized on the pretence that it had been made in

[17]Stephen Darwall, *Honor, History & Relationship,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[18]George Richard Casse, *Authentic Narrative of the Sufferings of George Richard Casse as a Prisoner of France During the Late War; And of His Escape to the Allied Army near Clermont: With Some Particulars of His Apprenticeship at Sea,* (London: J. Mason, 1828), p. 36.

[19]Gordon, *Imprisonment and Escape*, pp. 13-15.

[20]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

England.[21] Since most of an Englishman's goods came from his country of origin, in practice, this often meant that the best or newest objects were confiscated. Gordon describes how he and his companions were searched upon capture.

> We were searched at the customhouse for papers and for British manufactured goods; they were strongly inclined to seize a pair of cotton stockings from the mate, but as they were marked and had been washed, he was permitted to keep them .[22] … Vigilant as the French Government is, in endeavouring to prevent the circulation of British manufactured goods, I do not believe it would countenance the depriving of a prisoner of a few new clothes which might be in his possession; I rather consider it a robbery committed by the custom-house officers, and applied to their own use.[23]

The success of prisoner's attempts to exert control over stolen property, and thus their French captors, varied. Several prisoners marked the difference in conduct and behaviour of French officers of the old regime, who were often persuaded to honour the POW conventions, and the new officers, who were considered very unreliable.[24] Donat Henchy O'Brien, lieutenant of the *Warrior*, describes a leather trunk containing his 'shift of linen' which disappeared after being unloaded from the vessel by one of

[21]Smuggling cotton into France occurred frequently throughout the French Wars, with a similar smuggling trade going in the other direction with silk goods. Michael M. Edwards, *The Growth of the British Cotton Trade, 1780-1815,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), p. 49. Captain Frederick Hoffman makes note during his stay in Cambrai that some of the prisoners were employed in making dimity, a lightweight cotton fabric. Frederick Hoffman, *A Sailor of King George: The Journals of Captain Frederick Hoffman R.N. 1793-1814*, n.d. [e-reader version], 'End of Captivity'.

[22]This refers to the common practice of sewing one's initials or other identifying marks into linens and cottons. White goods in particular needed to be washed frequently as their whiteness was regarded as an indication of wealth and privilege, and as they were often made to the same or similar patterns. As such they needed to have some form of differentiation for when they were sent out to the laundry. For how marked linen was used to identify escaped prisoners see: John Tregerthen Short, *Prisoners of War in France from 1804-1814, Being the Adventures of John Tregerthen Short and Thomas Williams of St. Ives, Cornwall, with an Introduction by Sir Edward Hain*, ed. Sir Edward Hain, n.d. p. 93; Gordon, *Imprisonment and Escape*, p. 141.

[23]Gordon, *Imprisonment and Escape,* p. 19.

[24]Edward Boys, *Narrative of a Captivity and Adventures in France and Flanders: Between the Years 1803 and 1809*, Second, (London: J. F. Dove, 1831), pp. 14-15, p. 19 & pp. 39-40.

the French crewmen.[25] After an appeal to the officers, who were 'excessively hurt at such a piece of villainy being committed by one of their crew', O'Brien managed to recover part of the contents of his missing chest and was assured that the thief was forced to run the gauntlet.[26]

Incidents of stealing held moral as well as economic and physical dangers. Like the men discussed in Anne Little's article about cultural cross-dressing on the American frontier, 'the English had already been bested in one test of masculine worth. But bereft of their clothing, armour, and weapons, they were stripped of all proof of their manhood. What could be more insulting than to see the accoutrements of their masculinity on the bodies of their conquerors?'[27] While the anxieties that fuelled British soldiers fighting Native Americans in the colonies were not what fuelled Naval officers fighting a 'civilised' European enemy, the appropriation of their professional honour in the form of their stolen clothes was still an act designed to humiliate. Thus, John Tregerthen Short's account describing the experience of his cousin James Sincock who had his clothing stolen by the privateers who captured them, and then had the humiliation compounded by having to watch as the thief appeared dressed 'head to foot' in his clothing the next day.[28]

Prisoners were adept at turning these situations to their advantage, either by playing on class affinities, or in turning the tools of their captors against them. They used misdirection and indignation to avoid being searched and were often justified in their faith that these claims to agency would be respected. When their clothing was confiscated, prisoners prevailed upon the traditions of war, and mutual class and national affinities. In short, appeals for better treatment based on a belief in the 'civilised' nature of the enemy were not wholly unsuccessful.

Crafting

Many prisoners experienced a loss of clothing, either through search and seizure, or through its deterioration during the march from the coast to the prison depots. Lower-class prisoners turned to making or altering their clothing, or charity. In order to ease the burden of providing clothes to the prisoners, they were allowed access to

[25]Donat Henchy O'Brien, *My Adventures During the Late War: Comprising A Narrative of Shipwreck, Captivity, Escapes from French Prisons, Etc. from 1804 to 1827, Vol. 1,* (London: Henry Colburn, 1839), p. 10.
[26]Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[27]Ann M. Little, "Shoot That Rogue, for He Hath an Englishman's Coat On!': Cultural Cross-Dressing on the New England Frontier, 1620-1760,' *The New England Quarterly* 74, 2 (2001), pp. 238–73, . p. 263.
[28]Short, *Prisoners of War*, p. 26.

cloth to make their own. Some even found employment sewing French army uniforms.[29]

Sewing and mending skills are evident in the existing examples of seaman's clothing. The uniforms in the collections at the National Maritime Museum in London provide a general guideline as to the principles of fit and function, and show that even in these higher quality examples, efforts were made to reuse cloth and fittings, and to repair damage. While some of these repairs might have been carried out by professionals, or to modify the clothing for other wearers, the frequency of repair and the variety of materials, threads, and stitching techniques indicates that some may have been *ad hoc* repairs made by sailors.[30] Techniques like piecing and turning were standard practice in the eighteenth century, and cutting and tailoring methods were designed to conserve expensive textiles. William Story demonstrates some of these considerations when he describes the mending he performed, 'I employed myself in mending stockings, and preparing some thin waistcoats to march in, by attaching old stocking for sleeves, which I found very suitable.'[31] Likewise, Peter Gordon describes the ingenuity of his fellow captives in acquiring materials for clothing, explaining they used the studding sail to make trousers to replace those taken from them upon capture.[32] He later describes refashioning his old pair of trousers into a waistcoat.[33] Prisoners took their knowledge of sewing, gained from repairing their clothing, or repairing sails on board ship, and applied their skill to aiding their escape attempts.

Clothing was not always preserved, but instead torn or cut up to create ropes. French records document an instance of prisoners attempting an escape from Bitche, the punishment depot. They were stopped, ropes made with sheet from their beds were seized, and they were locked away with another prisoner, 'on whom [was] found some string which was going to be used to make a rope for escape'.[34] *Escape from France*, a narrative written by an anonymous prisoner, explains how the author and his friends arranged to purchase cloth for the purported purpose of making shirts and trousers,

[29]Short, *Prisoners of War,* p. 21; NMM JOD/224/1.
[30]NMM D2018.11; UNI0028; UNI 0075; UNI0076; UNI 0077; UNI0081; UNI 0095; UNI103; UNI105; UNI0162; UNI0163; UNI3404.
[31]William Story, *A Journal Kept in France, During a Captivity of More than Nine Years, Commencing the 14th Day of April, 1805, and Ending the 5th Day of May, 1814,* (Sunderland: George Garbutt, 1815), p. 46.
[32]Gordon, *Imprisonment and Escape,* p. 35. Duck was often used in sailor's dress, reusing the sail in this way was not uncommon, but it does represent a particularly 'sailorly' type of frugality and ingenuity.
[33]Ibid., p. 40.
[34]Archives Nationales de France (hereinafter FNA), F/7/3309.

and instead used the cloth to make rope.[35] These ropes could be concealed, as done by Ellison and his group, by wrapping them around the body under the waistcoat.[36] The alternate style was to conceal the rope under the crown of the hat. Examples of cocked hats show that there was often extra room in the crown, which included a lining that could be resized to fit the head using a draw string.[37]

The case of Alexander Stewart is indicative of just how important the skills learned as a sailor could be to a successful escape. Ropes needed to be long enough to descend multiple citadel walls and strong enough to bear the weight of multiple men. They needed to be constructed such that after each descent the rope could either be snapped or cut and the remaining length used for scaling the next wall. Miscalculations of this distance, a lack of materials, or impatience in making could result in dire consequences. Stewart, a superstitious young man with very little experience at sea, he had been captured after only a few months on board, and he had nearly drowned from falling overboard twice, made his escape attempt from the citadel in Verdun.[38] He and his co-conspirators spent six weeks collecting string and plaiting it into rope at night. During the day, Stewart kept the growing rope coiled under his hat, in constant fear that a gust of wind would blow it off his head. The night of their escape, Stewart was the first over the wall, but the rope was too thin to grip properly, and he had wrapped it around his hand. He slid more than sixty feet to the ground and cut his hand all the way round down to the bone. Stewart's inexperience with ropemaking and handling is not what doomed his escape, but it did nearly cost him his hand.

Sewing was also often employed to hide documents or tools. Covered buttons were a frequent means of concealment for coins, or watch-springs which could be used to cut through the bars.[39] Money was a necessary component of any successful escape plan, and prisoners with access to bank funds needed to convert their assets into tender that could be used along the planned escape route while not drawing the attention of the guards to their preparations. Multiple prisoners describe how they sewed their escape funds into waistcoats or into the seams of their shirts. Seacombe Ellison, captured after an escape attempt with three other prisoners, describes sewing

[35]Anonymous, *Escape from France: A Narrative of the Harships and Sufferings of Several British Subjects Who Effected Their Escape From Verdun,* (London: Hood and Sharpe, 1811), p. 27.
[36]Seacome Ellison, *Prison Scenes: And Narrative of Escape from France During the Late War,* (Liverpool: D. Marples and Company, 1838), p. 51.
[37]NMM UNI 0074; UNI 0082; UNI 0057; UNI 0059.
[38]Alexander Stewart. *The Life of Alexander Stewart, Prisoner of Napoleon and Preacher of the Gospel, Written by Himself to 1815, Abridged by Dr. Albert Peel in 1874, with a Preface by his Grandson Sir. P. Malcolm Stewart,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947)
[39]NMM UNI5860; REL0725.

five gold louis inside his flannel waistcoat, and one under the arm of his coat.[40] A brief examination of the seam allowance generally allowed for clothing items at this time show that they would have needed to be taken-in to adequately conceal even the smallest coins, so alternative methods like making wallets or pouches with additional fabrics, or suspending them from tapes, or used as replacement button moulds, were easier to achieve. Disguising money as buttons was a common enough ruse, many accounts indicate that if a search of a prisoner was conducted, then the buttons would be closely examined. In recounting his re-capture, Ellison tells of how the guards immediately caught on to the trick:

> One of them observed a button above the common size, and, thinking it looked suspicious, he cut into it, and out dropped a double louis, — which brought a grin upon all their countenances, and a few *sacres* from their tongues. All their knives were instantly in requisition, and the poor buttons were disemboweled in the most cruel and wanton manner: coat buttons, waistcoat buttons, pantaloon buttons, —all were ripped up; their hard hearts spared none, neither large nor small.[41]

Ellison's five gold louis survived the thorough search, which revealed a total of sixty louis hidden about his and his companion's persons. Ellison's experience proves that not only was choosing a unique hiding place important, but that having the sewing skills necessary to disguise the alterations could make a huge difference to success.

Similar to Ellison, Peter Gordon also used his buttons as a means to hide valuable objects. He planned an escape with two others from the depot in Cambrai. He was unusual in that he applied a systematic, and even academic, approach to escape planning.[42] He collected stories of all the escape attempts from the gossip in the depot, as well as looked to literary works like 'The Life and Adventures of Baron von Trenck' for inspiration. After a few months of preparation, his friend, Copeland, was able to obtain a watch spring. Gordon describes how they planned to use the object:

> I carried it to a watch maker, who I thought had the appearance of an honest man, to be made into a saw for cutting iron; he not only immediately consented to make it, but showed me a dozen or two of his own, which he said would answer better than the one I had, being stronger: but in this he was mistaken, as their strength would prevent their being coiled up, and covered like a button,

[40]Ellison, *Prison Scenes,* p. 64.
[41]Ibid.
[42]Gordon, *Imprisonment and Escape*, p. 113.

> which the other from its pliability admitted of, and in that shape, was intended to be secured to our clothes.[43]

The use of seaman's crafts like sewing and ropemaking helped prisoners to shape their experience of incarceration and manipulate it to their own ends, they took skills learned or honed by their profession or developed during their prison experience and used them to create technologies to get home. They deconstructed their clothing for use as raw material, and they used their sewing and mending skills to reconstruct their garments into effective concealment for other tools like maps, forged passports, saws, files, and coin.

Disguise

When deconstructing clothing was impossible or impractical, disguise was a popular solution. However, assuming a disguise could be a dangerous prospect. British prisoners who were recaptured would drop the ruse in order to regain the privileges accorded to their 'first class prisoner' status. However, the threat of being a suspected spy, or being caught while dressed as a French deserter was not a sufficient downside to outweigh the sheer utility of disguise. These disguises can be divided into a few categories, imposture of a different nationality, imposture of a different class, and finally, imposture of a different gender.

Those without the means to change their clothing relied on simple camouflage to arouse the sympathy of the local population. If one had already learned the language, it was possible to pretend to be a deserter from the ranks of the French army, and if one had not learned the language, then pretending to be a neutral American was an option as well. Many prisoners relied on their ability to pass for a different nationality, and they completed their costume by assuming items of national dress. Several prisoners, including Edward Proudfoot Montagu, Alexander Stewart, and the anonymous author of *Escape from France* report how they wore their disguise of French clothing up until they arrived in England. Montagu reported to the admiralty in his French peasant dress, where he was asked to give account of his escape.[44] Peter Gordon also chose to take shelter in a false French identity, writing:

> I passed through one village, when the boys were coming out of school, who hooted me as I went along, some coming forward and crying, Oh! here is a Frenchman! others hallooed after me, 'Are the French coming today?'- Their

[43]Gordon. *Imprisonment and Escape*, p. 110.

[44]Edward Proudfoot Montagu, *The Personal Narrative of the Escape of Edward Proudfoot Montagu, An English Prisoner of War, From the Citadel of Verdun,* (New Market Place: Loyns, printer, Beccles (not for publication), 1849), p. 73.

> abuse pleased me much, as I knew whilst I could pass as a Frenchman, I should not be in any danger in Holland.[45]

When escapees were forced by circumstances to take shelter or food in inns or to cross through checkpoints at borders, they were often mistaken for French conscripts deserting from the army. If a prisoner had a knowledge of the French language at hand, he could reinforce this idea, and there are many examples of the local population helping escapees because they believed they were merely conscripts trying to get home.[46]

For non-officer prisoners who did not have to be concerned about breaking their parole, as they had not been granted it, assuming a new national identity was a means of breaking out of close confinement. Alexander Stewart describes the practice of exchanging names and clothes with others to literally assume their identity in order to escape or get transferred to a more desirable depot.[47] When he heard that prisoners were being transferred, he arranged to switch places with some prisoners who were scheduled to leave but desired to stay where they were. The exchange was made by going out into the yard with another prisoner from his room to wash some clothes. The members of the other room then created a distraction by starting a fight and forcing the guard to intervene. During this scuffle, Stewart traded places with the other man, and completely the ruse by changing his clothes, donning a 'ragged jacket, an old cap' and 'discolour[ing] [his] hair and face with coal dust, which much resembled black lead.'[48]

Thomas Williams, another lower-class prisoner, tried multiple times to escape by changing his name or pretending to be of a different nationality. When French recruiters came to the prison trying to enlist Irishmen to fight in Spain, some 400 or 500 men quickly volunteered. These attempts to enlist the prisoners were occurred frequently, as a few days later a Captain came from Morlaix in an attempt to employ any willing men 'not of England'. Williams, who was listed as English in the prison books, arranged with an American to take his name so that he could enlist, with the intention of using the ruse to exit the citadel and then subsequently escape. The plan worked well enough until the French captain's new recruits were waylaid by the Irishmen recruiting for the Irish troop heading to Spain. These officers immediately claimed that the 'Americans' were instead 'Irish' and belonged in their regiment. When their bullying failed to persuade the Captain to relinquish his crew, the entire group was marched back to the prison.

[45]Gordon, *Imprisonment and Escape*, p. 210.
[46]Ellison, *Prison Scenes,* p. 66.
[47]Stewart, *Life of Alexander Stewart,* p. 72.
[48]Ibid., p. 73.

Williams tried the same trick again, this time disguising himself as a Dane. He describes this attempt:

> The Danes had made peace with France, and all men belonging to that nation were released from prison; but one of them left a Danish protection with one of the prisoners, and by stratagem he got more printed, and distributed them amongst us. Several of us petitioned Paris, claiming our release as Danes who were then not at war with France, sending our forged protections to Paris for inspection, and very soon an order came for our release. I had sent my name as Thomas Colby, a name I had taken after I came back from the privateer in exchange with a man of that name, in order that I might be with my old mess-mates, and so, when the order came for my release, he, of course, said he was Colby, and I was again disappointed. I tried the plan again in my own name, only making it Williamson instead of Williams. I received a very good report, but they did not let me go.[49]

Taking advantage of class consciousness could also be an effective means of evading notice. *Détenus* were the type of prisoner most likely to take advantage of being of the upper classes. They used their networks of wealthy or aristocratic friends (or friends with aristocratic sympathies) to slip out of France. This method was most effective immediately following the 1803 order that classed these civilians as lawful prisoners in the first place.[50] The longer *détenus* waited, the more difficult escaping could become. Nevertheless, *détenus* disappeared from their captivity at an alarming rate. James Henry Lawrence, who chronicled the plight of his fellow civilian prisoners writes,

> Mr. Brooke, M. P. for Newtown, in Lancashire, having a clever French valet, who had procured a passport for two travelling merchants, and who had packed up

[49]Short, *Prisoners of War,* pp. 79-80.

[50]William Wright, *A Narrative of the Situation and Treatment of the English, Arrested by Order of the French Government at the Commencement of Hostilities with the Transaction On the Arrival of the First Consul at Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk, and, Afterwards, Down to the End of July: Containing Some Secret Anecdotes of Bonaparte's Confidential Commandant at Calais, and an Account of the Author's Escape from Thence in a Trunk,* (London: J. Badcock, J. Ginger, J. Asperne, R. Dutton, 1803); James Henry Lawrence, *A Picture of Verdun, Or the English Detained in France; Their Arrestation, Detention at Fontainbleau and Valenciennes, Confinement at Verdun, Incarceration at Bitsche, Amusements, Sufferings, Indulgences Granted to Some, Acts of Extortion and Cruelty Practised on Others, Characters of General and Madame Wirion, List of Those Who Have been Permitted to Leave or Who have Escaped out of France, Occassional Poetry, and Anecdotes of the Principal Detenus,* (London: T. Hookham, Jun. and E. T. Hookham, 1810).

> all his master's luggage, left a large company with whom he had been dining, and who imagined that he had only returned to his lodgings; meanwhile he passed through the gates in his travelling chaise, and arrived without the least difficulty at Cologne. No escape was conducted with so much coolness and deliberation.[51]

In cases like these, the disguise was less one of clothing, and more one of personality. Relying on other's sense of propriety and a certain minimum level of respect for those of the upper class could be successful if one could afford to pay for the clothes and equipage to support it. Donat Henchy O'Brien also found being well dressed, and therefore of the upper-class, to be an adequate disguise. When confronted with a particularly sharp-eyed French ferryman, O'Brien relied on the cut and quality of his coat to persuade the man that he is no French deserter.[52] These kinds of claims were far outnumbered by those who impersonated the peasantry, however. This was due to the simple fact that peasant's clothing was much easier to obtain. With prisoners already being poorly clothed, dirty from travel, and poorly financed, passing as a peasant did not even require a 'disguise' as such.

Cross-dressing also occurred as a means of evading notice. The presence of women in the depots, either as family, servants, local townspeople, or engaged in the sex trade, made these disguises possible. Edmond Temple, a midshipman who escaped from Verdun in the company of his French mistress, was one of a few who dressed as a woman. He was briefly recaptured during his escape and kept in a local jail. He succeeded in engaging his mistress to obtain women's clothing for him that matched the habitual dress of the wife of another inmate. When she came to visit, he put on his borrowed dress, and walked out the door and past the guard without being questioned.[53] Likewise, Thomas Williams describes the case of five midshipman who were confined at the depot in Verdun, and who climbed over the railings of the prison dressed in women's clothing and with baskets of potatoes, where they blended in perfectly with the French women who came every day to the gates to sell food.[54] Edward Proudfoot Montagu writes in his unpublished narrative of an escape in which a man disguised himself as a washerwoman.[55] In the journal written by the Anonymous Scottish Seaman, he describes how 'an English soldier belonging to the Forty third

[51]Lawrence, *Picture of Verdun,* p. 35.
[52]O'Brien, *My Adventures,* p. 313.
[53]Edmond Temple, *Memoirs of Myself*, (London: J. Miller, 1816) [e-reader version], pp. 105-107, https://archive.org/details/memoirsofmyself00tempuoft/page/104/mode/2up Accessed 21 June 2021.
[54]Short, *Prisoners of War,* p. 94, 'I had the pleasure of seeing them go over the railings of the prison, some of them dressed in women's clothes.'.
[55]Montagu, *Personal Narrative,* p. 14.

[who] was taken up in Town dressed in women's clothes by one of the Police officers' was sent to the *cachot*.[56] Manipulation of gendered beliefs about who needed to be examined and for what reason were key components in how these disguises worked. The use of female disguise was always brief, and once the moment of its utility passed, it was discarded, sometimes in favour of other disguises. The brevity of its use indicates that these costumes did not constitute clear declarations of gender or sexual preferences, but they did allow prisoners to obtain or assert greater agency by facilitating the transformation from incarcerated person to a freed one.

The advantages of putting off certain forms of dress and putting on others was profoundly circumstantial. Prisoners were conscious that in putting off one's proper clothing and identity, one lost certain protections even while gaining others. Thus, the ability to reassume their habitual identity when desirable, was also a priority. Near the end of his journey, Edmond Temple demonstrates the possible consequences for an escapee's chameleon nature. In the final hurdle of his journey back to England, he was seized and asked to give account by the mayor of Lintz. The mayor was willing to help him get back to England, but was unconvinced, given the state of Temple's clothing, that he is indeed a British gentleman, as he claims. Temple, luckily, still had in his possession a gold watch key engraved with his name, crest, and the date of his being taken prisoner. This item is enough to prove his identity, and satisfied that Temple was indeed worthy of aid, the Mayor allowed Temple to make his way, finally, home.[57] Nevertheless, the prisoners who disguised themselves were not ashamed. When they did so, they were not shy about mentioning it in their accounts, nor of chronicling cases when others engaged in the practice. When they describe it, it is framed as an 'ingenious' or particularly clever ruse.[58]

Despite prison dress' modern history as a means of dehumanisation and disempowerment, prisoners of war during this period bucked this trend by claiming dress as their own and using it to their own ends. They were able to leverage the customs of war to retain their property, leverage their professional skills to make their clothing into useful objects and escape technologies, and finally, their knowledge of classed-, gendered-, and national- dress to create new identities when it suited them. The examination of the clothing of these prisoners gives insight into the embodied experience of imprisonment and self-liberation. The manner in which they discuss these activities indicates that they regarded these manipulations or impostures as empowering. Despite some reservations about the loss of identity meaning a concomitant loss of privileged status as prisoner of war, British, gentleman, or male, the use of imposture itself was part of warfare, and the identities assumed were not a

[56]NMM JOD/224/1, p. 28.
[57]Temple, *Memoirs of Myself*, pp. 110-111.
[58]Montagu, *Personal Narrative*, pp. 14-16.

threat to honour. British sailors were able to use their knowledge of dress, both as object, and as a marker of identity to exert agency during their captivity. Their knowledge of, and control over the physical qualities of their dress allowed them to shape their bodies so that they better fitted their needs, making clothing more comfortable, protective, and concealing.

'I will remember it as one more to the list of courtesies I have received': Interactions between the Imperial War Graves Commission and the Bereaved

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ABSTRACT
This article explores the interactions between the Imperial War Graves Commission and the bereaved. It particularly focuses on communications between the Commission and those with loved ones who died as a result of the First World War, as outlined by the Commission's charter, and who are commemorated across England. Through a close study of some of the recently digitized e-files held in the Commission's Archives at Maidenhead, broader discussions surrounding the questions commonly asked by members of the public are showcased, thus highlighting the unique nature of the work undertaken by the Commission across England.

The Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) is the organisation that is charged with the task of caring for the graves and memorials of almost 1.7 million servicemen and women of the British Empire who died as a result of the two World Wars.[1] They do this in more than 23,000 locations in more than 150 countries and territories. While the cemeteries and memorials found on the former battlefields are recognisable to the public, its work across the United Kingdom is relatively unknown.

The Commonwealth War Graves Commission began its work during the First World War. Initially called the Graves Registration Commission, it was placed under the British Army in 1915 and was tasked with recording and caring for the graves they could find. Under the leadership of Fabian Ware, a commander of a mobile unit of the

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[1]Commonwealth War Graves Commission (2020), 'About Us', *CWGC*. Available at: https://www.cwgc.org/about-us Accessed 20 April 2020.

British Red Cross who formulated the idea, the organisation known today as the Commonwealth War Graves Commission was established by Royal Charter in May 1917 as the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC). Key figures within the early organisation include Sir Herbert Baker, Sir Reginald Blomfield and Sir Edwin Lutyens, who were the initial three principal architects of the Commission, and Rudyard Kipling, who served as the Commission's literary advisor.

In the aftermath of the First World War, the IWGC sent the then Director of the British Museum, Sir Frederic Kenyon, to the former battlefields in order to consider how would be best to commemorate the dead. The 'Kenyon Report' was published in 1918 and provided the framework for how the Commission were going to undertake their task. His recommendations included the following:

1. Each of the dead should be commemorated, by name, either on a headstone or a memorial.
2. The headstone or the memorial should be permanent.
3. The headstones should be uniform.[2]

The Commission's work was not without its controversy, and there was backlash during its early years from grieving families. This controversy mostly related to the decision not to lift the repatriation ban, imposed by the British Army in 1915, on the remains of British Empire service personnel, in addition to the decision to use a grave marker that did not obviously show the religious beliefs of the casualty from a distance.[3] Signatories wrote to the President of the IWGC, HRH the Prince of Wales, presenting a petition demanding his intervention in the matter. This led to a parliamentary debate in 1920 on a motion rejecting the Commission's principles. At the end of the debate the motion was withdrawn and the issue settled in favour of the

[2]References throughout Frederic Kenyon, *War Graves: How the Cemeteries Abroad will be Designed* (London: HMSO, 1918); condensed version as found on Commonwealth War Graves Commission (2020), 'About Us', *CWGC*. Available online at: https://www.cwgc.org/about-us Accessed 20 April 2020.

[3]Commonwealth War Graves Commission Archive (CWGCA), CWGC/1/1/5/21, WG 783 PT. 1: War Graves Association 1919-1925. Referenced CWGCA records are available online at http://archive.cwgc.org/default.aspx Accessed 1 April 2021. Reference to this can be found in Alex King, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 187, Richard Van Emden, *Missing: The Need for Closure after the Great War* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2019), p. 153 and (2018), *CWGC Interns Handbook* [Unpublished guide to the various pieces of information imparted onto the CWGC Centenary Interns during their training], p. 26.

Commission.[4] The organisation was renamed as the Commonwealth War Graves Commission in 1960.

Despite the popular viewpoint of the First World War being that the dead lie in a field far from home, this was not the case for a significant proportion of the casualties in the Commission's care. The CWGC commemorates more than 300,000 casualties of the two World Wars in more than 12,000 locations across the British Isles, many of which are in isolated graves or scattered within a larger site.[5] This means that the number of commemorations across the British Isles is the second highest found across the world.[6] In spite of these numbers, the graves of the fallen in the British Isles are not as well-visited by the British public as those close to the former battlefields.

The cemeteries and churchyards found across the United Kingdom that contain war graves proved a challenging task for the Commission. In many cases, families had already taken ownership of the remains of their loved ones and commemorated them in their own way. This usually meant burying them within the family plot, with their name inscribed alongside those of their ancestors. Thus, when the Commission came to start their work to honour the dead buried in the United Kingdom, they had the additional challenge of respecting pre-existing family memorials. This would often mean negotiating with the bereaved regarding grave markers to ensure that the Commission's work in remembering the war dead in perpetuity could be undertaken in the United Kingdom.

This article aims to bring some of these stories to the attention of both academics and the public, by explaining why there are war graves in the United Kingdom and some of the challenges faced by the Commission when commemorating them. There is a widespread perception that very few, if any, casualties from the First World War are remembered on British soil with many continuing to believe that casualties were solely buried overseas. The impact of the Commission's work in the United Kingdom has largely been ignored, instead the focus has been on stories of families visiting sites abroad and this having a profound impact upon them. By researching those who had loved ones buried across Britain, and who made pilgrimages to the sites of memory for loved ones in the United Kingdom, we are able to connect these locations with the wider discussions surrounding the culture and memory of the First World War.

The historiography surrounding this topic has shifted since the 1990s away from being 'Western Front-centric', but a misunderstood view of the Commission's work

[4]Alex King, *Memorials of the Great War*, p. 187.
[5]Commonwealth War Graves Commission (2021), 'Our War Graves, Your History', *CWGC*. https://www.cwgc.org/our-war-graves-your-history/ Accessed 1 April 2021.
[6]The country or territory with the most commemorations by the CWGC is France.

continues. Indeed, while histories of the Commission by Philip Longworth and David Crane acknowledge the presence of war graves in the United Kingdom, these sites are mentioned as a passing comment rather than receiving their own chapter or book. With the Commission's own campaigns during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic highlighting sites across the United Kingdom there has been an increase in interest in these sites.[7] However, there is still much more debate and discussion to be had in relation to First World War dead commemorated in Britain.

This article will primarily focus on the interactions the Commission had with the bereaved families of First World War casualties commemorated across England. These were taken from the recently digitised enquiries files (or 'e-files') from the CWGC Archives; while not all regiments or forces are represented, the discussions in these letters are representative of the broader debates being considered by the Commission. The article will be split into three sections: dialogues about what precisely constitutes a war grave, conversations regarding the alteration of the commemoration type for a casualty and unique situations that challenged the Commission's policies.[8]

What Constitutes a War Grave?

When considering the archival evidence on this topic it is important to consider what constitutes a war grave that is cared for by the Commission. According to the Commission, their work pertains to those who died whilst in service of the British Empire Forces, or a recognised auxiliary organisation, during their dates of responsibility.[9] The dates of responsibility for the First World War are between 4 August 1914 and 31 August 1921; these correlate to the dates that Britain declared war on Germany and the Termination of the Present War (Definition) Act respectively.[10] However, this has been met with much confusion from the public, and the documents held in the CWGC archives highlight this.

[7]These largely came under the umbrella of their 'Our War Graves, Your History' project which included their inaugural "War Graves Week" in May 2021. Commonwealth War Graves Commission (2021), 'Our War Graves, Your History', *CWGC*. Available at: https://www.cwgc.org/our-war-graves-your-history/ Accessed 1 April 2021.

[8]It should be noted that the location of graves will be as per their record on the CWGC website. Many of these will be referenced in a historic format, so counties may be different to those found today.

[9]*CWGC Interns Handbook* [Unpublished 2018 guide to the various pieces of information imparted onto the CWGC Centenary Interns during their training].

[10]Ibid, p. 8.

In some cases, individuals were simply missed and were only found years later. This was the case for Driver H Gaskell of the Royal Field Artillery who is remembered at Lytham (St John the Divine) Churchyard in Lancashire.[11] In 1950, his brother-in-law wrote to the Commission to ask for a stone to be erected on Driver Gaskell's grave; he noted that the casualty had enlisted in 1915 but had died in Lytham Hospital three weeks after. The Commission had no record of him, so made the relevant enquiries to the War Office and Ministry of Pensions to ensure that Driver Gaskell's death was deemed to be attributable to war service.

Once the Ministry of Pensions confirmed that his death was considered to be as a result of the conflict, the Commission wrote to the next of kin to ask them to complete the grave registration form. This included writing out the particulars relating to the casualty and, if the family wished, a personal inscription. The letter was caveated that it might take some time to erect a Commission headstone over his grave due to the 'Commission's heavy programme of work dealing with the graves of the recent war.'[12] His family replied, requesting that Driver Gaskell's grave be given the personal inscription 'ROCK OF AGES'. Personal Inscriptions are often the part of the headstone that elicit the greatest emotional response from visitors, as they provided the family with the opportunity to display their grief. Many families chose simple phrases, such as 'RIP' or 'PEACE PERFECT PEACE', or biblical quotes to be placed at the base of the grave marker. While more research is needed to compare the epitaphs found in the United Kingdom to those overseas, it is clear that there were popular inspirations for inscriptions that can be found at all Commission sites.

This is also the case for Second Lieutenant BPB Harrison of the Royal Flying Corps, who is commemorated at Brigg Cemetery in Lincolnshire. It was not until August 1964, when a friend wrote to the Commission to query why his grave was not marked, that his name was found to be missing for Commission records. Again, as per protocol, the Commission queried the information provided by the friend, to conclude that he was killed in a flying accident at Waddington in 1918. Once this was confirmed, they wrote to the Council to ask to erect a Commission headstone. The Council permitted this and agreed to add Second Lieutenant Harrison's grave to the list of graves maintained in the cemetery; the 1914-1918 Register was also amended with his and another name to improve its accuracy.[13]

[11]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/220 (AA60353), Correspondence relating to Driver H Gaskell of the Royal Field Artillery.
[12]Ibid.
[13]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/2/611 (CCM102067), Correspondence relating to Second Lieutenant BPB Harrison of the Royal Flying Corps.

Sometimes the situation was slightly more complex, an example of which was faced by the family of Sergeant CCH Poole of the Royal Field Artillery. In 1921, his father wrote to the Commission in order to ask for a headstone to be erected on his son's grave at Gloucester City Cemetery in Gloucestershire. However, the Commission found that he had been 'Discharged Physically Unfit Para 392 (XVI) KR' on 23 January 1919 and the relevant documents had been forwarded to the Ministry of Pensions.[14] The Ministry of Pensions further noted that the late soldier was 'discharged with a gunshot wound, left leg and right arm, and valvular disease of the heart' and had died in September 1921 of '1. Aortic Regurgitation II. Heart Failure.'[15] As his death fell outside the dates of responsibility imposed by the Commission, he was deemed to be not entitled to a war grave.

When, in 1923, the widow of the deceased wrote to the Commission and found that his grave was not considered to be a War Grave, she replied to highlight her surprise at this. It was particularly difficult for her to understand this, as she had previously been denied the right to erect a private memorial over his grave by the IWGC and now could not receive a Commission headstone to mark the grave. She referred to this as being 'rather like the "Dog in the manger" kind of treatment' and was incredibly distressed by this news.[16] It became apparent that the grave had been acquired via a free grant from the Corporation of Gloucester by the Commission and thus they owned the rights to the grave. The widow refused the suggestion that she could place her own memorial on the grave, on the understanding that the Commission could accept no responsibility for its upkeep. This was partly due to the fact that the Town Clerk had suggested she erect a headstone that looked similar to a standard Commission headstone on the grave. As she was paying for it, she wrote, she thought it only fitting that she 'might be allowed to erect one according to my own choice.'[17] While this was seen as the 'simplest course' by the Commission's Legal Team, a Financial Advisor noted that 'in these circumstances' the best solution would be to erect a standard Commission headstone at the expense of the IWGC, as it seemed 'undesirable' to argue over the cost with the next of kin.[18] Both the Commission and the widow agreed to this, and it was advised that the headstone would be placed there prior to the site's unveiling ceremony in June 1923.[19]

[14]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/161 (AA49102), Correspondence relating to Sergeant CCH Poole of the Royal Field Artillery.
[15]Ibid.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Ibid.
[18]Ibid.
[19]Ibid.

Those familiar with the Commission's work may be surprised by this solution, in that it is in breach of the rigid regulations imposed by the Commission at the time; however, it was not uncommon for rules to be contravened in exceptional circumstances. Sites across Great Britain show examples of various violations of the rules laid out by the Commission, and it is this that makes this area of the Commission's work so fascinating. While many of the breaches may not be followed today by the modern Commission staff; nonetheless, the work that was undertaken by their predecessors provides a unique set of examples of adapting Commission policy in order to reach a conclusion beneficial to all.

Local rules that had been imposed by other nations could also cause some difficulties when explaining to families why their graves were not marked by the Commission. This was the case for Private AO Rix of the Australian Infantry, who had died of Pulmonary Tuberculosis in March 1933 and whose death was accepted as being due to war service. When asked by Australia House, on behalf of his widow, whether a headstone could be erected to his memory, the Commission's Legal Team had a difficult situation to manage. Many other Dominion nations, including Australia, had adopted the policy of accepting the graves of those who had died as a result of war causes within their own territories, even if they were outside of the Commission's dates of responsibility. The United Kingdom Government, however, were not prepared to adopt this policy with regard to graves in the United Kingdom and thus could not reciprocate this action. In April 1928, following a discussion on the broader issue, letters were sent to all Dominions asking whether there should be an amendment to this regulation under the terms of the Supplemental Charter. Australia and New Zealand agreed that this should be the case, but Canada and South Africa provided a contrary viewpoint.[20]

The broader issue was of great concern for the Commission as they had previously felt pressure from various groups, such as the British Legion and the British Empire Service League, to sanction the provision of headstones for veterans dying from war causes after the official cessation of hostilities. Due to this pressure being largely resisted in the past, the Commission wrote to Australia House to explain that the grave was outside of their powers. Yet, at a meeting in June 1928 it was decided that they would arrange for 'the construction and erection of a headstone of their standard pattern' on Private Rix's grave, with repayment of the expenses being reimbursed by the relevant government.[21] The approximate cost of this was found to be £8 and granite would be used. It can be assumed that this occurred, as an image on Find A Grave shows a headstone on Private Rix's grave that fits the description in the Meeting

[20]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/196 (AA59824), Correspondence relating to Private AO Rix of the Australian Imperial Force.
[21]Ibid.

Minutes, however he does not appear on the Commission's database as his date of death is outside of the Commission's remit.[22]

Not all requests of this nature were met, which could be an incredibly difficult process for both the family and the Commission. This was the case with Third Class Master Gunner W Rouse of the Royal Garrison Artillery. He had enlisted in May 1899 and retired from his military service in May 1920; he died at Gloucestershire Royal Infirmary twelve years later, aged 52. Unfortunately, in the e-files, no further information was recorded regarding the cause of his death. When his widow wrote to the Commission in 1933, informing them that her husband had died the previous year, she stated that she felt it would 'please him so much' to receive a Commission headstone similar to the one 'all soldiers who died in England from the effects of war service' received.[23] She had set aside £10 for this purpose, £5 of which had come from the Forest of Dean Boy Scout Association in recognition of her late husband's service to that cause. Furthermore, in her letter she cited the fact that the late Earl Haig had received a Commission headstone to mark his grave and thus there was room for another exception to be made.[24]

This did not convince the Commission to make another exception as they replied reiterating their Charter limited the remit of their work and that their headstone was copyrighted and reserved for the graves denoted within the Charter. They acknowledged the exception made to Earl Haig, citing that the case was allowed because 'it was felt that his was an entirely exceptional position' as the Commander-in-Chief of 'the many British soldiers' commemorated at sites across France and Belgium. It was thus considered 'fitting' by the Commission that his grave was somehow 'linked' to theirs.[25] Any further information about this case cannot be found within this particular file, but it is difficult to ignore how the widow may have felt receiving this news.

To conclude this section, one of the most heart-warming stories from the e-files comes from the records relating to Gunner W Pascall of the Royal Garrison Artillery. When, in 1926, his final verification form was received by the Commission, his next of kin noted that she did not have 'the means to pay for' a replacement headstone.[26] The

[22]Find a Grave, https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/192877787/albert-oswald-rix Accessed 1 April 2021.
[23]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/198 (AA59841), Correspondence relating to Third Class Master Gunner W Rouse of the Royal Garrison Artillery.
[24]Ibid.
[25]Ibid.
[26]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/189 (AA56871), Correspondence relating to Gunner W Pascall of the Royal Garrison Artillery.

Works Team asked the Enquiries Team to inform Mrs Pascall that Commission headstones, with the exception of an optional personal inscription, were provided to qualifying casualties free of charge. Mrs Pascall chose to add the personal inscription 'REST IN PEACE'.[27] By 1936, Mrs Pascall had passed away and the family wanted to put a fresh memorial on the grave; as the plot was owned by the Commission the Commission needed to agree to this. Eventually, it was agreed that the Commission would sign over the ownership of the grave by a deed of assignment in the form given in the Cemetery Causes Act 1847.[28] This is a more commonplace example of the flexibility the Commission adopted in terms of their strict regulations and begins a discussion on the broader topic of changes in commemoration. The flexibility shown by the Commission to these grieving families provide the primary findings of this research and is thus the main argument of its discussion. In the next section, another aspect of the Commission's work will provide further evidence of this flexibility through the organisation's interactions with the bereaved regarding changes in commemorations. This was often some of the most challenging work in the United Kingdom for the Commission, as will be shown through examples of communications found in the Commission's e-files.

Changes in Commemoration and Challenges

Visitors to Commission sites often have a clear image of what to expect from a Commission cemetery, which is often based on the cemeteries in France and Belgium, such as Tyne Cot Cemetery and Memorial in Belgium. This permeates the public's understanding of the Commission's work, with white headstones in clear rows, flowers planted to a design and the grass mown perfectly being the standard viewpoint. This does not relate to all Commission sites, particularly as there are more than 30 types of stone used by the Commission to make their grave markers; nevertheless, the fact that the majority of the public will be introduced to the Commission's work by the sites along the former Western Front has a profound impact on the public's perception of the organisation. As with all sites with war dead, the Commission had a clear remit in terms of their work across the United Kingdom. However, commemoration here was often one of the most complicated issues faced by them. When studying aspects of the Commission's work in the United Kingdom it must be remembered that that the majority of the sites, and indeed the graves themselves, are not owned by the Commission. This unique situation provides the context to many of the difficulties and queries faced by the Commission and, in order to resolve these, the Commission often had to be flexible in both their rules and their rulings. In this section, the focus will be on requests for changes to commemoration from families, in addition to various aspects that affected a particular plot; this issue could often prove

[27]Ibid.
[28]Ibid.

more difficult to resolve when compared to decisions surrounding similar issues in Commission-owned sites.

Similarly to those making pilgrimages to sites in France and Belgium to visit the graves of loved ones, families from across the British Empire made the journey to see the final resting place of their loved ones in Britain. This often began a correspondence between the Commission and the next of kin, particularly if a private memorial erected by the family was no longer suitable. An example of such a situation can be found with the grave of Serjeant FWC Bootle at Oxford (Botley) Cemetery in Oxfordshire. In 1956, the works team noted that the private memorial was becoming worn, and the Area Superintendent informed them that Sgt Bootle's sister had recently visited his grave and had enquired about the cost of its renovation. He had informed her that the Commission would likely replace the headstone free of charge, as removal and replacement privately would cost a significant amount of money. The Commission wrote to the sister using the address on a letter given to the Superintendent offering this service; she gratefully accepted this and stated that she did not wish to add a personal inscription to the new headstone.[29]

A particularly interesting part of this case is the fact that the Commission arranged to have this erected within a matter of months in order to ensure that the sister could view the new headstone before she returned to her native Australia. This pleased her greatly and she wrote to the Commission to convey her thanks to the Area Superintendent. She noted she would remember this as 'one more to the list of courtesies I have received since I arrived in England, I do appreciate it.'[30] This is a prime example of the pilgrimages that families of the bereaved undertook to visit their loved ones outside of the Western Front narrative, and thus highlights the importance of the Commission's work in the United Kingdom.

As shown in the previous section, it was not uncommon for there to be omissions to lists of casualties deemed to be in the care of the Commission. Furthermore, there could be oversights related to graves of casualties believed to be commemorated on private memorials. An example of this is the case of Driver EA Sheepwash of the Royal Field Artillery. After being accidentally killed on 28 May 1921, he was buried at Chatham Cemetery in Kent and the Commission recorded that his grave was marked by a private memorial. In 1960 the Commission wrote to the Driver Sheepwash's parents to draw attention to the fact that the grave location was denoted by a private

[29]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/153 (AA48189), Correspondence relating to Serjeant FWC Bootle of the Australian Imperial Force.
[30]Ibid.

memorial which 'bears no reference to him'.[31] In his letter, the Director General noted that the Commission would be happy to erect one of their standard headstones and that the stone would be placed at the foot at the grave, within the existing kerb, free of charge. The family were offered the opportunity to include a personal inscription of 'not more than 60 letters,' as per the Commission's general rules, if they wished to include this on the headstone.[32] The reply received from the eldest brother of Driver Sheepwash included an apology for a delay in responding to the letter; as his parents were now deceased, he had been in consultation with his siblings regarding what the family wanted. They ultimately decided to have the headstone erected on Driver Sheepwash's grave with the personal inscription "FOND MEMORIES CLING TO BYGONE DAYS."[33]

One of the most commonplace reasons for individuals with loved ones buried in the United Kingdom to get in touch with the Commission was to alter a casualty's commemoration type; this was usually either to remove or add a Commission headstone to the marking of the grave. There are countless examples of this within the available e-files, one of which relates to Acting Bombardier HE Leggett of the Royal Field Artillery. His parents wrote to the Commission in 1920 to explain that they had made all the funeral arrangements and would like to have a wooden cross erected on his grave. This was accepted by the Commission, but by 1929 the deceased's brother had written to the Commission to note that the wooden cross had not been replaced and they had some difficulties with the Cemetery Authorities who had prohibited all wooden memorials.[34]

The Commission were reluctant to help with this query, as it was found that a private memorial already marked the grave. The family stated that this was the case, but that the additional wooden cross had been placed at the foot of the grave in Allerton Cemetery, Lancashire. This related to a larger historic problem. In a number of cases wooden crosses had been erected as temporary memorials and then private memorials had been constructed, thus doubly commemorating a casualty. Initially it had been agreed that Commission headstones would also be erected in addition to any private memorials on graves in the United Kingdom but this decision had since been reversed. However, in this case the Commission offered to erect a Commission headstone if the family would like the wooden cross to be replaced, which the father

[31]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/262 (AA60706), Correspondence relating to Driver EA Sheepwash of the Royal Field Artillery.
[32]Ibid.
[33]Ibid.
[34]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/116 (AA42088), Correspondence relating to Acting Bombardier HE Leggett of the Royal Field Artillery.

agreed to.[35] This is another example of an exception being allowed to the rules imposed by the Commission and demonstrates some of the nuances found within UK-based war graves.

A similar situation was found in the case of Gunner A Collier of the Royal Field Artillery. In 1956 a local sculptor wrote to ask permission to remove the Commission headstone covering his grave at Bradford (Thornton) Cemetery in Yorkshire, as the family would like to erect a headstone and kerb. However, a potentially misleading image sent with the letter suggested that the family wished to have the Commission headstone recumbent in the centre of the family plot. The Commission did not object to the removal of the grave marker, provided that Gunner Collier was named on the private memorial, but did take umbrage at the possibility of the headstone lying flat. In their reply, the Commission stated that 'they could not give consent' to the headstone being placed recumbent on the grave. As per the Commission's instructions, the Commission headstone was destroyed, and Gunner Collier's name was included on the new family memorial.[36]

The Commission's work has not been limited to those who served in the Armed Forces, they also commemorate recognised Auxiliary organisations.[37] This includes Nursing Services provided during both World Wars. One example relating to commemoration is a communication regarding two nurses who were buried at Sutton Veny (St John) Churchyard in Wiltshire. A sibling of Sister FIC Tyson wrote to the Commission in 1953 to draw attention to the fact that she had received evidence of neglect of both her sister's grave and that of Matron Walker. The Commission wrote back to state that they had received contrary information from both other visitors and the Church authorities, and that they were unable to accept responsibility for private memorials. An interesting development in the reply is the offer to arrange for the memorials to be cleaned and then inspected to see if further repairs were necessary. It should be remembered that the maintenance of private memorials was outside of the Commission's remit so this would be contrary to the rules imposed.[38]

[35]Ibid. A visitor to the grave today will see a Private Memorial with a Commission headstone placed in front of it.

[36]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/133 (AA44101), Correspondence relating to Gunner A Collier of the Royal Field Artillery.

[37]A list of these, and a remit of the work undertaken in relation to each organisation, can be found in the Commission's Commemorations Policies. Commonwealth War Graves Commission (2020), 'Commemorations: Eligibility Criteria', *CWGC*. Available at: https://www.cwgc.org/media/udkhsep3/cwgc-policy-eligibility-criteria-for-commemoration.pdf Accessed 21 December 2020.

[38]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/166 (AA50618), Correspondence relating to Sister FIC Tyson and Matron JM Walker, both of the Australian Army Nursing Service.

The Assistant Regional Inspector visited the site in 1954 and noted that the stones were not in good condition, mainly due to the memorials being placed in recumbent positions. The Inspector stated that it would be a 'great deal of work and expense' to bring the memorials up to standard, so proposed that replacement with Commission headstones would be a better solution. This proposal was accepted by the family. The Commission's Administrative Officer suggested that the description of the inscriptions on the memorials should be noted so that they could be incorporated within a personal inscription for each of the women. By December 1956 replacement headstones for Sister Tyson and Matron Walker had been erected.[39]

Adding to the memorials within a family plot was a common occurrence. In 1936 the vicar St Andrew's Church at Steyning in Sussex wrote to the Commission on behalf of the family of Gunner G Feast of the Royal Artillery. The previous July Gunner Feast's widow had died and been buried in the same grave in Steyning Churchyard. Their daughter had now requested that a kerb be placed around the headstone and sought the consent of the Commission. As the Commission had no rights of ownership to the grave they could not refuse; however, they did request that the stone used for the kerb be similar to that of the headstone and that the headstone be reset to its correct height after the work. Furthermore, they stated that any damage done to the stone was the responsibility of the daughter and that they could not financially support this work. This appears to have been met with agreement from the family and a kerb was installed.[40]

A complication that could often arise when approving such requests was the question of maintenance; many families assumed that the Commission would take on the maintenance of a private memorial or additional memorials on the grave. In terms of maintenance of a standard grave there was, and is, a set of expectations, the policies of the Commission having largely remained the same as since the time of its formation. It must be remembered that if it is a private memorial the next of kin still hold the rights to the grave, and thus the remit of the Commission in these cases is limited.[41] In situations where a grave has been marked by a private memorial, the Commission would check that the grave marker is clean, with the name of the casualty clearly

[39]Ibid.

[40]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/207 (AA60050), Correspondence relating to Gunner G Feast of the Royal Field Artillery.

[41]Details of discussions regarding the maintenance of graves in the United Kingdom can be found across IWGC Meeting Minutes in the 1920s and 1930s, but clear guidance was finally agreed to at the 332nd Meeting on 21 December 1950, CWGCA, CWGC/2/2/1/332 (WG1831/274), 332nd Meeting of the Imperial War Graves Commission.

legible, that the grave itself was clear of weeds and the entire headstone visible, with flora and fauna such as grass and plants not obstructing the view. There are more expectations when a grave is located within a plot, but the general regulations listed were the usual expectation. If these expectations were not met the Commission would, and will, liaise with the families to find an appropriate solution.

Unfortunately, Gunner Feast's family were of the impression that the Commission were responsible, and in 1963 his daughter wrote to the Commission asking if they could repair the kerb erected to the memory of her mother. The Commission explained that they could not do this, but the plot could be maintained by them if the kerb was removed and the grave level turfed. They gave her the option to add a commemoration to her mother at the base of the headstone, either adding to the current personal inscription or changing the headstone entirely to have a longer epitaph. This offer was initially ignored, but after a similar request in 1971, the daughter agreed to this solution and paid the cost of £6 for the removal of the kerb, returfing and engraving.[42]

It is unclear when policies regarding adding to a personal inscription were finalised, but the solution offered to Gunner Feast's family would be unlikely to be the end result today, and is another exception to the Commission's general rules.[43] Personal Inscriptions chosen by families are now expected to be of the time, so references to those who died after a casualty's death, or relatives they would never have met, would be unlikely to be accepted by the Commission's Commemorations Team today.[44]

In the case of Gunner Feast, the situation was not concluded once the kerb had been removed. A year later, the daughter wrote to the Commission to highlight her dismay at the grass on the grave 'being allowed to grow over' and finding the grave covered with weeds.[45] As a consequence of this disappointment, she asked whether the Commission could lay a matching cement base with an opening for a flower vase. This was not agreed to, as it would 'create an undesirable precedent.'[46] Indeed, the Regional

[42]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/207 (AA60050), Correspondence relating to Gunner G Feast of the Royal Field Artillery.

[43]This is detailed in the Kenyon Report of 1918, upon which the Commission's founding principles were founded. Frederic Kenyon, *War Graves: How the Cemeteries Abroad will be Designed* (London: HMSO, 1918), p. 10.

[44]Commonwealth War Graves Commission (2020), 'Commemorations', *CWGC*. Available at: https://www.cwgc.org/find-records/commemorations/ [Accessed 21st December 2020].

[45]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/207 (AA60050), Correspondence relating to Gunner G Feast of the Royal Field Artillery.

[46]Ibid.

Director replied to the internal conversation stating that the supervision required, plus the fact that the operational team were not due to work in this area for some time, would prove difficult. In his final sentence, he states that 'We always like to help relations if possible, but I feel like this would be going too far!'[47] A local masonry company was recommended to take on this work for the family, and the Regional Director provided advice regarding the cement base in relation to the Commission headstone.[48]

As alluded to in at least two other letters, not all families were grateful or indeed happy with the work output of the Commission in the United Kingdom. A letter from the sister of Private FJ Marks of the Devonshire Regiment provides an example of this. In 1963, she wrote about the 'disgrace' she found her brother's grave to be in at Great Horwood (St James) Churchyard in Buckinghamshire.[49] This was further exacerbated by the fact that, when compared to her other brother's grave in Malta, it left a lot to be desired. It was found that the grave had a Commission headstone but was not owned by the Commission; instead there was a Maintenance Agreement with the Parochial Church Council for the upkeep of the three war graves in the site.[50]

While this was being investigated, Private Marks' sister wrote again, stating that her brother had also visited the site and found the state of the grave 'shocking'.[51] Indeed, when compared to the graves in Malta, it raised the question among the family 'why shouldn't the graves in our country be looked after as they are?'[52] It appears that the main issue for the family was the fact that his grave was completely flat, save for the headstone. The Rector of the Church assured the Commission that the grave was not neglected, and the Inspectors of the site only found issues with the length of the grass. The Commission thus replied, explaining the policies for graves in the United Kingdom and how these policies were as similar as they possibly could be to those in war cemeteries abroad.[53] Whilst it is unclear whether the Commission ever received a reply, or whether it was ever resolved with the family, it is apparent that not all were content with the thought that their loved ones were not receiving the care they would have received had they died abroad.

[47]Ibid.
[48]Ibid.
[49]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/3/89 (CDEW24400), Correspondence relating to Private FJ Marks of the Devonshire Regiment.
[50]Ibid.
[51]Ibid.
[52]Ibid.
[53]Ibid.

It was not always the case that the family were the first to notice an issue with a particular site. In 1962, the Commission wrote to the brother of Gunner FH Place of the Royal Garrison Artillery (the Commission having been unable to locate his widow), to inform him that the burial ground where he was interred was deemed unmaintainable.[54] It was explained that Gunner Place would be commemorated by a Special, or Kipling, Memorial headstone at Houghton-le-Spring (Durham Road) Cemetery in Durham, a cemetery near to where he was buried alongside three other casualties who would be commemorated in the same way. Gunner Place's brother gave his approval of this alternative commemoration and chose the personal inscription 'REST IN PEACE' the Kipling Memorial which installed on 3 March 1964.[55]

Kipling Memorials, or Special Memorials, can commonly be found in Commission sites across the globe for those who had been killed in action and received a burial, but whose grave had since been lost. While this is the most frequent reason for a Kipling Memorial being used, it is not uncommon to see them at cemeteries across the United Kingdom. Kipling Memorials in the United Kingdom are used similarly to those found in cemeteries abroad; they are usually utilised when a site at which a casualty is commemorated is unmaintainable. 'Unmaintainable' is broadly defined as either the site now being closed for burials and no longer cared for by a Cemetery Authority or religious community, the burial ground has been redeveloped, or it is no longer safe to visit that cemetery. This again highlights the fact that key features of the Commission's work can be found locally and emphasises the importance of the sites across Britain. Through exploring local churchyards and municipal cemeteries, the public can easily be told the Commission's story.

Unique Situations

In the final section of this article the discussion will turn to unique situations faced by the Commission in the United Kingdom. The title of this final section is slightly misleading as arguably all casualty cases are unique. However, the following stories were surprising to read when looking at the e-files, and hence can be categorised into a broader topic of unique situations.

The first casualty's story that fulfils this category is that of Gunner W L Buckley of the Royal Garrison Artillery, who was recorded as buried at Halliwell (St Peter) Churchyard in Lancashire. There was initially some confusion surrounding this casualty, as in March 1928 he was reported to have been buried both at St Peter's and Shoeburyness (St Andrew) Churchyard and Extension in Essex. The matter was initially considered to be resolved, as it was thought that the Bolton burial was the

[54]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/132 (AA43922), Correspondence relating to Gunner FH Place of the Royal Garrison Artillery.
[55] Ibid.

correct site, because the original marker at St Andrew's referred to a cross erected as a memorial cross by his comrades. The situation believed to have happened was that the body was moved to Lancashire at the request of his relatives in February 1917, but the wooden cross was not removed at the time and was later replaced by a Commission headstone. Hence, it was deemed that the solution would be to remove the Commission headstone in Essex and have the Private Memorial in Lancashire as the sole commemoration for Gunner Buckley.[56]

This was not as straightforward as it seems, however, as when the Commission's contractor visited the churchyard in Essex in October 1938, he was informed by the Sexton that the burial had been made by him personally and that he was quite sure that the body had not yet been removed. Ultimately, it was concluded that there were three possible explanations for the 'extraordinary state of affairs' that the Commission found themselves in: 1) Gunner Buckley was interred in Essex and the hospital authorities were responsible for an incorrect registration; 2) Gunner Buckley was originally buried in Essex, with his body later exhumed and reburied in Lancashire; or 3) Gunner Buckley's remains were still in Essex and that the widow was mistaken in her belief that he was buried in Lancashire. The view was taken that explanation 1) was the most probable and that the resolution to this delicate matter was to view the site in Lancashire as the place where Gunner Buckley's remains lay and ask the Rector of St Andrew's, Shoeburyness, to approve the removal of the headstone in Essex.[57]

The Rector was happy for the headstone to be removed, provided that a copy of the certificate of burial at Halliwell was signed by the present Vicar and a copy of Mrs Buckley's letter accompanied by a note of explanation from the Commission could be provided, which was sent to him in December 1938. The Rector himself thought that there was 'undoubtedly' a body buried in the grave, and thus requested that the grave be marked as the grave of an Unknown British Soldier.[58]

The second example of a unique case is that of Lieutenant VJ Austin of the Royal Field Artillery. Now buried in Canterbury (St Martin) Churchyard in Kent, he is one of the few repatriations back to the United Kingdom during the war. It is commonly known that, from March 1915, there was a ban on repatriations among the British Empire Forces, but some casualties were repatriated either prior to this order or illegally after the war, with grieving families bearing the cost of this task. It is not wholly clear what the case is for Lieutenant Austin himself, as he was killed at La Bassée on 26 January 1915. The e-file relating to him was initiated by a letter in March 1963 from someone

[56]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/134 (AA44435), Correspondence relating to Gunner WL Buckley of the Royal Garrison Artillery.
[57]Ibid.
[58]Ibid.

undertaking research on his father, Lord Austin, the founder of Austin Motor Company, who wanted clarification of a controversy surrounding Lieutenant Austin's burial.

The researcher had found an account which stated that his remains had been brought over to Folkestone and that he was buried in Canterbury shortly afterwards. The researcher stated that the popular narrative was that, due to the repatriation ban and the impossibility of bringing war dead home, he was smuggled over in a crate of spare parts. While this could be seen as quite a far-fetched narrative, the researcher noted that there were a number of eyewitnesses to this act, which challenged how the story was portrayed in the press.[59] A contemporary press report, cited by the researcher, had recounted Lieutenant Austin's repatriation to Folkestone from La Bassée in January 1915 and his burial at Canterbury on 8 February, thus contradicting the alleged illegal nature of the repatriation. Due to the confusion from the writer regarding the exact date when the repatriation ban was imposed, there was also some confusion regarding whether this was illegal at the time or not.[60] After some delay the Commission responded that it could not confirm or deny any of this as they did not include such information in their records. Although it is clear from contemporary sources that Lieutenant Austin was repatriated prior to the ban and there was no need for his body to be smuggled back hidden in spare parts, the later embellishments to the story makes for fascinating reading and demonstrate the range of queries the Commission had to address.

Lieutenant Austin's case was one of a small sample of individuals repatriated to the United Kingdom, but his story has garnered some attention due to his background as the son of the founder of Austin Motor Company, Lord Austin. His repatriation and funeral in England were used as an example by Sir Albert Ball, in a letter to the Commission from June 1918, as to why he should be allowed to bring his son, the fighter ace Captain Albert Ball VC DSO and 2 Bars MC, home to be buried near to the family. Lord Austin and Sir Albert Ball were friends and Sir Albert had been invited to attend the funeral of his friend's son at Canterbury in 1915. Following the war when the Commission were consolidating British graves into the large cemeteries we know today, Sir Albert refused permission to move his son's grave if he could not be returned to England, a request the Commission could not agree to.[61] Whilst it may

[59]CWGCA, CWGC/8/1/4/1/1/145 (AA5958), Correspondence relating to Lieutenant VJ Austin of the Royal Field Artillery.
[60]Ibid.
[61]More information can be found in the files relating to Albert Ball in the Commission's Archives in Maidenhead. They include information surrounding Captain Ball VC's repatriation, the family's refusal to have him concentrated to Cabaret Rouge

never be clear the exact circumstances of Lieutenant Austin's repatriation, it provides a captivating narrative surrounding why the repatriation ban was imposed and the repercussions of this.

To bring this article to a close, it is clear that the sites along the former battlefields that are synonymous with the Commission's work had a profound impact on the British public's understanding of the organisation's remit, when the reality is far more complex. As shown in the case of sites across Great Britain, the Commission often had to resolve the issues it faced here alongside the families as many had already taken ownership of and marked the grave. This provided a series of common complications, from understanding who was entitled to a war grave to looking at ways to alternatively commemorate casualties with private memorials whose name was no longer legible. The Commission's clear guidelines were often challenged in these cases, which meant that some flexibility was required on their part to ensure that their monumental task could be done. This flexibility is largely confined to the United Kingdom, and thus provides an interesting aspect of First World War commemoration in Britain that both challenges and extends the current discussions surrounding this topic. Indeed, the cemeteries and memorials found in the United Kingdom can provide a unique insight into the Commission's work, and an interesting case study into broader funerary practices for the dead of the two World Wars. These insights are outside of the scope of this article but it is hoped that the discussion into this fascinating topic is just beginning.

The article focuses on some of the stories to be found within the e-files that have been digitised thus far. These narratives are generally representative of the wider discussions surrounding the Commission's work in the United Kingdom and begin to highlight some of the constraints the Commission worked under in resolving matters in Britain. Broader research and discussions need to be conducted on the topic prior to conclusions being made surrounding the impact of these decisions, but by exploring these stories and beginning research into these localised histories it is clear that the commemorations in the United Kingdom both conform to and challenge the public's expectations of a 'typical' Commission site. The flexibility shown by the Commission in Britain highlights the importance of the history that can be found locally, and in particular its importance in relation to our understanding of First World War commemoration. By challenging popular narratives that have been a fundamental part of the historiography in recent decades, a broader understanding of the topic can be achieved, and local history can be explored further. It is hoped that this research will encourage people to remember to visit their local war dead, and not solely focus on nearby war memorials and the cemeteries found near to the former battlefields.

Cemetery and other ephemera. CWGCA, AGE 6/6 PT. 1 (uncatalogued), Correspondence between the IWGC and the family of Captain A Ball VC.

Destroyer Flag-Flying Visits, Civic Ceremony, Empire and Identity in interwar Britain

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ABSTRACT
The interwar period in Britain saw the Royal Navy performing multifarious duties aimed at reaffirming Britain's naval supremacy and reinforcing a sense of national and imperial unity. As one of the most fascinating and versatile ships, the destroyer had grown to capture the imagination of the British public through tales of courage, heroism and daring. Destroyers conducted many post-war cruises and exercises, and visited numerous regional locations performing mock battles, lighting displays, launches, pageants, sporting events and commemorations. These were ceremonial and interactive events reflecting a symbiosis between naval culture and civilian society. This article explores these regional ceremonies and pageants which showcased the destroyer and considers the agency of the ship in forging symbolic links between local communities, the nation, and the wider empire.

Introduction

The post-war economic climate in Britain immediately following the First World War left little resources or appetite for the grandiose naval reviews of the pre-war period; the substantial loss of life had rendered them too 'morally problematic.'[1] The Royal Navy had largely turned its attention to national recovery so that in 1919 the Admiralty designated the principle preoccupation of the destroyer was in 'showing the flag where it had not been since before the war' and 'preserving order and protecting British subjects.'[2] The work of destroyers' crews in quashing episodes of civil unrest

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[1]Jan Rüger. *The Great Naval Game*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 255.

[2]Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty. *Explanatory of the navy estimates, 1919-1920,* 1919. Cmd. 451. Vol. 33 [Online] Available from: https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1919-022769/usgLogRstClick!!?accountid=13268 Accessed 2 July 2021.

and aiding industrial recovery saw ships attached to locations such as Liverpool, Ireland and Wales, where they formed a military presence against rioters and strikers.[3] In addition, destroyers undertook vital duties such as transporting mail and food, whilst crews took over the operation of dockyards and coal mines.[4] Despite such issues with 'social discipline' and some anti-imperialist sentiment, the sailors called upon to replace industrial workers were not viewed with the resultant distrust of authority as the other military forces employed in civil control at this time.[5] Rather they received praise for their ability to turn their hands to a number of tasks in keeping the business of daily life going. Performed throughout 1919-1920, these duties left little opportunity for 'exercises, cruises and ceremonies.'[6]

There were, however, a number of poignant ceremonies of which the destroyer played an important part directly following the war, such as the use of HMS Rowena in transporting the body of nurse Edith Cavell back to England in May 1919 amidst an elaborate ceremony.[7] Later, in November of 1920, the body of the Unknown Warrior was transported to England aboard HMS Verdun, with the ship subsequently bearing a commemorative plaque.[8] In both examples, the role of the ship in conveying the bodies of those who had become symbols of the allied cause, served to imbue the destroyer with a poignant significance as a representative of the intrinsic role of the navy in both war and peace. In these ceremonies, the contribution of the destroyer as a symbol of commemoration and homecoming subtly underlined the way in which the navy could stir navalist sentiment with public display. Jan Rüger has argued that the supposed lack of naval celebrations in the years following the First World War was a symbolic representation of the perceived small role that the navy had ultimately played in the outcome of the war.[9] Indecisive action, such as that at Jutland, had somewhat overturned the image of the navy as invincible. However, in tactical appraisal, the work of destroyers and other escort vessels had proven to be a standout success.[10] In fact, destroyer attacks at Jutland were appraised as 'worthy of the highest traditions' of the

[3]*Dundee Evening Telegraph,* 5 August 1919, *The Aberdeen Daily Journal,* 24 September 1918.
[4]*Explanatory of the navy estimates, 1919-1920*
[5]Bernard Porter. *The Absent-minded imperialists: empire, society and culture in Britain,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 268-281.
[6]*Explanatory of the navy estimates, 1919-1920*
[7]*The Illustrated London News*, 24 May 1919.
[8]*The Leicester Daily Post*, 11 November 1920.
[9]Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*, p. 259.
[10]The War Cabinet, *Report for the year 1918*, 1919. Cmd, 325, Vol. 30. [Online] Available from: https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1919-022655?accountid=13268 Accessed 2 July 2021.

navy.[11] The prestige bestowed upon destroyers led to their considerable involvement in acts of 'showing the flag'. The destroyer had come to be an effective U-boat deterrent, safeguarding vital trade routes and protecting the British coast; symbolising security, innovation and the endurance of navy and the nation. The role and reputation of the destroyer led to the epithets of 'the sentinel of Britain' and the 'link in the chain of empire', and their appearance in many regional locations reinforced the pervasive influence that the navy had upon the farthest reaches of the British Isles.[12]

This article addresses the perceived lack of public naval spectacle in the interwar period, making the case for the continued culture of public naval ceremony in the form of destroyer visits and localised events that contributed to civic culture and identity formation. Rüger's assertion that destroyers and smaller ships were just token gestures 'propped up for display' somewhat disregards their role in the immediate post war period.[13] In fact, destroyers proved extremely popular sights during cruises and visits of the interwar period, attracting thousands of spectators. Considering this popularity, there is a lack of scholarship that addresses the agency of the destroyer as a symbolic vessel in the development of interwar culture and identity. Furthermore, the pervasion of localised naval pageantry into civic culture, especially during the interwar period, is a topic which deserves much greater attention to aid the understanding of the relationship between national identity and the navy at that time. Daniel Owen Spence has reflected upon the ubiquity of the navy throughout the British Empire suggesting the use of 'internal campaigns waged by smaller vessels' encapsulated Britain's 'omnipresence' and fostered the 'spread of British ideology'.[14] In using the destroyer for localised flag-flying campaigns the omnipresence of the navy was certainly felt within Britain. The symbolic role of specific ships has been explored by both Jan Rüger, exploring Dreadnoughts in the Edwardian period, and Ralph Harrington who considers the cultural impact of the battlecruiser HMS Hood.[15] These historians have set a precedent for the in-depth study of naval ships as tools for

[11]Official Dispatches, *Battle of Jutland 30th May to 1st June 1916.* 1920, Cmd. 1068, Vol. 29. [Online], Available from https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1920-023942?accountid=13268 Accessed 2 July 2021.
[12]*The Nantwich Guardian*, 23 February 1915, *The Weekly Telegraph*, 2 November 1935.
[13]Rüger, *The Great Naval Game,* p. 259.
[14]Daniel Owen Spence, *A History of the Royal Navy: Empire and Imperialism,* (London: I B Tauris, 2015), p. 1.
[15]Jan Rüger, 'The Symbolic Value of the Dreadnought', in Robert J Blythe, Andrew Lambert, Jan Rüger (eds), 'The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age', (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 9-18.; Harrington, Ralph. 'The Mighty Hood: Navy, Empire, War at sea and the British National Imagination 1920-1960', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 38, (April 2003), pp. 171-185.

negotiating British culture and identities, which this article will build upon in its consideration of the destroyer as a symbolic connection between navy, nation and empire.

Commemoration and post-war ceremonies

The staging of 'past rituals' immediately following the war was difficult in the 'face of new realities' about the navy and the world.[16] It is a fair assumption that for a nation that had lost many of its men in conflict, jingoistic pageants were particularly distasteful. Anne Summers goes further stating that popular militarism and large scale pageantry waned after 1918 because of the horrors of war quashing any 'defensive ideology'.[17] However, Rowan Thompson identifies this was not necessarily the case as celebrations of militarism and navalism continued throughout the interwar period in various 'institutional, cultural and popular' expressions.[18] This article supports Thompson's assertions that many studies do not consider the impact of militarism in popular culture past 1914 and suggests this 'muted' militarism, in the form of localised pageantry and destroyer visits, perpetuated a navalist culture. Rüger also highlights that a resurgence in historical and militarised pageantry which occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, was a means of propaganda to promote tradition, imperialism, and unity.[19] Emma Hanna goes further to suggest that the 'cult of the navy' was just as pervasive in the interwar period, demonstrated by naval pageants of the 1930s.[20] Importantly, interwar naval pageantry, ceremony and public displays provided a 'crucial platform' for navalist organisations to reinvigorate and 'narrate the navy's place in post war Britain.'[21]

A desire to memorialise and commemorate the war triggered public rituals which negotiated the aftermath of conflict, exploring patriotism, pride, and tradition as tools for local and national cohesion. In the examination of interwar pageants, Angela Bartie *et al*. note that pageants were often part of a spectrum of peace celebrations in 1919

[16]Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*. p. 260.
[17]Anne Summers. 'Militarism in Britain Before the Great War'. *History Workshop Journal* 2, 1, (1976), pp. 104-123, (p. 121).
[18]Rowan G. E. Thompson, 'The peculiarities of British militarism: The air and navy leagues in interwar Britain', unpublished doctoral thesis, (Northumbria University, 2019), p. 3.
[19]Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*, p. 269.
[20]Emma Hanna, 'Patriotism and pageantry: representations of Britain's naval past at the Greenwich Night Pageant, 1933', in Quintin Colville and James Davey (eds), *A new naval history*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019), pp. 215-231 & p. 220.
[21]Thompson, 'The peculiarities of British militarism', p. 266.

which forged a 'sense of collective belonging.'[22] Illustrating this, Liverpool awarded the freedom of the city to Admiral David Beatty in early 1919. An historical pageant was arranged for the occasion including 'two destroyers of a powerful new class', which stressed the centrality of the city to the nation and empire, and drew thousands of spectators.[23] Interesting parallels can be evidenced between the protests and rioting of returning servicemen in response to such public spectacles examined by Bartie et al., and the industrial unrest also occurring in Liverpool at the time of Beatty's pageant.[24] The war had proven to be 'unsettling' for the different demographics now working within Liverpool's industrial sectors, compounded by a rise in trade unionism and anti-imperialist sentiment.[25] For a city with strong ties to the navy and so reliant on overseas trade, Admiral Beatty's ceremony aimed to refocus the sense of identification with the naval heritage of the city demonstrating that even in times of social crisis, the navy remained a constant.

It was not only Liverpool that received destroyer visits to mark the contribution of the local community. In April of 1919, the destroyers HMS Velox and Watchman visited the industrial town of Preston, Lancashire. The ships travelled up the river Ribble and moored in the Albert Edward Dock where they were greeted by representatives from the 'Vegetable Products Committee' who had provided the crews of destroyers with fresh vegetables during the war. The vessels were navigated right up to the dock, which was deemed important for allowing attendees to see the ships in close proximity, and they were welcomed by the mayor with patriotic songs such as 'Red, White and Blue' being played by a local boy's home band. The men received dinner at the Guildhall, entertainments, and free theatre shows and tram travel. The mayor acknowledged that local prosperity would not have been possible were it not for the work of destroyers in supporting the 'important military centre' of Preston, stating

> We recognise that it has been what has been called the unswerving vigilance of the British Fleet in protecting our own coasts and effectually blockading the ports of the enemy that has made it possible - but we are given to understand your presence here is an acknowledgment of the work this town has done in ministering to the comforts of the Navy.[26]

[22]Angela Bartie, Linda Fleming, Mark Freeman, Tom Hulme, Paul Readman, and Charlotte Tupman, '"And Those Who Live, How Shall I Tell Their Fame?' Historical Pageants, Collective Remembrance and The First World War, 1919-39", *Historical Research* 90, 249 (2017), pp. 636-661. (p. 640).
[23]*The Scotsman,* 28 March 1919.
[24]Bartie et al., p. 643.
[25]Porter, pp. 268-269.
[26]*The Lancashire Daily Post*, 3 April 1919.

The occasion highlighted a symbiotic relationship between the visiting destroyers and the townspeople due to their mutually beneficial role in supporting each other during conflict. Moreover, the impact of the war on the communities in Lancashire had been substantial, somewhat challenging the local sense of identity partly founded on military association. By demonstrating a naval connection with the people of Preston it was hoped that some of that militaristic character might be rekindled.

Later that year, the Atlantic Fleet commenced a cruise beginning on 2 September 1919 which included various stops around Britain.[27] During a visit of HMS Thanet to the Thanet region of Kent in December 1919, reciprocal ceremonial plaques were exchanged between the mayor and Thanet's crew which symbolised a 'fresh link' between the navy and the Isle of Thanet. The occasion suggested a particular affinity between seaside towns and the navy because of the reliance upon the sea for tourism and fishing industries. This affinity was cemented by the recent naming of the ship as a tribute to 'Thanet's behaviour under air raids and bombardments.'[28] In doing so, the residents of Thanet could feel a sense of local pride and contribution expressed in the actions of the crew and ship. Much like, as Brad Beaven notes, companies of men originating from one locality 'embodied a local patriotism', this common naming practice which materially linked a town with a ship and its crew, encouraged the celebration of civic pride and identity.[29] The residents of Margate and Ramsgate made presentations of silverware to the officers and a ceremony took place at the town hall, emphasising the centrality of the civic space in the naval celebration.[30]

A grandiose spectacle

Although these initial commemoration ceremonies were popular with local communities, as more time passed, they gradually began to make way for carnivalesque occasions including popular entertainments, regattas, sports and imperial celebrations, reminiscent of the popular festivities at fleet reviews. In 1924 a regatta committee in Sandown on the Isle of Wight requested the presence of destroyers to bolster attendance at their sports competitions. HMS Winchester and HMS Tarpon contributed 'very materially to the sport of the day', and the 'destroyer crews helped to make good sport' in the special matches and tournaments which had been arranged.[31] This regatta proved to be for the benefit of highlighting local sporting

[27] *Explanatory of the navy estimates, 1919-1920*
[28] *Sunday Pictorial,* 14 December 1919.
[29] Brad Beaven, 'The Provincial Press, Civic Ceremony and the Citizen-Soldier During the Boer War, 1899–1902: A Study of Local Patriotism', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 37, 2 (2009), pp. 207–228 & p. 218.
[30] *The Observer,* 14 December 1919.
[31] *The Evening News,* 14 August 1924.

prowess and exemplified how aspects of civilian culture dictated the function of the destroyer visit, going as far as to suggest that the ships and their crews embraced 'typical carnival conditions' and the dispensing of naval routine.[32] This type of visit, where the destroyer was specially requested to fulfil the demands of the local civic elites, reflected the developing symbiosis between civic celebrations and naval pageantry.

A resurgence in cruises and visits at this time was partly in response to anxieties over imperial unity and inspired not only the Fleet Review of 1924 but the Empire cruise in that same year[33] The 1924 review was the 'greatest assembly of warships' since 1914 and boasted 200 ships arranged in spectacular formation at Spithead.[34] King George V made his way through 'inspecting' the lines of ships from the Royal Yacht amidst aerobatics displays and presentations to representatives from the Dominions. The year-long Empire cruise of the Special Service Squadron, beginning in November 1923, included visits to countries across the empire with 'a view to encouraging trade, to foster Dominion interest in naval matters and to give His Majesty's ships more experience of long-distance cruises.'[35] Ceremonies, rituals and the public display of naval power embodied by the ships, served as tools to project the navy as a 'common bond of empire' and the ships as 'a link with the Mother Country.'[36] Despite mixed reactions to the cruise, with many questions raised over the ethics of colonialism, it had set a precedent for the use of ships as symbolic bonds to unite divergent notions of identification. In a speech given by Admiral Beatty in Belfast the year before, the navy was reaffirmed as the quintessential representative of the might of the British Empire.[37] This speech, in reinforcing the value of the navy in forging national and imperial unity, was exemplary of much of the rhetoric that surrounded destroyer visits at the start of the 1920s. Beatty stated,

> They [the navy] were not only a fighting service. They were an ambassadorial service. Wherever the white ensign flew there was security, there was a connecting link between those far-flung portions of the empire and the motherland, and it was their proud privilege in the navy to feel and to know that

[32]Ibid.
[33]John C. Mitcham, 'The 1924 Empire Cruise and The Imagining of An Imperial Community', *Britain and the World*, 12, 1, (2019), pp. 67-88 (p. 69).
[34]*The Daily Mail Atlantic Edition*, 28 July 1924.
[35]*Hansard,* H.C. Deb 18 March 1924, vol.171 col. 201-406. [Online] Available from: https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0171p0-0002?accountid=13268 Accessed 2 July 2021.
[36]Mitcham, pp. 67-68.
[37]*The Hampshire Telegraph and Post*, 1 June 1923.

> they were as much a peace service, in enabling the empire to band together, as they were a war service in protecting the empire.[38]

Concurrent to these public rituals, there was an increasing demand for visiting destroyers and numerous requests were made each year to the Admiralty, resulting in a strict application system. On 17 June 1924, the first and sixth destroyer flotillas visited Liverpool, for which a range of entertainments were provided, such as golf, tennis and theatre shows. At a luncheon attended by 'prominent citizens', the mayor suggested that 'the Admiralty for too long had neglected the city' and that to 'increase the love for the navy it would be by more frequent visits of the fleet to the port.' Rear Admiral George Henry Baird informed the mayor that the limitations of the Washington Conference dictated the size and number of ships available, making the infrequent visits of destroyers all the more important to the citizens of Liverpool, particularly 'as the greater part of British food and raw material came by the sea, Liverpool people would know how difficult it was to protect 80,000 miles of trade routes.'[39]

Two weeks later, the fifth destroyer flotilla anchored in the Thames around Kent; HMS Malcolm, Vivacious and Voyager anchored at Gravesend, HMS Wryneck and Walrus at Northfleet, and HMS Vampire and Waterhen at Greenhithe. The ships anchored in these relatively small towns proved to be extremely popular with residents owing to the infrequency of such visits. The much larger flotilla leader HMS Osborne was opened to the public, and held a 'fascination all its own.'[40] *The Midland Telegraph* in contrast reported that the interest stirred from these regional visits was good for local patriotism but even the view of destroyers in the Thames could not 'add a fathom to the depth of the sea or make the Thames estuary such a suitable anchorage for the fleet as Spithead.[41] Criticism was atypical as many news reports described localised visits as particularly impactful, appealing to people outside of port towns. Indeed, the *Daily Mail* praised these summer cruises stating, they 'enable our landsmen to obtain a heartening glimpse of the sure shield which keeps invincible guard over our islands and our trade routes; the only regret is that owing to the exigencies of the navy's multifarious duties such visits are necessarily few.'[42] The recurrent complaint that visits were not frequent enough indicated an increased appetite for such spectacles.

[38]Ibid.
[39]*The Manchester Guardian,* 17 June 1924.
[40]*The Daily Mail,* 9 July 1924.
[41]*The Midland Daily Telegraph,* 7 July 1924.
[42]*The Daily Mail,* 9 July 1924.

Honing links with regional communities

To further encourage the relationship between the navy and coastal communities, the presentation of gifts and even charitable acts became popular alongside a growth in the scale of visits from the late 1920s. Spence has examined the impact of the presentation of gifts within colonial territories, however the exchange of symbolic gifts was also used to signify material connections within Britain too.[43] In addition to such exchanges, significant attempts were made to nurture the relationship between communities and the visiting ship by emphasising the integrity of the navy to local industry and culture which led to celebrations of a distinctly local character. Trips to Manchester had been suspended during the First World War but the visit of the sixth destroyer flotilla in 1929 was the 'best peep-show Manchester had seen for a decade' and reportedly attracted over 40,000 visitors to the ships.[44] Spectators were described as practically possessed when overwhelming crowds tried to board ships; crushing several people, causing women to faint, and sending two boys and a sailor overboard. *The Manchester Guardian* suggested that the public were especially thrilled to see the ships that year because they formed a literal representation of taxpayer investment in the navy, stating 'The taxpayer, puffed with so much climbing, stared at his own torpedo and didn't know back from front. [The visit] reassured the taxpayer that his money doesn't all go in paint and polish and tricky gold braid.'[45] The perception that naval resources were often diverted inappropriately was not unfounded. In 1919, there were reportedly naval ports 'crowded with destroyers' that were entirely obsolete, but whose outward appearances were maintained, and stores replenished at a significant cost. This situation, which saw thousands of men engaged in superfluous work, had supposedly 'become a joke', even amongst the Admiralty.[46] The formal programme of elaborate entertainments for the visit to Manchester was deemed a façade for the heart-felt embracing of the navy within the city, a 'cloak' which revealed how 'commercial Manchester took the sailors to its smoky bosom.'[47] A close affiliation subsequently continued between the city of Manchester and destroyers for the remainder of the interwar period, which saw visits by flotillas evolve into extravagant five-day festivals including historical pageants, sports and imperial celebrations. The *Manchester Guardian* recognised the value of the 1932 visit of the fifth destroyer flotilla as part of 'showing the flag' and its promotion of naval and imperial interests.[48] The visits were carefully designed to show just how important the city was in 'the

[43]Daniel Owen Spence, *Colonial Naval Culture and British Imperialism, 1922-67,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), p. 89.
[44]*The Daily Mail,* 29 June 1929.
[45]*The Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1929.
[46]*The Pall Mall Gazette,* 11 August 1919.
[47]*The Manchester Guardian,* 20 June 1929.
[48]*The Manchester Guardian*, 18 June 1932.

contribution made by the locality to the national story.'[49] It is possible that the visit aimed to curry favour within the predominantly left-wing demographics of the city who generally opposed naval re-armament with anti-war and anti-imperialist sentiment.

In 1929 four destroyers, including HMS Windsor and Vidette, conducted an 'at home' ceremony and reception in Aberdeen for 250 guests. Officers entertained local dignitaries aboard the ships and there was an exchange of gifts between the crew and Lady Provost Lewis. The men had crafted decorative ribbons representing the ships flags and made a wreath to lay on the city's war memorial. The act of laying the wreath was, in contrast to the ceremonies earlier that day, both simple and informal and was not attended by many spectators. This 'spontaneous' and 'human' incident generated much respect for the crew as they had acted without the prompting of the officers and 'quietly' returned to their duty of showing large crowds around the ships.[50] Later in 1934, the people of Exmouth presented HMS Exmouth with a gift following the naming of the ship as a tribute to the town. It was felt that the naming of the ship would encourage a strong bond with the community and proved successful when they raised funds to have a commemorative plaque on board, which was later turned down in favour of using the funds for the accommodation of sailors during a subsequent visit.[51]

Local philanthropists had gone to some lengths to present the ship with a gift to mark their contribution, in this way a piece of the town could travel with the ship, representing a tangible link. Similarly, in Hartlepool in October of 1936, the local community had raised money to repay the crew of HMS Echo following a successful visit. The cheque for £3 10s was sent back from the commander to the mayor of Hartlepool 'in appreciation of the courteous hospitality extended to the officers and men of the destroyer' expressing the money should be donated to the Hartlepool Crippled Children's Guild.[52] The exchange of gifts and fundraising in these examples highlighted how greater attempts were made to establish a firm bond between the ship and the community, but the refusal of funds was considered an appropriate gesture of goodwill and deflected concerns over the escalating cost of such visits.

An increased variety in the scheduled proceedings of such visits into the 1930s was in part due to changes in training and cruising policy in 1931 which allowed individual captains greater autonomy in their coastal cruises. The First Lord of the Admiralty expressed concern that a 'too highly organised fleet routine' had developed and that

[49]Bartie et al, p. 656.
[50]*The Aberdeen Press and Journal,* 24 June 1929.
[51]*The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette,* 16 November 1934.
[52]*Northern Daily Mail,* 19 October 1936.

captains should be able to decide on independent cruises of which the time at sea was to be considerably extended.[53] The extension of the cruise hoped to allow the crew to become more familiar with their ship and shipmates to acquire 'that feeling of intimate knowledge' for which the navy prided itself. Furthermore, in fulfilling this quest for 'intimate knowledge' it was decided that destroyers and other smaller vessels were unequivocally much better suited for the job because 'on a big ship, with a limited cruising time, every minute is precious, and suitable attention cannot be given to young entrants.'[54] Destroyers were well-known for the closer camaraderie and abilities of their crews to adapt to any operational task, which was certainly expressed not only in seafaring but as naval representatives and tour guides in their ambassadorial roles.

In July 1931, several destroyers of the V and W class visited Bridlington and Whitby. The occasion included a multitude of displays and entertainments and the towns were crowded with thousands of visitors in which the crew enjoyed dances, teas, and church services whilst the ships were decorated with bunting to welcome a mayoral party.[55] In return for the town's hospitality, the crew of HMS Vesper held a tea party for 700 local children aboard ship as a gesture of appreciation. Entertainments in Bridlington were enjoyed by local residents and sailors alike; the vast programme including 'festivities, games, fireworks and searchlight displays, dances, special programmes on the Princes Parade and places of amusement.'[56] This epitomised the significant expansion in the scale of events surrounding a visit, especially the inclusion of fireworks and searchlight displays from the destroyers. Colourful lighting displays had previously been a part of reviews and pageants signalling an 'innovation in stagecraft' but advances in technology aboard destroyers made the lighting display even more spectacular.[57] For example, in 1933 HMS Windsor provided a display of new types of lighting. The report of the display suggested, 'It seemed to come from outside the vessel and the hull, from waterline to deck, was bathed in light, as well as the masts, funnels and bridge….so far as is known, a ship has never been lighted in this way before. Certainly, as a spectacle, the experiment was completely justified.'[58] Lighting displays were certainly spectacular, but they also encapsulated the unique combination of demonstrations of technology and popular entertainment, which characterised the naval theatre.

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[53]*Hansard,* H.C Deb 7 March 1932, vol.262 col.1453-1608. [Online] Available from: https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0262p0-0011?accountid=13268 Accessed 2 July 2021.
[54]Ibid.,
[55]*The Yorkshire Post*, 6 July 1931.
[56]*The Yorkshire Post,* 4 July 1931.
[57]Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*, p. 115.
[58]*The Daily Independent,* 8 August 1933.

Later in 1937, several destroyers visited Cardiff for celebrations which included an exchange of gifts between the crew and dock representatives and various dances and tours for disadvantaged children. These charitable donations or the entertaining of children now occurred frequently as a part of the visits, possibly to stifle concerns over the diversion of public welfare funds to naval armament. For example, in 1934, George Henry Hall, the Labour MP for Aberdare, had expressed the discontentment in his constituency that money spent on armament was 'hampering the economic recovery' and 'retarding the advance of social reform' because a road or nursery school cost the same as a destroyer.[59] In Hall's comparison the ship symbolised a misplaced opportunity to spend funds for the real public good, consequently visits were not just about proliferating navalist ideologies, they were exercises in public relations. The Cardiff visit targeted the disadvantaged demographics, demonstrating that the navy were considerate of social and welfare issues within the polity, currying favour to keep the public attuned to the pressing need for rearmament. Furthermore, the Mayor's speech went some way to reinvigorate support for the navy, suggesting their complacency had maligned any local dependence on the protection of imperial trade, stating,

> Navy Week makes us pause to think of things we are usually too much inclined to take for granted. We bring away the haziest of recollections of much of our sightseeing, but we find it difficult to forget those great maps of the world with their crowded shipping tracks of Empire trade routes. The pull of ships and the call of the sea are as strong as ever they were, however, little we can explain them, it springs from instinct little more than the average physiological allowance of salt. Those trophies had been presented by people in gratitude for help afforded them by the Navy in times of distress…- and they showed us how much the Navy counts in peacetime.[60]

Sailor James Craig recalled these destroyer visits and cruises as requiring of months of preparation for which he took part and conducted tours and ceremonies aboard HMS Mackay. The 1938 destroyer regatta included races and football matches at Portland before trips to various ports in Africa, Iran, Tangiers and Malta. Upon the ship's return, it embarked upon a tour of the British coast, of which Mr Craig fondly remembered their stay in Weymouth. His experience of 'showing the flag' included taking visitors around the ship in groups of ten and delivering a scripted tour which was very popular with the public. He attributes this partly to the fact the public could meet a seaman and see the ship for themselves; and also due to the fact that the navy

[59]*Hansard,* H.C Deb 14 March 1935 vol. 299 col. 533-734. [Online] Available from: https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0299p0-0004?accountid=13268 Accessed 2 July 2021.
[60]*The Western Mail and Southwest News,* 30 June 1937.

was held in continuously high regard after the war. The fact that the tour was free was also quite an inducement. Subsequently, the Fleet Review in September of that year was the conclusion of a whole summer of exercises visiting holiday resorts, conducting rowing races and doing gunnery practice.[61]

Rearmament and the display of sea-power

Despite the distinct carnivalesque atmosphere that had developed surrounding the destroyer visits and civic ceremonies, these occasions were a highly visible expression of naval power, employing manoeuvres, fake battles and displays of modern technology. As Rüger states, mock battles and activities for amusement were 'never divorced' in these public displays.[62] Given general anxieties over the strength of the fleet in the interwar period, a display of power in such exercises aligned with the interwar policy of showing a deterrence rather than providing defence.[63] In addition, rapid construction of larger and heavily armoured destroyers in the programmes of 1935 and 1937, provided a number of the most modern and powerful destroyers ever built; a demonstration of naval strength and investment.[64] Whilst cruisers and battleships have typically been considered to be the embodiment of naval power, the innovations in destroyer construction represented a readiness to meet the diverse demands and strategic challenges of modern naval warfare. The establishment of a tactical school to evaluate the lessons of First World War naval strategy, particularly that of destroyers, led to significant convoy exercises and 'imaginary fleet actions' in the 1920s.[65]

Practice manoeuvres were valuable training exercises and powerful displays of new technology; therefore, it was particularly fortuitous to invite important colonial dignitaries to view the spectacle. This conveyed the investment that had been made in naval technology and reassured global premiers that the navy was indeed an imperial service. In a fake battle in 1928, King Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan was treated to a 'spectacular display' on the occasion of his visit to Britain. This included a display of destroyers fighting submarines using 46 vessels, of which the *Western Mail* reported,

[61]Imperial War Museum (hereinafter IWM) 27727, James Craig interview.
[62]Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*, p. 115.
[63]Eric J Grove. 'A War Fleet Built for Peace: British Naval Rearmament in the 1930s and the Dilemma of Deterrence versus Defence'. *Naval War College Review,* 44, 2 (1991), pp. 82-92 & p. 82.
[64]Grove, p. 87.
[65]Arthur Marder. 'The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914-1918.' *Pacific Historical Review,* 41, 4 (November 1972), pp. 413-443 & p. 416.

> The flagship sent out a message to the anti-submarine destroyers that hostile submarines had been sighted, and the King was thrilled by the spectacle of the destroyers racing to his rescue and dropping depth charges on the spot where the enemy was supposed to lurk beneath the waters. The fact that the battleships, cruisers and destroyers were enshrouded in mist only made the spectacle more impressive. The greatest excitement of the day was when the Nelson was attacked by the destroyer flotillas. The first line of destroyers rushed up to within 700 yards…King Amanullah said it had been one of the most thrilling episodes of the day.[66]

These demonstrations of fire power were particularly exciting aspects of any visit, but for an audience in a regional coastal town this may have been their only interaction with warships in action. Given the role of the destroyer in protection against submarines, their use of torpedoes and relative fast speed, this made for an especially dramatic and theatrical display. Rather like the depictions of naval battles in the work of official war artists, fake battles and speed trials provided a romanticised and glorified snapshot of the work of destroyers for curious spectators. Most importantly, the conduct of practice manoeuvres and battles brought the theatre of war into the realms of civilian society and reminded regional communities that in the arena of conflict, Britain was protected by the national, imperial and global force of the navy. The theatrics of such events were sometimes heightened by the presence of the Monarch, such as the visit of King George V to a practice battle in Weymouth in 1932, when destroyers demonstrated their 'concentrated firepower' by 'attacking' the battle squadron.[67]

Further speed trials and tests of new technologies as a part of cruises and visits demonstrated that there had been a significant attempt to strengthen the navy and improve its capabilities. Not only would residents in Britain's coastal towns be reassured that the navy could defend their doorway to the rest of the world; these displays were a powerful deterrent, which as Michael Markowitz notes, ships as symbols of power are only effective when displayed to both 'reassure friends and to deter potential adversaries.'[68] The associated visits still included the popular entertainments such as ship tours, sports and civic ceremonies, but increasingly the demonstration of fire power took centre stage. In 1933, the newly built HMS Cygnet underwent speed trials near Rosyth. Whilst this was not unusual at an established naval base, the incorporation of the trials into a destroyer regatta was fitting of the theatrical spirit that surrounded the conduct of such manoeuvres. *The Scotsman*

[66]*Western Mail,* 4 April 1928.
[67]*The Daily Mail*, 14 July 1932.
[68]Michael Markowitz. 'Fleet Naval Reviews: A Short History'. *Maritime Affairs: Journal of The National Maritime Foundation of India* 11, 2 (2015), pp. 1-8 (p. 1).

reported that 'Although we are anchored, however, the day is by no means over, and boat crews have been turned out for enthusiastic regatta practice while the opportunity offers. The destroyers have a separate regatta from the big ships.'[69]

Although destroyer visits and the staging of mock battles were mostly well received and proved extremely popular, there was some localised opposition to the now vast expenditure on ceremonies and the entertainment of sailors. Particularly, workers unions and Labour Party members in industrial cities were aware of what Bartie et al. have termed 'social control', in that after the First World War wealthy organisers aimed to force a sense of imperial and national cohesion through pageantry which only served to reinforce a sense of hierarchy.[70] Bartie et al. state, 'Civic elites believed that these events would showcase the past glories of town, city and nation, and foster civic pride in the present.'[71] These displays were, after all, highly politically charged demonstrations of authority and military power. A hierarchical relationship between civic elites and spectators in which the didactic staging of naval traditions and imperial discourse, certainly contributed to unrest during some destroyer visits. In Manchester in May 1932, protests occurred at the docks opposing the naval visits and associated celebrations. The Labour Party expressed that such displays should be abandoned, as naval ceremonies were at odds with the climate of disarmament in Britain.[72] *The International Labour Defence,* which instigated the protests, cited that mass unemployment was increasing and welfare funds shrinking, whilst vast sums of money were expended on the entertainment of sailors 'whose real purpose was to make the navy seem attractive to young men so that they might be induced to join it.'[73] For some local residents, the display was an inducement to war, and not a celebration of the navy in peacetime. As Rüger has highlighted, just because public spectacles occurred and were attended by vast number of visitors, does not necessarily mean that the public supported the navy or its promotion of empire.[74] Rather social pressures of not wanting to appear unpatriotic and the benefits of attending naval celebrations, such as public holidays and popular entertainments, most likely attracted a fair portion of the visitors.[75]

Ship Launches

In contrast to the ostentatious launch ceremonies of battleships and cruisers attended by large crowds, destroyers rarely had grandiose launching ceremonies. In fact, on

[69]*The Scotsman,* 17 May 1933.
[70]Bartie et al., p. 659.
[71]Ibid.
[72]*The Manchester Guardian,* 14 May 1932.
[73]*The Manchester Guardian,* 27 June 1932.
[74]Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*, p. 118.
[75]Rüger, p.115.

several occasions, such as the launch of HMS Escort, 'only a few officials were present' and there was 'no official ceremony.'[76] However, from around 1932 ceremonies, including launch patrons, for destroyers gained popularity. The role of the launch patron, often a female relation of a naval officer or politician and a recognisable dignitary, was to give a speech and bestowed good luck upon a new vessel directly before its launch. Whereas the launch ceremony of a new battleship or cruiser was charged with ideas of physical power, the launch of a destroyer was not solely about creating an imposing image but more about representing the strengthening of the foundations which bolstered the whole fleet.

To some extent, destroyers were the expendable pawns; yet they also represented the backbone of naval operations, and therefore embodied the integrity and combined strength of Britain and its empire. These themes were especially evident at the launching of Tribal class destroyers which took place from 1937 onwards, however prior examples of launches from around 1930 stressed the symbolic importance of the destroyer in fostering imperial relationships. In 1930, the launch of HMCS Skeena for the Royal Canadian Navy included a ceremony conducted by Mildred Bennett, the sister of the Canadian Prime Minister. In contrast, HMS Brilliant launched just the day before and constructed for the Royal Navy, received no naming ceremony and was attended only by shipwrights, demonstrating the launch of the Skeena to be a means of publicly displaying unity with Canada. As discussed below, the role of colonial representatives in the launch of the Tribal class vessels from 1937 specifically symbolised links with the wider empire through formal naming ceremonies.

The naval construction programme of 1931 instigated a number of symbolic launches which emphasised connections between destroyer construction and the industrial prosperity of the region. Most ships of this programme were launched between 1932 and 1934 which triggered an increased number of launching ceremonies conducted by prominent launch patrons. Due to the large number of destroyers constructed at regional shipyards and the creation of thousands of jobs, the launch of a new ship symbolised the bolstering of the local economy and the continuance of traditional skills and trades. Ship launches have been explored by Rüger as 'rituals' which brought together ideas of gender, religion, monarchy and navy to form influential pageants in the public naval theatre.[77] The launch ceremony was just one aspect of the naval theatre that reiterated imperial and national unity with its naval traditions, blessings from imperial dignitaries, and religious practices, uniting 'otherwise divergent senses of identification and nationhood'.[78] Lady Eyres Monsell conducted the ceremony for

[76] *The Daily Mail,* 30 March 1934.
[77] Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*. pp. 31-36.
[78] Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*. p. 197.

HMS Defender and HMS Daring in 1932.[79] Her speech accompanying the double launch highlighted the link between local industry and the destroyers, stating 'The long association of Thornycrofts with torpedo craft construction is emphasised by the fact that the Daring is the third British destroyer of this name built by the firm.'[80] The launch was also good for local morale as it was reported that a lack of orders left 23 berths empty and the state of shipbuilding was 'not bright'.[81]

Similarly, in 1934 HMS Encounter was launched from Hawthorn Leslie. The managing director of the firm said the ship marked the future prosperity of the town through the continued association with the navy, stating he 'rejoiced that the government was going to spend £2,000,000 on extending the navy, first of all because they were British, and secondly because it provided an opportunity for more work on Tyneside and the distribution of large sums of money in wages.'[82] Later in June of that year, HMS Foresight was launched at Birkenhead. Lady Brown, wife of Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Brown, conducted her first naming and launching ceremony on the occasion which was celebrated with an opulent luncheon given by local civic representatives. In the conduct of the launch Lady Brown made a short speech of thanks, and her husband said that he hoped the vessel would live up to the traditions of its famous namesake. The mayor and an executive of Cammell Laird expressed the view that the ship symbolised the saviour of the company and the local shipbuilding industry from disaster as 'it had been the means of giving employment to thousands of men who would otherwise have been unemployed, and more than that, it had been the means of preserving their skill.'[83] For these industrial cities with a strong reliance upon shipbuilding trades, the launch of a destroyer was a celebration of the employment and economic benefit brought about by the increasing number of ships under construction.

Colonial representatives were sometimes invited to attend ceremonies and launches as a demonstration of imperial unity, a practice which had begun at the start of the century.[84] Whilst these launches, ceremonies and naming practices aimed to encourage a sense of shared imperial identity, they also stressed a hierarchy in which Britain was the head of an imperial family.[85] Several references to the 'imperial family' and 'family gatherings' emphasised unity but also supported the existence of a familial

[79]*The Times,* 15 March 1932.
[80]*The Times,* 8 April 1932.
[81]Ibid.
[82]*The Times,* 31 March 1934.
[83]*The Liverpool Echo*, 29 June 1934.
[84]Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*, p. 177.
[85]Ibid.

hierarchy which was subsequently mirrored in the size and status of different vessels.[86] In April 1939 a writer in the *Naval Chronicle* asked, 'What part do warships' names play in Empire, unity, national prestige, regional patriotism, and naval spirit?' concluding that ships named after locations were symbolically important to national and imperial unity and 'preference should be given to territorial and place names'.[87] Capital ships best represented the 'imperial parents' in their embodiment of power and innovation, whilst smaller ships represented the 'sons and daughters' of the imperial family.[88] Rüger asserts that 'battleships specifically' were a means of projecting 'imperial sentiment', and as such were afforded names 'designed to foster the link between mother country and colony' such as Hindustan, Dominion and Commonwealth.[89] As Spence notes, in 1911 the name HMS Maori was rejected when the King Edward VII class battleship HMS New Zealand was renamed to allow the name to be used for the new Indefatigable class battlecruiser then under construction, because it was 'inappropriate to name a capital ship after a 'native people'.[90] Spence goes on to suggest that it was deemed more appropriate by the Admiralty to assign 'native' names to destroyers as they would follow but never lead a fleet, representing a subordinate place in the imperial hierarchy.[91] Furthermore, destroyers had been compared in 1916 to a group of unruly and sickly children to be corralled by an obsolete cruiser, the mother ship; emphasising the perceived subordinate role of the destroyer utilising the familial metaphor. The *Dundee Courier* of 1939 stressed that destroyers were simply not suitable to bear the names of 'distinguished' individuals for more than just their smaller size, but also due to their possible 'mundane' work.[92]

The naming of the Tribal Class destroyers aimed to gain the 'allegiance of these peoples to the Empire', for instance in the case of HMS Ashanti, the Ashanti people of Ghana.[93] Spence highlights a tour of West Africa by the ship in 1939, filmed for the purposes of imperial propaganda, which captured the Ashanti people marvelling at their namesake vessel and portraying them as still in need of 'Britain's paternalistic guidance'.[94] In this, the ship was an important tool for stressing imperial unity but also conveyed a sense of British superiority and influence. In numerous launch ceremonies the links between various indigenous peoples and the empire were expounded. HMS Sikh was launched in Glasgow in December 1937 with a naming ceremony performed

[86]*Northampton Daily Echo*, 1 October 1939; *The Advertiser,* 24 December 1937.
[87]*Hampshire Telegraph & Post and Naval Chronicle*, 6 April 1939.
[88]Ibid.
[89]Ruger, p.176.
[90]Spence, *Empire and Imperialism,* p. 126.
[91]Ibid.
[92]*The Dundee Courier* 3 May 1939.
[93]*The Scotsman,* 6 November 1937.
[94]Spence, *Empire and Imperialism,* p.149

by Lady Allia Abbas Ali Baig. The ship was said to symbolise the role of Sikh people in 'maintaining peace in the Empire' of which 89,000 individuals fought in the First World War.[95] As hundreds of Indian soldiers were reportedly on standby in China to protect peace in the Empire, so too were the new flotilla of destroyers which bore their namesake.[96] The following day, HMS Punjabi was also launched with an equally auspicious ceremony in which the High Commissioner for India highlighted the ship's forthcoming career in 'preserving the peace of the world' and commemorating the sacrifice of 38,000 lives that the Punjabi people had sacrificed during the First World War.[97] Sir Firozkhan Noon, who named the ship after his province, wished it 'a long and successful career in preserving the peace of the world' just as 500,000 Punjabis had done.[98] Furthermore in 1938, HMS Gurkha received a bronze trophy from Major General C H Powell, a representative of the Gurkha brigade, in recognition of the work of twenty Gurkha battalions.[99]

At the time, the Tribals represented the biggest and most powerful destroyers ever constructed for the Royal Navy and it was claimed that HMS Afridi, named after the Afridi people originating from Pakistan and Afghanistan, could be 'reliably counted upon' to counteract 'the super destroyer of certain Continental Powers'.[100] The application of martial race theory in the selection of ship names is particularly significant in understanding the role of the destroyer as symbolic of imperial identities. In assigning names of the perceived martial races, the ships were imbued with warlike qualities yet considered subservient when compared to the battleships at the head of the fleet. To this end, the image and status of the powerful Tribal class destroyers were aligned with martial races and this was reinforced through a succession of naming ceremonies and material links which stressed the connection between ship and people. Whilst these examples only hint at the broader role of the navy in navigating imperial relationships and identities of the interwar period; this has suggested how destroyers had their own part to play in publicly symbolising and reinforcing imperial relationships.

Conclusion

The destroyer visit was borne out of operational exercises but quickly became an incredibly popular and much requested aspect of local culture, that reached its zenith in the 1920s and 1930s. The possibility of going aboard a ship and seeing the navy at work was an exciting spectacle for many people in locales that existed outside of dockyard towns and encouraged a culture of associated ceremonies and spectacles

[95] *Northern Daily Mail*, 17 December 1937.
[96] Ibid.
[97] *The Lancashire Daily Post,* 18 December 1937.
[98] Ibid.
[99] British Pathe, *Presentation to HMS Gurkha,* 24 November 1938.
[100] *The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette*, 29 April 1938.

which embraced sailors into the heart of the community. By exploring the ways in which destroyers were used in the conduct of regional visits, ceremonies and pageants, this article has demonstrated that destroyers were an influential exponent in the development of a localised naval theatre which explored and negotiated local, national and imperial identities. Despite the tendency of some historians to focus upon the obvious projection of power by large ships in fleet reviews, this article has shown how the destroyer symbolised the combined power of Britain, the navy and the empire.

A visiting ship could act as a site for ceremonies, civic culture and naval celebrations which created tangible links between the ship and local people. However, many of the associated ceremonies, pageants and entertainments surrounding a visit were organised and funded by wealthy civic elites, which led to discontentment amongst some portions of society over misspent public funds. Despite these pockets of resistance to naval pageantry, communities were largely encouraging of such visits as a means of feeling connected and supportive of the work of the navy. By examining how the presence of a destroyer in visits or ceremonies impacted upon civilian culture and civic celebration, this article has highlighted one way in which the navy remained a deeply engrained part of British culture and identity formation in the interwar period. In turn, a rise in the celebration of civic identity and pageantry in the interwar period encouraged more frequent and much more elaborate destroyer visits which explored the central role of the community to the work of destroyers in national and imperial defence. Cruises of coastal resorts saw the increasing role of the civilian from spectator to participant. The use of destroyers in localised ceremonies had helped to successfully proliferate naval theatre beyond the war and renegotiated the place of the navy in a subtle yet pervasive way.

'Going downhill': the consequences of the Stabilisation Scheme on Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain and into 1941

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ABSTRACT
By September 1940 the quality of pilots supplied to Fighter Command had become unacceptably low. Reducing earlier stages of training was meant to be replaced by increased Operational Training Unit instruction, but this merely provided conversion to operational type. To preserve the first-line fighter force Fighter Command adopted a 'Stabilisation Scheme', relegating a third of squadrons to a training role. Pilot demand remained high and the Stabilisation Scheme was retained until pilot numbers in first-line squadrons were finally satisfactory in June 1941, and the need for training squadrons disappeared, despite increases in flying accidents during 1941.

Introduction

On 7 September 1940 a meeting took place at RAF Bentley Priory, the headquarters of Fighter Command.[1] By September the quality of pilots provided to Fighter Command from Operational Training Units (OTUs) had fallen to an unacceptable level and drastic measures had become necessary to preserve the first-line fighter force. This meeting is represented to a reasonable degree within the historiography, although

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[1]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA): AIR 16/330, Air Ministry: Fighter Command; Registered Files, Reinforcement of No. 11 Group, Minutes of a Conference held at Headquarters, Fighter Command, on Saturday 7 September 1940.

the level of detail varies. All accounts agree on the reclassification of the squadrons within Fighter Command.[2] Several convey the difficulty that the other participants had in persuading Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Sholto Douglas, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff that the pilot crisis was real and immediate action was essential.[3] Predictably, the defensive and selective Douglas memoir does not mention either the meeting or classification of squadrons at all, although the Douglas despatch does acknowledge the decline in operational pilot quality and squadron classes.[4] The historiography also reflects the understated insistence of Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Hugh Dowding in the meeting minutes that his command had to prepare 'to go downhill'.[5]

In order to understand how this situation developed, it is necessary to go back to before the Second World War began, to give context to both the long and short-term developments of the Royal Air Force (RAF). This article shows how the processes of continuity and change within British pre-war air power policy and practice during the expansion of the RAF led to training resources being compromised due to shortages of aircraft and crews. Despite attempts to rectify deficiencies, the enormous demand for pilots following the fall of France required drastic measures to increase pilot production. These amendments increased the proportion of training carried out at the operational conversion stage, at the expense of earlier stages of training. As the quality of pilots supplied to Fighter Command deteriorated, a 'Stabilisation Scheme' was implemented to manage resources which enabled daylight operations to continue. While demand for casualty replacement fell after the end of the Battle of Britain, squadrons continued to be inundated with trainees from OTUs so that they became congested with non-operational pilots. After the Stabilisation Scheme was formally rescinded in December 1940, the pilot supply crisis was considered to be over. Despite the formation of additional OTUs to improve pilot supply, several factors combined to aggravate the pilot shortage. This meant that pilots joining squadrons during the first half of 1941 still required further training before they could be

[2]Stephen Bungay, *The Most Dangerous Enemy,* (London: Aurum, 2000), p. 297; Richard Hough and Denis Richards, *The Battle of Britain – The Jubilee History,* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989), p. 251; Francis K. Mason, *Battle Over Britain*, (London: McWhirter Twins,1969), p. 355; Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, *The Narrow Margin*, (London: Arrow, 1969), p. 220.

[3]Peter Flint, *Dowding and Headquarters Fighter Command,* (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1996), pp. 111-112; James Holland, *The Battle of Britain,* (London: Bantam, 2010), pp. 529-531; John Ray, *The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives*, (London: Arms and Armour, 1994), pp. 90-91.

[4]Sholto Douglas, *Years of Command,* (London: Collins, 1966) and Sholto Douglas, 'Air Operations by Fighter Command from 25 November 1940 to 31 December 1941', *The London Gazette*, 16 September 1948, Number 38404, p. 5021.

[5] TNA, AIR 16/330, Minutes of a Conference on 7 September 1940, p. 1.

considered as operational, effectively reintroducing the Stabilisation Scheme. As the year progressed the accident rate remained high, prompting an increase in the length of courses to reverse the deterioration in the standard of training. The implications of, and reasons for this scheme, have been largely ignored or misunderstood in the historiography of the Battle of Britain.

The Pre-War Expansion of the RAF

Despite being seen as an era of 'appeasement', the expansion of the RAF had begun in 1934, but Scheme 'A' which was to give the Metropolitan (UK based) Air Force twenty-eight fighter squadrons by April 1939 had made little progress by the spring of 1935.[6] In order to achieve air parity with Germany, a ministerial committee reported that this scheme should be expanded to contain thirty-five fighter squadrons, and accelerated to give a completion date of April 1937. After the Cabinet approved the committee's report in June, the Air Ministry were then committed to fulfilling the requirements of Expansion Scheme 'C'.[7] John Ferris has described British air defence as 'planned for a bad case but not the worst case', against an enemy flying across the North Sea rather than being based on the other side of the English Channel.[8] By 7 November 1938 fifty squadrons of fighters had been sanctioned under the full 'ideal' scheme.[9] Between 1936 and 1938, however, the British aircraft industry fell eighteen months behind those of Germany and the United States in monoplane development so that the RAF received no modern aircraft during this period, which impacted British air expansion.[10] Fighter Command remained at a nominal strength of thirty squadrons until the autumn of 1938. At this point a further eight squadrons were to be formed under the intermediate stage of the 'ideal' scheme by April 1940. Expansion Scheme 'M' then replaced this to require forty-four squadrons by April 1939, before starting to form ten more in the year beginning April 1940. This was intended to allow the Command to spend the intervening year discarding obsolete types for the monoplane fighters expected to be available by that date.[11] By September 1939 only twenty-two of the thirty-nine Fighter Command squadrons had received their monoplane fighters

[6]T. C. G. James, *The Growth of Fighter Command,* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 18. Expansion Scheme 'A' also allowed for forty-seven bomber squadrons as well as those for fighters. Further reference to Expansion Schemes in this paper exclude bomber figures for the sake of clarity.

[7]James, *Growth of Fighter Command*, p. 20.

[8]John Ferris, 'Achieving Air Ascendancy: Challenge and Response in British Strategic Air Defence, 1915-40', in *Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo*, eds. Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 21-50, p. 42.

[9]James, *Growth of Fighter Command*, p. 37.

[10]Ferris, 'Achieving Air Ascendancy', p. 43; Sebastian Ritchie, *Industry and Air Power: The Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935-1941,* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997), p. 258.

[11]James, *Growth of Fighter Command*, p. 41.

and the formation of another eighteen fighter squadrons equipped with inadequate machines further exacerbated the shortage of suitable aircraft.[12]

The Impact of Expansion on Pilot Supply

Expansion of the Royal Air Force was obviously not limited to aircraft: without pilots to fly them the schemes would be pointless. In 1938 it was calculated that there would be a deficiency of 720 regular pilots by April 1940 that could not be corrected until September 1940. To address this problem, eight new Flying Training Schools (FTSs) were required, but since the personnel to man these would have to be drawn from squadrons in the first-line, concern was expressed at the impact on operational efficiency, so the number of extra FTSs was cut down to four.[13] The difficulty of simultaneously expanding Fighter Command while remaining an effective fighting force can be demonstrated by the position in September 1938. Only five of the twenty-nine squadrons were using modern equipment, the Hurricane, although three more would soon receive this type.[14] The problems of equipment pale into insignificance compared to the reserve pilot position. Only 200 out of the total pilot reserve of 2,500 were fit to join service units immediately. While the others were brought up to the required standard of training, the replacement of casualties in operational commands would be impossible.[15] Inter-war planning had paid careful attention to wastage and training, but as this planning was for a 'bad case', it assumed that home defence fighter squadrons would be outnumbered by two or perhaps three to one, from across the North Sea. The fall of France and the Low Countries meant that in the summer of 1940 Fighter Command faced four times its strength, described by Ferris as being 'next door'.[16] The shortage of modern aircraft meant that only a minority of pilots were trained to fly them because such types had only just become available.[17] The conversion of the large number of fighter squadrons still operating obsolete aircraft at the beginning of the war did not allow an increase in the reserve of suitably trained pilots.

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[12]Denis Richards, *Royal Air Force 1939-1945*, Vol. I, (London: HMSO, 1953), p. 65.

[13]TNA, AIR 41/4, Air Ministry: Air Historical Branch Narratives, Flying Training 1934-1942 (1945), pp. 142-143.

[14]The Hurricane had entered service in December 1937 and would not be in widespread service until December 1938. The Spitfire entered service in August 1938, but was not yet operational, and widespread service would not be achieved until September 1939. The third of the initial 'monoplane generation' fighters, the Defiant, would not be in service until well after war was declared: Francis K. Mason, *The British Fighter Since 1912,* (London: Putnam, 1992), pp. 254, pp. 258-259 & pp. 268-269.

[15] James, *Growth of Fighter Command*, pp. 42-45.

[16] Ferris, 'Achieving Air Ascendancy', p. 43.

[17] Ferris, 'Achieving Air Ascendancy', p. 43.

The Introduction of Operational Training

By May 1938, however, the Chief of the Air Staff, ACM Sir Cyril Newall, had recognised the need for training units to bridge the gap between FTS and operational squadrons. This was to be achieved using 'lighter types' of modern aircraft with similar characteristics to those in use at the squadrons.[18] In November 1938 the role of these new units was expanded beyond training to be used as pilot pools for the replacement of casualties in both Bomber and Fighter Commands. Priority was given to Fighter Command for the first two of the new units, now known as 'Group Pools', to serve No. 11 and No. 12 Groups exclusively.[19] It was acknowledged that trained replacements were 'an urgent necessity' for Fighter Command as it would be obliged to respond to enemy attacks, and was unable to limit casualties by reducing operations in the same way that Bomber Command could.[20] There would, however, be a delay before either Group Pool began training pilots. The first 'extra-ordinary measures' to strengthen Fighter Command were taken in the autumn of 1938 for a possible conflict in the April of 1939. As the 'critical period' was predicted to be the first three or four weeks of war, only a small reserve of fighters could be retained to ensure that line squadrons were at full strength.[21] The Air Officer Commanding of Fighter Command, ACM Dowding, concentrated on increasing first-line strength at all costs in 'working up' to 'full operational pitch'. Shortage of time and lack of modern aircraft meant that Fighter Command was the only Command to oppose plans forming special training units for operational training.[22] No. 11 Group Pool therefore only began operating in March 1939.[23] The Air Ministry pointed out that the absence of Fighter Group Pools would lead to a shortage of casualty replacements when the intensity of fighting increased, and that operational training aircraft could be used to reinforce the first-line in an emergency. Fighter Command therefore 'reluctantly agreed' to the formation of the No. 12 Group Pool in September 1939. Both Pools together were, however, only capable of producing half of the planned output of 1,100 pilots per year.[24] It is not difficult to argue that Dowding faced an impossible choice; either he continued to increase the number of first-line squadrons to meet the requirements of Scheme 'M' at the expense of operational training, or he slowed down the rate of expansion to provide aircraft for training, which would cease as soon as those aircraft were used to

[18]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 162. It was found that the only aircraft with 'similar characteristics' were those in use by the operational squadrons.
[19]James, *Growth of Fighter Command*, pp. 50-51.
[20]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 230.
[21]James, *Growth of Fighter Command*, p. 50.
[22]TNA, AIR 41/71, Air Ministry: Air Historical Branch Narratives, Flying Training, Vol. II, Organisation, Part III, Operational Training (1952), p. 817.
[23]James, *Growth of Fighter Command,* p. 51.
[24]TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 819.

reinforce the first-line. Either course of action could be seen as the wrong decision and was guaranteed to lead to criticism.

The 'Phoney War' and the Aftermath of the Campaign in Western Europe

During the 'Phoney War' the Group Pools struggled to meet the requirements of the fighter squadrons in France. This led the Air Ministry to overrule Fighter Command's objections about the diversion of resources to the operational training organisation at the end of April 1940.[25] The true rate of combat wastage during the Battle of France has been demonstrated by Peter Dye; nearly 1,000 aircraft were lost in a month, close to the losses predicted for maximum-effort operations.[26] Altogether 396 Hurricanes and 67 Spitfires were lost outright during the French campaign, with nearly 280 fighter pilots killed, missing or taken prisoner, while another sixty were wounded.[27] Following the fall of France, the enormous demand for pilots prompted sweeping changes within Training Command to increase output. Initially this was attempted by posting pilots from Service Flying Training Schools (SFTSs) a week before the end of the course. During May fifty-two fighter pilots were obtained by this method, but clearly much greater numbers would be required in the future months.[28] By 20 June 1940 there were fifty-eight squadrons in Fighter Command, compared to forty-seven on 10 May. These numbers were, however, deceptive, as twelve of the squadrons were unfit for operations. In addition, thirty-seven of the remaining squadrons had no more than thirteen aircraft on strength compared to the required sixteen initial equipment establishment. Only nine squadrons within Fighter Command were therefore at full strength. It was to be 'well into July' (with the Battle of Britain officially starting on 10 July) before all Fighter Command squadrons were fit for operations, but already a pilot deficiency of nearly twenty percent of establishment was apparent.[29] The fighter OTU course had been reduced from four to two weeks in the last week of May, and while this increased the number of pilots produced, the training became little more than a conversion to operational type. With insufficient OTU capacity available it was necessary for operational squadrons to take significant numbers of pilots straight from SFTS for conversion and training.[30] A series of amendments to training (the First to Third Revises) were then used to further reduce the course length of pilot training,

[25]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 246-247.

[26]Peter Dye, Logistics Doctrine and the Impact of War: The Royal Air Force's Experience in the Second World War', in *Air Power History*, eds. Cox and Gray, pp. 207-223, p. 219.

[27] James, *Growth of Fighter Command*, p. 98.

[28] TNA,TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 309.

[29] James, *Growth of Fighter Command*, pp. 98-99. The start date of the Battle is as defined in Basil Collier, *The Defence of the United Kingdom*, (London: HMSO, 1957), pp. v-vi.

[30] TNA,TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 497-498.

consequently introducing a fundamental deficiency into the training system which would continue throughout 1941.

The Training 'Revises'

For the First Revise, in June 1940, the Elementary Flying Training School (EFTS) course was reduced by a week to seven weeks, with a fifteen percent increase in pupil numbers and the SFTS course (for fighter pilots only) cut by four weeks to twelve, with twin-engine OTUs to operate a fourteen-week course. To accommodate the larger flow of pupils it was intended to increase the number of aircraft at each School to provide 100 hours of training, but this was not possible so the SFTS course was reduced to eighty hours per pupil.[31] The Second Revise in August 1940 shortened all SFTS courses to twelve weeks and cut an extra week off the EFTS course down to fifty hours. Since the numbers of training aircraft could not be increased the intention was to transfer a proportion of the instruction displaced from twin-engine SFTS courses to a lengthened OTU course. At the same time, it was also intended that the reduction of the fighter OTU course which had been implemented in May 1940 would be reversed back to four weeks and all pilots passed through an OTU before going to a fighter squadron. By 13 August it was realised that this increase would have to be postponed, so the fighter OTUs continued to provide nothing more than a conversion course.[32] From June 1940, therefore, it had been necessary for all new pilots joining Fighter Command to receive further training in their squadrons, which was still possible during the *Kanalkampf* (Channel Attack) phase of the Battle of Britain. When operations escalated after the *Adlerangriff* (Eagle Attack) phase began this training became difficult, and was then abandoned once 'The Battle of the Airfields' began in late August.[33] The First and Second Revises between them increased the pilot output from the SFTSs by thirty percent, but the Battle of Britain demonstrated that the largest possible output was imperative. The only options to further boost output were to increase the effort from instructors while also providing the SFTS with more aircraft, or make a further cut in the duration of the course.

On 20 August the Third Revise implemented both of these options to increase pilot output. The EFTS course was cut further to five weeks and thirty-five hours flying, while all SFTS courses were reduced to ten weeks comprising seventy-two hours of flying, with no night training. At the same time all SFTSs were to train an additional

[31]Before the reduction in hours, the length of RAF pilot training had already only been eighty percent of the equivalent *Luftwaffe* system, Williamson Murray, *The Luftwaffe 1933-45, Strategy for Defeat* (London: Brassey's, 1983), p. 314.

[32]TNA, AIR 20/2759, Air Ministry: Papers Accumulated by the Air Historical Branch, Vice-Chief of Air Staff; Miscellaneous Papers: Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Replacement of Pilots in Fighter Squadrons, 13 August 1940, p. 2.

[33]Phases of the Battle of Britain follow those from Collier, *Defence of the UK*, pp. v-vi.

twenty-five percent of pupils, with no increase in aircraft or instructors. Air Marshal (AM) Lawrence Pattinson, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of Flying Training Command, questioned whether pilots would be competent enough to handle operational aircraft at OTUs after only 120 hours of combined flying at EFTS and SFTS. He said,

> I consider that pupils with a total of 120 flying hours and with only ten weeks training in the SFTS will not be fit to fly operational types. In my opinion, a reduction to ten weeks would have the effect of increasing flying accident rate and reducing the flying ability of the pilots that were finally passed out of the OTUs.

However, 'a body of opinion' considered the transfer of training to the OTU stage would make no material difference to the final standard, and that Flying Training Command's attitude appeared conservative and reactionary. What mattered was that the theoretical pilot output was now double what it had been in May, which equalled the estimated demands of the first line, giving the prospect of a balanced flow into the OTUs.[34] Although these changes were too late to influence pilot supply during the Battle of Britain, the effects of the Third Revise would be felt by Fighter Command for many months afterwards.

The 'Stabilisation Scheme'

By September 1940 it was clear that the number and quality of pilots within Fighter Command had fallen drastically during the August battles. The demand for pilots meant that OTU course length ceased to have any meaning. Pilots were passed onto squadrons as soon as they were considered capable and the training was completely *ad hoc*. John Terraine argued that 'the RAF's disorderly pre-war expansion' had stretched training resources to the limit, although he does not document the consequences of the struggling training system.[35] As August ended the forty-nine and a half operational Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons were short of 352 pilots based on a twenty six pilot squadron establishment, or a shortage of 154 pilots from a twenty two pilot establishment. No manipulation of the numbers could disguise the fact that 107 pilots within these figures were non-operational, as shown in Table 1.[36]

[34]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 313-315.
[35]John Terraine, *The Right of the Line*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), p. 193.
[36]TNA, AIR 20/2062, Directorate of Operations (HOME); Fighter Command: Miscellaneous Papers, Memorandum on the Pilot Position in British Fighter Squadrons, 2 September 1940, Table A.

Position in Squadrons on Selected Dates		1 August 1940		15 August 1940		31 August 1940	
		H'cane	Sp'fire	H'cane	Sp'fire	H'cane	Sp'fire
Operational Pilots		530	363	512	334	498	330
Non-operational Pilots		125	39	63	41	54	53
Total Pilots (Aircraft)		655	402	575	375	552	383
Total Pilots (Command)		1057		950		935	
Total Non-operational		164		104		107	
26 Pilots	Establish-ment	793	494	793	494	793	494
	Shortage	138	92	218	119	241	111
	Total Shortage	230		337		352	
22 Pilots	Establish-ment	671	418	671	418	671	418
	Shortage	16	16	96	43	119	35
	Total Shortage	32		139		154	

Table 1: Pilot position in Fighter Command, August 1940[37]

The general quality of pilots being provided to Fighter Command from OTUs had fallen to an unacceptable level. Before May 1940 pilots had received twenty eight weeks training before joining a fighter squadron, but after the First Revise this was reduced to twenty one, as shown in Figure 1.

[37]Adapted from TNA, AIR 20/2062, Memorandum on the Pilot Position in British Fighter Squadrons, Table A



Figure 1: Changes to pilot training in 1940

There had already been a noticeable decline in quality amongst replacement pilots from training schools since the fall of France, and in July 1940 out of 107 pilots killed eighteen had been died in flying accidents.[38] A system of Sector Training Flights had previously been used in 11 Group to bring OTU pilots up to operational standards, but the heavy fighting in August made this impossible.[39]

Class	Group	Minimum Pilot Requirements	
		Operational	Non-operational
A	11	Constantly maintained at 16 pilots	N/A
A	10 and 12	16 pilots	As convenient
B	10, 12 and 13	16 pilots	Up to 6 pilots
C	10, 12 and 13	3 pilots (8 for Nos. 3, 232 and 245 Squadrons)	Up to establishment
All Blenheim and Defiant squadrons to be maintained to Class B standard			

Table 2: Squadron Classifications under the Stabilisation Scheme[40]

[38]Bungay, *The Most Dangerous Enemy,* p. 194.
[39]TNA, AIR 16/330, Minutes of a Conference on 7 September 1940, p. 8.
[40]Adapted from TNA, AIR 16/330, Policy for Maintenance of Fighter Squadrons in Pilots, 8 September 1940, p. 1

Following the meeting at Bentley Priory ACM Dowding was forced to use extreme measures to preserve the first-line fighter force and employ a 'Stabilisation Scheme' which categorised his squadrons in such a way that a third of them (C squadrons) were relegated to a training role.[41] Although the normal establishment for fighter squadrons was twenty-six pilots, the scheme prescribed the minimum requirements for each class of squadron as shown in Table 2.[42] Dowding realised that his command was 'going downhill', and that the reduction in unit establishment to consider anything above fifteen pilots as being acceptable would greatly increase the strain on his squadrons.[43] Nevertheless he knew that if Fighter Command could hold on and maintain the front line for a few more weeks, the deteriorating weather conditions would prevent an invasion attempt for the rest of the year.[44] His first-line strength of twenty nine A squadrons (South East England) would be maintained by pilots trained in the nineteen C squadrons shown in Table 3.

Class	Group	Hurricane	Spitfire	Total
A	10	2	2	4
	11	14	7	21
	12	2	2	4
	Total	18	11	29
B	10	1	-	1
	12	-	1	1
	13	2½	1	3½
	Total	3½	2	5½
C	10	2	1	3
	12	4	3	7
	13	7	2	9
	Total	13	6	19

Table 3: Distribution of Squadrons[45]

[41]Richards, *Royal Air Force*, Vol. I, p. 192.
[42]TNA, AIR 41/18, Air Defence of Great Britain (subsequently ADGB), Vol. IV - The Beginning of the Fighter Offensive 1940–1941 (1947), Part 1, Paragraph 59.
[43]TNA, AIR 16/330, Minutes of a Conference on 7 September 1940, p. 6.
[44]Vincent Orange, *Dowding of Fighter Command*, (London: Grub Street, 2008), p. 196.
[45]Adapted from TNA, AIR 16/330, Policy for Maintenance of Fighter Squadrons in Pilots, 8 September 1940, p. 2

Although the major daylight battles were over before this scheme took effect, heavy fighting still continued until the end of October 1940.[46] While the quality and experience of pilots joining Fighter Command from the OTUs was debatable, Peter Dye has demonstrated that the overall strength of Fighter Command continued to increase throughout the Battle of Britain.[47] Although the training of pilots from OTUs was continued primarily in the C squadrons, an analysis by Tony Mansell showed that nearly half of the pilots posted into 11 Group after the Stabilisation Scheme took effect had previously served there, which mitigated the decline in quality, which the standard works on the campaign fail to acknowledge.[48] The deterioration in the overall strength of Fighter Command was, however, clear to those within its headquarters. At the end of July, the Command had fielded sixty two squadrons and 1,046 operational pilots and whilst the number of squadrons had increased to sixty-six and half by the end of October 1940, the number of operational pilots was only 1,042.[49] The controlled decline of Fighter Command envisaged by Dowding meant that he could still field twenty-six A squadrons with two B squadrons in reserve at the beginning of November.[50] Within the historiography, Francis Mason described Dowding's decision to 'milk and dismember' his squadrons as completely vindicated, despite Collier insistence that scheme was 'unwelcome'.[51]

Demand for casualty replacements in A and B squadrons fell after the end of the Battle of Britain, but C squadrons continued to be inundated with pilots from OTUs. At the end of October Fighter Command consisted of 1,506 pilots, but 464 of these were considered as 'non-operational'.[52] The intensity of fighting during the Battle of Britain had demonstrated that sixty two front-line squadrons required a supply of 108 operationally trained pilots per week.[53] The pilot output from OTUs during this period has been estimated at 260 per month, which demonstrates that very few of those

[46]Michael J. F. Bowyer, *The Battle of Britain – 50 Years On*, (Wellingborough: Patrick Stephens, 1990), p. 207.
[47]Peter Dye, 'Logistics and the Battle of Britain', *Air Power Review*, 2000; 3 (4), pp. 14-53, p. 29.
[48]Tony Mansell, 'Dowding and his Manpower. The Case of Hurricane and Spitfire Pilots of the RAF and its Reserves in 11 Group', *Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal*, 22 (2000), pp. 126-131, p. 128.
[49]TNA, AIR 16/374, Fighter Reinforcement of the Middle East, Notes on Pilot Position, Fighter Command, as at 31 October 1940, 2 November 1940, p. 1.
[50]Douglas, 'Air Operations by Fighter Command', *The London Gazette*, Number 38404, p. 5021.
[51]Mason, *Battle Over Britain*, p. 426 and Collier, *Defence of the UK*, p. 250.
[52] TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraph 59.
[53]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 502.

trainees had achieved operational status after reaching a squadron.[54] By November 1940 the C squadrons had become so congested that they held 230 operational and 320 non-operational pilots, an average of twelve operational and seventeen non-operational pilots per squadron.[55] Although Bungay insists that Fighter Command was 40% 'stronger' by November 1940, this calculation is based on total pilot numbers, and not the large number of non-operational pilots.[56] This overcrowding appeared to be addressed by increasing the length of the OTU course to four weeks and transferring some pilots to the Middle East, so that the Stabilisation Scheme could be abandoned in December 1940.[57] Mason provides a table that shows Fighter Command fielding nearly 1,500 aircraft at the end of December 1940, but does not provide the context of how many trained pilots were available, which the analysis above demonstrates problems with continuing supply.[58] Douglas had never really approved of the system, and one of his first acts as the new head of Fighter Command was to rescind it. 'This was a successful expedient but it was bad in principle', commented Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air in a letter to Winston Churchill, 'and you will be glad to hear that the new C-in-C, Fighter Command has decided to abandon it forthwith'.[59] The C squadrons were then able to train the pilots they already had and work towards operational status. The three existing fighter OTUs could not provide enough pilots from four week courses, and as Third Revise pilots would require an extra two weeks of training an expansion of the OTU organisation was essential.[60] Additional OTUs were therefore approved to ensure that pilot supply never fell to critical levels again, including the establishment of the first night fighter OTU in December 1940.[61] This optimistic outlook failed to take into account the consequences of the changes to training implemented during 1940.

The Decline in Pilot Supply During 1940-1941

By January 1941 it was clear there had been no improvement in pilot supply to Fighter Command. In many respects the situation had actually deteriorated. Although the Third Revise was supposed to have produced 1,800 pilots from SFTSs in November

[54]Dye, 'Logistics and the Battle of Britain', p. 29.
[55]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 501-502.
[56]Bungay, *The Most Dangerous Enemy,* p. 368.
[57]TNA AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 825.
[58]Mason, *Battle Over Britain*, p. 481.
[59]TNA, PREM 3/24/2, Prime Minister's Office: Operational Correspondence and Papers, AIR, Pilots, Training Schools, Employment of Pilots, Secretary of State for Air to Prime Minister, 29 November 1940.
[60]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 502-503.
[61]TNA, AIR 41/17, ADGB, Vol. III - Night Air Defence, June 1940 - December 1941 (1949), p. 90.

and December 1940, the reality was completely different.[62] Archibald was politically astute enough to have qualified this estimate with a caution of 'No provision is made for loss of output due to enemy interference or to exceptionally bad weather conditions'.[63] The pilot shortage was aggravated by the combination of several factors which exacerbated the crisis.

Towards the end of December 1940 SFTS units were finding the completion of Third Revise courses difficult. Each SFTS had to produce 7,200 flying hours per month from 108 aircraft. Shortage of spares and winter weather combined to extend courses by several weeks and reduce pilot output, so it would not be until June 1941 that a Third Revise SFTS course was completed within the scheduled ten weeks. By December 1940 lack of spare parts had rendered twenty one percent of SFTS Miles Master aircraft unserviceable. Around the same percentage of advanced trainers would be immobilised by shortage of spares until July 1941 when the situation began to improve.[64] The future supply of advanced trainers was also causing concern. Although the Air Ministry had asked for forty percent of all aircraft produced to be trainers, in January 1941 Sinclair was complaining that this had been reduced to twenty percent and was continuing to decrease. He warned that this was delaying the expansion of the training organisation.[65] As well as the direct effect of bad weather in reducing the hours available for flying, the intensive operation of SFTS grass airfields had caused many to become unserviceable.[66]

Operations at the established OTUs were also disrupted over the winter of 1940-1941. As well as bad weather affecting flying, accommodation was a problem at 57 OTU (Hawarden), where tents had been used during the previous summer.[67] The situation for the new OTUs planned the previous autumn was even worse and none were yet operational. One OTU was held up by construction and accommodation difficulties, while a suitable station could not be found for a second. With the increase in fighter OTU course length, back to four weeks in November and then to six weeks in December, the three established OTUs produced few pilots during the winter of 1940-1941.[68] The combined output of all three fighter OTUs in the first quarter of 1941 was only 471 pilots, giving an average of 157 pilots per unit. Considering it had been previously calculated that 108 pilots per week were required for sixty two

[62]TNA, CAB 66/13/27, Paper No. WP (40) 447, Royal Air Force Training, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air, 15 November 1940, Appendix C.
[63]TNA, CAB 66/13/27, Appendix C.
[64]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 319.
[65]TNA, PREM 3/24/2, Secretary of State for Air to Prime Minister, 5 January 1941.
[66]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 320.
[67]TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 828.
[68]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 504.

frontline squadrons, the average production from each OTU was fewer than forty pilots per week.[69] It would take until April 1941 before all seven day-fighter OTUs were operating, with an obvious lag before pilots were produced, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 2.[70]

Month	No. of OTUS	Intake	% of Total Intake	Output	% of Total Output
January	3	169	3.7	188	5.1
February	4	154	3.3	137	3.7
March	7	312	6.8	146	3.9
April	7	286	6.2	213	5.7
May	7	335	7.3	229	6.2
June	7	468	10.2	411	11.1
July	8	549	11.9	387	10.4
August	8	540	11.7	400	10.8
September	8	503	10.9	475	12.8
October	8	539	11.7	459	12.4
November	8	382	8.3	340	9.2
December	8	370	8.0	326	8.8
Jan - Jun	6	1724	37.4	1324	35.7
July - Dec	8	2883	62.6	2387	64.3
Totals		4607		3711	

Table 4: Intake and output of pupils from fighter OTUs during 1941[71]

[69]TNA, AIR 16/1144, Record and History of Operational Training Units under Nos. 81 and 9 Groups and No. 12 Group: 1 July-31 December 1941, Vol. II, Input and Output of Pupils in 1941, pp. 488-493.
[70]TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 828.
[71]Adapted from TNA, AIR 16/874 and AIR 16/1144



Figure 2: Intake & Output from Fighter OTUS in 1941.

Fighter Command was still forming new squadrons to meet the renewed daylight attacks expected when the Battle of Britain recommenced in spring 1941. AVM Douglas had estimated that eighty squadrons, each with twenty three pilots would be required to meet this threat.[72] By the end of January 1941, however, 300 of the 1,461 pilots in Fighter Command were considered 'not fit for operations'.[73] Douglas had already given up 119 pilots to be trained as instructors by the end of January 1941 and was expected to provide another 100 for the new OTUs forming by the end of March.[74] Although the pilot establishment in fighter squadrons had been set at twenty three at the end of 1940, by this stage the establishment of pilots in fighter squadrons had fallen to about twenty one (compared to an overall average of 22.6 in October 1940), where it remained for the next three months. The decrease in experience continued between November 1940 and the end of March 1941 as Fighter Command lost 219 pilots killed and missing, with another 382 posted out of the Command, many to become instructors.[75] Offensive operations across the Channel between January and June 1941 also cost the Command another ninety three pilots lost, with 74 and 611 Squadrons each losing nine Spitfires on such operations during this period.[76] These

[72]TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraph 62.
[73]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 505.
[74]TNA, AIR 16/491, Training at Operational Training Units, CFS Trained Flying Instructors for OTUs, 18 February 1941, p. 1.
[75]TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraph 60.
[76]John Foreman, *The Fighter Command War Diaries Vol 2: September 1940 to December 1941*(Walton-on-Thames: Air Research, 1998), pp. 130-227.

included the experienced Battle of Britain pilot Squadron Leader John Mungo-Park of 74 Squadron, who was killed on 27 June 1941.[77]

The Reintroduction of the Stabilisation Scheme

The pilots coming from the OTUs were still inadequately trained, as despite the six week OTU course most pilots joining fighter squadrons during the winter of 1940-1941 had only managed to fly between ten and twenty hours in operational aircraft.[78] Lack of experienced pilots was evident as early as October 1940, when the transfer of 64 squadron to 11 Group was cancelled because only one out of four section leaders had 'experience of actual fighting', and seven of the remaining nineteen pilots were not sufficiently trained 'to be considered operational'.[79] At the beginning of February Douglas, who had been promoted to Air Marshal in November 1940, was clearly concerned, acknowledging that pilots needed to have completed 'about 50 hours flying' in an operational type aircraft before they could be considered 'operational'. The majority of recent pilots from OTUs had flown fewer than twenty hours due to bad weather restricting flying time, together with grass runways becoming unusable after heavy rain. Despite previously abandoning the Stabilisation Scheme on a point of 'principle', Douglas admitted that fighter squadrons were once again undertaking 'considerable training', with a further thirty or forty hours flying required before pilots could be classed as operational. With an eye towards the additional squadrons being formed, Douglas argued that 'the only alternative would be to extend the OTU course in excess of 6 weeks which would result in the flow of available pilots into the Command being reduced'.[80]

The Air Historical Branch narrative on operational training had no doubts about this 'virtual reintroduction of the Stabilisation Scheme'.[81] Neither did the Director of Operational Training, who cautioned Douglas on 20 February 1941 that under no circumstances should trainees be withdrawn from fighter OTUs until they had completed twenty hours on operational type. Whilst accepting that bad weather and unserviceable airfields had limited flying time, it was considered that courses should be lengthened to ensure all pilots received the minimum amount of instruction.[82]

[77]Kenneth G. Wynn, *Men of the Battle of Britain* (Croydon: CCB Associates', 1999), p. 366.
[78]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 505.
[79]TNA, AIR 16/330, Reinforcement of No. 11 Group, Operational State of No. 64 Squadron, 15 October 1940.
[80]TNA, AIR 16/491, Air Marshal Douglas to Under-Secretary of State for Air, 7 February 1941, pp. 1-2.
[81]TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 828.
[82]TNA, AIR 16/491, Director of Operational Training to Air Marshal Douglas, 20 February 1941, pp. 1-2.

Training facilities had decreased as units were moved to other parts of the Empire and were weakened further as airfields were handed over to operational squadrons.[83] By 8 February 1941 there were 270 non-operational pilots in Fighter Command, and there were concerns that while rushing pilots through OTUs might raise the establishment strength in squadrons on paper, it would actually lower efficiency by reducing the general standard of training. As the SFTS output was extremely small during this period due to poor weather conditions, the Director was clearly concerned that pilots with even fewer hours on operational aircraft would end up in fighter squadrons.[84]

Douglas responded by insisting that 'squadrons situated in the less active Groups are perfectly capable of accepting a larger number of non-operational pilots than they have at present', which was a perfect description of what had previously been considered a C squadron. He then argued that sticking to a rigid minimum of twenty hours would prevent Fighter Command accepting the full number of pilots available and mean that there would be unused training potential in quiet sectors. Incredibly, he went on to insist that 'passing out pilots from OTUs to squadrons with less than 20 hours will not depress the general standard of training in comparison with the past, because it has been very seldom that a figure of 20 hours per pilot has actually been obtained on passing out from OTUs'.[85] Arguing that the strength of Fighter Command would be reduced if it did not accept partially trained, non-operational pilots that did not increase fighting efficiency appears a singular view of reality at best. By insisting that pilots with fewer than twenty hours would not depress the general standard of training, Douglas ignored the increased importance of operational training in the Third Revise to the completion of overall training.[86] This argument looks even thinner after considering that pilots training at OTUs at the beginning of 1941 under the Third Revise had received seven weeks less training than their predecessors during the Battle of Britain before being introduced to operational aircraft (see Figure 1), something that would come back to concern Douglas.

By March Douglas was still sending pilots to squadrons with fewer than twenty hours flying at OTU, insisting that his squadrons were under strength, and was forming five new squadrons for which additional pilots were required. He was anticipating heavy casualties 'when the spring battle starts' and was 'naturally anxious to have all my

[83]TNA, AIR 10/5551, Air Ministry, Air Publications, Second World War 1939-1945: RAF Flying Training, Vol. I, Policy and Planning, p. 99.
[84]TNA, AIR 16/491, Director of Operational Training to Air Marshal Douglas, 20 February 1941, pp. 1-2.
[85]TNA, AIR 16/491, Air Marshal Douglas to Under-Secretary of State for Air, 24 February 1941.
[86]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 313.

squadrons up to strength and the OTUs full of pupils when this situation arises'. He went on to agree that it was a bad practice to send pupils straight from SFTS to fighter squadrons, and 'I hope that we shall never go back to that state of affairs'. He then insisted that this 'would not have happened last autumn if my predecessor had not set his face for years against forming fighter OTUs'.[87] As none of the reasons given by Douglas could be achieved by padding out his squadrons with partially trained pilots, the motivation behind this policy is difficult to understand. The attack on Dowding perhaps reinforces Douglas's limited understanding of the logistics of pilot supply, which had been highlighted during the 7 September 1940 meeting at Bentley Priory. It should be noted that Douglas had continually interfered with the operations of Fighter Command while he was Deputy Chief of the Air Staff during the Battle of Britain, which points to a wider clash of personalities between the two commanders.[88] The choices available to Dowding from 1938-1940 were limited, and the resources of Fighter Command were barely adequate at the start of the Battle of Britain. What is clear is that in April 1941 Fighter Command had sixty five squadrons with far fewer than twenty three pilots each, six of which were about to be sent to the Middle East.[89] The expected attack would therefore have been met with six more day-fighter squadrons than at the beginning of August 1940, but with only sixty more pilots. It was expected that the average strength of the fifty nine squadrons would be around twenty pilots. It should also be noted that the general level of experience throughout the squadrons was lower than in 1940.[90]

Flying Accidents in Fighter Command During 1941

At the end of April 1941 Douglas was becoming anxious about the number of flying accidents in Fighter Command. Writing to his Group commanders, he highlighted the eighty nine fatal accidents in the previous three months, which corresponded with Douglas beginning to supply squadrons with pilots from OTUs having less than a rigid minimum of twenty hours on operational type. Some pilots had been killed in collisions, which Douglas accepted as a risk during training. Other pilots had flown into high ground in bad weather, with Douglas attributing those accidents to inexperienced pilots needing more instruction and advice on bad weather flying techniques. He finished by urging his Group commanders to pay attention to a high standard of flying discipline and supervision of flying training.[91] As these skills should

[87]TNA, AIR 16/491, Air Marshal Douglas to Air Marshal Garrod, 9 March 1941.
[88]TNA, AIR 20/2062, Fighter Command: Miscellaneous Papers, Air Marshal Douglas to Air Chief Marshal Dowding, 27 August 1940.
[89]TNA, AIR 16/374, Air Marshal Douglas to Headquarters, all Fighter Groups, 12 April 1941.
[90]TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraph 62.
[91]TNA, AIR 16/663, Fighter Operational Records, September 1939-February 1942, Flying Accidents during the First Quarter of 1941, 25 April 1941, pp. 1-2.

have been learnt in the fighter OTUs rather than on operational squadrons, unnecessary deaths could have been prevented if Douglas had not removed pilots from OTUs before they had reached a satisfactory standard of training. Table 5 and Figure 3 summarise fighter pilot casualties in 1941, from both combat and flying accidents:

Month	Combat		Flying Accidents	
	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured
January	6	5	13	6
February	34	12	30	15
March	19	3	31	21
April	21	13	47	15
May	17	8	47	43
June	52	13	37	11
July	94	18	61	4
August	106	14	54	16
September	66	8	65	7
October	52	6	62	12
November	47	4	60	13
December	27	2	66	15

Table 5: Fighter Pilot Casualties During 1941[92]



Figure 3: Pilot Casualties 1941.

[92]Adapted from TNA, AIR 16/663, Summary of Fighter Pilot Casualties: January to December 1941

Although casualties continued to rise throughout 1941, these were from a much larger intake of pilots from OTUs. If total flying accidents for the first and second halves of 1941 are calculated as a percentage of the OTU output, an identical figure of fifteen percent is obtained. Statistics, however, do not tell the whole story as casualty figures for the second half of 1941 categorise operational losses not due to enemy action as flying accidents, which adds uncertainty to the analysis. The underlying accident rate therefore suggests a fundamental deficiency with training in general at this time.

The End of the Pilot Supply Crisis

Douglas had estimated in December 1940 that eighty day-fighter squadrons would be required to counter a renewed daylight air offensive against the UK. By transferring six squadrons to the Middle East in May 1941, the Air Ministry felt that the risk in keeping Fighter Command short of establishment was justified. They reasoned that if the *Luftwaffe* concentrated forces in the west again, experienced pilots could be put through the training organisation to reinforce the defence.[93] The opportunity for Germany to take advantage of the training crisis in Fighter Command was coming to an end, although Hitler's attention was already directed towards the east.[94] The seven day-fighter OTUs doubled their output in May to over 400 pilots, with an average flying time of forty three hours per pilot. The number of pilots produced and the standard of training was at last considered satisfactory, and the need for training squadrons finally disappeared.[95] By June Douglas was able to supply sixty four pilots for Middle East squadrons, while having an 'appreciable surplus of pilots available to form an additional twelve fighter squadrons'.[96] As shown in Table 6 and Figure 4, squadrons would continue to be formed throughout 1941 and some, especially Hurricane squadrons, were steadily posted overseas. The number of pilots within fighter squadrons rose significantly in the last quarter of the year, with concern being expressed that the delays in expanding Fighter Command meant that insufficient aircraft were available to keep the surplus of pilots generated in flying practice.[97]

[93]TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraphs 63-65.
[94]Horst Boog 'The German Air Force' in *Germany and the Second World War*, Vol. IV, *The Attack on the Soviet Union*, eds. Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffman, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991), pp. 326-376, p. 326.
[95]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 506.
[96]TNA, AIR 16/374, Air Marshal Douglas to Under-Secretary of State for Air, 7 June 1941, p. 1.
[97]TNA, AIR 16/491, Minutes of a Meeting held at the Air Ministry on 29 September 1941, 31 September 1941, p. 1.

DATE	AIR-CRAFT	TOTAL NO. OF SQNS FORMED OR FORMING		I.E. PER SQN	TOTAL I.E.	A/C SERVICE-ABLE (+/- I.E.)	PILOTS ON EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	PILOTS FULLY OPERATIONAL (% OPERATIONAL)	
07.02.41	H'icane	38	60	16	608	625 (+17)	895	722 (81%)	83%
	Spitfire	22		16	352	329 (-23)	429	378 (88%)	
07.03.41	H'icane	39	63	16	624	665 (+41)	903	761 (84%)	86%
	Spitfire	24		16	384	371 (-13)	459	407 (89%)	
04.04.41	H'icane	37	60½ (2½)	16	592	637 (+45)	884	748 (85%)	84%
	Spitfire	26		16	416	410 (-6)	497	410 (82%)	
02.05.41	H'icane	36	64	16	560	587 (+27)	787	663 (84%)	84%
	Spitfire	28		16	448	440 (-8)	600	509 (85%)	
30.05.41	H'icane	30	63	16	480	512 (+32)	678	594 (88%)	86%
	Spitfire	33		16	528	542 (+14)	666	571 (86%)	
04.07.41	H'icane	28	70	16	448	506 (+58)	698	N/A*	
	Spitfire	42		16	672	566 (-106)	743	605 (81%)	
08.08.41	H'icane	30	73	16	480	544 (+64)	643	542 (84%)	78%
	Spitfire	43		16	588	675 (+87)	962	713 (74%)	
05.09.41	H'icane	30	74	16	400	538 (+138)	741	539 (73%)	78%
	Spitfire	44		16	704	690 (-14)	999	821 (82%)	
03.10.41	H'icane	28	72	16	448	476 (+28)	704	551 (78%)	78%
	Spitfire	44		16	704	746 (+42)	1130	877 (78%)	
07.11.41	H'icane	13	67	16	208	237 (+29)	460	317 (69%)	75%
	Spitfire	54		16	864	833 (-31)	1420	1102 (78%)	
02.01.42	H'icane	12	65 (5)	16	192	195 (+3)	332	234 (70%)	75%
	Spitfire	58		16	928	890 (-38)	1582	1200 (76%)	

Table 6: Single engine fighter strength: 07 Feb 1941 TO 02 Jan 1942[98]

*No figure available for fully operational Hurricane pilots on 04.07.41

[98]Adapted from TNA, PREM 3/29/4, Prime Minister's Office: Operational Correspondence and Papers, AIR, Strength of Fighters and Bombers (I), Other Daily, Weekly and Monthly Returns, Weekly State of the Metropolitan Air Force (Part 1), 07.02.41-02.01.42.



Figure 4: Single Engine Fighter Strength.

Conclusions

The introduction of the Stabilisation Scheme in September 1940 allowed Fighter Command to manage a rapidly dwindling number of trained pilots and maintain effective operations against daylight attacks, a situation that has been either trivialised or completely ignored in the historiography. The approach of autumn meant that such a scheme, described by Dowding as 'a thoroughly vicious principle', was only intended as a short-term measure.[99] As winter began and the threat of invasion passed, the Stabilisation Scheme was abandoned, despite the large number of ineffective pilots still in Fighter Command in December 1940,. Changes to training courses and the expansion of the OTU network was meant to ensure that pilot supply would never again become critical. The output from OTUs remained low during the winter of 1940-41, due to bad weather, unserviceable airfields and a shortage of training aircraft.

The number of ineffective pilots in Fighter Command continued to increase, prompting the reintroduction of the Stabilisation Scheme. The shortage of effective pilots prevented the formation of planned additional squadrons, delaying the expansion of

[99]TNA, AIR 2/5246, Air Ministry: Registered Files, Enemy Air Offensive against Great Britain: Attacks on England from 11 September-31 October 1940: No. 11 Group Report, Air Chief Marshal Dowding to Under-Secretary of State for Air, 15 November 1940, p. 1.

Fighter Command. The Fighter Command order of battle in April 1941 therefore contained fifteen fewer day-fighter squadrons than Douglas had considered necessary in December 1940. In this respect the legacy of the Stabilisation Scheme was that it slowed down the rate that Fighter Command expanded, which fortunately never had to be put to the test by a second Battle of Britain. With a renewed invasion attempt seen as no longer realistic, six fighter squadrons were sent to the Middle East in May 1941. By June the output of the day-fighter OTUs was at last satisfactory, and the second Stabilisation Scheme ended. The numbers of trained pilots continued to rise to the point where concern was raised that insufficient resources were available to maintain flying practice.

The long-term consequences of the Stabilisation Scheme were eloquently summarised by the author of the AHB narrative on operational training:

> The situation in Fighter Command in 1940, when over one-third of the squadrons were relegated to what was, in effect, a training organisation, is a further instance of the struggle between immediate operational requirements and the long-term needs of training. Had it been possible to establish an adequate OTU organisation, so that pilots from SFTSs did not have to go straight from Harts to Spitfires (an instance is recorded of a pilot arriving at a squadron having flown only a Tiger Moth) accident rates – to say nothing of operational losses – would have been lower, and there would have been a considerable reduction in operational aircraft requirements.[100]

Although this analysis was intended as a comment on the situation in 1940, the same conclusions also apply to the continuation of the Stabilisation Scheme into 1941 where the accident rate illustrated its continuing validity. Analysis of aircraft written off during 1941 demonstrated that these doubled from EFTS to SFTS phases and then doubled again at OTUs and operational squadrons.[101]

Unit	Write Off Rate
EFTS	2.5
SFTS	5
OTU	10
Operational Squadrons	10

Table 7: Aircraft written off per 10,000 Hours; January-September 1941[102]

[100]TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 828.
[101]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 355.
[102]From TNA, AIR 41/4

The skill of pilots was not increasing as fast as the advance to more complex aircraft so that the shorter training courses and reduced amount of flying practice during earlier training made the prospect of accidents in combat situations more probable. This trend can be further confirmed by a comparison of total accident rate with fatalities during 1941.



Figure 5: Accidents per 1000 hours flown in 1941

Month	EFTS		SFTS		OTU/Non-operational		Operational	
	Total	Fatal	Total	Fatal	Total	Fatal	Total	Fatal
February	1.8	0.1	3.2	0.3	7.6	3.7	5.5	2.6
March	1.2	0.0	2.5	0.4	6.9	1.7	4.5	1.3
April	1.3	0.1	2.0	0.3	5.1	1.3	3.7	1.2
May	1.2	0.1	2.7	0.2	3.9	2.4	4.5	0.6
June	1.5	0.1	2.6	0.2	4.7	0.8	4.2	0.7
July	1.2	0.1	2.7	0.2	4.2	1.6	4.7	1.3
August	1.3	0.0	2.8	0.3	3.8	1.6	5.2	1.1
September	1.3	0.0	2.6	0.3	3.7	2.2	4.5	1.5
October	1.4	0.0	2.0	0.5	3.7	1.4	4.8	2.1
November	1.1	0.1	2.2	0.3	4.8	1.5	5.7	1.3
December	0.8	0.1	2.0	0.3	4.4	1.6	5.3	2.5
Average	1.3	0.1	2.2	0.3	4.8	1.8	4.8	1.5

Table 8: Accidents per 1,000 hours flown in 1941[103]

[103]Adapted from Air Historical Branch (RAF), RAF Northolt, London, UK: SD (Secret Document) 96, Monthly Analysis of RAF Aircraft Accidents Metropolitan Air Force, March 1940 - June 1943, 1941(7) to 1941(12))

As the non-operational accident rate remained high throughout 1941, this also suggests that a proportion of the 400 pilots lost on offensive sweeps over France in the second half of 1941 might have been due to inadequate training under the Third Revise, although other operational, technical and tactical considerations predominated.[104] The other legacy of the Stabilisation Scheme was that the attention paid to operational type training disguised the deterioration in the standard of the previous stages of training. By the end of 1941 the opinion of AM Pattinson, which had been rejected as 'conservative and reactionary' a year earlier, was completely justified and course lengths were doubled under the 'New Deal' proposals for training. Unfortunately this came too late for the pilots killed on offensive fighter operations in 1941.[105]

[104]TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 5, Paragraph 121.

[105]TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 356. This coincided with a rapid increase in availability of trained air crew from overseas, due to the success of the Empire Air Training Scheme, C. J. Jefford, *Observers and Navigators* (London: Grub Street, 2014), p. 211.

Commemoration in the midst of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict

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ABSTRACT
Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014, new memory actors in Ukraine (veterans, families of the fallen soldiers, and other activists) seek to commemorate those Ukrainians who lost their lives on the frontline. By examining the construction of memorials in the Poltava oblast (Central Ukraine), the article demonstrates that in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict the commemorative activity of ordinary people is impacted by the continued human losses, ordinary people's perception of the future (grounded in their present-day experiences), and their desire to ensure that their memories are preserved for future generations.

Introduction

The onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014 saw several initiatives to commemorate the fallen Ukrainian soldiers. As of early 2021, the conflict led to more than four thousand combat and non-combat military deaths among the Ukrainian military and its affiliated units.[1] New memory actors (veterans, families of the fallen soldiers, and other activists) now seek to commemorate those citizens who lost their lives on the frontline. These memory actors are ordinary people[2] who were not

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[1]'Book of Memory of Those Who Died for Ukraine' http://memorybook.org.ua/index.htm. Accessed 1 May 2021.

[2]The term 'ordinary people' is used here to describe those memory actors who are not public officials (in other words, not part of the state agencies) and not members of political parties. Ordinary people have no direct access to public funds or funds of political parties, and when seeking to construct memorials they need to either use their own funds and resources or acquire them elsewhere (from example, from the local authorities). Considering that the construction of many memorials to the Russia-

involved in the area of commemoration before the conflict. At the time of writing, the conflict is still ongoing, and there is little understanding of how and when it will end. This article explores how three key factors, associated with the ongoing conflict, impact the commemorative activity of ordinary people in the Poltava oblast (Central Ukraine).[3] For this purpose, the article analyses several commemorative projects and demonstrates that in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict the commemorative activity of ordinary people is impacted by the continued human losses, ordinary people's perception of the future (grounded in their present-day experiences), and their desire to ensure that their memories are preserved for future generations.

Academic literature on violent conflicts explores different factors that impact commemoration. The politics of memory of the state is researched by many scholars, who demonstrate that in the aftermath of a conflict, commemoration can be instrumentalised by the state in order to forge a national identity,[4] create a sense of unity among the citizens,[5] strengthen the state and endorse those in power.[6] At the same time, the state can also seek to silence the memory of certain wars that are not seen as heroic (as in the case of the Soviet-Afghan war), and give preference to some memories while repressing others.[7] As for the political memory actors in general (including political parties), it is expected that when dealing with different memory issues, they make "context-dependent strategic choices."[8] Social agents, for their part,

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Ukraine conflict is initiated specifically by ordinary people, their activity requires attention.

[3]In Ukraine, the term 'oblast' denotes a primary administrative division. Ukraine has 24 oblasts, and its 25th administrative unit is the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

[4]Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, 'Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet–Era Monuments and Post–Soviet National Identity in Moscow', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 92, 3 (2002), pp. 524–47 (p. 524).

[5]Michael Ignatieff, 'Soviet War Memorials', *History Workshop Journal*, 17,1 (1984), pp. 157–63; John Stephens, 'Concepts of Sacrifice and Trauma in Australian War Commemoration', *Commemoration and Public Space*, 15, 2 (2015), pp. 19-31 (p. 23).

[6]Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 1.

[7]Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, 'Setting the Framework', in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 6–39, p. 30; Sara McDowell and Máire Braniff, *Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes (Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies),* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[8]Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard, 'A Theory of the Politics of Memory', in Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard (eds), *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 7–36, p. 17.

also make their voices heard, acting either alongside the official or dominant commemorative narratives, or against them;[9] and oppositional memory is deemed to be in immediate disadvantage.[10]

Academic literature predominantly examines commemoration that takes place after the end of a violent conflict, when it is possible to establish which sides won or lost, or at least to assess the general outcome of the conflict in question. In such cases, it is rather common for both state and non-state memory actors to reflect on the outcome of the conflict while constructing war memorials, and to narrate such outcome in a particular way.[11] This, however, raises the question of how a violent conflict is commemorated when it is still ongoing and its outcome is unknown and difficult to predict. Currently this topic is under researched, and the existing research tends to suggest points for consideration rather than providing a detailed analysis. Thus, one of such points is highlighted by Alex King who notes that in the course of a conflict, official commemoration of the dead may be used "to keep up home-front morale and to focus attention on servicemen at the front in a personal way."[12] Commemorative activity of ordinary people (as non-state memory actors) during an ongoing violent conflict is researched to even lesser degree, and the present article will seek to address this gap.

When examining the impact of an ongoing conflict on ordinary people's perception of the future and their understanding of the need to preserve their memories, is it helpful to utilise Reinhart Koselleck's conceptualisation of historical times. Thus, according to Koselleck, through investigating people's experiences of the past and their consequent expectations regarding the future, one will be able to better understand their actions

[9]Winter and Sivan, p. 30.
[10]Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory,* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994), p. 139.
[11]T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, 'The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: Contexts, Structures and Dynamics', in T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper (eds), *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 3–86, p. 266; Nataliya Danilova, *The Politics of War Commemoration in the UK and Russia,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 7; Jan-Werner Müller, 'Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power and the Power over Memory', in Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1–38, p. 4; Robin Wagner-Pacifici and Barry Schwartz, 'The Vietnam Veterans Memorial: Commemorating a Difficult Past', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 97, 2 (1991), pp. 376–420, p. 376.
[12]Alex King, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance,* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1998), p. 60.

in the present.[13] In relation to this, it is also important to discuss commemorative work as a struggle against forgetting, as conceptualised by Iwona Irwin-Zarecka.[14] Furthermore, as Alex King notes, the political circumstances of different societies is an important factor behind the emergence of different commemorative practices.[15] In case of Ukraine, it is essential to take into account the socio-political aspects associated with the post-Euromaidan period and the ongoing armed conflict in the country. The present article will utilise the works of these scholars.

The data were collected during fieldwork in the Poltava oblast in 2018-2020. They include interviews with local ordinary people (veterans and families of the fallen servicemen who became memory actors after the onset of the conflict and are now involved in the construction of new war memorials). Although its is acknowledged that local authorities play an important role in commemoration of the conflict (in particular, through issuing official permissions and, in some cases, providing funding), the article will focus on the interviews with ordinary people as the main interested party (striving for recognition of their experience through commemoration) and the main driving force behind the construction of new war memorials.

Regional differences in historical memory in Ukraine is a topic that drives heated debates in academic literature. Thus, some scholars compare the historical memories in geographically "polar" Lviv and Donetsk.[16] Others insist on the importance of studying individual cultural-historical regions in order to break the widespread stereotype of "two Ukraines" (the nationalistic west and the pro-Russian east or

[13]Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts,* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 127.
[14]Irwin-Zarecka.
[15]King, p. 8.
[16]Mykola Riabchuk, *Dvi Ukrainy: Real'ni Mezhi, Virtualni Viiny* (Krytyka, 2003); Viktoria Sereda, 'Regional Historical Identities and Memory', *Ukraina Moderna*, Lviv-Donetsk: sotsialni identychnosti v suchasnii Ukraini, 2007, 160–209; Yaroslav Hrytsak, 'National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe*, 22 (1998), 263–81.

southeast).[17] In this regard, Central Ukraine deserves particular attention.[18] Although some important research has been done on various aspects of the historical memory of Central Ukraine, to a large degree this region is still significantly understudied.[19]

Many soldiers who took part in the Russia-Ukraine conflict as part of the Ukrainian military and its affiliated units were from the Poltava oblast (including those who died in the conflict and those who returned to their home cities and towns as veterans). However, in this regard the Poltava oblast does not differ from other Ukraine's oblasts, as the pro-Ukrainian soldiers come from all different oblasts of the country. Moreover, just like across Ukraine, the residents of the Poltava oblast have a whole range of opinions about the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. A survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre in 2019 showed that 40% of the respondents believed that the Donbas conflict is a war between Ukraine and Russia; 20% thought that it was a separatist revolt; 15% stated that it is a civil war between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian citizens of Ukraine; 7% saw it as a war between Russia and the US, and another 7% believed that it is a struggle for the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics.[20] It would be safe to say that these diverse views of the Ukrainian society (observed in the Poltava oblast too) will impact on how this page in Ukraine's history will be commemorated.

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[17]Ihor Symonenko, 'Osoblyvosti Struktury Istorychnoi Pamiati Ukrainskoho Narodu Ta Shliakhy Formuvannia Natsionalnoho Istorychnoho Naratyvu', *Strategic Priorities*, 1, 10 (2009), pp. 51–61; Serhy Yekelchyk, 'Regional Identities in the Time of War', *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review*, 46 (2019), pp. 239–44; Oxana Shevel, 'No Way Out? Post-Soviet Ukraine's Memory Wars in Comparative Perspective', in Henry E. Hale and Robert W. Orttung (eds), *Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine*, (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), pp. 21–40.

[18]Central Ukraine includes the oblasts of Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy and Chernihiv

[19]Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Oleksandra Gaidai, *Kam'yanyi Hist: Lenin u Tsentralnii Ukraini*, (Kyiv: K.I.C., 2018); Serhii Plokhii, 'Goodbye Lenin: A Memory Shift in Revolutionary Ukraine', *Harvard University, Ukrainian Research Institute*, 2018 https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/files/leninfallpaper.pdf; Oleksandr Hrytsenko, *Pamiat Mistsevoho Vyrobnytstva. Transformatsiia Symvolichnoho Prostoru Ta Istorychnoi Pamiati v Malykh Mistakh Ukrainy*, (Kyiv: K.I.C., 2014).

[20]*Public Opinion about the Situation in the Donbas and the Ways of Re-Establishing Ukraine's Sovereignty over the Occupied Territories* (Razumkov Centre, 11 October 2019) http://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/gromadska-dumka-pro-sytuatsiiu-na-donbasi-ta-shliakhy-vidnovlennia-suverenitetu-ukrainy-nad-okupovanymy-terytoriiamy Accessed 1 June 2021.

At the same time, one of the specificities of the Poltava oblast is that although it is relatively close to the front line (in approximately an eight-hour drive), its residents have not experienced the conflict directly on its territory (thus, they have not experienced the shelling and broken infrastructure, or the need to flee the combat area). Although the Poltava oblast is seen as representative of Central Ukraine, confining the analysis to a single administrative oblast offers the opportunity to compare the practices observed in towns and cities that are situated close to each other and have a similar historical background.

Continued losses in the ongoing conflict

The majority of the memorials to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the Poltava oblast were proposed by ordinary people (war veterans and families of the fallen servicemen), who also often played a key role in deciding the final design and location of these memorials. The new memorials are funded either by these ordinary people themselves (Hadiach, Kremenchuk), or by the local authorities (Kotelva, Lokhvytsia, Lubny, Poltava). Most of them are of moderate size (standing 2-3 meters high). Although the memorials to the Russia-Ukraine conflict commonly express the narrative of mourning, the images and inscriptions on them also tell of the heroism of the Ukrainian soldiers and their sacrifice in the name of the nation. For example, some of the inscriptions read "Eternal glory to Heroes who gave their lives for Ukraine" (Zinkiv), "Heroes do not die" (Kremenchuk), "Glory to the defenders of Ukraine" (Lokhvytsia). Frequently used images of swords and references to Cossacks (for example in Myrhorod, Kremenchuk, Lubny, Kobeliaky) link the present-day conflict to Ukraine's historical struggles for independence, while also presenting Ukrainian soldiers as brave and noble warriors.

One of the challenges faced in the carrying out of this commemorative work during the ongoing conflict, is the inability to finalise the list of the fallen soldiers. As of the May 2021, the number of casualties keeps growing, and this has a clear impact on the commemorative projects in the Poltava oblast. Some practices, used by the local authorities, are necessitated by very pragmatic reasons. Thus, in Kremenchuk (population 225,000), when the local authorities decided to build a military cemetery, they planned its layout in such a way so that it would accommodate graves of the future victims (whose number had to be guessed). Currently the large memorial in the middle of the cemetery commemorates dozens of local soldiers.[21] However, it also ready to commemorate more soldiers 'in advance': right next to it there is a spacious paved section with the allocated slots for more than twenty graves, serving as a grim reminder that the conflict is not over yet. In Poltava (population 280,000), the military cemetery includes a large wall with the names of the dead: it has plenty of empty space which is used on the ongoing basis to add new names. In Kobeliaky (population 9700),

[21] Author's observations, Kremenchuk, July 2019

the authorities made a somewhat rushed decision to carve six portraits of the local fallen soldiers on a granite memorial. Even by the time of the opening of the memorial in 2016, more locals lost their lives in the conflict.[22] A decision was made to add a smaller plate with the additional portraits. However, it is unclear what will happen with this commemorative object if more soldiers from the Kobeliaky district will lose their lives in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

For ordinary people, this issue is very topical too. This, for example, can be seen in the case of a memorial in Poltava that was constructed in 2018 on the initiative of a local group of mothers whose sons lost their lives in the conflict.[23] It is located in the middle of a small park and features a medium-size granite structure with an in-built electronic screen. The screen shows slowly changing slides, and each slide is dedicated to a different local soldier. Specifically, the audience can see the soldier's black-and-white picture (most of the soldiers are shown in their military uniform), his years of life, the circumstances of his death, and his military awards. The information on the screen can be updated. As the initiators of the memorial explained during an interview,[24] their original idea was to create a memorial sign that would be big enough to carve all names of the local fallen soldiers. They all strongly believed that people must know the names of the soldiers who gave their lives, and that a joint 'nameless' object was not an option. The main issue with this idea was that the conflict was still ongoing: "we came to realisation that since the war is still going on, we would need to keep adding new names, and this would require more space."[25]

Their final solution (the use of an electronic screen) is associated with some very practical issues faced by ordinary people. With the military cemeteries in Kremenchuk and Poltava, it was in the power of the authorities to create such project that could be extended in the future, and to include the funds required for such extensions into the annual budgets. In the discussed case of the activity of ordinary people in Poltava, from the very beginning they faced numerous obstacles: it took a lot of effort to

[22]'U Kobeliakakh Na Pamiatnyku Voinam ATO Ne Vystachylo Mistsia Dlia Portretiv Usikh Zahyblykh', *TV Ltava*, 13 April 2016 https://youtu.be/kD4HveDBdz0. Accessed 1 November 2020.
[23]Viktoria Baberia, 'U Poltavi Stvoryly Aleiu Pamiati Zakhysnykiv Ukrainy', *Zmist*, 6 March 2018 https://zmist.pl.ua/news/u-poltavi-stvorili-aleyu-pamyati-zahisnikiv-ukrajini-foto. Accessed 15 June 2018.
[24]Author's interview 1. Two mothers of the killed soldiers in Poltava (a retired medic in her 60s and an entrepreneur in her later 40s), who represent a local civic organisation named 'Poltava families of the killed defenders of Ukraine' and were actively involved in the construction of the memorial sign to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Poltava. Poltava, 7 August 2019.
[25]Author's interview 1.

receive an official permission to use the site, and to convince the authorities to allocate the funds for this project.[26] For these memory actors, the realisation of their project was seen as a struggle, which was also an indication that any future additions of names would require further interactions with the authorities. In a way, such ongoing struggle soon became a reality: according to the interviewed mothers, they continued to put pressure on the officials in order to include the maintenance of the memorial sign into the annual city budget.[27] In other words, these ordinary people tried to design a project over which they would have more control, and which would also satisfy their need to commemorate soldiers individually in the context of the ongoing conflict. The idea to use an electronic screen seemed to fulfil these needs. This local group of mothers are still actively collecting information about all the new soldiers who lost their lives and add their information to the electronic screen.

Future-proofing the memories: response to the volatile environment in the country

The conflict in Eastern Ukraine is still ongoing, and there is no clear understanding of when and how it will end. Ordinary people's concerns about the future are a factor that can affect their design choices, and it requires a careful consideration. This, for example, can be observed in Zinkiv (population 9000), where in 2018 a memorial to the Russia-Ukraine conflict was constructed by the local authorities in response to the initiative of a local veteran.[28] According to the veteran (a male in his late 30s), he himself created the design of the memorial sign, which includes an image of soldiers walking up a staircase to Heaven, and two more sections for inscriptions.[29] The inscription on the right-hand side was selected by the authorities and consists of a quote from Taras Shevchenko's poem 'Both Archimedes and Galileo' (1860):

> And on the reborn earth
> There will be no enemy, no tyrant
> There will be a son, and there will be a mother,
> And there will be people on the earth.[30]

[26]Author's interview 1.
[27]Author's interview 1.
[28]'U Zinkovi Osviatyly Pamiatnyi Znak Zahyblym Voinam', *Novyny Poltavshchyny*, 16 October 2018 https://np.pl.ua/2018/10/u-zin-kovi-osviatyly-pam-iatny-znak-zahyblym-voinam/. Accessed 10 December 2019.
[29]Author's interview 2. Veteran of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Zinkiv (a male in his late 30s, an entrepreneur who was actively involved in the construction of the memorial to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in this city). Online, 17 December 2019.
[30]Danylo Husar Struk, *Encyclopedia of Ukraine, Volume IV Ph-Sr*, 1993. (the source of the translation)

Although this text presents a hope for Ukraine's peaceful future, it does not make any statements about the commemorated conflict. The inscription in the middle section was selected by the veteran and unambiguously characterises the commemorated soldiers: "In eternal memory of the heroes who gave their lives for Ukraine". In an interview, he shared that for him this short phrase required a lot of effort and considerations.[31] In his original draft, the wording was "To the fallen participants of the ATO [anti-terrorist operation]." However, he was concerned that it will cause issues in the future: "The national authorities could change, their views about the ATO could change also. Who knows what could annoy them about the wording? I tried to make the wording neutral, but also to let people know who is commemorated here."[32] In order to make sure that the wording is future-proof, he contacted some analysts in Kyiv, who also advised him against mentioning the ATO. Although the local authorities did not appear to have any strong opinions about his choice of wording, he still wanted to make sure that the memorial would say exactly what he wanted: "I was still recovering after my war injury, but I kept walking on my crutches to their offices and asking them to not change the wording in any way."[33] His concerns are clearly linked to the issue of naming the armed conflict in Ukraine, and it requires attention.

From April 2014 to April 2018 the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine was officially referred to as the "Anti-Terrorist Operation"[34] (ATO). One of the official reasons given for not introducing martial law (and, consequently, naming the conflict "a war") was the inability to carry out elections under martial law.[35] In the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests (2013-2014) that resulted in the ousting of the President Viktor Yanukovych and significant power shifts, the elections were crucially needed. In April 2018, the name ATO was replaced with the "Joint Forces Operation", which introduced certain new legal aspects of Ukraine's activity in the occupied territories in Eastern Ukraine.[36] However, the abbreviation "ATO" and its derivatives

[31]Author's interview 2.
[32]Author's interview 2.
[33]Author's interview 2.
[34]'Decree of the President of Ukraine On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of April 13, 2014 "On Urgent Measures to Overcome the Terrorist Threat and Preserve the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine"', 2014 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/405/2014#Text. Accessed 10 April 2020.
[35]Sviatoslav Khomenko, 'Voiennyi Stan Chy ATO: Yak Nazvaty Sytuatsiiu Na Donbasi?', 2 July 2014 https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2014/07/140702_ato_martial_law_sx. Accessed 10 May 2020.
[36]'Zmina ATO Na OOS: Yaki Novovvedennia Ochikuiutsia Na Donbasi', *Slovo i Dilo*, 4 May 2018 https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2018/05/04/infografika/bezpeka/zmina-ato-oos-yaki-novovvedennya-ochikuyutsya-donbasi. Accessed 15 May 2020.

"atoshnyky" and "atovtsi" (referring to the Ukrainian soldiers participating in the ATO) continue to be commonly used by the public.[37] The existence of several terms used to describe the same conflict led to some ambiguity, uncertainly and even frustration: in the interviews conducted for this research, ordinary people commonly emphasised that Ukraine is at war with Russia, and that the term "war" should be used openly. However, when constructing their commemorative object, the very same people either do not write anything at all (the electronic screen in Poltava, and the memorial in Opishnia, among others), or write "ATO" (for example, the memorial sign in Kremenchuk, unveiled in 2016[38]). Out of the identified memorials constructed in the Poltava oblast on the initiative of ordinary people, only the memorial in Lubny (population 45,000) openly referred to the Russia-Ukraine conflict as "the armed aggression of the Russian Federation" (it was unveiled in 2018[39]). In all other cases the name of the commemorated event is either absent or rather ambiguous: for example, in Kotelva (population 12,000), the memorial initiated by the local veterans (2017) says that the soldiers protected Ukraine from "invaders from the East."[40]

When examining this issue, it is helpful to use the concepts of the "space of experience" and the "horizon of expectation", suggested by Reinhart Koselleck for analysing the relationship between the past, present and future.[41] According to Koselleck, "the past and the future are joined together in the presence of both experience and expectation," and these two categories "guide concrete agents in their actions relating to social and political movement."[42] In a similar way, Irwin-Zarecka notes that "… there are times when a very specific vision of the future frames the utilization of the past."[43] When it comes to the definition of what the armed conflict

[37]Oleksandr Ponomariv, 'Bloh Ponomareva: Atoshnyky Chy Atishnyky?', *BBC News Ukraine*, 18 December 2017 https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/blog-olexandr-ponomariv-42398686. Accessed 1 June 2020.
[38]Aliona Dushenko, 'U Kremenchutsi Vidkryly Memorialnyi Znak Heroiam ATO Ta Zahyblym v Ilovaiskomu Kotli', *Telegraf*, 29 August 2016 https://www.telegraf.in.ua/kremenchug/10056174-illovaysk.html. Accessed 1 June 2018.
[39]'U Lubnakh Vidkryly Pamiatnyi Znak Voinam ATO', *Novyny Poltavshchyny*, 18 October 2018 https://np.pl.ua/2018/10/u-lubnakh-vidkryly-pam-iatny-znak-voinam-ato/. Accessed 15 May 2020.
[40]Anatolii Dzhereleiko, 'U Kovpakivskomu Skveri Vidkryto Pamiatnyi Znak Uchasnykam ATO', *Zoria Poltavshchyny*, 18 November 2017 http://www.old.zorya.poltava.ua/2017/11/18/у-ковпаківському-сквері-відкрито-пам/. Accessed 10 April 2020.
[41]Koselleck, p. 126.
[42]Koselleck, p. 127.
[43]Irwin-Zarecka, p. 101.

in Eastern Ukraine actually is, ordinary people (memory actors) experienced a clear mismatch between how they personally saw the conflict and how it was officially defined. It could, arguably, explain the reason behind their reluctance to write the word "war" on the commemorative objects: after all, sticking to the official name or avoiding any names at all is a much safer strategy. As the case in Zinkiv shows, the decision of the initiator of the memorial sign to avoid naming the conflict was guided by his expectation that in the future the conflict and the actions of the Ukrainian soldiers may be interpreted differently. It is difficult to pinpoint what exactly was the source of his concerns, but it is possible to suggest that the observed mismatch and ambiguity in the naming of the conflict played a role. Furthermore, it is necessary to note that in post-Euromaidan Ukraine the perceived 'timelessness'[44] of memorials has been strongly questioned: the 'Leninopad' of 2013-2014 and the 'de-communisation laws' of 2015 clearly showed that the interpretation of the past can drastically change, and that the meaning of memorials is not guaranteed.[45] Moreover, within three decades of its independence, Ukraine experienced three revolutionary moments, which demonstrates that significant political changes in the country are not an unusual occurrence.[46] In other words, the wider environment in the country can fuel concerns of ordinary people about the future of their memories.

However, considerations of ordinary people about the future are not always negative. Moreover, in some cases such considerations do not always have an easily traceable impact on the design selection, but they are still often present in the decision-making process. Thus, one of the initiators of the memorial in Opishnia (population 5000) shared that: "We decided to construct this memorial, but we do not know what will happen in the future. Will these people be seen as heroes or ...? Our history can have a very sharp turn, and then they will be considered not as heroes, but as some kind of militia [opolchentsi]."[47] This memorial to the Russia-Ukraine conflict was unveiled in 2019, and it was constructed by the initiative of the local veterans and activists

[44]Lisa Maya Knauer and Daniel J. Walkowitz, 'Introduction', in Daniel J. Walkowitz (ed.), *Memory and the Impact of Political Transformation in Public Space*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 1–20, p. 5.

[45]Andriy Liubarets, 'The Politics of Memory in Ukraine in 2014: Removal of the Soviet Cultural Legacy and Euromaidan Commemorations', *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal*, 3 (2016). pp. 197-214; Plokhii.

[46]Olga Onuch, 'Maidans Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan', in David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills (eds), *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution*, (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2015), pp. 27–56.

[47]Author's interview 3. Activist in Opishnia (a female college teacher in her mid-40s, who was actively involved in the construction of the memorial to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in this town). Opishnia, 8 August 2019.

(ordinary people).[48] Although the memorial does not have any inscriptions and only shows a cut-out figure of an armed soldier, it does feature a marble structure resembling a red-and-black flag – a design choice that can raise questions even in the present, not only in the future. Thus, currently in Ukraine the red-and-black colours are associated with the Ukrainian nationalist political party Right Sector (formed in 2013, in the early stages of the Euromaidan protests) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (a Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary formation that operated during and after the Second World War).

While the red-and-black symbols can be commonly observed in Western Ukraine, in Central Ukraine people are much less comfortable with their use. When analysing the geopolitics of the UPA memory in Ukraine, Serhii Plokhii notes that "The Center, which had no direct exposure to living memory of the UPA, has been slow to accept the relevant historical mythology as part of its own narrative."[49] In this regard, it is helpful to refer to Andrii Portnov[50] and Serhy Yekelchyk,[51] who argue in their works that during the Euromaidan the symbol of UPA undergone a process of transformation and acquired new set of meanings. According to Portnov, two factors played a role in this: first, a rejection of Russia's portrayal of Ukrainians as 'fascists' and "banderovites',[52] and a lack of knowledge about the activity of UPA.[53] Yekelchyk explains that "in the course of the EuroMaidan Revolution, the image of Bandera

[48]Vasyl Neizhmak, 'Koshty Na Pamiatnyk v Opishni Zbyraly Vsiieiu Hromadoiu', *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 October 2019 http://www.golos.com.ua/article/323172. Accessed 10 April 2021

[49]Plokhii.

[50]Andrii Portnov, 'Bandera Mythologies and Their Traps for Ukraine', *Open Democracy*, 22 June 2016 https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/bandera-mythologies-and-their-traps-for-ukraine/. Accessed 14 June 2021.

[51]Serhy Yekelchyk, *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 107.

[52]Stepan Bandera was one of the leaders of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) – a Ukrainian political organisation that was established in 1929. In 1940 this organisation split into two parts: the OUM-M (headed by Andriy Melnyk) and OUN-B (headed by Stepan Bandera). Nowadays the media, the public and some scholars commonly refer to the OUN-B simply as the OUN. During World War II, the OUN's armed branch the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fought against the Soviet troops and the German troops, and it is commonly seen as the primary perpetrator of the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. At the same time, some Ukrainians honour the OUN and the UPA for their fight for independence of Ukraine. These organisations and Stepan Bandera in particular are very divisive symbols in modern Ukraine.

[53]Portnov.

acquired new meaning as a symbol of resistance to the corrupt, Russian-sponsored regime, quite apart from the historical Bandera's role as a purveyor of exclusivist ethno-nationalism."[54] After the Euromaidan, when the Right Sector formed military units that fought on the front line in Eastern Ukraine, the symbolism of a red-and-black flag as a symbol of resistance became even stronger. This is also observed in the analysed case in Opishnia: when asked about the symbolism of these colours, one of the main initiators (a woman in her 40s) limited her answer to "this is a symbol of the defenders of Ukraine."

In the context of the ongoing conflict, it is unclear how this newly shaped symbolism of red-and-black flags will be used in the future. However, the main initiator of the memorial tries to stay optimistic: "I believe that Ukraine now has a small (but significant) percentage of people who will not let the history turn backwards… Together, we will not let that happen – after all, we paid a very high price to get us here."[55] In the case of this memory actor, she focused on the positive experience – that the recent events in Ukraine demonstrated that there are people in the society who are ready to protect their views and memories, no matter what political changes Ukraine might face in the future. Both Zinkiv and Opishnia show that ordinary people's expectations about the future, grounded in their experiences, have an impact on their commemorative activity.

Didactic function: seeking to educate the present and future generations

Construction of memorials to violent conflicts by ordinary people can be associated with different inter-connected needs: to process the traumatic experiences and mourn over the loss of life, to ensure that their memories are recognised, and to search for the meaning of the commemorated conflicts. For the purposes of this article, it is important to consider the need to educate future generations through memorials – one of the re-current themes observed in the interviews with ordinary people in the Poltava oblast. Expression of this need is not associated with a particular visual language; moreover, it is often observed in the projects that have not been realised yet, which also requires attention, because in many cases this need is still unfulfilled. The next section will examine this aspect of the commemorative activity of ordinary people, while taking into account the impact of the ongoing violent conflict.

In 2019 in Novi Sanzhary (population 8000), a local veteran (a male in his 30s, an engineer by education) created a detailed design of a memorial to the soldiers of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. According to the veteran, the main elements of the design are

[54]Yekelchyk, *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*, p. 107.
[55]Author's interview 3.

full of symbolism and tell a story.[56] A metal sword is woven by tree branches that hold individual metal plates: they are curved as a body armour and shaped as the 25 Ukrainian administrative regions. From the front view, the metal plates show a map of Ukraine. On this map, the occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhanks oblasts are shown in red ("as if on fire"), and Crimea is grey ("because it was not defended, it was simply given away").[57] The tree branches also include chevrons of different military brigades. During the interview, the veteran shared that "For me personally this tree symbolises all of us [Ukrainians] as a family; before the war we were estranged, but the war made us mobilise and create one united family, as demonstrated by the map of Ukraine as one 'shield'."[58] As of 2021, this memorial exists only as a 3D visualisation in the creator's computer. Although he discussed his idea with the local authorities of Novi Sanzhary and asked them to organise a design competition in which he could take part, currently the authorities do not actively try to construct a memorial to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This case provides important insights into different aspects of the commemorative work of ordinary people: from the intergroup relations of the veterans to their interactions with the authorities and the tensions between competing officials. For the purposes of this chapter, the educational and future-oriented aspects of commemorative work will be discussed in more detail.

In the case of the Novi Sanzhary, the designer of this conceptual memorial explained in an interview why he believes that a local memorial to the fallen soldiers of the Russia-Ukraine conflict should be future-oriented. Although he himself is young (in early 30s), he is focusing on the people in Ukraine who are younger than him: "Today's young people are very active, they have broader skills than me: they travel abroad faster, they use low-cost airlines, they communicate with people in different countries. However, the war is a very distant thing for them. When the war started, they were only teenagers; now they are thinking about education and their plans for the future. I would want them to at least understand what this war is about, to not see it as a distant thing, and to not ruin the memorial."[59] The veteran is concerned that this part of Ukraine's history will be forgotten or remembered as a trivial episode: "People still remember that there was a year when the price of the dollar jumped from 5 to 8 hryvnia. If we do not tell about the war through memorials, then it will register in people's memory on the same level as the fluctuation of the dollar."[60] His design of a memorial has a strong potential to fulfil the required task – to tell such story about

[56]Author's interview 4. Veteran of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Novi Sanzhary (a male in his early 30s, an engineer by education, currently working in an NGO). Online, 15 April 2020
[57]Author's interview 4
[58]Author's interview 4
[59]Author's interview 4
[60]Author's interview 4

the war that goes beyond the mourning over the loss of life. However, to tell a complex story, this project uses a range of creative design techniques that may require more work and funding than some more conventional memorials used in the Poltava oblast (such as granite or marble plates or bronze statues). Thus, this case also raises the question of whether highly conceptual memorials with complex narrative-focused designs have any potential to be realised, especially when they are proposed by ordinary people.

As of April 2020, Novi Sanzhary has no memorials to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The interviewed veteran reported that the local veterans were offered two options by the authorities: either to 'add' their memory to the already-existing memorial to the Soviet-Afghan war (a period infantry fighting vehicle raised on a concrete platform) or to produce a separate simple memorial sign (an equivalent of a large stone with a plaque on it).[61] According to the interviewed veteran, he, and many other veterans did not agree with either of those ideas. First, they do not want the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Soviet-Afghan war to be mixed together because they see them as ideologically different. Second, they do not want a "cemetery-like stone" because it does not tell a substantial story about the war. From their side, the veterans asked the authorities to organise an official competition in which different designs could fairly compete. The interviewed veteran shared that he finds it very frustrating that the authorities have not tried to organise a competition: "In order to say that they do not have funds for a serious memorial they first need to ascertain how much exactly such project could cost; however, they have not even done any calculations."[62] Although he appreciates that money could be a serious issue, he is very disappointed that the authorities do not think about a wider picture and about the need to tell future generations about this war.

A similar discussion of the need for future-oriented commemoration is observed in Kremenchuk, where in 2016-2018 the local authorities held a design competition for a memorial to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The winning design titled 'DNA of memory' was created by an established Ukrainian architect and produces a historical narrative: it features a solemn angel on top of a spiralled column, decorated with three-dimensional images picturing Ukraine's history from the Cossack era to the current conflict.[63] Although this design delivers a story about the commemorated conflict, it was not supported by one group of local veterans because (in their opinion) "it is too

[61]Author's interview 4
[62]Author's interview 4
[63]Aliona Dushenko, '«DNK Pamiati» Peremih u Konkursi Eskiziv Pamiatnykiv Heroiam ATO u Kremenchutsi', *Telegraf*, 17 May 2018 https://www.telegraf.in.ua/kremenchug/10069931-dnk-pamyati-peremg-u-konkurs-eskzv-pamyatnikv-geroyam-ato-u-kremenchuc.html. Accessed 14 June 2021.

difficult for children to understand."[64] In the design competition, they supported a highly artistic memorial proposed by a local artist. This memorial is rich in folklore images: it includes three stained glass panels featuring a girl in traditional Ukrainian embroidered clothes, a semi-mythical Cossack Mamay (with a shot-through heart), the archangel Michael,[65] as well as red poppies, guelder rose, and a metal 'tree of the nation' (derevo rodu) with the names of the killed soldiers on its leaves.[66] According to the artist, this project would impact the viewers on the emotional level, and the veterans who supported her agreed with that.[67]

Although the analysed projects in Novi Sanzhary and Kremenchuk have not been realised, the memory actors in these two cases still seek to educate younger generations through different means. Thus, the veterans in Kremenchuk take part in the work of a grassroot museum of the Russia-Ukraine (opened in 2015), and they have been giving free of charge guided tours to school children: "Kremenchuk is only 500 kilometres away from the front line … but the city is drinking, partying, and dancing, no one remembers about the war. However, when the children come here and touch the rockets and shells, I can see that their eyes are changing… They begin to understand that the war is indeed taking place."[68] The veteran in Novi Sanzhary believes that he is fulfilling his task of educating younger generations by having joined a civil society project aimed at young people.[69]

According to James Young, "If societies remember, it is only insofar as their institutions and rituals organize, shape, even inspire their constituents' memories. For a society's memory cannot exist outside of those people who do the remembering – even if such

[64]Author's interview 5. Veteran of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Kremenchuk (a man in his mid-40s, a private entrepreneur and a member of a local veterans' union who was actively involved in the construction of the memorial sign to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in this city). Kremenchuk, 28 July 2019

[65]Archangel Michael is traditionally seen in Ukraine as the protector of soldiers

[66]'U Kremenchutsi Prezentuvaly Eskizy Novykh Pamiatnykiv Zahyblym Heroiam ATO', *Poltava Depo*, 24 January 2017 https://poltava.depo.ua/ukr/poltava/u-kremenchutsi-prezentuvali-eskizi-novih-pam-yatnikiv-zagiblim-24012017141700. Accessed 14 June 2021.

[67]Author's interview 6. Artist, the head of the Kremenchuk City Art Gallery (a woman in her 40s, who submitted her design for the design competition organised in order to construct a joint memorial to the Heavenly Hundred and the soldiers killed in the Russia-Ukraine conflict). Kremenchuk, 28 August 2018; Author's interview 5

[68]Author's interview 7. The head of a local veterans' union in Kremenchuk (a retired male colonel in his 60s, who was actively involved in the construction of the memorial sign to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in this city). Kremenchuk, 27 July 2019

[69]Author's interview 4

memory happens to be at the society's bidding, in its name."[70] Ultimately, the ordinary people in the two analysed cases believe in the same idea: that the members of the Ukrainian society (especially the younger and future generations) should be provided with an 'organised' and 'shaped' information package, because they are the people who will 'do the remembering' in the future. As Iwona Irwin-Zarecka notes, efforts to secure remembrance "often framed as the work to prevent forgetting."[71] This is exactly the aim of the two commemorative projects that are discussed here: to ensure that the next generations will not forget about the war. Since currently only few memorials to the Russia-Ukraine exist in the Poltava oblast, and there is no confidence that in the future the local authorities will construct more memorials, concerns about whether this conflict will be remembered are definitely justified. It is important to note that in these two cases the memory is shaped in a particular way. If in Novi Sanzhary the author of the memorial wanted to tell the next generations that the war brings deaths but also leads to unity of the nation, the interviewed veterans in Kremenchuk want to send a different message. Thus, they hoped that the folklore images would be better understood by children and would depict Ukrainians as a separate nation: "[the project] produces a historical narrative that will be easier for children to understand; the children will know for certain that in Ukraine's history there have been time when its neighbour, a so-called 'brotherly nation', turned out to be Cain. We must educate about such things."[72] Although the stories that the two projects are seeking to deliver are different, they both aim to prevent the Russia-Ukraine conflict from being forgotten, being driven by the lack of confidence about how this ongoing conflict will be interpreted in the future.

Conclusion

The present article discussed the factors that impact the commemorative activity of ordinary people in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. First, the continued human losses in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict produce the need to utilise solutions that would enable commemoration of individual soldiers. The need for individualised remembrance is driven by the complex, conflicting perceptions of the conflict by the society, and the memory actor's desire to remind the public that the fallen soldiers gave their lives for the country. Second, the yet unknown outcome of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the perceived possibility of misinterpretation of this conflict in the future impact the design choices made by ordinary people when constructing memorials. Thus, ordinary people tend to avoid any wording and naming of the conflict that could put their memorial at risk in the future. However, in some instances, ordinary people interpret the results of the present-day struggle in a positive

[70]James Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning,* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), p. xi.
[71]Irwin-Zarecka, p. 115.
[72]Author's interview 5.

way and hope that even in the unpredictable future they will be able to defend their memories and their interpretation.

Third, the lack of commemorative initiatives on the part of the authorities and the public's conflicting views about the conflict are significant factors that shape the design of the memorials that ordinary people seek to construct. Thus, they want to make sure that the commemorated events are explained to the future generations, and that the future generation not only remember those who died, but also interpret the events in a particular way. Specifically, the analysed cases demonstrate that ordinary people want their memorials to produce such narratives that talk about the Ukrainian national identity and the unity of the Ukrainian nation, and which also warn about the potential threat from the neighbouring Russia. Notably, such highly conceptual projects are rather difficult to realise, which again demonstrates the importance of funding, the responsiveness of the local authorities, and the readiness of the ordinary people to put pressure on the authorities.

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'The English Fury' at Mechelen, 1580

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ABSTRACT
The late sixteenth-century religious wars prompted a Protestant movement within the Elizabethan regime that sought state-sanctioned military intervention in aid of the Dutch rebels. Printed military news also became a popular genre during this period. This article seeks to re-examine the journalistic legacy of soldier-poet Thomas Churchyard through a close reading of his 1580 account of the English pillaging of Mechelen by a group of English mercenaries. Churchyard's text was the product of his connections to interventionist statesmen and the widespread vilification of Spaniards. His pamphlet utilised popular motifs that vindicated religious violence and exploited inchoate notions of journalistic credibility.

On 9 April 1580, a group of English soldiers waded through deep water, in some places up to their necks, as they approached the walls of Mechelen in Flanders. They were part of a mixed mercenary force under the command of John Norris, hero of Rijmenam and veteran of Ireland, and were tasked with capturing the Spanish-held town. Norris was attached to a larger force of Walloon and Scottish soldiers – a multinational entente reflecting the heterogeneity of late sixteenth century warfare. The men came under fire from the stout Spanish defenders; the attackers' boats were sunk, men drowned, and causalities sustained from firearms as the assaulting force pressed forward with their scaling ladders. Norris' men entered the town through a lightly defended gate and eliminated the enemy occupiers with 'greate courage', 'valiance' and 'the pushe of the pike'.[1] What followed this victory was a terrible pillaging, as the men sacked, plundered, and terrorised the local population. This event would later become known as the 'English Fury', eponymous of the infamous Spanish furies at Antwerp (1576) and the various towns sacked throughout the Duke of Alva's 1572 campaign. The 'English Fury' was reported back in England as the victory of

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[1]Thomas Churchyard, *A Plaine or Most True Report of a Dangerous Service,* (London: John Perin, 1580).

Mechelen by the soldier-poet Thomas Churchyard in his news pamphlet *A Plaine or Moste True Report* (1580).

The embryonic state of news reporting during the Elizabethan period has been well documented. David Randall's work has increased our understanding of how early modern notions of credibility in news accounts changed and developed over time, particularly as authors responded to calls for further proof and veracity in their accounts from the reading public.[2] News - particularly military accounts - evolved from eloquent prose and references to the author's honour to a more 'plain' journalistic style that emphasised eyewitness testimony and multiple verifiable sources with the oversight of a 'commercial professional' editor.[3] These changes began to occur during the late 1580s and by the 1620s small collections of broadsheets that contained succinct accounts of recent events named 'corantos' were beginning to resemble the modern newspaper format. Thus, Churchyard was writing within an inchoate genre in which modern notions of journalistic integrity were not fully articulated nor adhered to. Despite this, Churchyard has often been described as both a 'proto-field reporter' and 'journalist'.[4] Thomas Woodcock's comprehensive biography of Churchyard describes him at one point as a man who 'works hard to distinguish himself from the traditional figure of the braggart soldier or *miles gloriosus*', a man dedicated to 'accurate reporting', and possessing 'journalistic instincts'.[5] Churchyard himself claimed that he 'hadde rather followe the truth of the matter, than the flatterie of the time'.[6] However, a close reading of *A Plaine or Moste True Report* forces historians to confront this appraisal of Churchyard's probity. His pamphlet is rich with religious allegory, patriotic rhetoric, and 'alarum' pertaining to the imminent threat of Spanish invasion. He plays upon certain established motifs within a corpus of contemporary printed works in order to appeal to a virulent strand of patriotic militarism that emerged within the English audience's popular imagination. Churchyard's work melds the perceived veracity of 'plain' and 'true' military news with a political agenda that advocated English military intervention in the Dutch revolt, a topic under much contemporary debate within the Privy Council and the burgeoning public sphere of print.

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[2]David Randall, *Credibility in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Military News* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2008).

[3]Ibid., p.108 & p. 151.

[4]Sheila Nayar, *Renaissance Responses to Technological Change,* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 122; M.A Shaaber, *Some Forerunners of the Newspaper in England, 1476-1622,* (London: Frank and Cass, 1929), pp. 227-228.

[5]Thomas Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard: Pen, Sword, and Ego,* (London: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 205 & p. 204.

[6]Churchyard, *True Report*, p. 3.

The Protestant interventionist party within the Queen's council, headed by the Earl of Leicester and Francis Walsingham, were pressing Queen Elizabeth I to pursue open hostilities with Spain throughout the 1570s. These requests were denied due in part to Elizabeth I's financial prudence and religious moderation, resulting in small deniable expeditions to the Low Countries. Pressures from outside of the court came in the form of printed interventionist propaganda and calls for aid from continental Protestants. In 1579 the influential *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* was published in Basel, which reflected on the ethics of resisting tyrants and supporting religious allies.[7] Churchyard was connected through patronage to Christopher Hatton, who was promoted to the Privy Council in 1578 and aligned with Leicester's interventionist policy:

> Spain … we ought justly to fear … he will then, no doubt, with conjunct force assist this Devilish Pope to bring about their Romish purpose. Let us not forget that his sword is presently drawn, and then with what insolent fury this his victory may inflame him against us, in whose heart there is an ancient malice thoroughly rooted … therefore we ought not only timely to foresee, but in time most manfully resist the same.[8]

Churchyard had also worked under Leicester during the Queen's entertainment at Kenilworth in 1575 and had written a performance piece for the Queen's entertainment in Norfolk in 1578. Churchyard's play contained thinly veiled references arguing against the Queen's controversial proposed marriage to the Duke of Anjou, and it is thought that Leicester was influencing the entertainment behind the curtain.[9] Churchyard was also connected to the key interventionist statesmen Francis Walsingham, as in 1577 he served as his letter-bearer and diplomatic contact in the Low Countries.[10] In 1581, there is evidence to suggest that Churchyard operated as a double agent or carried out some 'piece of service' within the Scottish court, seemingly at the behest of Hatton.[11] It was in the middle of this flurry of state activity

[7]Anon, *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,* (Basel: Thomas Guérin, 1579); an English translation of Book IV appeared in 1588; H. P., *A short apologie for Christian souldiours,* (London: John Wolfe, 1588).

[8]Nicholas Harris Nicolas, *Memoirs of the life and times of Sir Christopher Hatton,* (London: S & J Bentley, Wilson & Fley, 1847), p. 159.

[9]Thomas Churchyard, 'The Shew of Chastity', in Thomas Churchyard, *Discourse of the Queen Maiesties entertainement in Suffolk and Norffolk,* (London: Henry Bynneman, 1578); Susan Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony: The Courtships of Elizabeth I,* (London: Routledge,1996), p. 150.

[10]Woodcock, *Churchyard*, pp. 184-5.

[11]Nicolas, *Memoirs*, p. 173.

that Churchyard penned his *Plaine or Moste True Report* in 1580, which was dedicated to the ascendant military commander John Norris.

Churchyard tacitly embeds religious allegory into the narrative of the reported battle and presents a fawning account of his dedicatee. Once the English had breached the town and were engaged in combat with the defenders, Churchyard describes Norris' one-to-one battle with a friar named 'Brother Peter'.[12] This zealous friar 'had put on a resolute mynde, either to kill Maister Norrice, or els to bee slaine hym self'. Churchyard reports that the two fought 'brauelie', as the friar lunged at Norris with a halberd and struck his cuirass. Norris 'revenged' these blows and 'dispatched' the friar, whose death prompted the surrounding Spanish soldiers to cry '*misericorde*' (mercy).[13] Churchyard's inclusion and description of this episode personifies aggressive Spanish Catholicism within the nature and implicit religiosity of Brother Peter. The friar is senseless and unrelenting in his attack on Norris, aiming to kill the commander or die trying. The threat of Catholic Spain as a 'tyrannical', expansionist universal monarchy, so often touted in anti-Spanish print, is anthropomorphised in this friar.[14] Norris, in contrast, is composed and defends himself after taking the friar's blows upon his armour. Again, the subtext of Spanish aggression is met with a decisive defensive strike from England. The message is redolent of Hatton's comments to Walsingham: 'we ought not only timely to foresee, but in time most manfully resist the same'.[15] Churchyard presents this seemingly chivalric episode as the climax of the narrative. The nuanced backdrop of geo-political tension and Protestant-Catholic animosity is narrativized in a hand-to-hand battle in which Norris, and thus England, scores a resounding victory.

The tacit religious metaphor becomes more explicit as Churchyard begins to tap into familiar anti-Catholic motifs and Hispanophobia. The friar is referred to as a 'lusty limlifter', suggesting Spanish sexual depravity, a contemporary trope associated with the consistent vilification of Spanish practices in their colonies and on the battlefield; a 'black legend' that was perpetuated by English print and emphasised Spanish brutality and iniquity.[16] Churchyard further contrasts Spanish debauchery with English benevolence as he recalls a nunnery 'in the toune ready to be spoiled'.[17] Norris, on hearing that this nunnery also contained English women 'defended them from harme,

[12]Churchyard, *True Report*, pp. 10-11.
[13]Ibid., p. 11.
[14]Anon, *An answver and true discourse to a certain letter lately sent by the Duke of Alba,* (London: Henry Middleton, 1573).
[15]Nicolas, *Memoirs*, p. 159.
[16]Ibid., p. 10; William Maltby, *The Black Legend in England: The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558-1660,* (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1971).
[17]Churchyard, *True Report,* p. 17.

and sette them free'.[18] This description normalises the notion of violence against Spaniards or Catholics as Norris' act of mercy was only spurred by the presence of English nuns. The brutal crimes against the local population by Englishmen are glossed over and Norris is instead the focus of Churchyard's approbation. Norris' clemency is compared to that of Alexander the Great, referencing Plutarch of Chaeronea's account of the mercy that Alexander showed to Darius' wife and daughters.[19] The use of classical anecdotes flatters Norris and appeals to a humanist audience that adulated classical heroes and used them as the basis of contemporary martial practice. Churchyard goes on to edify his readers and paradoxically compares Norris' perceived clemency to the barbarity of less virtuous commanders:

> Surely greater honor is gotten by vusing victorie wiselie, then by overthrowing a multitude with manhoode, without shewying mercie and gentilnesse. A conquerer by repressing crueltie by courtiesie, is had in admiration of his verie enemies, and a victor without virtue and pitifull consideration, is hated eming his freends, and despised generally emong all kinde of people.[20]

Churchyard's moralising prose was based upon the well-known atrocities committed by the Spanish Army of Flanders during their 1572-3 campaign, during which Mechelen, Zutphen, Haarlem, and Naarden were sacked. Alva's notorious 'Council of Blood' was also responsible for executing over 1,000 political and religious enemies during his attempt to quash the rebellion, although this figure was exaggerated in Protestant sources to more than 20,000.[21] George Gascoigne's *The Spoyle of Antwerpe* (1576) helped perpetuate the black legend and Elizabethan England's Hispanophobia.[22] The sack of Antwerp struck a chord in England's popular imagination and play's such as *A Larum for London* (1602) accentuated the incident's grotesque violence in what William Maltby describes as a 'deliberate attempt to arouse patriotic sentiment'.[23] Churchyard's rectitude was not extended to England's enemies in his prior text *Churchyard's Choise* (1579), as he explicitly described the torture and terror tactics employed against the Irish on campaign.[24] Nor did Churchyard condemn his own dedicatee when he was involved in the slaughter of hundreds of civilians, women, and children, at the Rathlin Island massacre in 1575.

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[18]Ibid., p. 17.
[19]Ibid., p. 18.
[20]Ibid., p. 18.
[21]Maltby, *Black Legend*, p. 48.
[22]George Gascoigne, *The Spoyle of Antwerpe,* (London: Richard Jones, 1576).
[23]Anon, *A Larum for London, or The Siedge of* Antwerpe, (London: William Ferbrand, 1602); Maltby, *Black Legend*, p. 53.
[24]Thomas Churchyard, *A generall rehearsall of warres, called Chucrhyardes Choise,* (London: Edward White, 1579).

The paradoxical nature of the black legend is that it was used to justify these kinds of atrocities against Catholics and Spaniards. Churchyard justifies the pillage of Mechelen in religious terms, stating that the English exclusively targeted religious buildings: they 'searched for cloisters and religious places' so that 'no masse should bee songe … for wante of gilted challices, and golden copes'.[25] In Churchyard's view, the religiously sanctioned violence of the English was a noble act in contrast to the Walloon and Scottish soldiers who were merely pillaging for the 'best booties'.[26] Churchyard used these themes to appeal to the latent Hispanophobia in Elizabethan society and presented the English as on the offensive, successful, and ultimately righteous in their destruction of Catholic objects. Churchyard creates a justifiable conflict in which 'glorious victorie' for the English could be won.

Norris is also depicted as an ideal commander as he leads his men from the front 'not as a Collonell, but as a common Soldiour … through thicke and thin, where moste daunger appeared'.[27] Norris' ability to fight in the midst of the action contributes to his depiction as a valiant commander and suggests an appealing camaraderie that is shared within his unit of brave Englishmen. He presents the English soldiers as superior in courage and combat to any other nation and commends their 'labour, charge, courage, readinesse, and warlike mindes'.[28] Churchyard's focus is squarely on English achievements and the foreign commanders of the non-English contingents, Fammai and Temple, are presented as incompetent. During the first stages of the assault, due to 'some negligence' and the failure of the Fammai and Temple's troops, the attack was almost called off. This 'forced Maister Norrice and the power with hym' to take the initiative and 'advance themselves towardes the enemie'.[29] Churchyard later bemoaned the fact that Fammai received the title 'Governor of Macklin', despite the fact that the English 'did most of the service, and deserves therefore the moste honor'.[30] This chauvinistic rhetoric eulogizes Churchyard's dedicatee and suggests that the incompetence of foreign allies necessitates the aid of England's courageous soldiers and adroit commanders to achieve victory.

Churchyard ends his text with an explicit reference to the theme of Spanish aggression, impending invasion, and the need for intervention in the Low Countries. He states that the fall of Mechelen should awaken those Englishmen not already cognisant of the looming Spanish threat to the peril they are in:

[25]Churchyard, *True Report*, pp. 15-16.
[26]Ibid., p. 15.
[27]Ibid., p. 14.
[28]Ibid., p. 2.
[29]Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[30]Ibid., p. 12.

> Macklin bothe wonne and loste, which commyng to light and to the open eye of the worlde, showes that all tounes, fortresses, and holdes (be thei never so strong) are subject to sodain overthrows and in the diuine disposition of the Almightie, who visiteth a nomber of our neighbours, with many kinds of calamities, to make vs beare in mynde his Omnipotente power, and our own dueties to God and our Prince.[31]

The ease with which towns could fall reminded London's residents of their own vulnerabilities, and Churchyard's allusion to English 'dueties to God and our Prince' frames the struggle against Spain as a religious obligation and civic duty. Churchyard was playing on a familiar Protestant literary trope that warned of the impending destruction of London due to the city's sins.[32] William Birch's *A Warnyng to England* (1565) compared London to the doomed biblical cities of Sodom, Gomorrah, Jerusalem, and Nineveh.[33] Birch warned that, if the 'wickedness', 'covetousness, glutony, and filthy lust' of London continued, the city would be 'cleansed'. John Barker's 1569 ballad was part of a broader genre concerning Jerusalem's 'destruction' and drew comparisons between London and Jerusalem during its Roman siege, referring to the inhabitants' 'whoredom, pride, and covetousness'.[34] Gascoigne's *The Spoyle of Antwerp* partially blamed the city's ordeal on the sins of Antwerp's citizens, suggesting that England should 'avoid those synnes, and proud enormities, which caused the wrath of god to be so furiously kindled'.[35] Churchyard too directly contributed to this genre of 'alarum' with his text *A Warning to the Wise* (1580), published just days after *A Plaine or Most True Report*.[36] Four years later, John Smith's play 'The Destruction of Jerusalem' (1584) was performed by the Coventry guilds, illustrating that this trope was prevalent throughout the Elizabethan era.[37] Churchyard utilised these well-established themes and incorporated the fear of religious damnation with the threat of Spanish invasion;

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[31]Ibid., p. 20.

[32]Tessa Watt, *Cheap Print and Popular Piety, 1550-1640,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 96-98.

[33]William Birch, *A warning to England, let London begin: To repent their iniquitie, & flie from their sin,* (London: Alexander Lacie, 1565).

[34]John Barker, *Of the horyble and woful destruccion of Jerusalem,* (London: Thomas Colwell, 1569).

[35]Gascoigne, *Antwerpe,* pp. 43-45.

[36]Thomas Churchyard, *A Warning to the Wise,* (London: John Allde & Nicholas Lyng, 1580).

[37]John Smith, 'The Destruction of Jerusalem' (1584), in Beatrice Groves, *The Destruction of Jerusalem in Early Modern English Literature,* (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2017).

this implicitly called for moral reform at home and an aggressive military policy abroad. Churchyard ends his text with a message to those back in England, urging them to join or support the brave Englishmen who fought:

> The Englishmen … are more to bee commended then thousandes of those that stood a farre of, and gave but the lookyng on … you maie see by the sane some meene are happie, not onely to passe through many perilles, but likewise to liue long, and make theim selues and their soldiours ritche: and cause the fame of their countrie to be spred as farre as the winde can blow, or the sunne maie shine.[38]

The fledgling state of Elizabethan news reporting meant that truth and veracity were imprecise and often subjective terms. It can be contended that Churchyard was not committed to 'accurate reporting' and manipulated the events at Mechelen to increase both the honour of his countrymen and dedicatee, and further a religiously motivated interventionist agenda.[39] Churchyard's own experiences as a soldier and his association with a military milieu of influential statesmen forged a text that was heavily imbued with the author's own prejudices and deeply rooted in a multiplicity of popular cultural motifs. This included religious allegory, xenophobia, righteous violence, and a nascent form of militaristic patriotism. Churchyard's writings exist in a liminal space between varying styles of news reporting. His turgid and allegorical prose predates the plainer style of succeeding news reports and is evidently propagandistic, yet it arguably contributed to the formation of an enduring Elizabethan military identity based on religion, 'honour', and national rivalry. However, as Churchyard's text displays, this identity was a shallow veneer that concealed and attempted to justify a dark legacy of war crimes and inexpiable violence, a legacy that the 'English Fury' at Mechelen epitomises.

[38]Churchyard, *True Report*, p. 20.
[39]Woodcock, *Churchyard,* p. 205.

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'Game on!' A research project on the Prussian Kriegsspiel

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ABSTRACT
The Prussian Kriegsspiel was the very first professional wargame and was originally introduced in the Prussian army in 1824 but has so far seen very little systematic research. This research project has compiled a corpus from all the rulesets currently extant, which was then made subject to formal and linguistic analysis. This yielded results in three important areas: First, by comparing them with a collection of contemporary texts on military theory it was possible to identify Kriegsspiel rulesets as distinctive text types. Second, comparing the rulesets gave valuable insights into the developmental history of the Kriegsspiel. And finally, it was possible to distinguish three distinctive phases in the development of the Kriegsspiel.

Introduction

Although the Prussian army is possibly one of the most intensively researched military organisations in history, the Prussian *Kriegsspiel*, the first professional wargame ever introduced to a military organisation, has seen surprisingly little scholarly attention.[1]

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[1]Brief overviews can be found in Matthew B. Caffrey, *On Wargaming. How Wargames Have Shaped History and How They May Shape the Future,* (Washington: Naval War College Press, 2019), pp. 15-35; Paul Schuurman, '*A Game of Contexts: Prussian-German Professional Wargames and the Leadership Concept of Mission Tactics 1870-1880*', in *War in History* 26 (2019), pp. 1-21; Jorit Wintjes, *Das Preußische Kriegsspiel,* (Opladen: Budrich, 2019), pp. 10-19; Jorit Wintjes, *When a Spiel is not a Game. The Prussian Kriegsspiel from 1824 to 1871*, in *Vulcan* 5 (2017); Jon Peterson, *A Game Out of All Proportions: How a Hobby Miniaturized War*, in: Pat Harrigan/Matthew G. Kirschenbaum (ed.), *Zones of Control. Perspectives on Wargaming,* (Cambridge/Mass.: The MIT Press, 2016), pp. 3-31; Martin van Crefeld, *Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 145-153; Jon Peterson, *Playing at*

While contemporaries, both Prussian and foreign, ascribed considerable importance to the *Kriegsspiel*, resulting in large numbers of publications appearing in the second half of the nineteenth century, most of that material has been forgotten. Recent years have seen a significant rise in interest in professional wargaming which has surprisingly not resulted in an increase of interest in its history.[2] As a result, some of the discussions among professional wargamers closely follow discussions in the Prussian army of the nineteenth century. A better understanding of the Prussian *Kriegsspiel* could lead to a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of professional wargaming today.

The *Kriegsspiel* is a real-time command-post exercise played on a topographic map; units are represented by tokens which are (roughly) to the same scale as the map, allowing participants to gain experience of the difficulties of moving forces through space. The simulation of combat situations is based on an appointed set of rules. One key advantage of the *Kriegsspiel* is its accessibility - no knowledge of the rules is required from the participants; they work as a staff team in much the same way they would do in a field exercise. At the same time the reliance on facilitators is a crucial limitation of the *Kriegsspiel*.[3]

One key element of the Prussian *Kriegsspiel* are the rulesets; at least 18 of these were published between 1824 and 1903 by several different authors, all of whom were active officers of the Prussian army (see Table 1). While modern interpreters have taken closer looks at some individual rulesets, notably the original 1824 *Kriegsspiel* and the rulesets developed by Wilhelm von Tschischwitz in the 1860s and early 1870s, the rulesets have never before been analysed in their entirety. This is unfortunate, as the surviving rulesets offer a wealth of information on the development of the *Kriegsspiel*. The research project "Game on!" has therefore collected all surviving rulesets in one corpus of texts for the first time; this not only allowed an initial exploration of the developmental history of the *Kriegsspiel* but has prepared the foundation for future systematic research into the *Kriegsspiel*. The main focus of the initial exploration was on gaining a better understanding of the textual character of the rulesets; to that end these were analysed employing computer linguistics and stylometrics methodology.

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the World. A History of Simulating Wars, People and Fantastic Adventures from Chess to Role-Playing Games, (San Diego: Unreason Press, 2012), pp. 221-240.

[2]UK Ministry of Defence W*argaming Handbook* (2017): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-wargaming-handbook. Accessed 8 June 2021.

[3]For a more detailed description see https://cosimwue.github.io/2019/11/03/prussian-kriegsspiel.html. Accessed 8 June 2021.

Preparing the Corpus

The first step in making the *Kriegsspiel* rulesets accessible was creating a corpus of texts that was machine readable. This meant turning texts published in various formats between 1824 and 1903 into plain text files. Once the plain text versions were ready the basic semantic features of the texts were then annotated based on the structure of the texts; in all cases the original orthography was retained, and only obvious errors corrected.[4] For the purpose of annotating the texts, standard techniques of computational linguistics were used which then had to be extended and adapted in order to accommodate for the specific structure of the rules. For an initial analysis, only the three different service arms (infantry, cavalry, and artillery) were annotated in the texts; however, the tagset used for annotating the texts can easily be expanded for future, more detailed analysis.

Once the rulesets had been collected in a corpus, a second corpus of contemporary texts on military theory was put together; the comparison between *Kriegsspiel* rulesets and "normal" military literature of the time allows insights into the textual character of a *Kriegsspiel* ruleset, which at present is still lacking a precise definition. This comparative corpus contains a small selection of contemporary articles and books on the Prussian *Kriegsspiel* itself as well as several tactical treatises, some of which written by authors of *Kriegsspiel* rulesets.[5]

For the initial exploration of the corpus, three different approaches were taken. First of all, the developmental history of the *Kriegsspiel* was considered – does an analysis of the corpus allow a tentative establishment of a sequence of phases in the history of the *Kriegsspiel*? Then a closer look was taken at the coverage of the different service arms in the respective rulesets – can trends be discerned throughout the development of the *Kriegsspiel*? Finally, the frequency of key words and phrases was analysed – is it possible to judge from word frequency the actual importance of certain elements of the rulesets?

[4]Examples for the former include the orthographic variants *Theil* and *Teil* ("part").

[5]For example, the corpus includes Carl von Decker's *Die Taktik der drei Waffen: Infanterie, Kavallerie und Artillerie einzeln und verbunden* (Berlin: Mittler, 1828) or J. Meckel's *Allgemeine Lehre von der Truppenführung im Kriege* (Berlin: Mittler, 1883).

ID	Author	Year	City	Publisher
R	Bernhard von Reisswitz	1824	Berlin	Trowitzsch
RS	Anonymi/Karl von Decker; August von Witzleben	1828	Berlin	(Ernst Mittler) [6]
A1	Anonymus	1846	Berlin	Ernst Mittler
A2	Anonymus	1855	Berlin	Ernst Mittler
Tsch1	Wilhelm von Tschischwitz	1862	Neisse	Graveur, Neumann
Tsch2	W. v. Tschischwitz	1867	Neisse	Graveur, Neumann
Tsch3	W. v. Tschischwitz	1870	Neisse	Graveur, Neumann
Tr1	Thilo von Trotha	1870	Berlin	Ernst Mittler & Sohn
Tr2	T. v. Trotha	1872	Berlin	Ernst Mittler & Sohn
Tsch4	W. v. Tschischwitz	1874	Neisse	Graveur, Neumann
Tr3	T. v. Trotha	1874	Berlin	Ernst Mittler & Sohn
M1	Jakob Meckel	1874	Berlin	Vossische Buchhandlung
M2	J. Meckel	1875	Berlin	Vossische Buchhandlung
N1	Julius Carl Friedrich Naumann	1877	Berlin	Ernst Mittler & Sohn
N2	J. C. F. Naumann	1881	Berlin	Ernst Mittler & Sohn
Z	Carl von Zimmermann	1901	Berlin	Ernst Mittler & Sohn
I	Friedrich Immanuel	1903	Berlin	Ernst Mittler & Sohn
ME	J. Meckel; Fritz von Eynatten	1903	Berlin	Vossische Buchhandlung

Table 1: Bibliographic list of the rulesets of Prussian *Kriegsspiele*.

Initial Results

In all, there are 18 texts written by 11 different authors.[7] The sharp increase in the frequency of publications from the 1860s onwards is striking. This can be explained by both contemporary historical events – Prussia's sudden, and, for many contemporaries, unexpected rise to become continental Europe's premier land power – and technological progress, which made it necessary to frequently update the rulesets.[8]

[6]The 1828 ruleset was a supplement to the 1824 rules published in the Zeitschrift für Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte des Krieges (vol. 13, pp. 68–105); Karl von Decker was one of its editors.

[7]In 1846 the Magdeburg artillery officer Gustav Weigelt produced a set of rules which circulated among the officers of the garrison, see Anonymus, Review of Trotha, Anleitung (Berlin: 1870), in *Militair-Wochenblatt* 55 (1870), pp. 100-101; it appears to be the only 19 Century ruleset that has not survived.

[8]See Wintjes, *When a Spiel is not a Game*, pp. 12-21.

ID	Pages	Chap-ter	Infantry[9] – relation[10]	Cavalry[11] – relation	Artillery[12] – relation	Appen-dix	Use of Dice
R	71	6	34 – 5,6%	25 – 4,1%	8 – 1,3%	✓	✓
RS	37	0	51 – 22%	107 – 46%	8 – 3,5%	x	✓
A1	53	26	61 – 16%	51 – 13%	48 – 13%	✓	✓
A2	53	26	61 – 16%	51 – 13%	48 – 13%	✓	✓
Tsch1	21	30	13 – 6,9%	27 – 14%	16 – 8,5%	x	✓
Tsch2	21	30	13 – 6,9%	27 – 14%	16 – 8,5	x	✓
Tsch3	26	30	17 – 8%	32 – 15%	15 – 7%	✓	✓
Tr1	43	28	22 – 10%	32 – 15%	4 – 1,9%	✓	✓
Tr2	43	28	22 – 10%	32 – 15%	4 – 1,9	✓	✓
Tsch4	34	31	31 – 14%	30 – 14%	15 – 7%	✓	✓
Tr3	41	28	22 – 11%	36 – 19%	N/A	✓	✓
M1	10	0	N/A[13]	N/A	N/A	✓	✓
M2	62	21	N/A	N/A	N/A	x	✓
N1	112	17	N/A	N/A	N/A	✓	✓
N2	105	17	24 – 5,1%	40 – 8,6%	42 – 9%	✓	✓
Z	40	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	x	✓
I	115	10	N/A	N/A	N/A	✓	x/✓[14]
ME	55	21	N/A	N/A	N/A	✓	x

Table 2: Results of Formal Analysis.

Close examination of the texts' structure enables some initial observations on the developmental history of the *Kriegsspiel*: changes in the general character of the texts

[9]Paragraphs dedicated to infantry.
[10]Relation between the number of structurally assigned paragraphs of the individual arms of service per ruleset and the number of all paragraphs per set of rules.
[11]Paragraphs dedicated to cavalry.
[12]Paragraphs dedicated to artillery.
[13]Due to a lack of structural reference to the different service arms the specified paragraphs could not be counted.
[14]According to Immanuel, it should be the umpires decision whether to use dice or not; in his opinion, they are unnecessary (Friedrich Immanuel, *Anleitung und Beispiele zum Regimentskriegsspiel* (Berlin: Mittler, 1903), p. 29).

can be detected around 1862 and again around 1875. These changes include the amount of detail found in the rulesets, which become significantly shorter around 1862, focussing on what were perceived to be the core issues of the *Kriegsspiel*. While the early rulesets were fairly long and complex, those published from 1862 onwards generally range from 20-50 pages; only after 1875 does the number of pages increase again. Based on this formal analysis it is possible to identify an early phase of development including the original 1824 *Kriegsspiel*, the 1828 supplement and the 1846 and 1855 rulesets, a middle phase including the rulesets published by Wilhelm von Tschischwitz, Wilhelm von Trotha and Jakob Meckel between 1867 and 1875 and a late phase including all rulesets published after 1875 (Table 2).

Analysing the coverage of the three arms of service produced some interesting results that are currently difficult to interpret. Thus, an analysis of the number of paragraphs covering infantry, cavalry or artillery appears to suggest that the importance of the respective arms of service varied considerably between *Kriegsspiel* rulesets from the three phases.[15]

For example, infantry seems to occupy a prominent place in the early rulesets, is then considerably less often mentioned in the middle phase of development, only to be mentioned more frequently again in the late phase (Figure 1). While it is fairly easy to determine whether this change in frequency represents an actual change in coverage as it does, it is much harder to assess whether this reflects a change in tactical thinking, a change in the general character of the *Kriegsspiel* rulesets or whether it is simply a matter of style; further comparative studies are necessary here.

Going deeper into the text, an examination of some of the linguistic features of the rulesets enabled a number of important observations: Firstly, taking a closer look at the relative frequency of nouns, verbs and adjectives suggests that each phase of *Kriegsspiel* history has a distinctive "rules' style". Visualizing word frequency with word clouds illustrates this point: the two examples of the word cloud for the 1874 edition of the Tschischwitz ruleset (Figure 2) and the Meckel ruleset published in 1875 (Figure 3) differ both in actual and in the distribution of the most frequent words.

[15]It is important to note that the data in Table 2 refers to the number of paragraphs dedicated to the respective service arms, not to the mere mentioning of the words "infantry", "cavalry" or "artillery". The lack of data in most of the later rulesets is due to a significant change in their textual structure; from the mid-1870s onwards the rulesets were no longer organised in paragraphs dedicated to certain actions or capabilities.



Figure 1: Distribution of Service Arms of service in all rulesets.

Figure 2: Word Cloud of the most frequent content words, Tsch4

In the Tschischwitz ruleset, dice (*Würfel*) clearly play a very prominent role, as do the decision (*Entscheidung*), infantry (*Infanterie*) and forces in general (*Truppen*); in comparison, the umpire (*Vertraute*) and cavalry (*Kavallerie*) do not find mention as frequently. The Meckel ruleset presents a very different picture: the most frequent word is *Kriegsspiel*, followed by token (*Truppenzeichen*), scale (*Maßstab*) and the set of gaming materials (*Apparat*). Also, the distribution of word frequency changes; while in the Tschischwitz ruleset a considerable difference in word frequency can be observed among the most frequent words, in Meckel these words are more evenly distributed,

suggesting a generally more varied vocabulary. Comparing the Tschischwitz and Meckel word-clouds shown above with those from other ruletexts shows that both, while published within a year, belong to different phases of *Kriegsspiel* developmental history, with Tschischwitz representing the middle phase of development, while Meckel already represents the late phase. On the whole the stylistic analysis confirms the result of the structure of the texts with regard to *Kriegsspiel* history.

Figure 3: Word Cloud of the most frequent content words, M1.

Analysing the most frequent words in the Meckel also served to illuminate one of the most important issues of current *Kriegsspiel* scholarship – that of the emergence of the so-called "free" *Kriegsspiel*. Existing scholarship mostly assumes that the 'free' *Kriegsspiel*, that is a *Kriegsspiel* unencumbered by dice and tables, with all decisions made by the facilitators, supplanted the 'traditional' *Kriegsspiel* from the mid-1870s onwards.[16] Looking at the word clouds at first seems to support this view. However, while dice (*Würfel*) do not rank among Meckel's most frequent words and hence do not appear in his word cloud, a close reading of his text leaves little doubt that dice were actually very important to him. Clearly in this case the word cloud then does not represent the actual importance of the dice for the ruleset – Meckel actually emphasises the importance of dice several times;[17] he also explains that the

[16]See eg Sebastian Schwägele, *Planspiel – Lernen – Lerntransfer. Eine subjektorientierte Analyse von Einflussfaktoren*, (Bamberg: BoD, 2015); Kalman J. Cohen, Eric Rhenman, The Role of Management Games in Education and Research, in *Management Science* 7, 1961, p. 131-166.

[17]Jakob Meckel, *Anleitung zum Kriegsspiele. Erster Theil: Direktiven für das Kriegsspiel*, (Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1875), p. 19.

information provided by his predecessors was so extensive that he mostly refers to them, which may explain why dice do not appear among his most frequent words. Indeed, dice remained a central element of the *Kriegsspiel* and were not completely abolished after 1875; only a very small number of rulesets dispensed with their use completely.

The case of dice usage shows that word clouds – while eminently useable for analysing usage – are less well suited for analysing the actual content of a text. In the case of Meckel's ruleset, however, the word cloud may offer some insights into the emergence of the traditional narrative of the "free" *Kriegsspiel*: if understood as a visualization of a brief thumbing-through of a text where only the most frequent words remain in memory, then such a cursory glance at for example the Meckel texts might indeed have given the impression of a *Kriegsspiel* without dice.



Figure 4: Appearance of the colours red, blue, white, and black in all rulesets.

Conclusions

The creation of a first corpus of Prussian *Kriegsspiele* has been successful. All rulesets published between 1824 and 1903 that are currently known to exist have been digitised and prepared for machine reading; they form the basis for the present research project and can serve as a starting point for future research into the Prussian *Kriegsspiel*. It is planned to make the texts available in an open access database at some point in the future.

Using computational linguistics and stylometrics as analytical tools has also turned out to be successful; taking a closer look at the texts has produced a number of important results suggesting that further, more detailed analysis should be undertaken. At the same time word frequency analysis has shown that any linguistic analysis has to be accompanied by a close reading and a sound interpretation of the actual texts.

Much remains to be done. Shortly after the present study was completed, a previously unknown set of rules by Konstantin von Altrock published in 1908 has surfaced. This shows that the topic of the Prussian *Kriegsspiel* is far from exhaustively explored, and that not only more in-depth research is necessary on the corpus of texts already collected, but that it is still possible to find primary material relevant to the developmental history of the *Kriegsspiel*. Moreover, so far only the Prussian *Kriegsspiel* has been analysed; neither translations and rules from other countries nor contemporary secondary material have been considered as yet.

A comprehensive study of the *Kriegsspiel* and its eventual use in other armies can provide an interesting window into the military culture of the time. As the Prussian *Kriegsspiel* was specifically designed to fit to the tactics and technology employed by the Prussian army, seeing how its rules were adapted by other armies will provide insights into how other armies' practices differed from those of the Prussian army.

Perhaps even more importantly, the surviving rules of the Prussian *Kriegsspiel* constitute the earliest corpus of serious gaming rulesets; the Prussian *Kriegsspiel* can be understood as the very first detailed attempt of depicting a complex chain of events in a simulative game with a set of complex rules. Analysing how the rules evolved over time can provide some insights into how contemporaries tried to cope with a world influenced by rapid technological and societal progress.

Women as Turncoats: Searching for the Women among the Kit Carson Scouts during the Vietnam War, 1966-1973

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ABSTRACT
This Research Note explores the presence of South Vietnamese women as defectors and addresses the question of whether women combatants were employed by the United States as Kit Carson Scouts during the Vietnam War. Through fragmentary source material, it is possible to determine the presence of women who had fought for the People's Liberation Armed Forces in every stage of the defection process. The existence of women Kit Carson Scouts is also proven, showing how the initiative and agency of women defectors led their employment but that the United States Army was reluctant to use them in combat.

Starting in the fall of 1966, the Kit Carson Scout Program made it possible for South and North Vietnamese soldiers who had defected from the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF, commonly referred to by the pejorative *Viet Cong* in traditional American historiography) and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, or the North Vietnamese Army) to volunteer to serve together with United States and other 'Free World' forces during the Vietnam War. The origins of the programme can be traced to an incident in the spring of 1966. After a PLAF soldier defected to the South Vietnamese government in the village of Thanh Son, Dien Bau District, Quang Nam Province, the PLAF began to spread rumours in the village that the United States Marine Corps (USMC) had executed the defector. In order to fight back against the rumours, a decision was made to bring back the defector to the village to dispel the planted rumours. The operation was considered a great success and subsequently led to the idea of using defectors as auxiliaries. The USMC inaugurated the programme and remained the only force to employ Kit Carson Scouts until authorization was given

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to extend the programme to all American units in South Vietnam in April 1967. The programme grew from six scouts in 1966 to over 1,500 scouts by the end of December 1968. The programme drew its name from the legendary 19 Century American frontiersman and Army Scout Christopher 'Kit' Carson (1809-1868). In their capacity as Kit Carson Scouts, supposedly following in the footsteps of the historical Kit Carson, these soldiers functioned as guides, interpreters, and as combat soldiers in order to assist American soldiers find their enemy. The scouts were treated as American soldiers; they wore American uniforms, were armed with American weapons, and were given a range of benefits, including high wages and access to American medical care.[1] In the majority of personal accounts and archival material referring to the Kit Carson Scouts the soldiers have always been identified as men, but women also fought as combat soldiers in the PLAF. Is it possible that there might have been women Kit Carson Scouts? Did women defect from the PLAF? Who were the women associated with the Kit Carson Scout Program? The lives and ultimate fate of the Kit Carson Scouts is difficult to reconstruct due to the scarcity of source material. The experiences of their wives, women defectors, and the possibility of women Kit Carson Scouts have proven to be even more difficult to uncover. This Research Note briefly considers traces of the presence of women found in the fragmentary source material concerning the Kit Carson Scouts and *Chieu Hoi* program with the purpose of attempting to answer these questions and uncover the possibility of women Kit Carson Scouts.

The path to becoming a Kit Carson Scout began with defection. In 1963, the government of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter referred to as South Vietnam) initiated a programme to encourage the defection of individuals who were currently in rebellion against the government. In its shortened form, the programme was known as *Chieu Hoi* ('to return', also known as the 'Open Arms' programme in English, with the individual defectors known as *Hoi Chanh*). Approximately 150,000 South Vietnamese and 2,000 North Vietnamese defected during the war.[2] Some of them were women. One unnamed South Vietnamese woman defected to the 9 Infantry Division Intelligence Detachment on 10 April 1968. She had once been the leader of a PLAF women's auxiliary group but made the choice to defect when she found out about the death of her brother, a soldier in the 514 PLAF Battalion, that had been

[1]For scholarly research on the Kit Carson Scouts, see Stefan Aguirre Quiroga, 'Phan Chot's Choice: Agency and Motivation among the Kit Carson Scouts during the Vietnam War, 1966–1973', *War & Society*, 3, 9 (2020), pp. 126-143; Tal Tovy, From Foe to Friend: The Kit Carson Scout Program in the Vietnam War, *Armed Forces & Society,* 33, 1 (2006), pp. 78-93.

[2]J.A. Koch, *The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1973), pp. 20-22; A. Sweetland, *Rallying Potential Among the North Vietnamese Armed Force*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1970), p. ix.

kept from her by the PLAF. Despite being stopped by the PLAF in her initial attempt to leave her hamlet in the Mekong Delta, the woman ultimately succeeded to defect. Another example is Tran Thi Ho Le, an 18-year-old PLAF medic and squad leader of an all-women mortar squad from Nhon Thanh Trung in Long An Province who defected in July 1968.[3] What happened to women like Tran once they had defected?

After the defection, defectors would be sent to provincial *Chieu Hoi* centres where they underwent interrogation and political re-indoctrination. This process lasted approximately six weeks and upon completion, the defector would be offered vocational training so as to facilitate their re-entry into civilian life. At the different *Chieu Hoi* centres there were classes specifically for women, such as sewing classes that were meant to refresh pre-existing skills in order to provide women with additional means of obtaining an income in their villages. One such class at the *Chieu Hoi* centre in Tam Ky was attended by unnamed woman who had served as a PLAF platoon leader. Women also found other types of employment after their period in the *Chieu Hoi* centre. American construction companies, for example, hired women as 'truck drivers, machine shovel operators, and general construction workers.'[4]

During and after their period in the *Chieu Hoi* centre, women defectors were actively involved in military operations. For example, an unnamed former PLAF nurse led soldiers from the 9 Infantry Division to the hospital at which she had once worked, an act that resulted in several PLAF casualties and even more being captured. Women participated in the different incarnations of the Armed Propaganda Teams, a unit consisting of defectors who ventured into territory controlled by the PLAF in order to spread the message of the South Vietnamese government. It was during their six-week stay at the *Chieu Hoi* centre that the defectors could volunteer to become a Kit Carson Scout. Among them were women defectors who openly expressed their desire to join the Kit Carson Scouts. Their interest in the programme led to the only known employment of women Kit Carson Scouts that began in 1968. In order to overcome barriers that prevented communication with South Vietnamese women in villages, the 9 Infantry Division chose to recruit women Kit Carson Scouts (or Tiger Scouts as they were known as in the 9 Infantry Division). They were deployed on 'NITECAP' missions through which a unit resembling an Armed Propaganda Team known as the Integrated Civic Action Program (ICAP) infiltrated Mekong Delta hamlets in the evenings and provided medical care, propaganda lectures, and even showed Disney films dubbed in Vietnamese to villagers. Yet what is evident by the missions that women defectors and the women Kit Carson Scouts received is that

[3]'VC ladies abandon guerilla auxiliary', *The Old Reliable*, 24 April 1968, p. 3; 'Hoi Chanh escapes enemy ahead of death sentence', *The Old Reliable*, 8 January 1969, p. 8.
[4]Richard Merritt, 'Hoi Chanhs given new life', *Southern Cross*, 22 May 1970, p. 3; Koch, *Chieu Hoi Program*, p. 81, 86.

they were non-combat in nature. The 9 Infantry Division leadership were reluctant to use women scouts in combat. Although they received the same benefits and wages as men, women scouts were not used in missions where they could possibly face combat, despite the fact that all women scouts would likely have had past combat experience. The military intelligence that the women scouts collected were vital and they performed an important role that all Kit Carson Scouts played, but the chance to achieve their full potential in the field was deprived of them due to American prejudice against women as combatants. American reluctance notwithstanding, the presence of women Kit Carson Scouts would not have been possible had it not been for the initiative of women who sought access to the programme. Ira A. Hunt, Jr., who at the time was chief of staff of the 9 Infantry Division and one of the men responsible for their recruitment, did not take credit for the idea of employing women as scouts. Hunt stated that the 9 Division only borrowed it 'from some girls in the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Centre. They wanted to work for the Tiger Scouts'.[5]

Not all women associated with the Kit Carson Scouts were defectors themselves. For married South Vietnamese men of the Kit Carson Scouts, the safety and support of the wives, children, and parents they had left behind was a crucial factor in their decision to defect and volunteer for the programme. After the defection of their husband, the wife of a future scout would sometimes be brought under the security of the South Vietnamese government in the *Chieu Hoi* centre. In one documented case, the wife of a future scout facilitated the defection of her husband, Truong Kinh, from the PLAF. This is an early hint at the involvement of the wives of Kit Carson Scouts in the continued military life of their husbands. While it is uncertain whether or not the families of scouts were allowed to live with the scout in military installations while he was on active duty, there are hints of their presence, as well as to the interaction and the relations that existed between American soldiers and the wives of scouts. After the fall of Hoai Nhon in 1972, the unnamed wife of a scout escaped from the town and provided intelligence to American forces about the occupation of the town by the PAVN. In a more tragic case, American soldiers from the 25 Infantry Division, 5 Infantry Regiment, gave financial aid to the widow of their scout Ngo Dau who had been killed in action. When that money did not suffice, the soldiers arranged for the widow to be employed as a food handler in the 1 Battalion's Rear Mess.[6] The two

[5]Wayne Campbell, 'VC nurse leads 2-39 to hideout', *The Old Reliable*, 2 October 1968, p. 1; Koch, *Chieu Hoi Program*, pp. 22-24; Ira A. Hunt, Jr., *The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam: Unparalleled and Unequaled*, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), pp. 89-90; David Hoffman, '9th Infantry Mobilizes Female 'Tiger Scouts'', *The Capital Times*, 19 December1968, p. 3.

[6]John T. Wheeler, 'Ex-Cong Now Kit Carson Scouts - Band Used to Ferret Out Guerrillas', *Chicago Tribune*, 22 October 1969, p. 34; Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive (VNCA), Texas Tech University, Dale W. Andrade Collection,

examples suggests that the camaraderie and trust between American soldiers and the Kit Carson Scouts could also extend to the families of the scouts.

In conclusion, as with many topics related to the Kit Carson Scouts, it is difficult to draw generalised conclusions from fragmentary sources. Yet the insight that we are given through these traces of women in the available source material holds the potential for adding nuance to several aspects of the Vietnam War that have traditionally been steeped in stereotypes, such as representations of civil-military relations in South Vietnam from the perspective of South Vietnamese women. Far from being passive victims or faceless foes, South Vietnamese women defectors and the wives of the Kit Carson Scouts are examples of the shifting allegiances and family culture that was the reality for many women during the war but which has not yet been explored in full. Furthermore, the role that women Kit Carson Scouts played in the 9 Infantry Division opens up new aspects that have eluded researchers in the past. The participation of martial women was not limited to the PLAF or North Vietnam and although the women scouts seemingly did not participate in combat, they still played an important military role in similarity to their male counterparts and displayed their own agency in desiring to volunteer to be scouts.[7] This is not something that should be overlooked. Further research is necessary to piece together the agency of these South Vietnamese women to join the increasing body of scholarship into the lives and experiences of women during the Vietnam War.

24992407002, Memo from J. Green - re: The Fall of Hoai Nhon, 18 May 1972, p. 1; 'Bobcats Aid Widow', *Tropic Lightning News*, 3 March 1969, p. 1.

[7]For more on the participation of South Vietnamese women in uniform, see Nathalie Huynh Chau Nguyen, 'South Vietnamese Women in Uniform: Narratives of Wartime and Post War Lives', *Minerva Journal of Women and War*, 3, 2, (2009), pp. 8-33.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES (July 2021)

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Verb past participles: -ed endings rather than –t endings are preferred for past participles of verbs i.e. learned, spoiled, burned. While is preferred to whilst.

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Upon first reference the full name and title of an individual should be used as it was as the time of reference i.e. On 31 July 1917 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), launched the Third Battle of Ypres.

All acronyms should be spelled out in full upon first reference with the acronym in brackets, as shown in the example above.

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- Michael Howard, 'Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 510-526.
- The UK National Archives (TNA), CAB 19/33, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, evidence to Dardanelles Commission, 1917.
- Shilpa Ganatra, 'How Derry Girls Became an Instant Sitcom Classic', *The Guardian*, 13 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/feb/13/derry-girls-instant-sitcom-classic-schoolgirls-northern-ireland Accessed 20 April 2019.

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